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PART Is 1919-1922
4Introduction
The opening years in this study of revolutionaries and reform­
ists in New South Wales are extremely unsettled years, marked by wide- 
spread strikes, the formation of new radical parties, the strengthening 
of left-wing influence and authority, and the bitter clash of factions 
v-i.thin the mass -o-rty, the Australian Labor party, labor's established
1,1' ~Trr>P ’ " * P° one man or clique dominates the movement. Relative
bo their behaviour in previous periods, the rank and file is active 
cather than passive. Through the years which follow, the left wing 
retains and even extends the early hold over trade union positions which 
v-s so vital to its influence and authority. And although the struggle 
or political leadership traces out a. fluctuating course, this left wing 
)j no means lacks its share of victories.
Yet the rank and file can no longer be described as 'active'; 
passivity is spreading fast. By 1927, the area over which power is 
-hared in the mass party, for example, has shrunk dramatically. A subur- 
' ri e'+'r'ta agent, of little talent has the levers of rower in his hands, 
s he quickly entrenches himself in dictator-like remoteness from rank 
md file control, the labor movement finds that the struggle of the twenties 
:s moving towards an unexpected outcome: the personal rule of the 'Big 
Telia', John Thomas Lang.
V °YJ situation of the orening years change to that of
ihe latter years?
This Study examines the events of 1919-27 which accompanied 
'and accomplished) this striking change. It gives particularly close 
attention to the activities and role of a number of labor leaders known
5collectively as the ’Trades Hall reds'.
The Australian labor movement is and has always been profoundly 
?pformist, its ideology empiricist in the extreme. But during its most 
radical and militant period, c. 1916-1921, in New South Wales the labor 
novement threw up a group of socialists with powerful mass connections- 
1he ’Trades Hall reds' of these pages, who played a vital part in found­
ing and shaping the policy of the early Communist Party. These, unlike 
nost of their comrades overseas - and those at home who were less well-
connected in the mass labor organisations - were conservative bureaucrats
them
jn industrial matters and opportunist in political affairs. But without/ 
end their union ties, it would have taken perhaps five months, instead 
cf the actual five years, for the new Communist Party to stand revealed 
cS yet another revolutionary splinter party, almost ignored in national 
Tolitics despite great powers of endurance gained through its connection 
vith the Soviet Union.
Profoundly significant for the future development of the Trades 
lall reds, was the ebbing of the international tide of political radical­
ism and industrial militancy which had thrown them up. If Europe, or 
even some part of it outside lussia, had turned socialist, then the 
climate of the twenties would have been far more favourable to revolution 
cries throughout the world. As it: turned out, the influences already 
ifirmly planted in Australian soil which tkourish reformism became stronger 
claiming the Trades Hall reds as their own. Need they have been claimed, 
end need they have been claimed to the extent that they were? Was it 
inevitable that this should happen? During the years 1921-26, we see the 
nrades Hall reds make a series of decisions which 1 ed to the steady
6erosion of the group's distinctively left standpoint. It seems too 
facile to say that these were predestined or inevitable decisions, al­
though they were likely and understandable decisions.
In examining the industrial policy of the Trades Hall reds, 
a method of strike analysis is developed which has not so far been used 
among labor or strike historians. This method distinguishes the 'extended1 
from the 'confined' type of strike "tactic, each with its various sub­
forms. The concepts began to take some shape during earlier studies on 
the Australian waterside strike of 1928 and the coal lockout of 1929-30, 
and emerged more clearly in an investigation of the timber strike of 1929»
Also used throughout the thesis is the concept of the rank and 
file, on which some comment is needed.
The rank and file of a party or trade union are those not 
holding the main leadership positions. This distinction may not always 
be a valid one, as for example at times in certain important industries 
during the first world war in England, when the rank and file were bended 
so closely with de facto leadership as to make separation difficult if 
not impossible. But in most times in most countries the distinction is 
an obviously real one. There will however be room for argument as to 
precisely which neople constitute the main leadership at a given time. 
Through most of our neriod, for example, the main leadership of the 
A.I.P. were the sta.te executive, the parliamentarians and those able to 
exercise influence on party nolicy and activities by virtue of trade 
union positions. Once Lang's rule was decisively established, by contrast, 
the main leadership in fact came from Lang and his 'inner group'.
One cannot sustain the idea of a firm distinction between
the industrial and political leaderships, for the reason mentioned 
above - some union officials exert substantial influence on party 
policy and activity without being formally part of the political 
leadership; nor between the industrial and political rank and file, 
as these also overlapped considerably.
Indeed, the same interweaving of an industrial warp and a 
political woof is continually apparent in this as in other periods of 
labor history, and the study that follows inevitably moves back and 
forth between these two strands. The political strand however is 
itself clearly divided between the mass party (the Australian Labor 
Party) and the socialist groups. In this sense, then, three studies 
are pursued in what follows.
CHAPTER I RE-ORGANISING THE MOVEMENT: the One Big 
Union and the Industrial Socialist Labor
Party
9New South Wales Labor on the Eve of The 
One Big Union
In 1919» the masses were aroused on a scale unprecedented 
in history, in movements that leaped over national frontiers everywhere. 
In some countries, this took the form of political revolutions; in 
others, strikes and mass demonstrations stopping far short of rev­
olution. In Australia, one of the world's most prosperous and insular 
corners, there was an echo of the far-off thunder.
The most heavily populated and industrialised of Australia's 
six states is New South Wales. Labor's path throughout Australia was 
and is strongly influenced by labor in New South Wales. There, in 
1919» the trade unions were still inclined towards direct action 
despite a disastrous strike in 1917* Since 1890, when they had played 
a crucial role in setting it up, the unions had acknowledged the 
Australian Labor Party as their mass party; but now in 1919» their 
attitude to it ranged from passivity and discontent to flat hostility.
Yet the A.L.P. in New South Wales had by no means been un­
responsive to mounting working class discontent as the war unfolded.
It is true that many leading A.L.P. members, including parliamentar­
ians, had resisted union pressure for improvements in working condit­
ions , but outstanding among the exceptions were leaders of the Aust­
ralian Workers' Union (A.W.U.), for example. The giant A.W.U. was a 
federal union originally based on outback shearers and shed-hands, 
but now an empire embracing many types of workers, largely semi­
skilled and unskilled and mainly rural. The A.W.U.'s tough bureaucracy,
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members o f  w h ich  were o f t e n  h i g h l y  p l a c e d  w i t h i n  th e  A .L . P . ,  c o n t a in e d  
many who were p e r s o n a l l y  l e s s  e n t h u s i a s t i c  a b o u t  th e  a l l i e d  war e f f o r t  
th a n  a b o u t  th e  I r i s h  r e b e l l i o n ,  and  who o pposed  c o n s c r i p t i o n  f o r  o v e r ­
s e a s  s e r v i c e .  O th e r s  were a la rm e d  by t h e i r  rank; and  f i l e ' s  r e s p o n s i v e ­
n e s s  t o  c l a s s - w a r  c o n c e p ts  and t h e i r  r e s i s t a n c e  to  w a r - t im e  e r o s i o n  o f  
l i v i n g  s t a n d a r d s ,  and  t h e s e  l e a d e r s  h e lp e d  c r y s t a l l i s e  and  l e a d  s u ch  
r e s i s t a n c e ,  i n  o r d e r  to  p r o t e c t  and s t r e n g t h e n  t h e i r  p o s i t i o n s .
The A .L .P .  e x p e l l e d  many who r e s i s t e d  u n io n  p r e s s u r e  f o r  econom ic 
im provem ents  when th e y  a l s o  f e l l  f o u l  o f  th e  u n io n s  o v e r  c o n s c r i p t i o n .  
I n d e e d ,  t o  accommodate th e  r a n k  and  f i l e  d i s c o n t e n t  m a n i f e s t  i n  New 
South  Wales a s  i n  so many la n d s  a s  th e  war d e v e lo p e d ,  th e  A .L .P .  s p l i t .  
A l l  t h i s  d id  n o t  p rove  enough . Though u n i o n i s t s  d i d  n o t  a d o p t  a new 
p a r t y  a s  t h e i r  own, th e y  te n d e d  to  t u r n  t h e i r  b ack  on th e  o l d ,  f o r  
th o s e  who re m a in e d  i n  i t s  l e a d e r s h i p  d i d  to o  l i t t l e  t o  meet l a b o r ' s  
new mood.
in
T hat new mood was one s y m p a th e t i c  t o  th e  l e f t j p o l i t i c a l  
m a t t e r s  a n d ,  i n  i n d u s t r i a l  a f f a i r s ,  w e l l  d i s p o s e d  t o  what was p o p u l a r l y  
c a l l e d  ' d i r e c t  a c t i o n '  -  t h a t  i s ,  u s e  o f  th e  s t r i k e  weapon i n  i t s  
many fo rm s .  The w o rk e rs  o f  I r i s h  b ack g ro u n d  p la y e d  t h e i r  p a r t  i n  
s h a p in g  t h i s  mood, a s  th e y  saw th e  hand  o f  i m p e r i a l i s m ,  and  n o t  m e re ly  
o f  th e  E n g l i s h ,  i n  th e  c r u s h in g  o f  t h e  E a s t e r  r e b e l l i o n .  T r a d i t i o n ­
a l l y  a s s o c i a t e d  w i th  th e  A .L .P . ,  t h e y  h e lp e d  a t  t h i s  t im e  t o  fo rm  a 
c l im a te  w i t h i n  t h a t  p a r t y  f a v o u r a b l e  t o  th e  l e f t .
Labor was w e l l  d i s p o s e d  t o  th e  s lo g a n s  o f  s y n d i c a l i s m ,  s t i l l ,  
though t r a n s i e n t l y ,  th e  most p o w e r fu l  c u r r e n t  on th e  l e f t .  S y n d i c a l i s t
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i n d u s t r i a l  t a c t i c s  - th e  g e n e r a l  s t r i k e ,  the  ex tended s t r i k e ,  o r  
forms of  th e  p a r t i a l  s t r i k e  such as t h e  go -s low  - were p a r t  o f  l a b o r 1s 
everyday v o c a b u la ry .
The s y n d i c a l i s t  p l a n  f o r  a new world tu rn e d  about  t h e  One 
Big Union which was to  be b u i l t  from i n d u s t r i a l  u n io n s ,  t h a t  i s ,  
un ions  which o r g a n i s e d  a l l  workers  i n  a p a r t i c u l a r  i n d u s t r y  who
c o n t r i b u t e  to  one p roduc t  o r  g roups  of  p r o d u c t s ,  i r r e s p e c t i v e  o f  t h e i r
/
s k i l l .  I n d u s t r i a l  un ions  were p o p u l a r  and,  to  a l e s s e r  e x t e n t ,  th e  
One Big Union was a l s o  - b u t  as  a weapon i n  t h e  d a i l y  g u e r r i l l a  war* 
a g a i n s t  C a p i t a l ,  r a t h e r  than  as components o f  the  s o c i e t y  o f  tomorrow.
I f  t h e  A u s t r a l i a n  l a b o r  movement was s t r o n g l y  i n f l u e n c e d  
by New South Wales, t h a t  o f  New South Wales was dominated by Sydney.
There were o t h e r  c e n t r e s  o f  power,  i t  i s  t r u e ,  a t  N ew cas t le ,  Wollongong 
and Broken H i l l .  Where Sydney h a d ,  in  g e n e r a l ,  i n j e c t e d  i n t o  t h e  
l a b o r  movement a c o n s e r v a t iv e  i n f l u e n c e ,  th e  o u t l y i n g  c e n t r e s  had 
i n j e c t e d  a more p o l i t i c a l l y  r a d i c a l  and i n d u s t r i a l l y  m i l i t a n t  i n f l u e n c e .
But in  any c o n t e s t ,  the  s t r e n g t h  l a y  wi th  Sydney,  and w i th i n  Sydney 
t h e  locus  o f  power was to be found i n  th e  i n d u s t r i a l l y  c o n s e r v a t i v e  
New South Wales Labor Counci l .
These were unusua l  t i m e s ,  however,  and th e  c l im a t e  o f  u n r e s t  
made i t s e l f  f e l t  even w i th i n  t h a t  augus t  body.  During 1919 a group 
o f  l e f t i s t s  ( a t  th e  t ime n e i t h e r  s y n d i c a l i s t  nor  s o c i a l i s t ,  b u t  a 
l i t t l e  o f  each) began to  t a k e  c o n t r o l  o f  th e  Labor C o u n c i l .  In  1917, 
t h e  c o n s e rv a t iv e  s e c r e t a r y  o f  t h e  Labor Counc i l ,  E . J .  Kavanagh, had 
appoin ted  as a s s i s t a n t - s e c r e t a r y  le a d in g  l e f t i s t  John Smith Garden,  a Scots
umigrant, one-time lay preacher, and. no-conscription candidate for 
the A.L.P. Not long after this, Kavanagh resigned the secretaryship 
to take up a government position, and Garden became the new secretary 
by two votes, early in 1918.
The union defeat in the 1917 'debacle', as the inaccurately 
but popularly known 'general'1 strike was dubbed, had convinced those 
not already so minded that union reorganisation was needed. To meet 
this need, Garden and his supporters launched, with official Labor 
Council support, the One Big Union project. And in 1919 this project 
was the first of the contests through which left and right in New 
South Wales met in struggle; the second contest took place over a 
breakaway party from the A.L.P. led by One Big Unionists boring from 
within it and known as the Industrial Socialist Labor Party.
Industrial Unionism - All Things to all Men?
As framed by the New South Wales left, the One Big Union
was taken over almost unchanged from the American Industrial Workers 
1Aof the World. x
According to the Labor Council, the strike involved 100,000 
workers, 65,000 of whom were in New South Wales, and lasted about 
eight weeks.(Report and Balance Sheet Lab.Council, for Half Year 
ending December 31 1917j p.ll)*
For a version of the 'political' or DeLeonite I.W.W. preamble, see 
Workers' International Industrial Union, Constitution, Sydney, n.d. 
but 1917 or 1918. For the'industrial' or 'Chicagoite' I.W.W. 
preamble, see the pamphlet Direct Action, printed by the Sydney 
Branch of the I.W.W., n.d., p.l5$ for an analysis of it,
The I.W.W. Its History, Structure and Methods, by Vincent St.John, 
Ohio,n.d.
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The Preamble of the One Big Union said:
Capitalism can only be abolished by the 
workers uniting in one class-conscious, 
economic organisation to take and hold 
the means of production by revolutionary 
industrial and political action. 2
The idea of the One Big Union had a firm foundation in the 
prevailing popularity of industrial unionism. 'Industrial Unionism'
- there was a slogan under which nearly all sections of the post-war 
labor movement (officials or rank and file, right wing or left wing) 
were willing to march. But the destination of that march, and even 
the precise meaning of the slogan, were understood quite differently 
by different sections of the movement. And in this variety of inter­
pretation one finds much to explain the paradoxes within the One Big 
Union itself.
Though industrial unionism was common to both Marxist and 
syndicalist traditions, it was more widely known as part of the latter. 
Australian syndicalism was chiefly represented by the Industrial 
Workers of the World (I.W.W.). In 1911» the Australian I.W.W. split 
into an 'industrial' or 'Chicago', 'direct action* faction, and a
Rules, Workers Industrial Union of Australia, 1918.
This appears to be an orthodox DeLeonite I.W.W. formulation. 
However, originally the words 'and political' ('revolutionary 
industrial and political action') were absent. They were inserted 
during the New South Wales Trade Union Congress of August 1918, at 
the insistence of a conservative federal A.L.P. parliamentarian, 
one James Howard Catts (See Molesworth collection, Set 243» Item l).
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’ p o l i t i c a l ’ , o r  ’D e L e o n i te ’ , ’D e t r o i t ’ f a c t i o n .  The D eL eon ite  s t r e a m  
was r e p r e s e n t e d  by th e  Sydney S o c i a l i s t  Labour P a r t y ,  l e d  by  E .E .  J u d d ,  
an d  by th e  W o rk e r s ’ I n t e r n a t i o n a l  I n d u s t r i a l  League , e s t a b l i s h e d  i n  
1916. A l l  I.W.W. g ro u p s  s u p p o r t e d  th e  i d e a  o f  a  One B ig  U n ion .  But 
th e  d i r e c t  a c t i o n i s t s  had th e  g r e a t e r  mass a p p e a l ,  b o th  th ro u g h  
t h e i r  s lo g a n s  and  t h e i r  s t y l e  o f  w ork , so d o u b t l e s s  th e y  d i d  th e  m ost 
t o  p o p u l a r i s e  th e  One B ig  U nion . The I.W.W. g roups  u rg e d  t r a d e  
u n i o n i s t s  to  combine i n  one g r e a t  ’c l a s s '  u n io n ,  th e  One B ig  U nion , 
o v e r th ro w  e x i s t i n g  s o c i e t y ,  and  b u i l d  a new s y n d i c a l i s t  s o c i e t y .  The 
One B ig  Union w ould  be t h e i r  s c a f f o l d i n g .
S e e p in g  i n t o  A u s t r a l i a n  w o rk in g  c l a s s  th o u g h t  a f t e r  1905 
th ro u g h  I.W.W. p ro p a g a n d a ,  th e  One B ig  Union s t e a d i l y  i n c r e a s e d  i n  
p o p u l a r i t y ,  a s  th e  I.W.W. c a s e  a p p e a r e d  t o  g a in  s t r e n g t h  from  th e  
le s s o n s  l e a r n e d  i n  th e  i n d u s t r i a l  c o n f l i c t s  a t  Broken H i l l  and  N e w c a s t le  
i n  1909> Lithgow  and  Q ueens land  i n  1912, and  i n  New S ou th  Wales i n  
1916 and 1917.
A tte m p ts  t o  f u r t h e r  th e  g row th  o f  i n d u s t r i a l  u n io n ism  were
made w e l l  b e f o r e  th e  g e n e r a l  s t r i k e  o f  1917» I n  1913 and  191 4 ,
r i g h t - w i n g  and  m o d e ra te  u n io n  l e a d e r s  s p o n s o re d  an ’A u s t r a l i a n  U n io n s '
F e d e r a t i o n '  w hich  th e y  c a l l e d  a  'One B ig  U n io n ’ . I t s  'm o s t  im p o r ta n t
r u l e '  c o n t a in e d  t h e s e  w ords;
No c e s s a t i o n  o f  w ork o r  d i s t u r b a n c e  o f  e x i s t i n g  
c o n d i t i o n s  (w hich may in v o lv e  an  i n d u s t r i a l  
d i s p u t e )  by an a f f i l i a t e d  o r g a n i s a t i o n ,  s h a l l  
t a k e  p la c e  u n l e s s ,  and u n t i l  th e  m a t t e r  has 
b een  l a i d  b e f o r e  t h e  C o u n c i l ,  and th e  C o u n c i l  
has  so d e c id e d .
V.G. Childe agrees with both a contemporary opinion * that the
scheme was a sort of checkmate on the industrial ardour of men*
and the opinion of a leading A.W.U. official, Lambert, that it was
a IMcunningly devised scheme by a few wily politicians to hobble, bind
3and shackle the unions."* The checkmate theme proved a dominant one, 
echoed by later official proponents of industrial unionism, whether 
right- or left-wing. In 1916, the A.W.U. itself arranged exploratory 
discussions on the subject of the One Big Union, but the smaller 
unions1 suspicions of A.W.U. motives proved fatal. In January 1917, 
the executive of the New South Wales Labor Council received corres­
pondence from Newcastle Labor Council asking for an all-states confer­
ence to devise !a scheme that would make Strikes a thing of the past.1 
The executive signified its approval of Newcastle*s desire to *abolish 
strikers]*. In 1917 conferences of marine transport unions succeeded 
in establishing a so-called industrial union known as the Transport 
Workers* Federation. In 1917, the Chicagoite I.W.W. leaders were 
goaled^ and the movement itself virtually wiped out; but the One Big 
Union movement survived and gained new vigour after that year of
3 Cited V.G. Childe, How Labour Governs, pp.111-113. See also S.M.H. 
20 May 1914, Direct Action, 15 June, 1 July 1914.
4 Exec. Min. Lab. Council, 2 Jan. 1917.
They were charged under the Unlawful Associations Act 1916 and 
the Crimes Acts 1914-1915 (Geoffrey Sawer, Australian Federal 
Politics and Law 1901-1929, pp.134-136).
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industrial upheaval. Indeed the general strike appears to have 
stimulated interest in the One Big Union amongst both officials and 
rank and file unionists - though in somewhat different ways.
From 1917 to 1930, union officials in Dew South Wales, 
whether right-or left-wing, often referred to the general strike 
of 1917 as the '1917 debacle'. Officials appear to have drawn the 
lesson that, since the general strike was an extreme form of the 
'extended front' strike, any sort of extended strike was, in it­
self, disastrous. The general strike had been initiated by the 
rank and file. Because almost all officials were against the 
extended strike after 1917> any such strikes after that year would 
have had to be initiated by the rank'and file, whose mood was such 
that officials felt them likely to do this. The right wing hoped 
that 'industrial reorganisation', a term they used interchangeably 
with industrial unionism, would help keep rank and file militancy 
in check. But prominent men on the left had views not dissimilar. 
In 1919, the Labor Council's new left-wing secretary, J.S. Garden, 
said, in giving the Council's annual report;
Surely in this day we can use a more scientific 
weapon than the obsolete weapon of the strike... 
let us... lay aside the strike weapon until the 
movement is thoroughly organized along scientific 
lines that will make it an efficient weapon.
The Sydney Trades Hall reds associated with Garden were extremely
influential men, both in the left wing and in the overall union
6 E.H. Lane, Dawn to Dusk, Reminiscences of a Rebel, Brisbane, 
1939, PP. 206-20?“.
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movement of New South Wales. Their practice from 1919 to 1927 was 
to encourage strikes very little, to take the lead only when un­
avoidable, or when an extended strike might threaten without their 
intervention. Their almost invariable choice was for what this study 
defines as the 'confined' strike - strikes 'confined' as to mode of 
action or area, and usually both. Examples are the Saturday morning 
strike, the no-overtime strike, the go-slow, the work to regulations 
strike, limited perhaps to one industry, or section of one industry, 
and often, as we shall see, to a small group of shops within one 
industry. Though much influenced by both Chicago and DeLeonite 
I.W.W., the Trades Hall reds leaned towards the strike tactics of 
the latter. In place of the Chicagoite willingness to use both the 
short, extended form and varieties of confined and on-the-job forms 
('go-slow', overtime ban etc.) the Trades Hall reds invariably 
leaned towards the confined forms.
In different ways, the 1917 strike inspired both officials 
and rank and file with the need for 'industrial unionism'. In 
December 1917» the conservative secretary of Labor Council, E.J. 
Kavanagh, proposed to Council a scheme for 'industrial reorganisation' 
which he felt supporters of the One Big Union 'if consistent' would 
support, as a first step towards their ideal. He prefaced his pro­
posals with an account of the 1917 general strike, explaining that 
officials, and more particularly the Labor Council executive,
6a Industrial Union Methods, William E. Trautmann, Chicago, n.d. 
but c.1908.
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had found it impossible to prevent the strike, and equally imposs­
ible to confine its area once it was under way. The strike suggested 
to Kavanagh the need for a 'complete alteration of our present 
system of organisation in order that in future such matters shall 
be controlled by a responsible... body.' To achieve this end, 
Kavanagh proposed:
That all Unions be grouped on lines of trade 
affinity. Such groups to be formed into 
Industrial Federations, which in order to form 
a complete whole shall be linked up to a State 
or Central Council. State Councils to be linked 
up to a Federal body by the formation of an 
Australian Labor Council.. ,
Industrial Councils to deal with all domestic affairs 
affecting any trade or calling within its own group.••
Australian Labor Council to deal with all Federal 
matters, including disputes that extend beyond the 
limits of any one State...
No Union to cease work unless by authority of 
Industrial Federation« ,
Industrial Federation to have power to investigate 
any matter in dispute, and if deemed necessary, to 
order the taking of a ballot of members of any 
Union in its group...7
The scheme bore a strong similarity to the Australian Unions'
Federation of 1914» which Lambert of the A.W.U. had predicted wouldg
'"hobble, bind and shackle the unions."' A sub-committee appointed 
to investigate Kavanagh's scheme consisted of leading leftists 
Garden, A.A. McPherson and E.E. Judd. They objected to Kavanagh's
Rep, and Bal. Sheet, Lab. Council, for Half Year Ending December
31,1917.
See above, p. 15.8
proposal not 'because its degree of ton-committee control mould
1 "botbl e , M n d  and shackle, . , "1 , but because it ’was on craft lines.,,1.
Council adopted the left scheme for reorganisation on *"industrial 
Qlines"1 • But the Left’s scheme was as likely to ’"hobble, bind
shackle..."1 individual unions as much as the right’s.
The Trades Hall reds led the One Big Union movement but,
contrary to Childe’s belief (see below), one does not find them
advocating it as a means of more efficiently conducting strikes,
particularly the extended strikes for which industrial unions were
widely believed to be designed. Ch.ilde writes:
detailed a.ction by sections of the working-class,
essentia,1 ... for success in the struggle against the
master class ... required, above all, that a paralysing strike
could be called of the whole of the workers in one
specific industry-building, mining, railways, etc. A
union departmentalised on the American plan could carry out
just those tactics. 10
In their )rop? anda, the G . ' d .t t . leaders said v e m  little -bout 
immediate uses t*or industrial unionism, whether for strikes or other 
purposes. Rether, the stress was laid upon the new social structure 
the O.B.U. could bring:
tep. and Bal. Sheet, Lab. Council for Half ve--p Tiding Tune 30,1918. 
J.S. Garden wes secretary by this time and so gave the annual report. 
See also the Social Democrat, 26 April 191.8.
Ch.ilde, op.cit. p. 107. In this passage Childe equates ’industrial 
unionists’ (with whom he associates J.S. Garden) and the I.W.W., 
in respect of their strike tactics.
Industrial Unionism educates the workers so that they 
may run the plants themselves, so that they may directly 
control the various industries under the truest form of 
democracy. 11
Strike figures for the time show that unionists were willing to strike
12fpr immediate demands, and this willingness explains why sympathy for 
industrial unionism was so widespread among the rank and file. Should 
^e wish to strike, the rank and file unionist could bring some sort 0+4 
pressure to hear on the elected leaders of his own union. However if 
no strike could begin without the approval of the ton committee of a 
One big Union, the position was cleanly less favourable to the would-be 
striker. One Big Union spokesmen made it abundantly clear that they 
di.d not encourage strikes. Thus the rank and file desire to. strike for 
immediate demands in fact drew no more nourishment from the One Big 
Union, 1018-1922, than it had from the right-wing schemes of 1914 and 
1917. ~
One Big Union - Industrial Unionism, a leaflet published by the O.B.U.
ler its official title the ’Workers* Industrial Union of I.’
Signed by the .I.u. secretary, J.S.Garden. Sydney n.d. but Moles— 
worth dates it August 1919. (Set 243,item 1, Molesworth Collection, 
Mitchell).12
See appendix Ch. 3.
13 The words, attitudes and actions of O.B.U. leaders told the unionist 
’"here the O.B.U. stood on strikes. But the 1918 constitution would 
also have told him, had he read it, (Workers’ Industrial Union of. 
Australia, Rules , 1918, clause 5 (i ) ). In 1.018, under left-wing 
leadership, provisions on local autonomy were no different from those 
of 1 Q9?r right-wing influence wa. dominant. (Australasian Work­
ers' Union, Constitution and General Rules 1022-23. Svdnev. 1922.
H.E.Holland coll.)
It might he argued that such provisions were designed, to meet the 
requirements of the arbitration courts. Australian unions must show 
the courts that they control their membership, and. provisions on 
local autonomy would suggest lack of control. This would certainly 
have been a consideration in the case of the 1922 Australasian Work­
ers* Union, but not with the 1918 Workers Industrial Union of Aust­
ralia. The latter was modelled closely on the DeLeonite Workers' 
International (industrial) Union, (see below p.22) which had very 
similar provisions on local autonomy (Constitution, Sydney,n.d.1917 
or 1918) and as much interest in the arbitration court as the O.B.U.
First Steps^and First Clashes 
In 1Q].8, when excitement over the conscription referenda 
P.nd the general strike had subsided, the Lahor Council, announced,
• t the instance of A.C. 'Willis, general secretary of the powerful 
miners* federation, a trade union congress for 5 August 1918, and 
circulated a copy of the left-wing proposals for industrial re­
organisation. At the congress, where 141 delegates, including nine
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from the A.W.U., re present eel seventy nine unions, the left won the
main official positions, while th(e scheme for industrial reor anisa-
1 5tion accepted from several alternatdves ' was that of the left, with 
its merke6 Ii'V . influence.
According to the left union officials’ ed constitution,
trade unionists would strive for th<e overthrow of capitalist owner- 
oh-'.-n of the means of production thr-ough a One Big Union embracing 
all workers in six greet economic 'departments1 - these, being con- 
cerned with building and construction, manufacture end general 
production; transport and communicant ion; agriculture; land and fish­
eries? civil services and public utilities; and mining. Each 
’department* was then sub-divided seeveral times until, through the 
tal unit of the 'section', the network encompassed the rs 
and file.
While A.C. Willis w- e chairman , 'seven of the twelve members on 
i ■ ittee* were leftists (A. Rutherford, J.
Kilburn, A. Rae, E.E. Judd, A.(C. Willis, J.S. Garden end G. Burns)
For two alternative Victorian schemes, see J.T. Sutcliffe,
■ fligtory of Trade Unionism i ^ ustralia, p , 210 and p. 21,2.
For another rejected scheme, sponsored by the 1T.S.W. Branch of 
the Printing Industry ^raployeeis Union, see Electrical Trades 
Journal, 30 April, 1919.
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After adopting the constitution for the One Big Union 
proposed by the left wing, the 1918 congress elected an organising 
committee of twelve, asKed trade unions to pay in £5 for each 1,000 
of their members, appointed an organising secretary (J.S. Garden ) 
and planned to launch the One Big Union on 14 October, 1918.
There were criticisms in plenty: some, including the 
right wing, criticised the August constitution because it was felt
17that skilled unionists ran the risk of being ’swamped' by unskilled.
A tiny DeLeonite I.W.W. group, the Melbourne branch of the Workers'
10
International Industrial Union, condemned the August constitution
See Electrical Trades Journal, 29 July,1919; Executive Minutes 
of the Sheet Metal Working Industrial Union, N.S.W. branch,
21 Eov.1918 (Mr. Brickell's contribution); Something of the 
same fear also appears in the Monthly Report of the Commonwealth 
Council of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers, Jan.1920.
In 1916 Australia's DeLeonite I.W.W. (assisted by the Socialist 
Labor Party, considered to be the I.W.W.'s 'political sword') 
changed its name to the Workers' International Industrial Union, 
in accordance with an American lead. The subsequent story of 
this tiny faction-ridden body can be gleaned in part from 
fragmentary minutes in the Mitchell Library. See the Minute Book, 
National Executive of IWW-Clubs. National Executive Committee 
of Australasia, 1913-1921* A second book contains minutes of 
general meetings of the 'Sydney Socialist IWW Club', 1916-18.
While it was nowhere healthy, the W.I.I.U. made more impression 
in Melbourne than in Sydney. In Melbourne, in March 1918, this 
body organised the One Big Union Propaganda League to build 
support for the One Big Union among Victorian unionists. In 
October,1918, the One Big Union Propaganda League began to 
publish the 'One Big Union Herald'. (For an account of the act­
ivities of the 'workers' International Industrial Union from 1916 
to 1928, see L.G. Churchward, 'The American Influence on the 
Australian Labour Movement', in Historical Studies of Australia 
and New Zealand, (vol.5>no.19, p.272).
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because the fundamental units or 'sections' were based on existing
20craft unions and their officials. Expressing this view, a spokes­
man for a group with very similar views alleged that the 'Trades Hall 
One Big Union'
resolve £d itself into a conglomeration of Trades 
Unions cursed with 'bossdom' of autocratic executives... 21
The I.W.W. critics insisted that the One Big Union must be built up
from 'shop committees', industrial unions in miniature.
Yet despite criticism, to the casual observer of 1918 the
future of the One Big Union surely looked rosy. Union interest in
reorganisation was at a peak: in August 1918, the Central Council of
the Miners' Federation resolved to endorse the formation of the
The Constitution of the Workers' International Industrial Union 
(Marxian Print, Sydney, n.d. but either 1917 or 1918) forbade a 
member to be an officer in a 'pure and simple trade union' (Article 
VI, sec.3). Its local unit was composed of 'all the actual wage­
workers in a given locality, welded together in shop branches or as 
the particular requirements of said industry may render necessary' 
(Article 1, sec.2(c)).
In a recent study of the One Big Union, Ian Bedford ( The One Big 
Union 1918-1923» The Last Lays of Revolutionary Syndicalism in 
Australia, Final Year Thesis, Department of Government, Sydney 
University, i960.) remarks (p.7) a contrast between the American 
I.W.W., whose strength lay among non-unionised, unskilled workers, 
many of whom were recent immigrants, and the Australian, sponsored 
and controlled by the skilled unionists officially controlling 
the labor movement of New South Wales. It is probable that this 
contrast is linked with the greater Australian emphasis on 
centralised control as against local autonomy.
Solidarity, the Official Organ of the I.L.P. (industrial Labouf Party) 
21 Sept. 1918.
21
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One Big Union and to donate to it 10s. for each 100 members of the 
Federation. By November 1918, J.S. Garden, secretary of the One 
Big Union movement as well as of the Labor Council, announced an 
impressive list of unions which had passed resolutions approving the 
One Big Union as outlined at the 1918 Conference. J At the Sydney 
Domain, a 'Monster Demonstration' was held on 8 December 1918 to 
promote the One Big Union. There were four 'stumps', each with a 
constellation of leading labor spokesmen, right-wing, moderates and 
left-wing. ^
The participation of right and left-wing union officials in 
the 1918 union congress and its sympathy for the One Big Union; the 
acclaim for the One Big Union throughout the labor press and move­
ment; above all, the keen rank and file interest in industrial unionism 
as an aid to industrial action- all this augured well for the One 
Big Union. But below the appearance of unity lay strong divisive 
influences: the ambitions of the great Australian Workers' Union; 
official concern over rank and file industrial militancy; and fear 
that the left would use the One Big Union to make a bid for control 
of the A.L.P.
Minutes, Central Council Miners' Federation 14-18.8.1918.
For the list, a long one, see a letter from Garden in the 
One Big Union Herald, November 26,1918.
See printed handbill, Workers' Industrial Union of Australia, 
One Big Union. Monster Demonstration.(Marxian Print, Sydney; 
R.S. Ross collection.)
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The One Big Union and the Industrial Socialist 
Labor Party, January-September, 1919.
The One Big Union was one of two arenas in which the battle
between labor's left and right wings was fought in late 1918. After
January 1919) that battle was also fought in the arena of labor's
mass political party, the Australian Labor Party. Here the left
met with such a defeat that it would have been extremely hard, given
the peculiar intermeshing of union and political affairs in Australia
through the A.L.P., to make good its losses.
Exhilarated by its success at the Trade Union Congress
of August 1918, the left initiated moves which came close to changing
the official objective of the A.L.P. in an extremely radical way.
The left made its bid to control the A.L.P. through the Industrial
Vigilance Council, an officially constituted and powerful organisation
within the A.L.P. Established under the name of the Industrial
Section of the A.L.P. in 1916, the Industrial Vigilance Council had
originally been a united front of right, moderate and left-wing-
25unionists against the so-called 'politicians'.
For a good, brief account of this body's constitution, function 
and history, see Childe, op.cit., p.64. For the Rules and 
Constitution of the Industrial Section of the Political Labor 
League of N.S.W., see Molesworth, Set 71? Item 6; see ibid, 
for the First Annual Report and Balance Sheet of the Industrial 
Section,1917f and the Annual Report and Balance Sheet of the 
Industrial Vigilance Council,1918. For a right-wing account 
of the body's history till August 1918, see V. Molesworth's 
'History of the Industrial Section of the Political Labor 
League which in 1918 was renamed the Industrial Vigilance 
Council of the Australian Labor Party (N.S.W. Branch)'. 
Typescript, ibid.
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The left remained fairly quiet until it took the lead in the conscript­
ion referenda of 1916-17 and, in 1917» through the instrumentality 
of the Industrial Vigilance Council, gained two vice-presidencies 
and several other state executive positions in the A.L.P. itself.
In 1918» the left was still influential and, on its initiative, 
peace proposals were circulated over prominent A.L.P. names during 
the party’s annual conference in 1918. The signatories castigated 
'the existing capitalistic system of production for profit',
proclaimed that enduring peace could come only from 'an organised
27system of production for use, under democratic control', and
succeeded in alarming the more alert of the right wing. Left-wing
influence within the A.L.P. continued to grow, and reached a climax
in January 1919 when the Industrial Vigilance Council adopted the
28One Big Union preamble as its objective.
In 1917> Arthur Rae, an old A.W.U. member and a former Senator, 
and A.C. Willis were vice-presidents, while J.J. Graves and 
J. Howie, later prominent Communists, were executive members 
(Molesworth Set 243, Item i). In 1918, Willis was once more a 
vice-president, with Rae acting general secretary, and Rutherford 
a member of the executive.
Roneoed sheet headed 'Australian Labor Party. N.S.W. P.L.L. 
Conference, Peace Proposals'. It was signed by T.D. Mutch^(M.L.A.), 
along with prominent leftists^. (Molesworth, Set 243, Item I;.
After defining the two main classes in industrial society, and 
stating that lasting peace was impossible while classes exist, 
the new objective said: ’Between these two classes the struggle 
must continue until Capitalism is abolished. Capitalism can only 
be abolished by the workers uniting in one class-conscious 
economic organisation to take and hold the means of production 
by revolutionary industrial and political action...' (Seo alee 
T n . For the whole new constitution
see Industrial Vigilance Council, Australian Labor Party of 
New South Wales, Rules and Constitution,... Revised and Adopted 
Jan. 24 1919. Handwritten inside the constitution are the words 
'never issued'.
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From i t s  in c e p t io n ,  th e  I n d u s t r i a l  V ig ila n c e  C ouncil had
nom inated  a  ’ t i c k e t ’ f o r  th e  key A .L .P . com m ittees to  be e le c te d  from th e
A .L .P .’s an n u a l co n fe re n c e . When th e  I n d u s t r i a l  V ig ila n c e  C ouncil adopted
th e  One Big Union pream ble a s  i t s  o b je c t iv e ,  i t  was presum ed t h a t  th o se  on
th e  C o u n c il’ s ’t i c k e t ’ f o r  annual co n fe ren ce  would u rg e  th e  A .L .P . to
renounce  i t s  e x i s t in g  o b je c t iv e  fo r  t h a t  o f  th e  One Big U nion. Both
l e f t  and r i g h t  w ing threw  them selves  in to  f e v e r i s h  e f f o r t s  to  have t h e i r
men e le c te d  from  le ag u es  and u n io n s a s  co n fe ren c e  d e le g a te s .  The l e f t
s e t  up a  com m ittee o f  se v en ty  b u t ,  i n i t i a l l y  in s p i r e d  by f e d e r a l  A .L .P .
29p a r l ia m e n ta r ia n  James Howard C a t ts ,  " th e  r i g h t  d id  f a r  b e t t e r .  P a r ­
l ia m e n ta r ia n s  were c a l le d  upon, and s t a t e  p a r lia m e n ta ry  le a d e r  John S to re y , 
once w e ll-d is p o se d  to  th e  One Big U nion, now t r e n c h a n tly  denounced th e  
’few l im e l ig h te r s  and n o to r i e ty  h u n te r s ’ who a ttem p ted
to  sad d le  th e  A u s tr a l ia n  Labour P a r t y . . . .w ith  methods 
fo re ig n  to  ou r A u s tr a l ia n  s p i r i t . . . . u
By May, th e  r i g h t  had made c e r t a in  o f  so many d e le g a te s  t h a t  l e f t i s t  A .L .P .
v ic e - p r e s id e n t  W i l l i s  t r i e d  (u n s u c c e s s fu lly )  to  p u t o f f  th e  1919 annual
31co n fe ren ce  a l to g e th e r .  D ecid ing  to  s id e - s t e p  th e  I n d u s t r i a l  V ig ila n c e
" M olesw orth say s  t h a t  J .H . C a t ts  and J .  B a ile y  (V ic e -P re s id e n t o f  th e  
A.W.U.) took  th e  i n i t i a t i v e .  ( 'T h e  Labor P a r ty  C r i s i s  o f  1919* Being 
th e  e v e n ts  le a d in g  up to  th e  June 1919 co n feren ce  o f  le a g u e s  and u n io n s 
a f f i l i a t e d  w ith  th e  A u s tr a l ia n  Labour P a r ty ,  o u t l in in g  th e  f i g h t  betw een 
th e  c o n s t i tu t i o n a l  e lem ent and th e  O .B .U .-S o v ie t s e c t io n ’) .  T y p e s c r ip t ,  
(M olesw orth c o l l ,  S e t 243 j Item  l ) .  C a t ts  says he h im se lf  le d  th e  r i g h t  
wing cam paign. (Comm. P a r i .  Deb. ,  vol.X CIX , p .197> 6 J u ly  1922.)
3° S.M.H. , 7 Mar. 1919*
In  M o lesw o rth 's  ’The Labor P a r ty  C r i s i s  o f  1919* B eing th e  e v e n ts  le a d in g  
up to  th e  June 1919 c o n fe re n c e ............ '
31
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Council and sponsor its own ’ticket' for annual conference, the right
’stacked’ a meeting of the Industrial Vigilance Council so that it
adjourned until after conference without having chosen the customary ’ticket’.
In response, the left formed the 'Reorganised Industrial Section', and
32under this name drew up its own ’ticket’.
Conference opened after unparalleled hackstage preparations,
and A..C. Willis, secretary of the miners’ federation, proposed that
the following he substituted for the existing A.L.P. objective:
That the object of the Party be the establishment of a 
State of social democracy, in which the entire means of 
wealth production shall be owned and controlled by the 
community of workers industrially organised.
That this be the sole issue of future elections...
That in the event of the foregoing series of resolutions 
being carried by Conference, a campaign of propaganda be 
commenced with the object of acquainting the general 
public with the changed economic circumstances engendered 
by the war....which make a peaceful revolution of the 
social system urgent...if the working classes are to 
escape degradation of their standard of living and a 
condition of servitude culminating probably in a war 
even more devastating than the one from which we have 
just emerged.33
The left’s new objective gained a remarkably big vote, being defeated 
only by 127 votes to 112.^ But the highest left-wing vote for an
~5 Roneoed Sheet 'The Industrial Section. Statement of the Position'. 
Handed out at annual conference on 9 June 1919 (llolesworth,Set 243, 
Item i); also Molesworth's own account: 'The Labor Party Crisis of 
1919»••1j and Truth, 22 June 1919*
“  Labor News, 14 June 1919*
34 Truth, 22 June 1919*
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executive position was 69, and. not one leftist gained a place. The
right wing had earlier gained control of the credentials and agenda
Committees, and it was suggested that the right-wing ’rigged' the
35ballot-count for executive positions to exclude the leftists.
Towards the end of conference, in protest against an infringement
of the rules by the right wing,* 3 *^ A.C. Willis led the left-wing
delegates from conference to the Trades Hall, where he held a 'special
37emergency meeting of the Industrial Vigilance Council'. Knowing 
full well that Willis was in two minds as to whether he should bluff 
concessions from the existing A.L.P. executive, or set up a new 
political party, the executive lost no time in blocking the way back
•30
to the A.L.P.; it denounced the left move as an I .W.W.-inspired*5 
effort to woo unions away from the A.L.P., a move, furthermore, 
a leading right-winger charged, which violated the principle of
J At the A.L.P. Annual Conference in 1923 it was alleged that 
'sliding ballot boxes' were in use in 1920.(S.M.H.5 June 1923;
see also A.W.U. Convention. 'Ballot box Enquiry. Debate & Decision. 
Sydney,1925»P»10). J.J. Graves, a prominent left-wing participant 
in the 1919 Conference, told the writer that the right 'pinched' 
the ballot boxes in 1919« See also Childe,op.cit.p.66.
3  ^ Childe, op.cit., p.67; The Socialist,26 Sept. 1919; interview 
with J.J. Graves.
37 Truth, 22 June 1919*
3^ Australian Labor Party, Official Manifesto by the New South
Wales Central Executive, 23 June, 1919 (Molesworth, Set 243,Item i).
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labor solidarity.
If Mr. Garden and Mr. Willis knew the elementary prin­
ciples of the Australian Labour Party, they would know 
that it has been founded on solidarity. Does Mr.
Garden hope to persuade the Labour Council to 'rat' 
as a body on the A.L.P.? 39
'Whatever their intention at the moment they walked out of conference, 
the left were thus pushed towards establishing a new party; as Childe 
says, the left 'allowed themselves to be manoeuvred into forming a 
new party in 1919'• ‘A After several meetings, the left announced 
that a new party would be launched by a conference of delegates 
from A.L.P. leagues and affiliated unions on 2 August. Both left 
and right then vigorously set about approaching those bodies,^ 
explaining the whole affair from their different standpoints.
S.A. Rosa, a veteran laborite, outlined the dominant left-wing 
strategy in an address to the Labor Council; the left, he said, 
v/anted
a militant Labor Party, to regard the Labor Party and 
the Nationalist Party as reactionary parties, to be 
fought as the Freetrade and Protection Parties were 
fought by the Labor Party in 1894» 42
The idea that the new party might hold the balance of power in
parliament was taken quite seriously by the right wing. Molesworth,
Sunday News, 22 June 1919»
Childe, op,cit., p.208.
See, for example, Minutes, General Meeting, Ship Painters' and 
Dockers' Union, 21 July 1919; Sydney Wharf Labourers' Union,
2 July 1919; 9 July 1919".
Daily Telegraph, 27 June 1919; See also S.M.H., 27 June 1919. 
There is no mention of the address in the Minutes of the 
Labor Council.
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for example, usually a well-informed, and shrewd observer, wrote:
Though ’moderate' leaders attempt to discredit the 
breakaway movement as having no backing I fear that 
such is not the case and a new industrial party will 
be formed - of that there is no doubt. They will run 
candidates and must get a few in. It recalls the private 
conversation I had with R.D. Meagher M.L.C. before State 
Conference. He said 'There will be a mixv;ap at next 
election. There will be Labor, National, Country Party, 
O.B.U. and independents, returned...43
Molesworth angrily alleged that J.T. Lang made no move to 'rouse...up'
the 300 members ^  he controlled in the Auburn Labor League; and
this body consequently declared for the breakaways. Could the astute
Lang have been so uncertain in 1919 as to sit on the fence - as he
often did v/hen uncertain during the 'twenties?
Veteran laborite Arthur Rae identified himself with the 
45breakaways and was removed from editorship of the Labor News,
46official A.L.P. newspaper. One conservative daily newspaper commented:
^  Molesworth Papers, Set 243, Item 1. Dated 7 July,1919» 
Molesworth Papers, Set 243, Item 1. Dated 6 Aug. 1919*
Activist in the Shearer's Union from 1886, Rae took a prominent 
part in the I89O strikes, and was returned from Murrumbidgee as 
one of the first Labor parliamentarians in 1891 (Common Cause,
8 Dec.1922). Senator Guthrie, once a prominent leader of the 
Seamen's Union, described Rae, at the time he joined the break­
aways, as 'the best Labour man you ever had' (Comm. Pari Deb., 
vol.XCI,p.677, 24 March 1920.)
^  The Molesworth Papers (Set 243, Item l) carry an account of the 
paper's Board of Control meeting on 3 July 1919, at which Rae 
was given two weeks' pay in lieu of notice.
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This action is one of the most serious moves taken 
by Labor for a long time. Mr. Rae has always been 
recognized as one of Labor's stalwarts, and the fact 
that he has made a cleavage is evidence of the serious 
position Labor finds itself in today. 47
On 17 July, the state executive of the A.L.P. expelled Rosa, Willis
and Rutherford, and on the eve of the August conference, the
executive called together and then formally disbanded the Industrial
Vigilance Council/'
The long awaited conference on 2 August, 1919» opened with an
attendance of 200 from unions and leagues, though many had been sent
49along to see how much support the breakaways could muster. A new 
party was formed - 'the Industrial Socialist Labor Party'. Its 
objective was:
The abolition of Capitalism and the establishment of 
a system of Society based upon the socia,l ov/nership, and 
democratic control of the means and instruments for pro­
ducing and distributing wealth by, and in the interests 
of, the whole community.
In regard, to political action, the new party's credo declared that:
Sunday Times, 6 July 1919» cutting in Molesworth Coll. Set 243, 
Item I.
The 'Third and Last Annual Report and balance Sheet of the 
Industrial Vigilance Council (formerly 'Industrial Section') With 
Official Report of Disbandment'. (Molesworth, Set 71, Item 2).
See also the Sun, 2 Aug.1919, for an account of the final meet­
ing, which was not without its exciting moments.
For example, the Boilermakers, the Amalgamated Carpenters, the 
Australasian Society of Engineers, and the Hairdressers, said 
they had sent delegates along merely to hear the opinions 
expressed.
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Inasmuch as industrial action produces its political 
reflex, the I.S.L.P. recognizes the use of revolutionary 
political action...as distinct from the palliative- 
mongering parliamentarism of non-revolutionary parties, 
to be essential to the complete overthrow of the capitalist 
system. $0
A.C. Willis was elected president of the new party, and he claimed that
*the new movement was simply part of a world wide protest against the
mismanagement of those who had hitherto controlled the means of
51production and distribution*. Upon the party’s provisional executive
were to be found the sponsors of the One Big Union, the leading
left-wing union officials of the day; amongst them were J.S. Garden,
J. Howie, J.J. Graves, H.L. Denford, A. Rutherford, T. McCristal,
52R. Webster, H. Dessaix and J. Cullinan. To strengthen the hand of 
the Industrial Socialist Labor Party, Percy Brookfield, popular 
Labor state parliamentarian for the Barrier, resigned from the A.L.P. 
But for all this, an air of foredoomed failure clung to the infant 
party. Even at the founding conference, several unions and leagues
J Objective,Constitution and Rules adopted by the Conference of
the Industrial Socialist Labor Party, Aug.1919* (R.S. Ross Collect­
ion). See also the report on the conference given to a general 
meeting of the Hotel, Club and Restaurant...Employees* Union by 
its delegates (Minutes, 2 Sep.1919)*
51
J By contrast, P.Brookfield, M.L.A., said later that the new party 
had been formed because *a large number of working class repre­
sentatives in Sydney had come to the conclusion that after twenty 
years* experience of electing Labor members to Parliament, the 
position of the workers was just as insecure*. Something was 
needed, he added, which ’would allow the full economic power 
of the working class to be used to the best advantage...along 
One Big Union lines*. (The Socialist, 26 Sept.1919*)
52 The Sun, 13 Aug.1919.
34
had disassociated themselves, while some announced that the matter
53of affiliation would be left to individual members* Though the
Industrial Socialist Labor Party sponsored public meetings throughout
Sydney, response was poor. Doubtless sensing the decline of the
breakaways' hopes, Albert Willis, a consummate tactician, asked the
federal executive of the A.L.P. to intervene in the Mew South Wales
54dispute in order to restore the expellees to the A.L.P. However,
far from allowing Willis, Rosa and Rutherford to re-enter the A.L.P.,
the state executive was soon so confident of its strength that it
55expelled *30 to 40 prominent Labor extremists', ^  including the prov­
isional executive of the new party.
On August 9, the Industrial Socialist Labor Party convened a
56'unity' conference of all socialist bodies, but no unity was achieved.
During August and September the battle between right wing
Among these were some in which leftists were prominent; the Milk 
and Ice Carters, the Miscellaneous Workers' Union, and the Iron­
workers •
54 Baity Mirrw r^"«3»Au-g.; Daily Telegraph, 4 Aug.; Labor News.30 Aug.
1919.
Newspaper Cutting, 13 August 1919» in Molesworth,Set 243» Item I; 
see also Letter, from the executive of the New South Wales Branch 
of the Australian Labor Party, 14 Aug.1919, to 'Secretaries of 
A.L.P. Branches and Affiliated Unions throughout New South Wales'. 
The executive said 'that members of the Australian Labor Party 
who have definitely associated themselves with and joined the 
recently formed scab Political Party, automatically cease to be 
members of the A.L.P...* See also the Sun, 13 Aug.1919*
Rawson suggests an important reason for the failure was the effort 
of Socialist Labor Party secretary Judd to impose upon the new body 
the name 'Revolutionary Socialist Party' (D.W. Rawson, 'The 
Organisation of the Australian Labor Party,1916-1941'> Ph.D thesis, 
Me lb., 1954,p.17-18).
35
and left wing continued, though considerably abated; but there could
57be little doubt about the outcome. Despite sustained efforts and
58an occasional victory, and with small need of the great efforts
59the moderates threw in, the battle was won - and lost. After the 
end of September one hears almost nothing further about the Industrial 
Socialist Labor Party.^ Those of its members who stood for the 
federal elections in December 1919 did so as members of a socialist 
alliance and polled deplorably. This also happened at the state
57
58
59
On 24 August, supporters of the new party addressed meetings on 
the South Coast. At one of these, Willis claimed that 'The 
principal aim of the Labor politicians...was to hold their 
seats...taken as a whole, there was little, if any, difference 
between them and the Nationalists* (Evening News, 25 Aug,1919)«
A ‘Monster Demonstration' was held in the Sydney Town Hall on 
17 September (see leaflet, Industrial Print, Sydney, E.S. Ross 
Collection) and regular Sunday meetings in the Domain were 
conducted (see leaflet 'Militants! Militants! Your Party has at 
last come on the Industrial and Political Horizon* signed T.W. 
McCristal, E.S. Ross Collection).
The I.S.L.P. claimed that a new branch was formed at Rockdale, 
boasting 30 members, and at Wollongong, with 50, that branches 
were also to be formed at Kogarah, Hurstville and Homebush, 
and that Warren branch of the A.L.P. had left it in favour 
of the new party. All except 2 members of the Ashfield branch 
went over to the I.S.L.P. (A letter from one of the remaining 
two members to Molesworth, Molesworth Collection, Set 243,Item i).
See typed report of a meeting of the A.L.P. Propaganda Committee, 
24 Aug.1919, signed by J.H. Catts, in Molesworth, Set 243» Item I, 
also Labor News, 30 Aug.1919*
60 The Barrier 'Industrial Socialist Labor Party*, of which one does 
hear, was a separate organisation.
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elections in 1920, though the Socialists stood in the most heavily-
industrialised areas of Sydney.^ In January 1920, W.H. Lambert of
the Australian Workers' Union alleged that the Industrial Socialist
62Labor Party had amalgamated with the Socialist Labor Party, while 
in 1921 Willis referred to this period as if no breakaway party had 
ever existed.^
The architects of the New South Wales One Big Union movement 
were amongst the union officials most prominently connected with the
See S.M.H., 1 Mar. 1920. Results by electorates, at 24 March
(S.M.H. 24 Mar.1920) are tabulated below.
Sydney
283 votes
Botany
Earnest Judd Mrs Anne Toohey 177
Daisy Loughran 45 Henry Leigh Denford 50James Jamieson 42
Timothy McCristal 122
Balmain Newcastle
J.O. Moroney 57 Joseph Charlton 570.
R. Corcoran 72 Thomas Johnston 69
Peter Christensen 34 John Michael McDonald 60
H. Weston 17 David McNeill 140William North 51
The candidate for Sturt, P. Brookfield, we must count as1 separate
from the rest, because of Broken Hill's special traditions (Brook­
field was returned with 4>222 votes).
Australian Worker (A.W.),22 Jan.1920; Common Cause,8 Dec.1922.
^  Australian Labor Party, Official Report of Proceedings of the
Ninth Commonwealth Conference.Brisbane,0ct.1921,p.13* Willis said 
'No, it was the Socialist Party that was proposed 
at that time, but...the attempt was to unite 
all Socialist groups in Sydney. We failed, and, 
consequently, no party has been formed.' But 
earlier he said W^e ran two candidates under peculiar 
circumstances, and one opposed Mr. Catts, because 
they regarded him as one of their most dangerous 
enemies...The party alluded to was^to be a propaganda 
party, and not a political party.*[jny emphasisj (Catts, 
expelled in 1922, was in general bad standing in the 
A.L.P. by late 1921).
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Industrial Socialist Labor Party. Childe believes that this connection,
earning the leftists the title of 'rats’, gave the One Big Union its
final 'quietus' ^  and there is a good deal of contemporary evidence
65to bear out Childe's verdict. The One Big Union and the Industrial 
Socialist Labor Party were overlapping areas in which the right and 
left engaged in battle, and, in setting up what rapidly proved to be 
a splinter party, the left offered the right a deadly weapon. No 
one could have known it in 1919> but it turned out that the trade 
unionists, militant though they were in industrial matters, kept 
looking to the established party of labo^ for political leadership; 
the new party on the left was simply by-passed by the unionists, 
despite its manifold union and A.L.P. connections.
During these initially hopeful months that were ultimately 
to bring the left defeat in the political arena, their performance 
in the trade union arena was, if anything, even less impressive.
4 Here is Childe's opinion in fulls ']The One Big Union] finally
received its quietus when its leaders were expelled from the Labour 
Party in N.S.W. and allowed themselves to be manoeuvred into form­
ing a new party in 1919* by that step they earned for themselves 
the title of 'rats'*, for the majority of unionists, to whom the 
Labour platform had become a sort of religion, saw no distinction 
between men like Garden or Willis who left that body to go further 
Left and those who, like Hughes and Holman, went over to the Right.' 
(How Labour Governs,p.208)•
^  Industrial unionism and the One Big Union were popular in the
Sydney Wharf Labourers* Union (which indeed balloted to join the 
O.B.U. in 1920). But the idea of labor 'solidarity' was so strong 
that McCristal, in persuading the union to send delegates to the 
founding conference of the Industrial Socialist Labor Party, argued 
that such delegates should be sent 'for the purpose of solidifying 
the Labor Party...' Right-wing officials fiercely opposed associa­
tion with 'a scab party' (Minutes, General Meeting, 9 July,1919)*
A resolution passed in the same month in the Amalgamated Rail & 
Tramway Services' Association reveals similar resentment ( Exec. 
Minutes, 5 July 1919)*
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The One Big Union, January-August 1919»
The first All-Australian Trade Union Congress devoted 
specifically to the One Big Union was held on 11 January 1919» Though 
the absence of the Australian Workers' Union came in for widespread 
comment, attendance was otherwise fair; the Congress elected an O.B.U. 
Provisional Council, declared the existing Sydney left-controlled 
newspaper, O.B.U.«to be the movement’s official newspaper, and 
adopted the preamble of the August 1918 Conference.
While there were signs of growth in these early months,^ 
at the same time one could see evidence that all was not well. Several 
bodies now openly propounded as alternatives to the One Big Union (the 
Transport Workers' Federation, the Building Trades' Federation, the 
Iron Trades' Federation and the Returned Soldiers' and War Workers'
In February, it was reported that the Geelong branch of the Aust­
ralian Labor Party, along with the Geelong Trades and Labor Council, 
had declared for the One Big Union, appointing a 'strong* committee 
to carry on 'educational* work on its behalf. Ballarat Trades and 
Labor Council declared for the One Big Union, while the Leongatha, 
Malvern, Hampton, Port Melbourne and Surrey Hills branches of the 
Australian Labor Party also declared their support (O.B.U. 21 Feb. 
1919> Melbourne). In March, the Victorian branch of the Australian 
Timber Workers' Union conducted a ballot by which its members 
adopted the principles of the One Big Union by 'a 98 per cent 
majority'. (O.B.U.20 March 1919)* Claude Thompson of the Amalgam 
ated Railway and Tramway Services Association wrote glowingly of 
the reception given the One Big Union at the union's 29th Annual 
Conference (O.B.U. 1 March,1919)» claiming that most branch 
officials were 'just as enthusiastic as the rank and file'.
W.R. Corcoran, organiser for the One Big Union and agent for the 
newspaper O.B.U.was reported as addressing a good many lunch hour 
meetings. 0. Schreiber edited the O.B.U. while Garden, Burns and 
Swiney of the Trades and Labor Council toured New South Wales 
with the message of the One Big Union as did E.E. Judd (ibid,
1 April 1919).
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Industrial Union of Australia) received increasing attention in trade
union circles. Of the seventy nine unions represented at the 1918
Conference, only twenty eight had paid over money to the One Big
Union by mid-February 1919» and this amounted to only £250, of which
£60 had come from Willis’s miners, and £50 from the left-controlled
67Western branch of the Australian Workers’ Union. Though attendance
68at the New South Wales conferences in March was still fair, several
69One Big Union officials had resigned, while opposition now began to
be heard in unions well-disposed to the O.B.U. (such as the Wharf 
70Labourers, and, in a less well-disposed but still favourable union,
71the Printing Industry Employees’ Union). In Victoria, the picture
72was little better.
^  Evening News, 18 Feb.1919* See also O.B.U.1 Feb.1919*
68 The Workers* Industrial Union of Australia, One Big Union, 
Organising and Propaganda Committee, Report of Congress, March 
28,29 1919* (Letter and Report, processed. Molesworth, Set 243 
Item I.)
69 Round Table, vol.9,1918-19,p.808.
70 Minutes, General Meeting of the Sydney Wharf Labourers' Union,
21 May, 25 June 1919.
^  Printing Trades Journal, 18 March,1919*
^  The Easter Conference of the Victorian branch of the A.L.P. 
rejected a motion by O.B.U. zealot B. Mulvogue to replace the 
A.L.P.*s existing objective by that of the O.B.U. Perhaps this 
was to be expected; but there came unexpected blows when 
Mulvogue caught influenza and later suffered a nervous breakdown, 
and when Frank Hyett, secretary of the Victorian Railways' Union 
and another O.B.U. stalwart, died. Attendance fell away sharply 
at the Victorian One Big Union Conference in May.
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With the A.W.U. and the right wing gone, and moderate
support beginning to drop away, the minority leftists* demand for 
73’Shop Branches* as the O.B.U. unit made headway. In January 1919*
the official O.B.U. constitution was amended so that the 'section*
embraced 'wage workers in any locality in an industry.'^ Minority
75leftist pressure for shop branches intensified, and the Sydney
Trades Hall reds modified their initial opposition. Their express-
76ions of approval for the minority view, at first qualified,' became 
77more definite after all hope of retaining moderate elements had
73
74
75
76
77
The most vocal minority leftists, members of the Melbourne-based 
Workers' International Industrial Union, had criticised the O.B.U. 
constitution of August 1918. They claimed that the 'sections' were 
really refurbished craft unions • See above p. and also the pamphlet 
Revolutionary Industrial Unionism. Tactics and Plan of The 
Workers' International Industrial Union. Published by the Literat­
ure and Education Bureau of the Workers' International Industrial 
Union. Melbourne. Victoria. Sept.1918.
'Preamble, Classification and Rules of the Workers' Industrial 
Union of Australia, Adopted at the All-Australian Trades Union 
Conference'. Melbourne, Jan.1919*
The One Big Union Herald, Mar.1919*
See Report of the N.S.W. executive of the One Big Union to the 
N.S.W. Congress, 28 and 29 March 1919; and the One Big Union 
Herald, 30 April 1919> where the minority left claimed the official 
One Big Union in Victoria had agreed that, after a certain date 
on which a ballot was to be held on the O.B.U., the O.B.U. would 
no longer officially 'recognise' any trade union. The O.B.U. 
would go 'to the Job...and organise the workers...on the MSIS 
of SHOP or JOB; branches'. A similar statement from J.S, Garden 
drew a public official disavowal from the executive of the One 
Big Union. Workshop committees, said the executive, were intended 
only to spread propaganda on behalf of the One Big Union, and were 
not meant to be part of that body.
By August 1920, the rules of the One Big Union were amended to 
give 'sections' uniting all 'wage workers in an industry* greater 
scope in controlling their own affairs (Minutes, General Meeting 
of the Hotel, Club, Restaurant and Caterers' Employees’ Union,
3 Aug.1920).
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v a n is h e d .  But n e i t h e r  th e  o f f i c i a l  l e f t  n o r  th e  m in o r i ty  l e f t
e n v isa g e d  th e  shop b ran ch  o r  shop committee as  b e in g  used  in  c o n n ec t io n
w ith  s t r i k e s .  In  F e b ru a ry  1919 th e  o f f i c i a l  l e f t  d e c la re d ;
DIRECT SHOP ACTION i s  an  im p o ss ib le  p r o p o s i t i o n  
a t  p r e s e n t ,  p r i m a r i l y  because  u n i t y  i s  consp icuous  
by i t s  a b s e n c e . . .
I n  u r g in g  'NO STARVATION STRIKES', th e  o f f i c i a l  l e f t  obse rv ed ;
I t  may be t h a t  shop o r g a n i s a t i o n  w il l  no t  come 
p ro m in en tly  i n t o  a c t i o n  when th e  One B ig Union i s  
f i r m ly  e s t a b l i s h e d ,  and t h a t  Mass-Movement w i l l  
be found  more e x p e d ie n t .
The argum ent was t h a t  s t r i k e s  m ight w e l l  be av o id ed  a l t o g e t h e r  as
em ployers would be so im p ressed  by th e  fo rm a l  s t r e n g t h  o f  the  One Big
78Union t h a t  th e y  would o f f e r  no r e s i s t a n c e  to  un ion  demands. These
argum ents were d i r e c t e d  a g a i n s t  s t i l l - s t r o n g  a p p ro v a l  o f  the  t a c t i c s  of
the  g ao led  and d i s p e r s e d  C h ic a g o - i te  I.W.W. members, and a g a in s t  rank
and f i l e  sympathy f o r  ' d i r e c t  a c t i o n ' ,  r a t h e r  th an  a g a in s t  the
DeLeonite W .I . I .U .  i n  A u s t r a l i a .  The l a t t e r  made t h e i r  d is a p p ro v a l
of s t r i k e s  and t h e i r  p r e fe re n c e  f o r  v a r i e t i e s  o f  'p a s s iv e  s t r i k e '
( f o r  exam ple, th e  ' g o - s l o w - o n - t h e - j o b ' ) ,  v e ry  c l e a r  from th e  s t a r t .
The W . I . I .U . ,  th ey  c la im e d ,  ' a t  a l l  t im es  seek s  to  av o id  the  n e c e s s i t y  
80
of a s t r i k e ' •
78 O .B .U ., 1 F e b .1919.
R e v o lu t io n a ry  I n d u s t r i a l  U nionism , p.19« See a l s o  Preamble and 
C o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  th e  W . I . I . U . ,  1917» Newtdjn, N.S.W. A r t i c l e  2, 
S e c t io n  e le v e n ,  ' S t r i k e  and L ockout* .
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By the middle of 1919» 0» Schreiber, an influential union
secretary, had resigned editorship of the Q.B.U. newspaper, and unions
who had previously endorsed the One Big Union now formally refused
to pay their dues. Thus by September, Hound Table could write of the
8l‘virtual failure* of the One Big Union movement. The tide of battle 
had turned disastrously against the left in the political arena, and 
this sharply affected the course of the industrial aspect of that 
battle. Yet even without this disaster, other directly industrial 
influences were at work to destroy the One Big Union. The craft officials 
feared for their jobs, and the A.W.U. had its own plans to become the 
One Big Union, And no one prominent in the O.B.U. attempted to give 
the One Big Union a meaning for the rank and file unionist in terms of 
his immediate struggles.
The One Big Union September,1919-May,1924 
After 1919» there was little further rank and file interest 
in the One Big Union movement, save amongst the shearers and shed 
hands. In 1921 the One Big Union appears to have experienced a renaiss­
ance, but it was extremely short-lived and the rebirth stirred little 
interest outside the ranks of officials.
81 Vol.10,1919-1920, p.171
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Nevertheless the movement did show some sign of life during its
’dark ages’ in late 1919 and 1920. A group of old-established militants
achieved considerable success for the One Big Union in the A.W.U.,
while anti-official resentment flared up at the A.W.U. annual
82.
conference of 1920, and came to a head because officials were be­
lieved to have accepted unfavourable award conditions for the year 
1920-21. Directed by non-official, non-Communist militants, a 
strike for higher wages broke out, and at its finish, the One Big 
Union made some headway amongst shearers and shed hands.^ In August 
1920, a ballot held in the New South Wales branch of the Federated
Ironworkers’ Association resulted in a majority in favour of the One 
65Big Union, and in the same month, the Central Council of the Water­
side Workers’ Federation adopted the O.B.U. constitution, while a
A.W., 8 Apr.; E. Lane, op.cit., p.239*
^  For example, shearers and shed-hands at Merri-Merrigal station,
near Hillston, N.3.W., sent out a circular containing a resolution 
of no confidence in officials on the grounds of poor conditions. 
These and other shearers planned a conference of shed represent­
atives for 29 December, 1920, in Sydney. They invited as chairman 
left-winger J. Cullinan, former leader of the militant "Western 
branch of the A.W.U. (This branch had been recently dissolved on 
the casting vote of the chairman of the Sydney branch, par- 
- liamentarian Arthur Blakely.) On the Merri-Merrigal, and other 
sheds, the Evening News commented: ’The A.W.U. is said to be 
exceedingly anxious over the situation.’ (21 Sept.1920).
J O.B.U., Auga 1920. The union’s federal president ruled that the 
ballot result was invalid (ibid.).
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ballot in the Sydney branch approved the One Big Union. In October
1920, the New South Wales miners decided to adopt the O.B.U. constitu- 
87tion and they became the only organisation to take its name, being 
called to this day the Mining Department of the Workers’ Industrial 
Union of Australia*
Early in 1921 the A.W.U. sponsored a conference of delegates
from the waterside workers, miners, seamen and railwaymen, and this
seems to have marked a reversal in the A.W.U.'s attitude, from
distaste for the O.B.U., to sympathy. Consequently Garden sounded a
most conciliatory note in commenting on the A.W.U. leaders:
...the only proposition put before the A.W.U.
was that it should take its place at the head of
the rural workers and pastoral departments of the O.B.U.
He considered that this could be arranged quite simply 
without the A.W.U. losing any of its identity, or any 
loss of status by the officials. £ my emphasis, m Tr T j 88
To a further conference on 1 March came delegates from the coal
miners, the Meat Industry Employees Union, the Australian Workers'
86
87
88
Minutes, General Meeting, 31 March 1920.
Minutes, central committee of the miners* federation, 22 Oct.1919 
Daily Telegraph, 2 Feb.1921.
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Union and t h e  A u s t r a l i a n  R a i lw ay s 1 Union;  th e  seamen p r e s e n t e d
89
a p o l o g i e s  as t h e i r  o f f i c i a l s  were busy e l s e w h e re .  The March con fe rence
ag reed  t h a t  a new b a l l o t  was to  be ta k e n  December 31 1921,  and the
agenda committee to  a r r a n g e  th e  b a l l o t  compri sed  A.C. W i l l i s ,  of  the
miners* f e d e r a t i o n ,  W. Smith o f  the  Railways* Union,  and A. B lake ly
o f  t h e  A u s t r a l i a n  Workers* Union. The March c o n fe r e n c e  a l s o  approved
a c o n s t i t u t i o n  headed by t h e  o ld  *r e v o l u t i o n a r y * pream ble ,  bu t  i n s t e a d
of  i t s  fo rmer  t i t l e  ( ’The Workers* I n d u s t r i a l  Union of  A u s t r a l i a * )  th e
90one b ig  un ion  was now t o  be c a l l e d  ’The A u s t r a l a s i a n  Workers* Union*.
And, as  i f  t o  show t h a t  t h e  ’ r e v o l u t i o n a r y ’ p ream ble ,  bu t  i n s t e a d
o f  i t s  former  t i t l e  ( ’ The Workers* I n d u s t r i a l  Union o f  A u s t r a l i a * )  th e
90one b ig  un ion  was now to be c a l l e d  ’The A u s t r a l a s i a n  Workers’ Union*.
And, as  i f  to  show t h a t  th e  ’ r e v o lu t i o n a r y *  preamble  need b o th e r  no 
one,  a n a t i o n a l i s t  ’ White A u s t r a l i a ’ c l a u s e  was added,  exc lud ing  
’ Chinese ,  J a p a n e s e ,  Kanakas,  o r  co lo u re d  a l i e n s * .
As we w i l l  see i n  t h e  fo l l o w i n g  c h a p t e r ,  a Communist P a r ty  
formed i n  December 1920 q u ic k ly  s p l i t  i n t o  two s e p a r a t e  o r g a n i s a t i o n s ,  
th e  ’ Sussex S t r e e t  C.P.* and t h e  ’ L ive rpoo l  S t r e e t  C .P .* .  The Trades 
H a l l  r e d s  i n h a b i t e d  t h e  Sussex S t r e e t  C.P.  as  a de f a c t o  autonomous 
group.  A w r i t e r  in  t h e  o f f i c i a l  o rg an ,  t h e  A u s t r a l i a n  Communist, qu ick ly  
condemned the  March O.B.U. c o n s t i t u t i o n ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  f o r  c l a u s e s  which 
the  p a p e r  claimed would ’ do away with  rank and f i l e  c o n t r o l  and p l a c e  
the  whole movement in  t h e  hands  o f  a few e x e c u t i v e  o f f i c e r s  to run
The seamen were a t t e n d i n g  m ee t ings  o f  th e  ’Manning Committee.*
(See below, p .1 3 2 ,  143).
A u s t r a l a s i a n  Workers ’ Union,  C o n s t i t u t i o n  and General  Rules 1922-23. 
Sydney,  1922.
46
91as they like'. Earlier, Garden and the other Trades Hall reds in
leading positions in the O.B.U. had formally endorsed the 'shop branch'
and the idea of rank and file control. However, now they paid no
attention to criticism from either the Sussex Street C.P. or its
rival, and fully supported the March constitution. They played a
prominent part in the All-Australian Trades Union Conference of June
1921; and they supported the One Big Union constitution put up at 
92that conference. That constitution was the one drawn up in March 
1921; its provisions on rank and file initiative as to strikes were 
substantially those the Trade Hall left had sponsored in August,1918.
Three separate questions now need to be explained. Firstly, 
why did the Australian Workers' Union change its attitude to the One 
Big Union project? If the Waterside Workers' Federation, the Aust­
ralian Railways' Union, the Meat Industry Employees' Union and the 
Seamen's Union ( in all of which there was widespread rank and file 
militancy) were to be drawn into negotiations with the arch-conservative 
officials of the A.W.U., the way would have to be shown by a powerful 
man of outstanding militant reputation; the man almost uniquely fitted 
to constitute a 'bridge' between the A.W.U. and the rest was A.C. Willis, 
the miners’ secretary. Our second question, then, is this: why did
^  The a— a— Bttarx Communist, 3 June 1921.
Official Report of the All-Australian Trades Union Conference, 
Melbourne, June 20-25,1921.
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A.C. Willis join forces with the A.W.U.? The third question: By 1921, 
the Trades Hall reds were ostensibly converts to the 'shop-committee1 
view of the One Big Union. Why did they support the 1921 O.B.U. 
constitutions which were based on craft-sections, and which also 
contained 'White-Australia' provisions abhorrent to the reds' inter­
nationalism?
As the year 1921 opened, the Australian Workers' Union found
itself plagued more sorely then ever by its own militants, who drew
93nourishment from the One Big Union. Hence - to put the matter in
federal Labor parliamentarian James Catts's colourful, if vulgar words:
For two years the A.W.U. has bitterly fought the I.W.W.- 
O.B.U. Then the guerilla, white ant methods 'of the O.B.U.’ 
worried the A.W.U., and the latter decided to grease its 
throat well and swallow the O.B.U. 94
Yet this does not give the whole explanation, for neither 'greasing'
nor 'swallowing' began until the A.W.U. had satisfied itself that the
omens were propitious; for one thing, the A.W.U. could not digest the
'shop-committee' approach (emanating, it believed, from 'disruptive
\95revolutionary elements')  ^nor could it stomach internationalism.
yj For rank and file discontent with A.W.U. leaders, see E. Lane.op.cit., 
pp.208,239*241-2; P.S. Cleary, president of the Catholic Federation, 
ascribed the union's interest in the O.B.U. to the increase of 
non-shearers within it. (The One Big Union. Will it Emancipate the 
Worker?)Membership declined owing to discontent. See Comm.ParLDeb., 
vol.XCIX, p.199, 6 July 1922; International Communist, 12 Feb.1921.
^  The Vanguard, I, No.l, 26 Sept.,1921. R.S. Ross Coll.
95 See the pamphlet Solidarity or Sectionalism. A Plea for Unity, by 
P.H. Hickey, Australian Workers' Union, Queensland, Branch,
Brisbane,1918«
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But in fact, before sitting down to its meal with the devil, the 
A.W.U. had assured itself of a very long spoon.
Well before 1921, A.C. Willis, powerful secretary of the 
miners’ union, had decided that there was no future for the Industrial 
Socialist Labor Party, the ’breakaway’. Now Willis wanted above all 
to get back into the Australian Labor Party and, if possible, retain 
the privileges associated with continuity of membership, though he 
had broken this continuity. For this, Willis had to have the good­
will of the A.W.U. He knew of the A.W.U.*s empire-building designs 
upon his and other unions, but thought he could handle this. For 
their part, the hierarchs of the A.W.U. knew Willis to be no friend of 
'local autonomy'. The new constitution adopted by the miners, in 
declaring themselves the 'Mining Department of the Workers' Industrial
Union of Australia', was marked by increased central control over
9 6districts and lodges in respect of finance and strikes; if the A.W.U. 
officials had not in any case already known Willis's approach to local 
autonomy, this would have set their minds at rest. Thus the A.W.U. 
made its first overtures to Willis^a man who appeared safe for their 
purposes while enjoying a valuable reputation as a militant.
By 1920, the Trades Hall reds were beginning to lose interest 
in the One Big Union, turning their attention to the task of forming 
a Communist party. Closely studying Comintern discussions with the 
syndicalists, they noted that, for Bolsheviks, industrial unions were
Rules and Constitution of the Workers' Industrial Union of 
Australia (Mining Department), Sydney,1921. (Ferguson Coll.)
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adjuncts to a struggle for proletarian power which was to be waged
essentially on the political level. So the Trades Hall reds in
New South Wales came to reject the One Big Union as syndicalist and
impossible to achieve, and to re-examine the idea of industrial unions.
They also seriously reconsidered their position in relation to the
A.L.P. A good many of the Trades Hall reds had been in the A.L.P.
97before the breakaway in 1919» while fellow union officials and union 
associates were often connected with the A.L.P. The Trades Hall reds 
could therefore see clearly the advantages of good relations with 
or membership of the A.L.P. Their view drew considerable opposition 
from fellow Communists, but the Trades Hall reds formed a tightly- 
knit and extremely influential group within the early Communist 
parties, and they pressed quietly ahead with their own policy regard­
less of opposition.
As early as November 1920, steps were announced in preparation
for the holding of a special All—Australian Trades Union conference
to draw up a new policy for the A.L.P., and this seemed promising to
98the Trades Hall reds. Among the Communists of both parties, many 
received news of the conference with indifference or hostility, but 
the Trades Hall reds hoped to use it to urge the case for industrial 
unionism, to push the mass party to the left, to set under way a
For example, J.S. Garden, J. Howie (Labor Council president),
H. Denford, A. McPherson, A. Kutherford, R. Webster, H. Dessaix, 
J.J. Graves.
The Socialist, 26 Nov. 1920.98
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cam paign  f o r  Communist a f f i l i a t i o n  w i th  th e  A .L .P .  ( ' a  u n i t e d  f r o n t
\ 99o f  a l l  w o rk in g  c l a s s  p a r t i e s ' ) ,  and  t o  w in ,  a t  l e a s t  f o r  th e  l e s s  
p ro m in e n t  o f  th o s e  e x p e l l e d  f o l l o w i n g  th e  1919 b reak a w ay ,  th e  r i g h t  
o f  r e - e n t r y  t o  th e  A .L .P .
So g r e a t  was A.W.U. i n f l u e n c e  i n  th e  A . L . P . ,  t h a t  th e
Sydney T rad e s  H a l l  r e d s  c o u ld  hope t o  a c h ie v e  none o f  t h e i r  g o a l s
i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  th e  A .L .P .  i f  th e  A.W.U. s e t  i t s  f a c e  a g a i n s t  them .
Thus th e  T ra d e s  H a l l  r e d s  made no c r i t i c i s m  o f  th e  March c o n s t i t u t i o n
o f  th e  One B ig  U n io n ,  n o r  o f  t h e  A .W .U ., a t  th e  A l l - A u s t r a l i a n  T rad e s
Union C o n fe ren c e  i n  l a t e  June  1921* In d e e d ,  J . S .  Garden s a i d  to
A. B la k e ly ,  l e a d i n g  A.W.U. spokesm an:
I  r e a l i s e  t h e r e  i s  v e r y  l i t t l e  d i f f e r e n c e  b e tw een  
u s .  I n  t h e  l a s t  two y e a r s  we have b een  " a t  one 
a n o t h e r "  i n s t e a d  o f  g e t t i n g  down to  b u s i n e s s . . .  100
By December 1921, th e  T rad e s  H a l l  r e d s  had i n t r o d u c e d  to
th e  Labor C o u n c i l  a  scheme f o r  i n d u s t r i a l  u n io n ism  w hich  was c l o s e
i n  s p i r i t  t o  K av an ag h 's  m u c h -sco rn e d  p r o p o s a l  o f  1 9 1 7 But ,
u n l i k e  K av an ag h 's  p r o p o s a l s ,  th e  C om m unists ' b l u e p r i n t  now o p e n ly
p ro c la im e d  t h a t  s u c c e s s  depended  above a l l  on th e  g o o d w il l  o f
e x i s t i n g  o f f i c i a l s .  The need  t o  s e c u r e  th e  ' c o o p e r a t i o n  o f  th e  T rade
F o r  C om in te rn  v iew s  on Communists and  th e  B r i t i s h  L abor P a r t y ,  
1919 -1921 , s e e  below  a t  pp.95 -9 8 .
O f f i c i a l  R e p o r t  o f  th e  A l l - A u s t r a l i a n  T rad es  Union C o n fe re n c e ,  
June  20toto 25*» 1 9 2 1 ,p#8 .
See p .18  o f  t h i s  c h a p t e r .101
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Union S e c r e t a r i e s ,  o r g a n i s e r s ,  e t c ’ , w as , th e y  c la im e d ,  th e  ‘c a r d i n a l
102p o i n t ’ i n  t h e i r  schem e; i n  p r e s e n t i n g  th e  p la n  to  p a r t i c u l a r  g ro u p s  
o f  u n i o n s ,  th e  L abor C o u n c i l  e x e c u t iv e  a l s o  s t r e s s e d  i t s  r o l e  i n  
p r e v e n t i n g  th e  i n i t i a t i o n  and  s p r e a d  o f  s t r i k e s . L u r i n g  th e  
Labor C o u n c i l  d e b a te  on t h e i r  b l u e p r i n t ,  t h e  Communists were c h a rg e d  by 
s y n d i c a l i s t  and  o t h e r  c r i t i c s  on t h e i r  l e f t  w i th  a b a n d o n in g  th e  r a n k  
and  f i l e .  I n  r e p l y ,  G arden a l l e g e d l y  ‘p ro c la im e d  h i s  unbounded co n tem p t 
f o r  th e  “ i n t e l l i g e n c e  o f  th e  m a s s e s “ , and  rem a rk ed  t h a t  i f  we w ere t o
See E x e c u t iv e  M in u te s ,  Labor C o u n c i l , 13 D e c .1921. T h is  r e v e r s i o n  
o f  t h e  T rad e s  H a l l  r e d s  t o  a  p o s i t i o n  c l o s e  t o  t h a t  o f  th e  
c o n s e r v a t i v e  Kavanagh i n  1917 d e s e r v e s  c a r e f u l  d o c u m e n ta t io n ,  
b e c a u s e  i t  r u n s  so  much a g a i n s t  w hat one m igh t e x p e c t : ‘Your 
E x e c u t iv e  i s  aw are  t h a t  th e  main d i s c u s s i o n  w i l l  c e n t r e  ro u n d  th e  
t h r e e  y e a r s  c o n t r a c t  f o r  t h e  r e t e n t i o n  o f  th e  s e r v i c e s  o f  th e  
e x i s t i n g  T rade  U nion  o f f i c i a l s ,  and  em phasis  i s , . . l a id  upon th e  
n e c e s s i t y  o f  s e c u r i n g  th e  w i l l i n g  an d  a b l e  a s s i s t a n c e  o f  th o s e  
who know e v e ry  d e t a i l  o f  e x i s t i n g  o r g a n i s a t i o n . . . There i s  l i t t l e  
do u b t t h a t  I n d u s t r i a l  U nionism  would,..have m a t e r i a l i s e d  had  th e  
movement b een  a s s u r e d  o f  th e  a c t i v e  c o o p e r a t io n  o f  th e  T rade 
Union S e c r e t a r i e s ,  o r g a n i s e r s ,  e t c .  I t  i s  th e  r e a l i s a t i o n  t h a t  
t h i s  c o o p e r a t i o n  i s  p r e - r e q u i s i t e  f o r  t h e  r e - o r g a n i s a t i o n
o f  th e  T rade  Union Movement w hich  b r i n g s  th e  p r o p o s a l s  o f  y o u r  
E x e c u t iv e  f rom  th e  r e a lm  o f  th e o r y  down to  t h e  c o n c r e te  f a c t s  o f  
th e  e x i s t i n g  s i t u a t i o n .  T h is  i s  th e  c a r d i n a l  p o i n t  o f  o u r  
p r o p o s a l s . '  The members o f  th e  su b -c o m m it te e  who drew up th e s e  
p r o p o s a l s  i n  th e  f i r s t  p la c e  were t h r e e  o u t s t a n d i n g  r e d s :  J . S .  
G arden , J . J .  G ra v e s ,  and  J . K i lb u rn  (Exec . M in u te s ,  L a b .C o u n c i l ,  
29 N o v .1 9 2 l ) .  B oth  Graves and  K i lb u rn  were d e e p ly  i n f l u e n c e d  by 
G arden . W hile K i lb u r n  was n o t  a member o f  th e  Communist p a r t y ,  
he p ro c la im e d  h im s e l f  a member o f  th e  'Communist g ro u p ' a t  th e  
A l l - A u s t r a l i a n  T rad e s  Union C o n fe ren c e  (O f f i c i a l  R e p o r t , p . 2 l ) .
103 E x e c u t iv e  C o u n c i l  M in u te s ,  B ak ing  T rad e s  E m ployees ' F e d e r a t i o n  
o f  A u s t r a l a s i a ,  Sydney b r a n c h ,  8 Mar. 1921.
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wait for Industrial Unionism until the rank and file bring it into 
being, we should wait till the Second Coming, or words to that effect'.^^ 
In fact, from early 1921, the leading Trades Hall reds had had very 
little to say about the rank and file’s role in building industrial 
unionism. Instead, they displayed considerable sympathy for the 
viewpoint of non-Communist fellow union officials, and an insensitivity, 
remarkable for Communists in those early days, towards the outlook 
and the needs of the rank and file.
The One Big Union movement itself was abandoned to the non- 
Communist officials, each trying to preserve or extend the influence of 
his own organisation. And so the door was opened to those wretched 
squabbles which were to mark the formal collapse of the whole project.
Throughout 1921 and 1922, officials met and conferred over
105the establishment of the One Big Union, now styled ’The Australasian 
Workers' Union’, At first, there were great h o p e s . I n  1921, 
a plebiscite commanded by that year’s A.W.U. convention approved the 
One Big Union by 18,000 votes to 4,000, and the organisational structure 
of the new body began to take shape. The first serious sign of trouble 
came in mid-1922 when the A.W.U., about to issue tickets for the One 
Big Union (the Australasian Workers' Union), announced it had been
Direct Action, vol.l, no.3, Feb.1922.
For an account of some conferences, see Common Cause, 17 Feb.1922; 
28 Apr.1922.
106 For example, Common Cause, 3 Mar.1922
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legally advised that such a ticket issue would mean 'the union would
go out of existence, leaving the whole of the assets in the hands of
107the trustees with no power of transference.••' Thus there was a
delay while each amalgamating union tabulated its assets in preparation
for their transfer to the One Big Union. But shortly after this came
the difficulty over registration in the Commonwealth Arbitration
Court, which finally precipitated the collapse of such desultory
official negotiations as now limped on. A Provisional Council Meeting
on 29 September 1922 instructed the O.B.U.'s general secretary (Senator
Barnes, of the Australian Workers' Union) to make application for
108registration in the Commonwealth Court. The Registrar had no ob-
109jection, but suspicion and rumours were rife amongst the unions, 
a further application before the Court on 4 September 1923 was incon­
clusive, and by this time inter-union recrimination was particularly 
f i e r c e . W h e n ,  on 6 May 1924» a further Court application was 
rejected because of opposition from a large group of unions,efforts 
virtually collapsed.
In setting down explanations for the failure of the One Big 
Union, V.G. Childe, E.J. Brady, and E.H. Lane divide the blame between
107
108
109
110 
111
Ibid., 2 June 1922.
O.B.U. Why It Failed! Sydney,1924. p6. 
Common Cause, 23 Feb.,1923*
Ibid., 25 May 1923*
For the list, see O.B.U. Why It Failed! p.12
54
the drive to power of the A.W.U. hierarchs, craft officials’ fear 
of losing their jobs, and the machinations of conservatively-inclined 
politicians. Louise Overacker endorses this explanation."^" One
can hardly deny the importance of such reasons, but more can be given.
The One Big Union as such could never have succeeded, because 
it was a syndicalist utopia; whether one agrees with Elie Halevy that 
syndicalism was
h doctrine which really open £ed *~| a new era in the history 
of socialism and which lacked only a prophet of the stature 
of Karl Marx to be appreciated as it deserved.
or with Schumpeters
unlike Marxism or Eabianism^yndicalismi cannot be espoused 
by anyone afflicted by any trace of economic or socio­
logical training. There is no rationale for it. 114
one can admit that, as one of the mainstreams of labor thought, syndical­
ism was doomed, suffering its death blow, no doubt, in the triumph of the 
Bolshevik view in 1917» But if the One Big Union were an utopia, the 
idea of industrial unionism was not.
The left-wing officials had chosen to work for the cause 
of the One Big Union from within existing unions; unlike, for example,
Childe, op.cit.,pp.65-66; Brady, 'The 1921 Decision* in 'The Red 
Objective' n.d., E.J. Brady Papers, 206/14, A.N.L.; Lane, op.cit., 
253. By contrast, H.E. Boote put the blame on the rank and 
file (O.B.U. Why It FailedQ.'The explanation is provided by 
the apathy, indifference and ignorance of the mass of the workers.’
The Australian Party System, p.129.
•L'Ere des Tyrannies; etudes sur le socialisme et la guerre'
(Paris, 1938,p.177)» Quoted in Val Lorwins The French Labor 
Movement, Massachusetts, 1954» P*35? J*A. Schumpeter,
Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, p.339»
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the early American Communists, they had not alienated the goodwill of
the union rank and file by asking that it build up industrial unions
on the ruins of existing unions. Partly for this reason, the left-wing
officials retained the respect of the rank and file, and kept their
own official positions in those unions. Thus, if the left had wished
to take at least some first steps in building industrial unions as
effective weapons in the trade union struggles of New South Wales, there
were useful materials to hand: first, there was a widespread rank and
file militancy over wages and hours; second, there were shop-committees 
115in existence and, more important, a climate of opinion favourable 
to the spread of further shop-committees. But despite their short lived 
period of lip-service to the idea of building the One Big Union through
In the Sydney metal trades, the Stove Moulders Union and the Sheet 
Metal Working Industrial Union participated in shop committees. 
(N.S.W. Ind.Arb.Rep.,vol.18,1919«P»40-42: Minutes of the executive 
committee of the Sheet Metal Working Industrial Union, N.S.W. branch, 
11 Sept.1919)» There was a shop committee at the Randwick Railway 
Workshops, Sydney. (Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry into 
the Proposed Reduction of the Standard Working Week from 48 to 
44 hours,N.S.W. ParL.Pap.vol.il,1920,p.1242,1244)• There 
were shop (or, as they were called, 'job') committees among marine 
transport unions: such a 'job' committee, on a given ship, cut 
across the barriers imposed by the existence of many marine trans­
port unions (Marine Cooks' Union, Marine Stewards' Union, Seamen's 
Union) and provided a large-as-life example of an industrial union. 
'Lodge' control had long plagued the leaders of the Miners' 
Federation. There were shop-committees in the meat industry in 
several states. For an account, no doubt idealised, of an effective 
shop-committee, see Job Control published by the Literature Bureau 
of the Workers' International Industrial Union, Aust. Administrat­
ion, South Melbourne 1919* Here, the composition, method of election 
and activities of the 'board of control* at the Adelaide Metro­
politan Abattoirs is discussed. There were shop-committees, usually 
comprising five men, in at least 16 furniture trade establishments 
in New South Wales (see Minutes, Board of Management of the 
Furniture Trades Society of New South Wales, April,1919» "to April, 
1920). There were also shop-committees at some Victorian timber 
works (One Big Union Herald, 28 May 1919)*
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shop-committees, the Sydney Trades Hall reds gave little if any 
thought to the possible use of shop-committees in everyday trade union 
affairs. Yet because a shop committee unites all workers in a given 
shop irrespective of skill, it is an industrial union in miniature - 
and the Trades Hall reds were pledged to the cause of industrial 
unionism.
The unions might have made at least a partial use of shop-
committees in the wages and forty four hours campaigns of 1919 and
1920; indeed, one particular union announced that it would use and
further develop a fairly widespread shop-committee network in its
117own industry as the basis for its campaign on hours. The Sydney
ll8Trades Hall reds held sufficiently strong official positions 
and there was strong enough feeling among the rank and file, to have 
stimulated industry-wide campaigns, extensively implicating the rank 
and file by means of existing shop-committees and, more important, 
by means of new ones thrown up in the course of the campaign. Had 
such campaigns turned out even tolerably well, they would have given 
the rank and file a vivid illustration of the immediate advantages 
of industrial unionism. As it was, the Trades Hall reds largely 
directed their efforts to build industrial unions towards fellow 
officials - and ten years later the cause of industrial unionism had 
advanced little, if at all.
See above p. 40.
Minutes, Board of Management, N.S.W. branch of the Furniture 
Trades* Society, 1 Oct. 1919*
For details of these positions, see the Appendix to chapter 2.118
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During these years the Sydney Trades Hr.11 reds were 
enthusiastic advocates of the idea of confining t: ' ;s to the 
narrowest possible area,. Had the reds called uwon the rank 
to use existing shop-committees and throw up new ones in the hours 
es igns of those years, the result might v< ;ily
have been to stimulate the rank and file to go beyond the ’confined1 
industrial strategy sponsored by the reds and (given the militant 
mood of* the rank and file) to indulge in ’extended’ strikes. However, 
the Sydney Trades Hall reds believed that extended strikes would be 
disastrous, and. hence the27- had little reason to encourage the growth 
of shop-committees.
In forming their picture of the One Big Union, the rank 
and file would be inclined to look for evidence not so much in a 
written constitution as in the words, attitudes and deeds of the O.B.U. 
spokesmen. Tve Trades Hall red~ left no o^e in pp”vt of their attitude 
to strikes. As unions then stood, the right to strike was in the hands 
o-p union leaders directly -pesoonsible to and dependent for their 
jobs upon the rank and file. In the centralised O.B.U. scheme, a 
further and possibly decisive step was interposed between the wishes 
of the rank and file and the authority sanctioning their expression. 
Thus the O.B.U. hammered strikes in this way - and this was seen as 
vital and valid by right and left wing officials alike.
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W hile th e  Trades H all re d s  had no cho ice  h u t to  abandon th e  
One B ig U nion, th e y  m ight have done f a r  more ab o u t d ev e lo p in g  in d u s t r ia l ,  
u n io n ism , had th e y  o r ie n te d  th e i r  work tow ards th e  rank  and f i l e  r a th e r  than  
tow ards t h e i r  fe llo w  o f f i c i a l s .  But fo r  the re d s  to  do t h i s ,  th ey  would have 
had to  be i n d u s t r i a l  m i l i t a n ts  as w ell as p o l i t i c a l  r a d i c a l s .
Why Were the  Trades H all Reds B u re a u c ra tic ?
A f te r  th e  c o n sc r ip tio n  campaigns o f  1917 were o v e r , th e  g e n e ra l 
s t r i k e  d e fe a te d  and th e  C h icago ite  I.W.W* le a d e r s  g a o le d , th e re  was a  l u l l  
on th e  i n d u s t r i a l  f r o n t  u n t i l  1919* During 1918, a s  has been  s a id ,  a  new 
g ro u p in g  o f  th e  l e f t ’s le a d e rsh ip  took p la ce  in  Sydney, around J .S .  Garden 
and o th e r  u n io n i s t s .  Many gained  p la ces  o f  r e a l  in f lu e n c e  in  t h e i r  un ions 
d u rin g  o r  a s  a  r e s u l t  o f th e  ferm ent of 1917, b u t a l l  save Thomas Walsh o f 
th e  Seam en 's Union adopted th e  confined s t r i k e  t a c t i c  w herever th e y  co u ld .
Why? They b e l ie v e d  and s ty le d  them selves re d s  and, in  1920, Communists, 
and i t  was an o b i t e r  d ic ta  o f  the in te r n a t io n a l  communist movement to  u se  
ex tended  s t r i k e s ,  i f  a n y th in g , in  p re fe ren c e  to  co n fined  s t r i k e s ,  and to  draw 
th e  m asses in to  c u r re n t  communist campaigns by l in k in g  th e se  w ith  g o a ls  
a c t u a l l y  o f  moment to  th e  rank  and f i l e .  The Sydney T rades H a ll  re d s  were 
'd e v i a t i o n i s t s ' , th e n , in  in d u s t r i a l  m a tte rs . In  th e  te rm in o lo g y  o f  th e  
la b o r  movement, th ey  a c te d  in  a b u re a u c ra tic  and in  a  c o n s e rv a t iv e  way in  
i n d u s t r i a l  a f f a i r s .
One can argue th a t  most, i f  n o t a l l ,  th e  in f lu e n c e s  a t  work a ro se  
i n  one way o r  a n o th e r  from th e  Trades H all r e d s ' 'e n v iro n m e n t '.  For th e  
p u rp o ses  o f  a n a ly s i s ,  such in f lu e n c e s  a re  reg a rd ed  as  'd e te rm in e d ' in f lu e n c e s ,  
a s  opposed to  'a c c i d e n ta l '  in f lu e n c e s .
The re d s  were union o f f i c i a l s ,  r a th e r  than  ra n k  and f i l e  members,
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so t h a t  t h e i r  jo b s  p re d isp o se d  them to the q u ie t  l i f e  o f  th e  o f f i c e .  Dominant 
am ongst them was th e  a t t i t u d e  no t only o f the  o f f i c i a l ,  b u t o f  th e  c r a f t  
u n io n  o f f i c i a l ,  ensconced as  they  were in  the w o r ld -a p a r t  o f  th e  Sydney 
T rades H a ll .  The Sydney Trades H all dominated th e  Sydney u n io n  movement 
and , as th e  c e n t r e  o f  c r a f t  union in f lu e n c e , i t  had on th e  w hole been an 
in f lu e n c e  tow ards p re v e n tin g  and con fin ing  s t r i k e s .  When th e  re d s  took  over 
c o n tro l  o f  th e  Sydney Labor C ouncil, they took over i t s  i n d u s t r i a l  t r a d i t i o n s  
which were shaped in  no sm all degree by y e a rs  o f f ig h t in g  i n d u s t r i a l  b a t t l e s  
th rough  th e  a r b i t r a t i o n  c o u r ts .  Other in f lu e n c e s  a r i s i n g  from  th e  A u s tr a l ia n  
env ironm ent may be s e t  down: A u s t r a l ia 's  u n f a m i l ia r i ty  w ith  w ar, t r a d i t i o n s  
o f  p r o s p e r i ty ,  th e  a r b i t r a t i o n  system , the s p e c ia l  p la c e  u n io n s  had in  th e  
a l t e r n a t i v e  p a r ty  o f  governm ent. Yet between 1916 and 1919 th e r e  w ere o th e r  
'd e te rm in e d ' in f lu e n c e s  a r i s i n g  from the  environm ent which o f f s e t  o r  c o u n te r-  
posed th o se  making fo r  re d  conservatism .
•/Then jo in e d  w ith  c l  a s s - s t ru g g le  id e o lo g y , th e  h ig h  s ta n d a rd  o f 
l i v in g  can be such a  c o u n te rp o s im  in f lu e n c e , h e lp in g , as  i t  d id ,  to  c r e a te  and 
deepen i n d u s t r i a l  m i l i ta n c y  which in  i t s e l f  c o n s t i tu te d  a  f u r th e r  in f lu e n c e .
T his was i n t e n s i f i e d  by th e  e f f e c t s  o f  the  I r i s h  r e b e l l io n  and th e  re d  O cto b er, 
and a ls o  by th e  w inning o f  th e  a n t i - c o n s c r ip t io n  s t r u g g le s .
G iven th e  i n t e r p la y  o f environm ental o r  'd e te rm in e d ' in f lu e n c e s ,  
some o f w hich made fo r  co n serv a tism  and o th e rs  o f which m i l i t a t e d  a g a in s t  i t ,  
one needs a ls o  to  c o n s id e r  an ' a c c id e n ta l ' in f lu e n c e  -  th e  rem oval from th e  
la b o r  scene o f th e  C h ic ag o ite  I .  ".W. du rin g  c ru c ia l  y e a r s .
Chicago I.W.W. we re  the  men w ith  th e  mass touch  and th e  m ost e f f e c t iv e  
mass t i e s ,  d e s p i te  th e  f a c t  t i n t  they s tood  o u ts id e  o rg a n ise d  la b o r .  These were 
th e  to u g h e s t id e o lo g u e s  o f  th e  l e f t ,  them selves o f te n  op s e m i- s k i l le d  and
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u n s k i l l e d  o r ig in s .  T h e ir  in fluence  was re m a rk a b le , b o th  d i r e c t l y  on th e  ran k  
and f i l e  and on th e  o f f i c i a l s  of the organised Labor movement. The c lim a te  o f 
th e  tim e was such th a t  t h e i r  words s tru c k  home. In  1917 th e  o u ts ta n d in g  I.W.W. 
men were g a o le d , th e  g a o lin g  i t s e l f  being  a t r i b u te  to  I.W.W. e f f e c t iv e n e s s  in  
th e  s i t u a t io n  o f  1916-17* This d isappearance l e f t  the  way c le a r  f o r  th e  T rades 
TIall r e d s .  Had th ey  r i s e n  to  power w ith the Chi ca g ö l t e  I.W.W. cad re s  s t i l l  
f r e e ,  th e  T rades H a ll re d s  would have continued  to  resp o n d  to  I.W.W. in f lu e n c e  
a s  th e y  had done f o r  s e v e ra l  y ea rs , for'j’th e  c lim ate  o f th e  day, th e  l e f t  a s  a  
whole was ex trem ely  s e n s i t i v e  to the views o f the  extrem e l e f t .  W ith t h e i r  
rem oval, the  spectrum  o f  th e  l e f t  was d isp la c e d  to th e  r i g h t .
The id e o lo g y  o f  th e  Trades H a ll re d s  was p o w e rfu lly  in f lu e n c e d  by 
th e  i n t e r p la y  o f  p e r s o n a l i t i e s  w ithin the group i t s e l f ,  and t h i s  in t e r p la y  now 
to o k  p la c e  w ith  a  minimum o f  in te r fe re n c e  from the  C'hi c a g o i t e s . At t h i s  l e v e l  
o f  in v e s t ig a t io n ,  i t  would seem crude to conceive of t h i s  in t e r p la y  a s  m ere ly  
th e  outcome o f  env iro n m en ta l in flu eh o o sj o r to  p o s i t  t h a t  t h i s  le a d e r s h ip  c i r c l e  
cou ld  n o t have s e t t l e d  upon a  tnor^ orthodox le f t* l i f t s ,  l i h $ ,  w ith  a c o n s id e ra b le  
a l t e r a t i o n  in  the  cou rse  o f  ev en ts  in  the la b o r  movement a s  a  r e s u l t .
The argum ent f i n a l l y  hinges no d oub t, upon o n e ’ s view s on the  r o le  
and p o t e n t i a l i t i e s  o f  le a d e r s ,  and th i s  i s  c lo se ly  r e l a t e d  to  o n e ’s view  o f  
th e  c r e a t iv e  r o le  and p o te n t i a l  o f the in d iv id u a l  in  h i s to r y .  In  t h i s  work 
one can do no more than s p e l l  out court er posed view/s and in d i c a te  o n e ’s own.
To s t r i k e  a  n o te  o f  g r e a t e r  c e r ta in ty  would run beyond th e  ev id en ce .
CHAPTER I I FOUNDING THE COMMUNIST PARTY 1919-1922
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Socialists and Syndicalists
Despite the stunted youth and early death of the Industrial 
Socialist Labor Party, during 1920 the Trades Hall reds helped to 
set up a new party. This was not so foolish as it might seem. It is 
not surprising that, in mid-1919» the left entertained the most 
robust hopes for their breakaway party; after all, one knows that the 
left harbours life's most incurable optimists. But astute and sober 
realists of the right took the most painstaking precautions to ensure 
that the breakaway party collapsed; clearly, the possibility of 
success did not exist simply in the imagination of the leftists.
The times were such as to encourage the boldest schemes. And indeed, 
despite the precedent set by the Industrial Socialist Labor Party, the 
new Communist Party did not wither and die. It did, however, remain 
the minority party that it was at birth. The working class upsurge 
in Australia was primarily one of industrial militancy; its political 
aspects were not such as to nourish mass Communist parties similar 
to those which sprang up in Prance, Germany and Italy. The Australian 
Communist Party resembled, rather, its British counterpart; as in 
Britain, while unionists displayed passivity, impatience, even disgust, 
with their established traditional party, they were not prepared to 
transfer their political allegiance to the left.
During 1919 and 1920, the main socialist and syndicalist 
groups which took part in the negotiations to set up a new left- 
wing party were: the Australian Socialist Party, the Victorian 
Socialist Party and the Social Democratic League of New South Wales;
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the Socialist Labor Party, the Melbourne branch of the Workers'
International Industrial Union, and apparently isolated Sydney
members of the outlawed I.W.W.
In their early days, the forerunners of the groups who
threw themselves into setting up the Communist Party all found they
disagreed in some way with the A.L.P.'s empirically formulated,
nationally oriented program, designed to appeal to, and reflecting,
the heterogeneity1 of the A.L.P.'s social basis. Of these groups,
we may first note the Australian Socialist League, from which many
important figures in the socialist and labor circles of 1919 received
their first socialist ideas. Founded in 1887, the League played a
2significant part in establishing the Labor Party. Luring the 1890s,
it filtered diverse socialist concepts into the labor movement at
large, mainly through the Labor Party. But the League grew uneasy
over the Labor Party's electoral neglect of specifically working class
interests, and parted company with the Labor Party in 1898, later
standing candidates as the Socialist Labor Party against the Labor
Party. The Socialist Labor Party advocated socialism, to be achieved 
1
through the "industrial and political organisation of the workers -
13mental and manual...*, as well as through the spreading of socialist 
ideas. By returning socialist candidates to federal and state
Childe's phrase (op.cit., p.73).
See P.J. O'Farrell, 'The Australian Socialist League and the 
Labour Movement, 1887-1891’ in Hist,Studies A.N.Z., vol.8, 
no.30, May 1958.
R. Gollan, Radical and Working Class Politics. A Study of Eastern 
Australia. 1850-1910. p.209*
3
63
parliaments and to municipal councils, the party would achieve socialism 
by parliamentary means. But such candidates were to forswear all 
’palliatives’. After parting company with the Labor Party, the Social­
ist Labor Party's strength dwindled, and it came to have an uncanny 
resemblance to the American Socialist Labor Party which, in Brissenden's 
words, 'seemed to be suspended after a fashion in an atmosphere charged 
with a kind of pedantic essence of the Marxian dialectic'.^
The Victorian Socialist Party, arising from Tom Mann's
'Social Questions' Committee', soon grew into the strongest socialist
5group in Australia, having in all some 2,000 members. Until 1907 
the Victorian Socialist Party had worked largely through the A.L.P., 
but in that year the Victorian Socialist Party participated in a 
'unity conference' of Australian socialists which established the 
Socialist Federation of Australia and rejected the A.L.P. as a means 
to its objectives.^ The Socialist Federation announced that the main
Paul F. Brissenden, The I.W.W. A Study of American Syndicalism, 
p.240. E.E. Judd was apparently not without some resemblance to 
Daniel DeLeon: 'The Socialist Labor party is doctrinaire, unyielding, 
Jesuitical as was its leader' ( ioc.cit.).
Ir r {om M&nrt) (
Tom Mann^ Memoirs, p.197; Gollon (op.cit.,p.210), citing Internat­
ional Socialist Review. 13 April 19075 gives C.2000 as the figure.
The Socialist Labor Party withdrew from the new Federation after 
the component groups refused to amalgamate with it (Overacker, 
op.cit,, p.172).
6/1
v e h i c l e  f o r  s o c i a l i s t s  was t o  be t h e  movement f o r  i n d u s t r i a l  u n io n i s m ,
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a d v o c a t e d  e a r l i e r  i n  a ' r a t h e r  a c a d e m i c ’ way by th e  I.W.W. c l u b s  
and t h e  S o c i a l i s t  Labor P a r t y .  I n  1912,  t h e  S o c i a l i s t  F e d e r a t i o n ,  
th o u g h  r e m a i n i n g  f e d e r a l  i n  s t r u c t u r e ,  changed  i t s  name t o  t h e  A u s t ­
r a l a s i a n  S o c i a l i s t  P a r t y ,  a f f i l i a t i n g  u n d e r  t h i s  name t o  th e  Second 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l .  Soon a f t e r  th e  change o f  name, however ,  i t  l o s t  
t h e  V i c t o r i a n  S o c i a l i s t  P a r t y ,  w hich  l e f t  i t s  r a n k s  t o  f o l l o w  a g a i n  
t h e  e a r l i e r  t a c t i c  o f  w ork ing  th r o u g h  t h e  A .L .P .
These ,  t h e n ,  were t h e  e a r l y  s o c i a l i s t s ;  o f  com parab le  
im p o r t a n c e  were th e  s y n d i c a l i s t s .  The e a r l y  I n d u s t r i a l  Workers of  
t h e  World c l u b s  i n  A u s t r a l i a  r e c e i v e d  th e  s u p p o r t  of  a l l  t h e  s o c i a l i s t  
g r o u p s .  The c r u c i a l  American  e x p e r i e n c e  -  t h e  s p l i t  be tw een  th e  
' i n d u s t r i a l '  ( o r  ’C h i c a g o ' )  f a c t i o n  and  t h e  ' p o l i t i c a l '  ( ' L e L e o n i t e ' 
o r  ' D e t r o i t ' )  f a c t i o n  -  was n o t  r e e n a c t e d  h e r e  u n t i l  1911» and th e  
new ' C h i c a g o '  p a r t y  l a y  v i r t u a l l y  dormant u n t i l  s e v e r a l  o u t s t a n d i n g  
f o r e i g n e r s  a r r i v e d .  I n  1912,  J . B .  King ,  o r i g i n a l l y  f rom Canada 
r e t u r n e d  t o  s t a y  i n  Sydney a f t e r  a  bvtief>>ry v i s i t  t>c*ne mofntks e a r l i e r .
Tom Glynn,  f rom Sou th  A f r i c a  tLhd. I r e l a n d  and  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s ,  
a r r i v e d  a t  much t h e  same t i m e ,  h a v i n g  t a k e n  p a r t  i n  m a jo r  s t r i k e s  
i n  S ou th  A f r i c a .  L a t e r  came Tom B a r k e r .  The e x p e r i e n c e  and s t y l e  
o f  work of  t h e s e  men, i n  c o n d u c t i o n  w i t h  e v e n t s  be tw een  1914 and  
1 9 l 6 ,  were a b l e  to  t r a n s f o r m  t h e  im pac t  o f  t h e  I .W .W . , and  a t  l e a s t
7 C h i l d e ,  o p . c i t . , p .1 1 5
65
one generation of labor cadres was unforgettably influenced by them. 
Among those so influenced were men who were to play an important part 
in the early years of the Communist Party - J.S. Garden, H.L. Denford, 
Hector Ross, Norman Jeffery; left-wing Labor Party members such as 
Donald Grant and Bettsy Matthias, and future right-wingers such as 
Gavin Sutherland, The I.W.W. leaders soon drew about them a group 
of second-line leaders trained in their ways of work, and there were 
few who did not concede to them first place for their methods of 
approaching the rank and file, particularly the semi-skilled and 
unskilled. Though an early secretary of the Communist Party, W.P. 
Earsman, might tell the Comintern congress of 1921 that I.W.W. g
'intensified propaganda' among Communists had 'little results', 
this was far from true. While the I.W.W. had little success in a 
bid made for organisational strength within the early Communist Party, its 
influence on the thought of the early Communists was nevertheless 
considerable. Wholesale arrests of ‘Chicago' leaders brought to the 
top a second line of cadres, such as Norman Rancie, Douglas Sinclair, 
E.A. Giffney, Norman Jeffery, Harry Meatheringham, but these were not 
able to sustain the organisation's appeal. For the more respectable 
DeLeonite or Detroit I.W.W., their failure provided a much needed 
opportunity.
Following the American example, this body renamed itself
Third Congress of the Communist International. Report of Meetings 
held at Moscow June 22nd-July 12th 1921. (Reprinted from "Moscow", 
the special organ of the Congress.) Published by the Communist 
Party of Great Britain, p.lßl.
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the Workers' International Industrial Union (W.I.I.U.).^ Always 
extremely weak, the Sydney branch was further v/eakened by conflict 
within it between supporters of the Socialist Labor Party, the Aust­
ralian Socialist Party, and cadres whose first loyalty was to the 
W.I.I.U. itself.'*0 The Melbourne branch, though also tiny, was more 
active, and produced the newspaper, the One Big Union Herald.
Though weakened past all recovery by wholesale wartime 
arrests, I.W.W. elements took some part in the One Big Union campaign.
At first, the I.W.W. had high hopes for the One Big Union; William 
Beatty, one of the arrested I.W.W. men of 1916, wrote after his 
release to J.B. Scott of the Workers' International Industrial Unions
The O.B.U. is about the most hopeful thing here, and 
is doing good work among city navvies and labourers.
The I.W.W., said Beatty, could not build up its organisation before
the anticipated revolution came. But it could
try to force the O.B.U. to do so and hold I.W.W. aims 
and forms in front of them to lead them on. 11
We met the Melbourne DeLeonites of the Workers' International Industrial
Union in the One Big Union movement between 1918 and 1920, insisting
that the 'shop-committee' must be the unit of the One Big Union.
Minutes, National Executive of I.W.W.Clubs, National Executive Comm­
ittee of Australasia, 24 Mar.,15 Dec.1916; Minute Book, gen.meetings, 
Sydney Socialist I.W.W. Club, 23 Aug.l9l6.
Minutes of gen.meetings, Sydney Socialist I.W.W.Club,1916-18.
Beatty to J.B. Scott, 14 October 1920 (Barnes coll.).
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Formally expelled from the One Big Union in 1920, the Workers'
International Industrial Union denounced as a sham the One Big Union
planned at the Trades Union Conference of June 1921. While some
members (Maurice Feinberg for one) moved to the A.L.P., others, such
as J.B. Scott and Bernard Meyers, passed to the frail Victorian 
12Communist Party.
The main socialist figures of 1919) then, may be classified 
as either syndicalist or Marxist, though at the time, few were clear 
on the distinction between the two traditions, and many, among the 
Sydney left-wing unionists especially, should more accurately be 
termed quasi-syndicalist or perhaps syndicalist-socialist.
The Marxists in turn can be sub-divided according to their 
approach to the mass party, the A.L.P. The Australian Socialist Party 
believed that the A.L.P. was useless to workers in the present, and 
would, in the future, prove to be the final obstacle to the overthrow 
of capitalism. Yet so great was labor's discontent in the war and 
immediate post-war years that the Australian Socialist Party did expand 
its influence at that time, despite its scorn for both the A.L.P. and 
the trade unions. Endorsing the Marxian concept of 'class struggle' 
and the Marxian definition of the 'state', by 1919 the Australian
Meyers to Barnes, 10 March, 1945 (Barnes coll.).
Chronological Notes on the History of the Australian Communist 
Party. (Barnes coll.n.d. but probably late 1942); History of the 
A.C.P. Part 4 (Typescript, Barnes coll.).
12
13
68
Socialist Party had a clear perspective. Partly through the example 
of Russia, partly because the class struggle would depress living 
standards, the workers would turn to the A.S.P. Unity was desirable, 
certainly, but it was not to be bought at the price of doctrinal 
purity; thus the Australian Socialist Party had long and regularly 
failed to reach agreement with other socialist groups. They believed 
that the workers, induced by suffering to see the futility of other 
parties, would turn to the Australian Socialist Party if only it 
retained its doctrinal integrity, and the Australian Socialist Party 
would then lead the workers in establishing the Dictatorship of the 
Proletariat.
A long-standing quarrel among socialists the world over 
had developed over the tactic of ‘permeation’. Socialists might 
permeate or infiltrate established trade unions, established political 
parties, or both. Many of the Trades Hall reds, for example, had 
permeated both unions and the A.L.P. before 1919» and while they gave 
up permeation of the A.L.P. after mid-1919, they resumed it as 
Communists in 1921, though the Australian Communist Party withheld its 
formal blessing until the end of 1922. By 1924» however, Communists 
were asking who had permeated whom - to what extent had the permeators 
been permeated by the ideology of the A.L.P., and what had the 
communists achieved for communism in permeating? As old hands at 
permeation, the Victorian Socialist Party could furnish evidence that 
socialsCpermeators might make some mark.
The V.S.P. role in the conscription struggles for example,
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was an important one and was made possible through the widespread
nature of V.S.P. influence. When war threatened in 1914» the V.S.P.
canvassed all Victorian unions on the advisability of a ’general strike
(\against war’, i.»-. ii.no with t1—  p^-^y ^  + ~ i
4 4
■■riiwwifeeiftiii 4limf" :, and as a result of their agitation, the Melbourne
Trades Hall Council declared its support of the Hardie-Vaillant
resolution, emphasizing in their support 'the oneness of the interests
of the workers of all countries', and pledging itself to work for
15an end to ’huge profit making by the armament ring...' . The V.S.P.
went on to play an important part in the successful opposition to
16conscription for overseas service. Amongst the earliest members of 
the V.S.P. were men who helped popularize industrial unionism and 
the One Big Union, and who did much to win acceptance of the Socialis­
ation Objective by the All-Australian Trades Union and the Federal 
A.L.P. conferences of 1921.
Amongst its earliest members the Victorian Socialist 
Party numbered Tom Mann, famous socialist agitator and organiser,
Frank Hyett, secretary of the Victorian Railways' Union, E.F.
Russell of the Victorian branch of the Agricultural Implement Makers'
See the leaflet in the R.S. Ross collection, 'War against War'
6 March,1914»
R.S. Ross coll.
Leslie C. Jauncey, The Story of Conscription in Australia, 
pp.144,149,200.
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Union, and R.S. Ross from 1Q09 to 1920, intermittently secretary of
17the Victorian Socialist Party and editor of its paper, the Socialist«
Former Victorian Socialist Party members, with whom cordial relations
were maintained, included Maurice Blackburn, editor of the official
Australian Labor Party newspaper, Labor Call, and E.J. Holloway,
secretary of the Melbourne Trades Hall Council and Federal President
(l92l) of the Australian Labor Party; Thomas Tunnecliffe, member of
the Bootmakers’ Union, who became Premier of Victoria, as did another
V.S.P. member, John Cain; while a keen supporter, John Curtin, became
Prime Minister of Australia. Active Victorian Socialist Party members
often stood as endorsed Australian Labor Party candidates at elections.
l8The poets Bernard O'Dowd and Marie Pitt were also V.S.P. members.
R.S. Ross was particularly important. To him, the One Big Union 
held out the hope of a uniquely Australian, peaceful, socialist 
revolution, (see Revolution in Russia and Australia, Melb.1920; 
The Socialist, 10 Sept.1920; What Next? Building the Industrial 
State (Australian Labor’s Hext Step).Melb.1921, E.J. Riley Coll. 
A.R.L.). Ross argued for this with spirit. Ross had considerable 
direct influence in securing the adoption of the socialisation 
objective at the All-Australian Trades Union Conference in June, 
1921, while another prominent member of the V.S.P., E.F. Russell, 
its one-time president (Minutes, special general meeting V.S.P,, 
12 Feb. 1908), moved the motion for adoption of this objective 
_ (Official Report, p.5-6).
lfi ^Tom Mann$ Memoirs, p.201*
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Through its leading spokesman, R.S. Ross, the V.S.P. 
dealt ably with its opponents' most serious charge - that of support 
for the A.L.P. The V.S.P. supported the A.L.P., Ross said, 'as the 
existing party of the organized Labor movement', and as the 'creation 
of the proletariat... to date the only organized political reflex of... 
Trade Unionism...' And later; 'As for me, I question the wisdom of 
discarding the Labor Party until we have its revolutionary successor 
ready,.. It isn't by any means improbable that in the future we'll feel 
tremendously fortunate in having even It.'
But if the V.S.P. could claim important achievements, given 
the number of its members in high places, what can one conclude about 
its success as a permeator during the years of this study? For a start, 
there is no doubt that the socialists themselves would say that many 
of their men in high places were among the 'permeated' rather than 
the 'permeators'. And as part of the Second International, and then 
of the 'Two and A Half’ International, the V.S.P. was no match for 
the triumphant representatives of the Russian October. By 1920, the 
V.S.P.'s brother party in New South Wales, the Social Democratic League, 
had been destroyed after take-over by the Workers' International 
Industrial Union, which in turn soon disappeared from the political 
scene. By 1923, the V.S.P.'s long-established newspaper, the Socialist, 
was coming out only fitfully, and the party's activities had fallen 
off greatly.20
19 The Socialist 12 Dec. 1919, 23 Jan.1920.
20 For an account of the conflict within the V.S.P. after 1919, see 
Keith Campbell, The Influence of the Russian Revolution on the 
Victorian Labor Movement 1917-1922,p.20-27. Honours Thesis, 1962, 
History Dept., School of General Studies, A.N.U.
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V.S.P. members were often more cultured than their
opponents on the left, and undoubtedly more tolerant and open-minded.
However, the V.S.P. was not able to convert these qualities into
political advantages. Indeed, they were to prove distinct political
disadvantages in some cases. Workers' control, much respected by the 
21V.S.P., ceased to be fashionable on the left, as it passed out of
vogue in Russia, while the course of the Russian and the international
revolution was to convert critical sympathy for Russia, such as the 
22V.S.P. displayed, into a guarantee of minority status on the left. 
Such status was made the more likely, in any case, by the V.S.P. 
refusal to affiliate with the new Third International.
See Maurice Blackburn, in a pamphlet claimed later to be 
the earliest on the subject in Australia (Typescript on the 
death of Maurice Blackburn, Barnes collection). The pamphlet 
was called Bolshevism. What the Russian Workers are Doing, 
by Maurice Blackburn, Vice-President A.L.P.(Victorian Division). 
Melbourne, 1918, Ferguson coll. Also R.S. Ross, Revolution in 
Russia and Australia, Melb. 1920.
22 e.g. The Socialist 24 Sept. 1920, 9 Dec.1921
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Socialist Unity Negotiations and the Trades Hall reds.
After 1917» under the spell of the Bolsheviks’ conquest of
power, stimulated by the flow of Bolshevik pamphlets reaching
23Australia, and aware of the new Communist International's general 
policy of accepting only one affiliate from each country, Australian 
socialists and syndicalists renewed their efforts towards unification. 
The first important Sydney-based attempt can be dated at 
9 August 1919* On this day, the Social Democratic League, the Socialist 
Labor Party, the Australian Socialist Party and the A.L.P. ’breakaways' 
of the Industrial Socialist Labor Party, met in conference and agreed 
to name a new, united party 'The Revolutionary Socialist Party of 
Australia'. But the gathering was small and the voting close (ll votes 
to 8) 4 and the A.L.P. 'breakaways’ refused to be bound by this title, 
insisting upon being known as 'The Industrial Socialist Labor Party'.
Some of these pamphlets, bearing names that were almost all 
to disappear from the Communist world in the next decade and 
a half, were: The Russian Revolution. Socialism in Science 
and Action by Karl Radek (Andrade's, Melbourne,1919)» What 
is Russia? by Peter Simonoff (Sydney, Worker Print,1919);
The Mew Communist Manifesto of the 'Third Internationale' 
(Bolshevist and Left-Wing Socialists), Dec.1919> (Victorian 
Socialist Party, Melbourne); The Communist Programme of World 
Revolution, N . Bucharin (Melbourne Proletarian Publishing 
Association, 1920); A Paradise in this World, Leo £sic^j 
Trotsky (international Publishing Association, Melbourne, 
I920); The State and Revolution, N. Lenin. Australian 
Socialist Party (Marxian Printing Works, Sydney. First Aust­
ralian Edition, April 1920).
The International Socialist, 16 August 1919*
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’iPluit - I n d u s t r i a l -  d o c i a d i s t  - Labor  P a r t y ' .  On 6 September  a f u r t h e r
' u n i t y '  c o n f e r e n c e  i n v o l v i n g  t h e s e  g roups  f a i l e d ,  d i s a g r e e m e n t s
25a g a i n  a r i s i n g  o v e r  th e  name o f  t h e  new body .  By m id-1920 ,  t h e  
I n d u s t r i a l  S o c i a l i s t  Labor P a r t y  had d i s i n t e g r a t e d  e x c e p t  i n  Broken 
H i l l ;  t h e  e a r l i e r  e l a n  and mass a p p e a l  o f  th e  One B ig  Union had 
f a d e d ,  and  i n  any  c a s e ,  as  we have s e e n ,  t h e  r e d  u n io n  o f f i c i a l s  had 
t u r n e d  away f rom  t h e  s y n d i c a l i s t  One B ig  Union .  F o r  t h e s e  r e a s o n s ,  
th e  T rad e s  H a l l  r e d s  were r e a d y  f o r  more s e r i o u s  a t t e m p t s  t o  form 
a new open p a r t y  o f  r e v o l u t i o n . ^
The w e ig h t  o f  p a r t i c i p a t i n g  t r a d e  u n i o n i s t s  s u c c e e d e d  i n  
g i v i n g  t h e  i n f a n t  Communist P a r t y  i n  New S o u th  Wales an u n u s u a l  d eg ree  
o f  i n f l u e n c e  b o t h  i n  t r a d e  u n i o n  and  Labor P a r t y  a f f a i r s .  As we 
have shown, t h e  Trades  H a l l  r e d s  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  Garden b e f o r e ,  d u r i n g  
and a f t e r  h i s  r i s e  t o  s e c r e t a r y s h i p  of  th e  Labor C o u n c i l  i n  1918^ were 
among t h e  most  p o w e r f u l l y  c o n n e c t e d  l e f t i s t s  i n  A u s t r a l i a .  T h e i r  
d a i l y  p e r s o n a l  c o n t a c t  i n  t h e  c o u r s e  of  T rad e s  H a l l  b u s i n e s s ,  t h e i r  
l o c a t i o n  i n  t h e  T rades  H a l l ,  and  t h e i r  c o n s t a n t  c o n t a c t  w i t h  u n io n  
o f f i c i a l s  o f  a l l  p o l i t i c a l  s h a d e s ,  r e i n f o r c e d  t h e i r  power im m easu rab ly .  
Not t h e  l e a s t  i m p o r t a n t  s o u r c e  o f  t h a t  power ,  however ,  was t h e  
e a r l i e r  A .L .P .  membership  o f  many of  t h e i r  number,  and  t h e  r e d s '  
g row ing  i n f l u e n c e  among u n i o n i s t s  s t i l l  i n  t h e  A .L .P .  (An a p p e n d ix  t o
I n t . S o c i a l i s t . ,  13 S e p t . 1919»
A c c o r d i n g  t o  th e  H i s t o r y  o f  th e  A .C .P .  P a r t  4 (Barnes  c o l l . ) ,  
t h e  f a i l u r e  o f  t h e  O.B.U. ' removed  a b a r r i e r  i n  t h e  way o f  a 
n e w . . .  p a r t y . '
25
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this chapter lists the n mes and positions of those most well-known.)
The Trades Hall reds probably made up a numerical majority of the 
Sussex Street Communist Party. Figures ere not available, but in any
c? e ''n i it tn -• >c *cely unfamiliar to the historian, where
numbers Dt the all-important consideration. The cohesion of the
Trades Hall reds would have outweighed any numerical disadvantage °nd 
they derived an additional advantage from the fact that their opponents, 
whether in Sussex Street or Liverpool Street bed few mass connections.
Trade union cells embracing the left spectrum of the day 
existed long before the Communist Party was set up in October, 1920, 
having formed "the basis for Garden’s increasing influence within the 
Labor Council. (Union cell members were by no means clear upon, or 
perhaps greatly -interested in, distinctions between the general political 
nos it-ions of syndicalists and Marxists - after all, the international 
authorities of the Bolsheviks and the syndicalists took un substan­
tially the same nosition on the need for cells within unions). In its 
Annual Report for 1919? the conservative U.S.W. executive of the
Electrical Trades Union claimed there were '50-odd' 'white-anting'
27grouus in industry. The anonymous Chronological history of the 
Australian Communist Party, c. 194-2, writes of 'independent' groups 
functioning 'secretly' in the trade unions, and 'term£ing^J themselves 
Communists.' These groups were to be found chiefly in Sydney where
—■fas. jnp-t-^ r».r. ggr,
Electrical Trades Journal, 23 Aug. 1919*27
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they had been organised by J.S. Garden. Garden, however, has told the 
writer that such groups were in existence during and before 1919 and 
had been organised by 'Tom Walsh and others’.“ ' Confirmation of the 
existence of such groups from a hostile source may be found in a 
leaflet by George Waite, assistant secretary of the United Labourers' 
Society; entitled 'Waite's Warning to Workers', the leaflet claimed 
that
29In every Union the destroyers are a.ctive.
J. Kilburn, a prominent left-wing socialist in 1919» claimed that 
there were at least 100 'Marxian students’ in the building trades.
In 1921, a prominent I.W.W. leader, Tom Glynn, temporarily inhabiting 
the Sussex Street Communist Party, claimed, in that body's official 
organ:
In practically every Trade Union in Australia, today, there 
are a nuclei, essentially Communist in outlook, where they 
are not actually declared Communists, whose work is growing 
in importance from day to day...31 Q sic^.
After October,1920, the Communist Party - and when it divided
into two, the Communist Parties - included in official programs the
need to establish communist groups in 'every mill, factory, work-shop 
32and field.* The Sussex Street party fulfilled this ambitious aim 
more successfully than its Liverpool Street rival, though neither came 
anywhere near fulfilling it at all adequately. Sussex Street
28
29
30
31
32
Interview with writer, Aug. 1961, 
Molesworth coll, set 71» item 7* 
Interview with writer, Aug. 1961.
The Australian Communist, 8 Apr. 1921. 
The Socialist, 12 Nov. 1920.
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continued to meet the requirements of practical exigencies, as
well as Comintern orthodoxy, in not asking union cell members either
for formal membership or whole hearted ideological endorsement and
organisationally, the Sussex Street Communist Party seems to have
benefitted from union cell activity.^
All save a handful'"' of the Trades Hall reds gained their
positions during labor's war and post-war wave of militancy. The
old A.L.P. stalwart and leftist, ex-Senator Arthur Rae, and A.C. Willis,
talented secretary of the powerful miners' federation, were vice-
presidents of the N.S.W. branch of the A.L.P. in 1917, and acting
general secretary and vice-president respectively in 1918. While not
a Communist, Rae, an early member of the A.W.U., appears to have worked
with Communists in trade union affairs when he wanted. A.C. Willis
was technically a Communist in that he had formally applied for 
35membership and there is no reason to suppose he was rejected.
But Willis acted as a lone-hand leftist of increasingly moderate hue, 
and was a strong moderating influence on the Trades Hall reds.
Both Willis and Rae were widely believed to be part of the Trades 
Hall reds' complex, and certainly both of them paved the way for the 
rise of the Trades Hall reds. The prominent Trades Hall reds 
J.J. Graves (Stovemakers) and J. Howie (Coopers) were both A.L.P.
33 See below, p. 89.
^  E.g. J.J. Graves (Stovemakers), T. McCristal (Wharf Laborers),
Arthur Rae, Albert Willis, and intermittently a union official 
from at least 1911» T. Walsh.
International Communist, 15 Jan.1921; One Big Union Herald Mar.1921.
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executive members in 1917 with Rae and Willis, while the red H.L.
•3 cDenford was an alternative member of the A.L.P. executive in 1917“* 
and, with another prominent Trades Hall red, A, Rutherford, a full 
executive member in 1918.
While assistant secretary of the N.S.W. branch of the
Clerks Union, J.S. Garden, the key Trades Hall red, had been
appointed assistant secretary to Labor Council by its conservative
37secretary, E.J. Kavanagh. In 1918, Kavanagh was appointed to 
a government position and Garden became the new secretary by two votes. 
So strong had red influence become by March 1922, that Labor Council 
decided to affiliate with the Communist-dominated Red International
•30
of Labor Unions.
J.S. Garden was a Scots migrant, son of a Nonconformist
family, and a former lay preacher in fruit-growing areas in Victoria
39and New South Wales. He had 'volunteered for active service, but 
was refused permission by the Defence Department, they stating his 
services were required at home'.^ Long an A.L.P. member, in 1917>
36
37
38
39
40
Workers' Weekly, 8 May 1925»
Exec. Min. Lab. Council, 10 Apr. 1917» . 11-12.
Gen, £*ec.sneer. Min. Lab. Council, 9 Feb., 2 Mar., 1922; Min. 4», Meeting 
Lab. Council 21 Feb. 1922.
Of Garden's oratory in these days, Turner comments that his phrases 
belonged to syndicalism, his tone of voice to the Old Testament,his 
imagery to Will Dyson.(I.A. Turner, 'Industrial Labor and Politics. 
The Dynamics of the Labor Movement in Eastern Australia: 1900-1921.' 
(Ph.D. thesis, A.N.U., 1962). p.306)> However by comparison with the 
early Chicagoite I.W.W. leaders such as King, Barker, Glynn, Larkin 
and Grant (an incomparable mass orator) Garden appeared colourless 
and respectable.
From the leaflet 'Electors of Parramatta.Vote for J .8.Garden.'Sydney, 
Worker Print,1917* (Molesworth coll, set 243,item 1.).
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Garden stood for the state seat of Parramatta as the ’Selected 
Labor and No-Conscriptionist C a n d i d a t e ^  As the centre of the 
Trades Hall red network, not greatly encumbered by theoretical 
conviction/K despite transient membership in so doctrinaire a body 
as the Socialist Labor Party, Garden undoubtedly played an important 
part. However Guido Baracchi, another foundation member still alive, 
has told the writer that W.P. Earsman was the power behind Garden at 
the start.^
W.P. Earsman, prominent in the Victorian Socialist Party as
early as 1912,^ was a member of the Melbourne and later the Sydney
District of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers. He seems to have
had no important official position in the organisation, if the
comprehensive Commonwealth Council Monthly Reports can be taken as 
•ftba guide. Foundation Melbourne Communist Guido Baracchi told the writer
45that Earsman had a great influence upon Garden, while another early 
Communist, Hector Ross, has mentioned Earsman as one of the outstanding 
ideologues and teachers of new members.^ This gives a good idea of
^ See note 40 above.
42 In 1922, a shrewd comrade of Garden's wrote in charitable under­
statement '... he is always open to the reception of the latest 
lessons of the times. There will come a time when it will be 
necessary for Jock to crystallise his views into a definite set 
purpose...' (The Communist, 4 Aug.1922).
4^ Interview,11 July,1962.
44 Exec. Minutes, V.S.P. 11 Dec. 1912, 3 June 1913*
45 Interview, 11 July 1962.
4^ Interview, Oct.1964.
44*> Cf. J. Normington-Rawling, ’The Communist Party of Australia, to 1930. * 
(Processed). Work in progress seminar paper, A.U.U., Institute of 
Advanced Studies, 4 May 1962, p.12.
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the left-wing ideological level of the time, for while Earsman was 
certainly a more able socialist theoretician than Garden, he was far
A Hfrom impressive.
Another prominent unionist founder of the Communist Party
was H.L. ('Snowy') Denford, Originally a South Australian, in 1911
Denford, one of the Sydney I.W.W.'s first members,^ was also a member
of the Socialist Labor Party and the Social-Democratic League, and
at one time was general secretary of the Australian Socialist Party.
Denford succeeded Earsman as secretary of the Communist Party in
Sydney, leaving along with Garden in 1926, and later joining the A.L.P.
Denford was successively a member of the Coal Lumpers* Union, vice-
president of the Tramways’ Union and a member of the Federated Iron-
50workers' Association (l920)." In January 1922, Denford first attended
47
48
49
50
See, for example, Earsman's 'Report to the C.E. of C.P. 
(Confidential)', Typescript, late 1921, in Hancock coll.
MSS. 772,8-12, ML. This was Earsman's account of the Third Congress 
of the Comintern? Also his contributions to the Congress, according 
to the official English report, Third Congress of the Communist 
International. Report of Meetings Held at Moscow June 22nd-July 
12th 1921, p.131.
Denford faded into relative obscurity in the I.W.W. when, in 1912 
and 1913, T. Barker, J.B.King, C. Reeves and T.Glynn arrived in 
Sydney from New Zealand, from Canada and England via New Zealand 
and from South Africa. Their persuasion being that of the Chicago 
'bummery', these men had been hardened in bitter trade union 
struggles and drew an instant response from rank and file unionists 
in Australia, particularly the semi-skilled and unskilled, 
(interviews, Mrs. B. Matthias and Mr. N. Jeffery.)
Workers' Weekly, 8 May 1925»
From Minutes of Evidence taken at Sydney for the Commonwealth 
Royal Commission on the Basic Wage, 1920,p.852.
$ \
51as delegate to the Lahor Council and, in the same year, he became 
part of that body's executive. By 1924 (if not earlier - union records 
at this time are fragmentary), Denford became a delegate to annual 
conference of the Federated Ironworkers' Association, and is recorded
as being Balmain branch secretary and by 1925, the Association's
. , . 52vice-president.
J.B. ('Jack') Howie, Coopers' Union delegate to the Labor
Council from 1914 onwards, and another early Communist, became Labor
Council president in 1919. Baracchi has described him as a 'stick, in
the mud' , ~ while E.M. Higgins said that Howie was 'not an opinion
maker'.  ^ Other early Trades Hall reds were C. Hook, organiser of
55a rad union group in the Municipal Workers' Union, B. Corcoran, a.
Socialist Labor Party delegate to the abortive 'unity' conference on 
56 ~n August, 1919» and a prominent member of the Boiler-makers* Union,
, McPherson (Letter Carriers' Union); H. Desmix (Amalgamated Can '
' , '
Employees' Union); J. Burns (Federated Ironworkers' Association member
Minutes, Gen. Meeting, 5 Jan. 1922.
c; p cords, Federated Ironworkers' Association, National Head­
quarters, Sydney; Workers' Weekly, 8 May 1Q25.
Interview, Aug. 1961.
Interview, 4 Sept. I960.
Interview with Garden, Aug. 1961.
hove, p.73.
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who died of influenza in 1919); R. Webster (Municipal Workers’ Union);
W. Gibb (Federated Clothing Trades' Union); J. Kilburn (Operative 
Bricklayers' Union); F. Roels (Federated Engine-drivers' and Firemen's 
Association); A. Rutherford (Saddlers' Union); J.J, Graves (Stove- 
makers' Union); Pat Brew (Sheet Metal Workers' Industrial Union);
H.E. w,uaif f e , building trade unionist; and A. Thomas, whose union the 
writer cannot discover, but who was probably a unionist, since he 
was appointed an organiser for the One Big Union in 1920.
In December 1919? the Annual Conference of the Australian 
Socialist Party in Sydney declared for the newly formed Comintern 
and adopted a manifesto entitled 'Australia and the World Revolution - 
A Statement of Communist Principles.' But in 1920 an initiative appears 
to have come from an opposition body, later known as the Sussex Street 
C.P., with which, as has been noted, the Trades Hall reds were 
associated. Earsman, speaking to the Third Comintern Congress on be­
half of the Sussex Street C.P., made the following claims
In 1920 a small group of revolutionaries decided to establish 
the Communist Party of Australia, which they did as a secret 
organisation. We set to work among the trade unions and 
formed a number of groups, whose main object was the spreading 
of Communist principles and the white-anting of these unions... 
Then we sent out a manifesto and programme in keeping with the 
principles of the Third Communist International, and a call 
to form a legal Communist Party. 57
Earsman gives the impression that the ideology of the early red cells
was far less diverse than it actually was, and he exaggerates the
initiative of the Sussex Street men in starting them, for the groups
57 The Communist, 23 Sept.1921
were thrown up at a time when syndicalist currents were probably 
stronger than Bolshevik in the Australian labor movement. His claims 
were hotly contested in Moscow by Rees, attending on behalf of the
egLiverpool Street (ex-Australian Socialist Party) Communist Party.
For all this, Earsman may well be right about the manifesto, as the
Australian Socialist Party itself published a manifesto discovered in
September 1920, which it alleged was not written by the A.S.P., but
by a body calling itself the 'C.E. of the Australian Communist Party'.^
The earnestness of their rivals possibly spurred the A.S.P.
to try to recapture the initiative. On 22 September 1920, the A.S.P.
wrote to all it thought interested:
In an endeavour to bring*)the unified action of all 
who stand for the emancipation of the working class by 
revolutionary action, we have decided to arrange a 
conference, to be held on Saturday, October 30th,1920, 
in the A.S.P. Hall, Liverpool St., City.
Enclosed was a statement by the A.S.P., 'put forward... as a basis for
the discussion.’ The proposed objective was a Communist society, the
first step towards it being the establishment of the 'Proletarian
Dictatorship’. The Third International's principles were endorsed,
and 'exclusively Communist' local branches and shop committees were
desired. Support was given to the idea of industrial unions, though
as 'subsidiary to the general political Communist movement', while
parliamentary activity was approved, though not as 'a cardinal principle
58 Third Congress of the Communist International, Report of 
Meetings held at Moscow... p.144 (Comrade Reece jlsicj )
Int, Socialist. 2 October,1920.59
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but merely a tactic to be employed as circumstances warrant’.
Some sixty people were invited to the conference and, from a list in 
the Hancock collection, it would seem that the International Socialist 
(organ of the A.S.P.) is correct in asserting that the majority were 
invited ’upon the advice of J.S. Garden’. T w e n t y  six attended:^’' 
six were credentialled from the A.S.P. while H.L. Denford had moved 
from the defunct Industrial Socialist Labor Party to the Newtown
zT 7
branch of the Socialist Labor Party, from which he came as a delegate. 
The remaining nineteen came as individuals, and included I.W.W. 
sympathisers, members of reconstructed I.W.W. groups and members of 
the red trade union fractions - many of which, of course, might well 
have overlapped with the former categories.
Garden was unanimously elected conference chairman. The 
conference formed itself into the Communist Party, elected W.P.
Earsman provisional secretary against the A.S.P. nominee, Reardon.
Hancock coll. MSS 772, 8-12, ML.
— riHancock coll. MSS|, 8-12, ML. Typewritten sheet with extensive 
pencilled additions, n.d.; International Socialist, 1 Jan.1921.
Original Minute Book of the Communist Party of Australia,
Hancock Coll.
63 The Socialist Labor Party formally rejected the invitation, 
seeing ’... no working class necessity or justification for the 
formation of another Party’ (int. Socialist, 6 Nov.1920).
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The remaining eleven members of the provisional executive were A.S. 
Reardon (general secretary of the A.S.P.), A.T. Brodney (honorary 
secretary of the Sydney branch of the A.S.P.) and R. Everitt (A.S.P.); 
C.W. Baker, Thomas and Adele Walsh (Seamen' Union federal secretary 
and his wife, one of the English Pankhursts), Christine Jollie Smith 
a.nd Tom Glynn, whose prime loyalty might well have been to I.W.W. 
principles throughout his brief first stay in the Communist Party.
C. Hook, A. Thomas, J.S. Garden were also elected and these, along 
with Earsman, were most responsive to the prevailing views at the 
Trades Hall.
The programme adopted at the October conference laid stress 
on encouraging the spread of the Communist political philosophy 
and strategy; study classes were to be held under Communist auspices 
or those of other labor organisations; public meetings were to be 
sponsored, and 'revolutionary literature' distributed. As to 
industrial activity, the programme stipulated that the new party was 
to form groups of its members in 'every mill, factory, workshop and 
field, so that it [was] always in a position to direct and control 
through its members every industrial dispute... of the workers, 
keeping always in mind the same end - social revolution - and trying 
to utilise every spontaneous action of the workers for that one end*' :
64 The Socialist, 12 Nov. 1920
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The A.S.P. could trace its history, and its newspaper, the 
International Socialist, back for many years. Leading members of the 
A.S.P. were often more sophisticated as theoretical socialists than 
were the Trades Hall reds, who were strong where the A.S.P. was weak, 
that is, on mass contact through unions and the A.L.P. In all, thus, 
the A.S.P. felt little love for the comparative latecomers and inter­
lopers, whom they suspected of being unduly influenced by immediate 
considerations arising from union and A.L.P. affairs, but things went 
smoothly enough with the new Communist Party for some weeks, with 
A.S.P. branches re-naming themselves Communist branches, and public 
meetings to spread the new doctrines. However, on 11 December a further 
conference with eighteen delegates, chaired by J.S. Garden, hinted 
at impending trouble on the vital question of party control. The 
conference rejected an A.S.P. proposal to take nominations for regular 
officers and the executive from branches, with the actual election 
from a ballot of the whole membership in January, 1921« Instead, the 
conference carried an Earsman/Denford amendment by twelve votes to 
five which retained the existing provisional executive until a confer­
ence in Easter 1921, should itself elect a regular executive and 
officers. The Trades Hall reds carried the day on the matter because 
the I.W.W. men had thrown in their lot with them for the time being.
On 14 December, the A.S.P. withdrew its men, Brodney,
Reardon and Everitt, from the Communist Party's provisional executive, 
and announced that it would sever all relations with the conference 
attempting to work out conditions for Communist unity. The A.S.P. 
alleged that negotiations had revealed 'a definite scheme... on the
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part of a dominant section of the Conference, who represent no one
hut themselves, to subvert’ attempts at unity ’for their own personal
ends*’ As evidence they offered the Earsman/Denford amendment of
11 December, passed by 'twelve individuals, v/ho truly stated their
position in the Communist movement when they urged that a Conference
of the Party be held over until Easter, because they were "unknown to
65the Revolutionary Movement,,,"1 ' The Trades Hall reds were strongly 
represented on the rump provisional executive which considered this 
letter of withdrawal, Denford, Garden, Hook, Webster, and Thomas all 
being present.
The A.S.P. now renamed International Socialist the 
International Communist, and called itself the Communist Party of 
Australia. We have called it the Liverpool Street party, after the 
fashion of the time and in order to distinguish it from its rival, 
also the 'Communist Party of Australia.' To us, this is the 'Sussex 
Street' party.
Sussex Street began publishing the Australian Communist on 
24 December 1920, and in the paper one can discern the several main 
tendencies within the party. The Trades Hall reds' influence is 
directly manifest in J.S. Garden's 'Industrial Notes' and, in a 
probably more important way, in the almost complete absence of 
criticism of the A.W.U. faction in the New South Wales branch of the 
A.L.P. The more orthodox Marxists on the C.P. central executive 
were led by Carl Baker, an ex-American, formerly from Melbourne,
65 Letter from the 'Communist Party of Australia' 14 Dec. 1920, 
to W.P. Earsman (Hancock coll.) Emphasis in original.
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and W.P. Earsman. Such men were well aware of the justice in 
some of Liverpool Street’s charges that ’opportunism' and 'job 
communism' could be found in their ranks. However, as another 
executive member, Norman Jeffery, recently suggested to the writer 
(interview)) those most guilty of these things, the Trades Hall reds, 
were the men with the mass connections, and one could not lightly 
overlook this fact.
A unity conference on 25 March failed, and Liverpool Street
rebuffed Sussex Street proposals for further unity efforts in April,
66May and June of 1921* Both parties sent representatives to the
third congress of the Comintern in Moscow, June-July 1921. Soon
after the third congress, the Executive of the Comintern wrote to the
Australian parties suspending all '...representation at Moscow...
67until unity is achieved.' By the end of 1921, little progress
68towards unity - at least on the formal level - had been made.
The Sussex Street party seems to have had a steady, if modest, 
stream of applications for membership, despite the split and the
So, incidentally, did the Socialist Labor Party, who thought 
very ill indeed of Sussex Street. See, for example, a letter 
from E.E. Judd, secretary, to the general secretary of the C.P. 
of A. 16 March 1921. 'The policy of the "C.P. of A." constitutes 
an excellent cover under which Capitalist subsidised spies and 
agents provocateur^ can get at sincere members of the working 
class.' (Hancock coll.).
fn Copy cpLetter, 20 August,1921, Hancock coll.; the Communist, 2 Sept.1921.
/*Q
Letters between A.S. Reardon (Liverpool Street) and ,C.W. Baker 
(Sussex Street), 1921, and Minutes of the annual conference of 
the Sussex Street party, 27 Lee. 1921. (Hancock coll.).
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69lack of Comintern recognition. Interstate branches were established
and consolidated and, within Sydney, amongst other branches there
appeared the Trades Hall branch,
... a good branch...formed with the object of concentrating 
their work in the Trade Unions. They had no less than 19 
unions represented and there were 29 delegates on the 
Labor Council."70
As to overall membership figures for Sussex Street, the nearest
apparently accurate estimate is that of 750 for the whole of Australia
in 1922, given by Garden as a Sussex Street delegate to the fourth
Comintern congress. The best approximation one can make for Sydney is
that a majority of Communists lived in the city. Sussex Street’s
comparative solidity is aleo attested by the fact that, though its
bank balance was usually si bildet: , it not only published a
weekly newspaper, many leaflets and pamphlets, paid the rent for the
Communist Hall, but also employed a full-time official in the
71person of the newspaper editor, paying him £5 a week.
While at first the I.W.W. elements worked with the Trades 
Hall reds against the former A.S.P. men, it was not long before the 
old antagonism between syndicalist and socialist began to show up.
From 1919 to 1921 the Comintern, deeply influenced by the syndicalists,
Minutes, central executive Meetings, 30 Dec.1920, 4>10, ’.24 Jan;
5,2' Feb; 4 , M 2  March 1921.
Minutes, C.P. annual congress, 27 Dec.1921. (Hancock coll.)
Savings Bank Bo^ok 2 ; Minutes, central executive of C.P. (Hancock 
coll.)
70a See below, p. 236
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made quite as strong a bid for the syndicalists as for the left
socialists. Comintern and syndicalist views approached nowhere more
closely than on the need to organize at the workshop level, and on
the need to build industrial unions. Aside from the triumph of
October,1917» this was what most attracted the MS.W. I.W.W. elements
to the new communists, whose early program, as has been said, stressed
72the need to form groups in ’every mill, factory, workshop and field.’ 
Many syndicalists, however, quickly discovered something notably 
unmilitant about the leading unionist Communists; additionally, they 
were not always able to reconcile Marxist views on political activity 
with their essentially anarchist approach. At first, however, things 
looked promising.
In September 1920, the Australian left read a pamphlet 
reproducing the message to the I.W.W. by the Comintern's second
73congress, with a foreword by leading Australian figure Tom Glynn.
A Melbourne Communist journal, the Proletarian Review, expressed 
the hope that the I.W.W. would join in setting up a united Communist 
Party.^ Syndicalists and former syndicalists of more than one 
variety responded. Tom Glynn, outstanding former leader of the
See above, p. 76.
G. Zinoviev, To the I.W.W. A Special Message from the Communist 
International. (Moscow) Foreword by Tom Glynn. M d b  iga-o
The Proletarian Review, Sept. 1920.
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Chicagoite I.W.W. in Australia, was out of gaol by the end of 1920,
and became the (successful) anti-A.S.P. nominee for editorship of
the Communist newspaper at the conference of 11 December 1920. In
February 1921, a Darlinghurst branch of the Sussex Street party was
formed from the I.W.W. branch of that suburb. However, some at
least of the I.W.W. men planned either to 'raid* the C.P. or capture
it, whether before or as a result of disagreements which appeared
as early as March 1921, one does not know. On 2 August 1921, Earsman,
op
at the congress of the Red International Labor Unions in Moscow, wrote
to his Sydney comrades to say that the American I.W.W. had endorsed
the ’principle of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat’, along with
syndicalists in France, Italy and Sweden.
I hope that those comrades who joined the C.P. of A. with 
the object of capturing it to make it an I.W.W. turn out, 
will mark this... and drop their talk about capturing any­
thing and particularly to people who are opposed to you and 
who carry their spicy news long distances from Sydney to 
Moscow. 75
The I.W.W. were obviously uneasy in the Communist Party and on 9 
November 1921, J.B. King and Thomas Glynn led the syndicalists out 
of the Party and established the Industrial Union Propaganda League, 
publishing a short-lived paper, Direct Action. Both Communists and 
the Industrial Union Propaganda League set forth their disagreements, 
the Communists initially in the most measured tones. The I.W.W., less
75 Earsman to the Central Exec. C.P. of A., 2 Aug.1921 (Hancock coll.)
restrained - charge cl the Communists with being ' right-wing’s
’Relations with Moscow* a.re now becoming so fashionable . , , 
that there is a. danger that there may be Unions in 
Australia, who, in order to boa^t that they are ’linked 
up with Moscow', will secure a 'paper affiliation’ while 
i.n reality pursuing tactics and methods that would disgrace 
even the vellow International o^ .Amsterdam.
Relations between the Industrial Union Proneganda League and the
ü i ^ :  '
ry 1922 arrived ; t a 'working agreement' based on mutual
acceptance of the program of the Red International of Labor Unions.
This conference included members of the Workers’ International
Industrial Union and members of the 'revolutionary Trade Union
77fractions'. Though the . 1 Street Party ' d to attend,
iference declared the est nt of the 'United Communist
Party of Australia'. And despite the; fact that its adrais Lc t
against the Bolshevik principles of party structure, the Industrial 
Union Propaganda League was admitted as an autonomous group, for it 
hed refused tc lissolve itself. T ter expulsion of these I.W.W. 
elements came not because of this infri: - ent of 0 ani ational
procedure, but as a result of a clash over fundamental political 
doctr? hen members of the Industrial Union Propaganda League
opposed a Communist Party decision that Communist members on the 
Labor Council should endorse trade union participation in politics and 
call
76
77
Direct Action, Jon, 1922.
Chronological Motes on the history of the Communist Party 
(Lcs Barnes coll.).
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7ftfor the Labor Party’s return to office.' ’ After this, relations
bUs.
between the Sussex Street Communists and Industrial Union Propaganda
League deteriorated rapidly. In September 1922, the Communists
dubbed an I.W.W. pamphlet 'More I.W.W. Moonshine', and added that
79the I.W.W. was 'moving not to the left but to the right'. "
The Communist reported a speech by J.B. King, leader of the League,
wherein he allegedly stated that the Led Army would 'shoot down...
strikers', and that the Communist Party was the 'worst enemy' of
80the working class.
At times in 1922, then, the chances for Communist unity
appeared slim, delations between the Liverpool and Sussex Streets
C.P.s had deteriorated further when, in February 1922, A.S. Reardon,
leader of the Liverpool Street C.P. and delegate to the Labor Council
from the Blacksmiths' Union, opposed the Labor Council reds' proposal
that Council should affiliate to the Red International of Labor 
81Unions. The Communists persuaded the Council to expel Reardon in 
March 1922, by thirty eight votes to thirty six, when Reardon charged
Minutes, Gen. Meeting, Labor Council, 9>l6, Mar. 1922; Direct Action, 
Apr.1922.
The Communist, 29 Sept. 1922.
The Communist, 1 Sept.1922.
Minutes, Gen. Meeting, Lab. Council, 9 Feb.,
Int. Communist, 18 Feb* 1922.
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that the Labor Council executive had used money collected for Russian
82Famine Relief to pay Labor Council expenses. The Comintern cabled
and wrote to both Communist parties in April 1922, enquiring as to
8 ithe ’progress of unification...', but relations with the I.W.W. did 
not improve, while the Liverpool Street party rejected yet another 
Sussex Street invitation to discuss unity.^ However, by the end of 
June 1922, a revolt within the Liverpool Street party against Reardon 
and Everitt, led by T. Payne and Lionel Leece, brought an influx 
into Sussex Street, which boon dropped the word 'united' from its
85title and was henceforth simply the 'Communist Party'.
A 'unity conference' began sitting on 15 July and continued 
for some time, and in August 1922, Earsman, then in Berlin, notified 
the Communist Party that its affiliation as the Australian section 
of the Communist International had been accepted. Between unification
Minutes, Exec. Meeting, 15, 21 Feb., 10 Apn; Minutes, Gen.Meeting, 
Lab. Council, 2, 30 Mar., 13 Apr. 1922.
Copy of letter, 10 Apr. 1922, which informed both parties that a 
cable had been sent on 10 April, from the Comintern executive.
The letter was signed 'Rakosi' (Hancock coll.).
^  Liverpool St. C.P. to H.L. Denford, Secretary United C.P. of A.
17 June 1922 (Hancock coll.).
The Communist 30 June,1922.
According to the unsigned history of the C.P. written c. 1942 in 
the Barnes collection (Chronological Rotes...), R. Everitt, editor 
of the International Communist, asked for his overdue wages in 
reprisal for a demand from the 'rank and file' that he resign 
editorship. To secure his wages he, along with Reardon, one of 
the other main figures in the party, sold the party printing press, 
'the only revolutionary printing plant in Australia.'
94
and the holding of annual conference in December 1922, the party 
claimed that 102 members had joined. This annual conference elected 
H.L. Denford as secretary - treasurer a and editor, J. Howie and H. Ross 
as trustees, N . Jeffery and L. Leece as auditors, and as central 
executive members, J. S. Garden, C.W . Baker, N. Jeffery and L. Leece 
amongst others. A balance was preserved between Sussex Street and 
Liverpool Street, with the Trades Hall reds in a strategically fine 
position.
At its first conference, the united party formally proclaimed
8<the policy of 'party affiliation to and membership in the Labor Party' 
a policy which the most influential members had openly promoted as 
early as June 1921, at the All-Australian Trades Union Conference, 
and had steadily pursued since then. The formal turn is of minor 
interest to this study, as its outcome was merely a heightening of the 
Communist influence already brought to bear on the unions and the 
A.L.P. by the Trade Hall reds with their de facto operation of a united 
front line for more than eighteen months. The earlier'de facto' 
operation, moreover, had been carried out in a climate more favourable 
to communist influence than that of 1923 and 1 9 2 4»
86 The Communist, 5 Jan.1923.
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The Trades Hall reds and the United Front; Permeation 1920-1922» .
So far we have focussed on the organizational history of 
the Communists. Now to their policy, or rather that change in policy
which contributed so much to Communist Party political influence in 
New South Wa.les between 1921 and 1925» We refer to the Communists' 
idea of a united front with the Labor Party, loosely described above 
as 'permeation'.
The British Labor Party, with (in Lenin's words) its 'quite 
unique character', its 'very structure... so unlike that of the
Q n
political parties common to the Continent', bore a strong resemblance
to the Australian Labor Party. Both were trade union rather than
social-democratic parties, for one thing. Australian leftists paid
close attention to British discussions on the relation between British
socialists and the Labor Party, and the Comintern's interventions on
the matter as early as 1919 is unlikely to have passed unnoticed. In
1919» Sylvia Pankhurst initiated a correspondence with Lenin, chiefly
over whether Communists should participate in parliamentary elections.
On 28 August 1919 Lenin wrote in reply:
I am personally convinced that to renounce participation 
in the parliamentary elections is a mistake on the part 
of the revolutionary workers of Britain...88
Left Wing Communism, An Infantile Disorder written 27 April 
1920 and first published as a book in June'* 1920, taken from 
On Britain, by V.I. Lenin, p.472; see also p.541.
88 On Britain, p. 424*
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This immediately raised as a corollary the idea that Communists
should seek relations with the British Labor Party, the issue constit-
89uting a central point in socialist unity negotiations. The
British Socialist Party, an affiliate of the Labor Party and a
participant in Communist unity discussions, republished part of the
Pankhurst-Lenin correspondence in its organ, the Call, on 22 April
1920. In April 1920, Lenin finished Left Wing Communism. An Infantile
Disorder, in which he discussed the 'second point of disagreement
among the British Communists - the question of affiliating or not
90affiliating to the Labour Party'.' While Lenin did not give his own 
views on the matter here, in July he was among those who persuaded 
the second congress of the Third International to conclude:
At the same time, the Second Congress of the Third Inter­
national should express itself in favour of groups and 
organizations in Britain that are communist, or sympathize 
with communism, affiliating to the Labour Party ...
For, so long as this Party permits its affiliated organiz­
ations... to carry on...activity in favour of the dictator­
ship of the proletariat and Soviet government, so long as . 
that Party preserves its character of an association of all 
trade-union organisations of the working class, the 
Communists must... agree to certain compromises in order 
to have the opportunity of influencing the broadest masses 
of the workers... 91
James W. Hulse, The Forming of the Communist International,
pp.115-121.
On Britain, p*472. An English edition of the pamphlet was published in 
June. (ibid., p.599).
Ibid., P.499.91
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92These Theses were published in Australia in 1920. Even after the
Comintern second congress, there was no lack of disagreement on the
issue. Reporting to the third congress on the work of the Comintern
executive since the second congress, Zinoviev said:
We had first to straighten out the "Left" trend cropping 
up in Germany, Italy, England and America. Take, for 
example, the question of our attitude to the Labour Party. 
Some of the English comrades were absolutely opposed to 
the idea of working within this party owing to its 
opportunism. We, however, insisted on the necessity of 
"boring from within" on the ground that in a country like 
England it was imperative that we utilize the opportunities 
offered by very large labour organizations to penetrate its 
ranks... 93
British delegates returning from the second congress brought with
94them Left Wing Communism, published in Britain almost immediately."
Soon, despite strong initial opposition some of which persisted,
British Marxists 'accepted readily a policy which would see them
enter the Labour Party in order to discredit its "reformist" leader- 
9‘5ship..i1 " The ensuing British Communist campaign for affiliation was 
not without some influence on British labor at large, and as late as 
June 1921, the acting President of the Miners' Federation was prepared 
to argue for Communist affiliation to the Labor Party at the Labor
Theses and Statutes of the Third Communist International, 
Adopted by the Second Congress. July 17-Aug. 7 1920. Published 
by the Communist Party of Australia, Australian Section of the 
Third International, Sydney, 1920.
93 Third Congress of the Communist International. Report of 
Meetings held at Moscow... p.44*
94 s.R. Graubard, British Labour and the Russian Revolution 1917- 
1924, p.134.
95 Ibid., p.134*
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Party annual conference.'
The Australian left was able to follow the Comintern view
on Communists and the British Labor Party through the Victorian
Socialist Party's newspaper the Socialist and the Sydney-based
International Socialist. On 3 September 1920, Lenin's wireless message
to Sylvia Pankhurst had appeared in the Socialist
In particular, I am personally in favour of participation 
in Parliament, and in favour of adhesion to the Labor 
Party under the condition of reserving entire freedom and 
independent Communist action...
On 24 September 1920, reporting further Comintern discussion on
the matter, R.S. Ross commented:
Anyhow, the Communists are slowly but surely accepting 
the Australian attitude. Read Bukharin and Lenin on 
"boring from within", and note Third International's 
allegiance to Parliamentary action and the decision of 
the British Communist Party to affiliate with the Labor 
Party.
In October 1920, the Melbourne Communist journal, the Proletarian,
reported a statement by the executive of the Russian C.P. to the
second congress of the Comintern which laid down '"the position that
we should get inside the Parliamentary Labor Parties..."', and in
November 1920, the Socialist carried further news on the matter.
In Sydney, the theses of the second congress of the third internat-
97ional were published about this time." In October the International 
Socialist, organ of the Australian Socialist Party (now on the point 
of helping found the Communist Party), discussed the theses and their
96
Ibid, p.l8l.96
97 See above, p. 97
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passages on the ‘Communist Parties and the Question of Parliamentarism.' 
Readers knew that in Australien as much as in British terms, this 
involved the matter of Labor Party-Communist relations, and therefore 
implied consideration of ’permeation’ - or to give it its more recent 
name, the ’united front’.
Australian Communists were thus not slow to grasp at least 
some of the issues at stake in the debate with the Comintern, 
crystallised as they were in Lenin's Left Wing Communism which became 
a prescribed text for Communists. In April 1921^ Garden invoked 
Left Wing Communism to defend the Trades Hall reds against Liverpool 
Street C.P. attacks over the new One Big Union Constitution, which
had grown out of the A.W.U.'s renewed interest in the question in
99February, 1921."
At the June All-Australian Trades Union Conference, it was 
clear that the Trades Hall reds had moved further towards the A.L.P. 
executive in New South Wales, controlled w  it was then by the hierarchs 
of the Central Branch of the mighty A.W.U. At this gathering, which 
was closely followed in labor circles, the Trades Hall reds pressed 
for discussions with the
Australasian Labor Party Executives to achieve unity 
politically of all working-class parties on the basis of 
affiliation.
Int.Socialist, 9 Get., 20 Nov.1920.
For Garden's sympathetic attitude to the A.W.U.'s renewed interest, 
see Daily Telegraph, 2 Feb.1921, quoted above, p/WFor International
Communist's reactions, see that paper's issue for 12 Feb.1921.
For Garden's use of Left Wing Communism, to defend the Trades Hall 
reds' position, see Internalional Communist, 30 April 1921.
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(Thus A, McPherson, former A.L.P. Executive member and now a prominent
Trades Hall red.) Garden himself stressed that the
men on the left wing-had, and still, supported the Labor 
Party every time, not the capitalists.
The Trades Hall reds supported, the A.W.U.-approved One Big Union
Constitution adopted at the conference, ignoring leftist critics,
even within Sussex Street itself, for supporting a constitution which
excluded ‘Chinese, Japanese, Kanakas, or coloured aliens,’ and which
neglected provisions for rank and file control. Without making it
clear exactly how, Garden said tha.t his view of the O.B.U. had changed,
and let it be thought that he had a good deal in common with the
A.W.U. controllers of the N.S.W. T.rj'bor» Pq-rtv executive:
Ho one can make a revolution. It is something which is 
born by things developed under the capitalistic system.
It will come. It is coming. Everyone knows that. When 
the system of its own weight starts to collapse, then it 
is for a movement like this to take directing authority in 
Parliament and everywhere else, so that the whole machinery 
will act at the one time.
Arthur Blakely (A.W.U. leader) commented:
That is purely evolution.
Garden replied:
I realise there is very little difference between us. In 
the last two years we have been “at one another” instead of 
getting down to business and seeing where we are. 100
Yet the Trades Hall reds had pressed the matter of A.L.P.
affiliation more strongly than their own, Sussex Street Communist
Party comrades could be happy with. In the copy of The Communist
Official Report of the All-Australian Trades Union 
Conference, p.20, p.8.
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which reported the All-Australian Trades Union Conference, Garden 
wrote:
101
- to fear a compromise with the Left Wing of the Labor 
Party is really laughable. On the contrary, it is incumbent 
upon Communists to seek the necessary complete fusion with 
this wing, and on the other, would in no way tie the hands 
of the Communists in their ideo-political struggle against 
the opportunist Right Wing of the Labor Party. [sic|
Editorially, however, the paper (no doubt through editor Carl Baker, 
formerly from Melbourne) discussed the Labor Party and the Communists 
of Great Britain;
Today in England the Communist Party of Great Britain is 
prepared to back the Labor Party for the sole purpose to 
further the inevitable development of conditions in
This might happen here, thought the editorial, but a clear note of 
doubt was sounded. But where Sussex Street had doubts, Liverpool 
Street castigated the Trades Hall reds in no uncertain way, scorning 
Garden’s attempts to defend them by ’clumsily plagiariz £ing] from
The Bolsheviks had to deal with those whom Lenin states 
had ’’infantile sickness” like our friends the A.S.P. 103
In June and July 1921 the Comintern held its third congress,
and its central theme, that about which the stormiest arguments raged,
The Communist, 8 July 1921.
The Int. Communist, 16 July 1921.
England,
102Lenin's "left wing Communism".’ Garden retorted by again using
Lenin:
101
102
103 The Communist, 22 July 1921
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was that the Communists could no longer expect the masses to seize
power spontaneously. The first great spontaneous mass upheaval,
with its attendant houndless confidence, had given way to a spent
w a r i n e s s . T h e  Communists still believed the proletarian revolution
would spread. But the masses would need leadership in order to make
a second assault, and they would accept the Communists as leaders only
if proofs of Communist worthiness were given. Consequently, it was
argued, the Communists had to prove that worth by demonstrating their
capacities in the everyday affairs of the trusted working class
organisations - the unions and, especially where Communists had
not been able to lead a big scale breakaway, the labor and social
democratic parties. Only in this way could ’small communist sects’
105be transformed into ’mass communist parties’.
From August, 1921, the proceedings of the Comintern's
See for example Trotsky, 'Theses of the Third World Congress 
on the International Situation and the Tasks of the Comintern', 
in The First Five Years of the Communist International,vol.I,p.260: 
'It is absolutely incontestable that on a world scale the open 
revolutionary struggle of the proletariat for power is at 
present passing through...a slowing down in tempo... it was 
impossible to expect that the revolutionary offensive after the 
war, insofar as it failed to result in an immediate victory, 
should go on developing uninterruptedly along an upward curve...' 
Also Jane begras (ed). The Communist International 1919-1943 
Documents. Vol. I 1919-1922, pp. 229-30.
105 Jane Degras, op.cit. p.243
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third confess were faithfully reported in the Sydney Communist
press,"''^ and hy October, the congress theses began to appear in 
107booklet form, Whatever the reason, no word was said for some
time on the obvious political application of the third congress line, 
discussion on the united front being curiously limited to the industrial 
united front stipulated early in the year by the Red International 
of Labor Unions.1 '""
One reason for the uncertain attitudes to the united front 
within the Sussex Street party was the fact that Liverpool Street 
opposed it unequivocally, and the Comintern had insisted that Sussex 
Street and Liverpool Street unite before it would accept any Australian 
affiliate. Another reason was that v/ithin the Sussex Street party 
there was genuine opposition to the united front with the A.L.P., and 
doubt even among those v/ho were impressed by the validity of work 
within the Labor Party. Others were dismayed by the opportunist way 
the Garden circle applied their de facto united front. Garden might 
talk about the need to work with the left wing of the A.L.P., but 
those whom he took care not to offend were the leaders of the N.S.W. 
Executive, who were also leading men in the A.W.U. - and hardly 'left 
wing.' Nevertheless the Trades Hall reds were influential enough - 
with or without calling upon Lenin and, now upon the third congress 
decisions - to prevent any criticism within the Sussex Street Communist
106
107
107a
E.g. The Communist, 26 Aug., 2,9>l6,23 Sept.1921»
Theses on Tactics Adopted by the Third Congress of the Communist 
International•Moscow,1921. Published by the Communist Party of 
Australia.'"Sydney,I92I. (Available in October - see The 
Communist, 7 Oct. 1921.)
Mr. Alastair Davidson (A.N.U,, Canberra) brought this stipulation 
to my notice.
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p r e s s  of  t h e  E x e c u t i v e  m a j o r i t y  o f  t h e  N.S.W. A .L .P .  -  t h e  B a i l e y  
A.W.U. g roup .
I n  March 1922,  s t a t e  e l e c t i o n s  were due i n  New South  Wales ,  
The Trades  H a l l  r e d s  had ,  a s  e a r l y  as  t h e  l a s t  q u a r t e r  o f  1921,  c a s t  
i n  t h e i r  l o t  i n  th e  f a c t i o n  f i g h t  w i t h  t h e  A.W.U. f a c t i o n  which 
c o n t r o l l e d  t h e  s t a t e  e x e c u t i v e  o f  t h e  A .L . P .  ( th e  so  c a l l e d  B a i l e y -  
McGirr  f a c t i o n . )  Under th e  T rad e s  H a l l  r e d s '  i n f l u e n c e ,  th e  Labor 
Counc i l  i s s u e d  an e l e c t i o n  m a n i f e s t o  c a l l i n g  f o r  t h e  r e t u r n  o f  t h e  
Labor P a r t y .  A l though  th e  A .L . P .  was d e s c r i b e d  a s ,  i n t e r  a l i a , 
o p p o r t u n i s t ,  t h e r e  was no m e n t io n  o f  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  f a c t i o n s ,  and 
th e  o n ly  p e r s o n s  c a s t i g a t e d  by name were w e l l -know n members o f  the
108Dooley f a c t i o n  ( th e  s o - c a l l e d  ' p o l i t i c i a n s '  o r  ' p a r l i a m e n t a r i a n s ' . )
As the  s t a t e  b a t t l e  between B a i l e y i t e s  and D o o l e y i t e s  warmed
up ,  w i t h  t h e  e l e c t i o n s  d raw in g  c l o s e r ,  t h e  S ussex  S t r e e t  Communist
newspaper  gave more a t t e n t i o n  t o  t h e  q u e s t i o n  of  Labor Par ty -Com munis t
109P a r t y  a f f i l i a t i o n .  y On 24 March 1922,  S u s sex  S t r e e t ' s  p a p e r  
r e p o r t e d  a Cominte rn  e x e c u t i v e  m e e t i n g  of  18 December 1921 e m p h a s i s i n g  
the  need  f o r  a f f i l i a t i o n  w i t h  l a b o r  p a r t i e s .  Sussex  S t r e e t  w r o t e :
While th e  d a i l y  p r e s s  was f i l l e d  w i t h  t h e  f a c t i o n  war w i t h i n  
t h e  A . L . P . ,  be tween  B a i l e y i t e  e x e c u t i v e  and D o o l e y i t e  c a u c u s ,  
t h e  Communist condemned ' p a r l i a m e n t a r i a n s '  and u p h e l d  i n d u s t ­
r i a l i s t s ' ,  condemned t h e  A .L .P .  i n  g e n e r a l  te rm s  a n d ,  whenever  
s p e c i f i c  ab o u t  names,  named o n l y  D o o l e y i t e s .  See th e  Communist , 
2 , 9  S e p t . , 9 Dec. 1921.
The Communist,  13*20,27  J a n .  and  24 F eb .  1922.109
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...the Communist International approves the Demand for 
a United Working Class Front. The Communist Party 
every country will enter into negotiations with every other 
working class organisation (right, centre, or left) to 
establish a common fighting programme. The Communist 
International is prepared to enter into negotiations with 
the Second International, the Two and A Half Inter­
national. . .
This policy has just been decided upon, yet our party has 
been working on these lines for months past, and, to a 
degree, we have succeeded. But the fact that the 
Communist International has now adopted a broad policy of 
unity in face of the impending collapse of the old order 
in Europe justifies the attitude towards unity which has 
been taken by this party in the past.
We have organised a ’’United Working Class Front” here in 
Australia, only to be called ’’opportunists" by other 
"Communists.” 110
Liverpool Street minced no words on this matter:
To many, 'Left Communism' came as a God-send, as it afforded 
them a naive excuse for, and allowed them to develop to 
the fullest, their opportunist inclination. Ill
"'jG^tting down to "the masses”, too often degenerates - right here in
Sydney-into a tragic farce,' charged the Liverpool Street party. The
Communist Party in Australia should not do as Sussex Street seemed on
the verge of doing, that is, press for affiliation with the A.L.P.
Rather,
...if...as here in Australia, the movement is stagnating, 
the duty of the revolutionary workers is...the development 
of the understanding and efficiency of the Communist Party.112
110 Ibid., 24 Mar. 1922.
Ill The Int. Communist, 25 Mar. 1922.
112 Ibid., 1 Apr. 1922
106
By the end of March, Labor had lost the state elections and 
Comintern refused of any affiliation before Communists were united 
came to the forc|e again. With this came keener awareness, no doubt, 
of the need to accommodate the intransigent men of Liverpool Street. 
Thus, in June, the Communist stressed A.L.P. deficiencies and found 
the idea of affiliation ’foolish’. ^ “'
But this made very little difference to the Trades Hall
reds. They continued to interest themselves greatly in A.L.P.
internal affairs, and took the part of the Bailey faction with
undiminished enthusiasm. Garden's industrial notes in the Communist
reported the shearing strike of 1922 for example, in a tone that
displayed sympathy for the A.W.U. leaders at times, and certainly
never attacked them; nor did the general reports in the Sussex Street 
114press.
After July 1922, unity negotiations between the two Communist 
Parties had got well under way, as we noted, and so there was no 
longer such a strong need to appease the former A.S.P. men on the united 
front question. Sussex Street men who continued to have their doubts 
on the matter felt no inclination to clash with the Comintern on it, 
and once Communist unity was assured, the united Communist; Party moved 
immediately to implement the Comintern line. The annual conference 
at the end of 1922
The Communist, 16 June 1922; see also, 9 June 1922.
However, when Garden had sailed for a congress in Moscow in 
September, the Communist attacked the A.W.U. leaders over a 
pastoral strike in no uncertain way: 'If ever the workers weredeserted by their leaders in an industrial fight it is on this
occasion.1 (The Communist, 22 Sept.1922.)
discussed this question at ore at length ^nd 
recognised that °s the -policy of the Communist Inter­
national was tor p-rty ‘affiliation to and membership 
in the Labor party, the conference was bound to accept 
same and work for its realisation, 115
The passage sounds ~ clear not'-' of reluctance, and one of some significance 
as it turned out. It is hard to spe any apnreciable difference in 
the effectiveness of the united front policy now that the Communist 
Party was formally carrying it out as a party, where before a key 
group had implemented it without formal national approval. Those who 
had had real doubts about the line possibly carried the line out with­
out enthusiasm, despite its orthodoxy. There is no notable increase 
of Communist work in the unions as a result of the new line's formal 
acceptance, for the chief union reds had been implementing the line - 
in their own wa.y - for some time. One does see Communists at work 
in the local A.L.P. branches - Lionel Leece , former Liverpool Street 
member, is a good example. These people were not only less effective 
in A.L.P. affairs, but also more vulnerable to expulsion from the 
A.L.P. Finally, the C.P. members in A.L.P. branches had no organisat­
ion to cater for the quite peculiar problems arising for Communists 
in the A.L.P., and thus were less effective for this reason, too, than 
the Trades Hall reds, who had an organisation effective for their Labor 
Party as well as their union work.
Many of those who entered this study as socialists and 
syndicalists have now become communists. Many of them were later to 
leave, while some never formally joined. Jack Kilburn, for example,
The Communist, 5 Jan. 1923»115
f e l t  t h e  t im e  was n o t  r i p e  f o r  s e t t i n g  up a new r e v o l u t i o n a r y  p a r t y ,  
th ough  he j o i n e d  t h e  A .L .P .  i n  1922 a t  th e  r e q u e s t  o f  Garden and 
Howie,  h i s  comrades  i f  n o t  members of  th e  same p a r t y .  O t h e r s ,  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  t h o s e  once c l o s e l y  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  th e  Chicago I.W.W, 
l e a d e r s ,  f o u n d  t h e  new Communists n o t a b l y  u n m i l i t a n t  and l a c k i n g  i n  
th e  mass t o u c h .  Mrs.  B e t t s y  M a t t h i a s ,  c l o s e  c o l l a b o r a t o r  w i t h  t h e  
C h i c a g o i t e s  f rom 1915 to  1917 t o l d  t h e  w r i t e r  t h a t  she  d i d  n o t  j o i n  
th e  new p a r t y  b e c a u s e  i t s  l e a d e r s  d i d  n o t  ’ go fo rw ard*  as  ’m i l i t a n t s  
i n  th e  p r o p e r  m a n n e r ’ , o r  as  ' p r o p a g a n d i s t s  i n  t h e  p r o p e r  m a n n e r ’ , 
and d id  n o t  a d e q u a t e l y  ' t e a c h  Communism o r  i t s  i d e a l s .
The e a r l y  Communists owed t h e i r  r e m a r k a b le  im pac t  on th e  
l a b o r  movement t o  th e  p o l i t i c a l  r a d i c a l i s m  and i n d u s t r i a l  m i l i t a n c y  
of th e  u n i o n  r a n k  and f i l e ,  t o  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  so many f o u n d i n g  
Communists were u n io n  o f f i c i a l s ,  and t o  t h e  f a c t  t h a t ,  f o r  s e v e r a l  
y e a r s ,  t h e  e a r l y  Communists o r i e n t e d  most of  t h e i r  a c t i v i t y  tow ards  
the  A .L . P .  , l a b o r ' s  mass p a r t y  i n  t h i s  c o u n t r y .  ,/e i n t r o d u c e d  th e  
l e f t i s t s  c h i e f l y  a s  i n i t i a t o r s  o f  th e  I n d u s t r i a l  S o c i a l i s t  
Labor P a r t y ,  a s  d i r e c t o r s  of  t h e  One B ig  U n ion ,  and as f o u n d e r s  o f  
the  Communist P a r t y .  I n  s h o r t  we have c o n s i d e r e d  them so f a r  i n  
t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  r a t h e r  th a n  t h e i r  i n d u s t r i a l  r o l e s .  Now we w i l l  
look  a t  them a s  t r a d e  u n i o n i s t s .
116 I n t e r v i e w ,  4 Mar. 1963.
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CHAPTER II. APPENDIX I
The Union Strength of the Left 1919-1926
In April, 1917j J* S. Garden was appointed Labor Council
assistant-secretary by E.J. Kavanagh, conservative secretary of
Labor Council. (Ex. Min. Lab. Council 10 April 1917)» Among those
nominating for executive positions in July, 1917> were J.J. Graves,
(Stovemakers) W.J. Gibb, (Clothing) J.S. Garden, (Clerks) and E.E.
Judd, (then Municipal Workers’ Union). (Ex. Min. 19 July 1917)» In
1918, the left gained a major control of the New South Wales Trades
117and Labor Council, and entrenched itself rapidly in the years 
which followed.
By December 1918, as members of the Labor Council Executive, 
along with J.S. Garden, secretary of the Council, were A. McPherson 
(Letter Carriers* Union), as Vice-President, H. Dessaix (Amalgamated 
Carpenters and Joiners* Society), J. Howie (Coopers' Union), E. Judd 
(Miscellaneous Workers' Union) and G. Burns (Hotel, Club and Restaurant 
Employees' Union). In 1919? while Howie became president of the Council, 
the left was strengthened by the accession to the Executive of R. Webster 
(Municipal Employees' Union), W.J. Gibb (Federated Clothing Trades Union), 
J. Kilburn (Operative Bricklayers' Union), and F. RoeIs (Federated 
Engine-drivers & Firemen's Association). In 1920, J.J. Graves 
(Stovemakers' Union) and A. Rutherford (Saddlers' Union) joined the 
117 Several unions broke their affiliation with the Council as a 
consequence 5 for an account of the new leadership by one (the 
Electrical Trades Union, which disaffiliated shortly after June 
1918) see the E1 ectrica 1 Tra.des Journa 1. 29 July 1919»
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executive of the Trades and Labor Council; in 1921, J. Beasley 
(Electrical Trades Union), R.A, King (Saddlers' Union) and P. Shirley 
(Amalgamated Printing Trades' Union) also joined the Executive. In 
1922, Beasley became Acting President of the Council, while H. Denford 
(Federated Ironworkers' Association) and J. Johnson ( Seamen's Union) 
appeared upon the Executive, In 1924, C. Hook (Municipal Workers' 
Union) and A.E. Bennet (Coachmakers1 Union) were members of the 
Executive, while M.P. Ryan (Storemen & Packers' Union) appeared in 
1926. In all this time, J.S. Garden was Labor Council secretary, 
and the centre of the red trade union network.
During the same period, many unions began to send left-wing 
delegates to Council who never became executive members, but who 
formed an important part of the left's bloc. Among these were 0. 
Schrieber (Furniture Trades Society) (briefly a leftist in 1918 and 
early 1919)? J* Swebleses (Wharf Labourers' Union), J. Burns 
(Federated Ironworkers' Association), G. Sinclair, R. Corcoran and 
T, Falkingham (Boilermakers' Society), H.J. Potter and W. Aldwell 
(Hotel, Club and Restaurant Employees' Union), R.J. Heffron, S. Dallman
on
and W. Elliott (Marine Stewards* Union). (For all details Labor 
Council personnel, see the Report and Balance Sheet of the Labor 
Council of New South Wales, 1911-1927»)
What was the strength of the left within the state's 
largest unions?
By the middle of the nineteen twenties, the largest union
in New South Wales was the Australian Workers' Union, with 34>639 
members; next came the New South Wales branch of the Australian
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R a i l w a y s ’ Union ,  w i t h  17 ,140  members;  t h e  F e d e r a t e d  I r o n w o r k e r s '  
A s s o c i a t i o n ,  w i t h  15)601;  t h e  N o r t h e r n  C o l l i e r i e s  Em ployees '
A s s o c i a t i o n ,  w i t h  13 ,500 ;  t h e  M u n i c i p a l  and S h i r e  C o u n c i l  Em ployees ,  
1 0 ,0 1 5 ;  t h e  Amalgamated S o c i e t y  o f  E n g i n e e r s ,  7 )5 9 8 ,  t h e  Amalgamated 
Timber W orkers '  Union ,  7 )500 ;  t h e  H o t e l s ,  C lu b |  and R e s t a u r a n t  
Employees  of  New Sou th  Wales ,  7)136* (From t h e  R e p o r t  o f  t h e  R e g i s t r a r  
o f  F r i e n d l y  S o c i e t i e s  and Trade U n io n s ,  f o r  t h e  'Twelve Months e n d i n g  
30 J u n e ,  1927) N.S.W* P a r i .  P a p e r s * v o l .  1,  1928,  p . 624)
While t h e  l e f t  h e l d  few o f f i c i a l  p o s i t i o n s  i n  t h e s e  u n i o n s ,  
i t s  i n f l u e n c e  was by no means n e g l i g i b l e .  I n  th e  A.W.U.,  t h e r e  were 
c a p a b le  n o n - o f f i c i a l  l e f t - w i n g  l e a d e r s ,  s u c h  as  G. B e r r y ,  G. Be l lam y,
A. Rae and J .  C u l l i n a n .  ( C u l l i n a n  was th e  l e a d i n g  f i g u r e  o f  the  
p o w e r fu l  W es te rn  Branch  of  t h e  A.W.U. To c r u s h  t h e  t h r e a t  he r e p r e s e n t e d ,  
th e  r i g h t - w i n g  m a j o r i t y  l e a d e r s h i p  of  t h e  A.W.U. d i s s o l v e d  t h e  e n t i r e  
b r a n c h  i n  1920.  (i n t e r n a t i o n a l  S o c i a l i s t ,  11 S e p . 1920. V o t in g  was 
50 f o r ,  50 a g a i n s t ,  w i t h  A. B l a k e l y ' s  c h a i r m a n ' s  v o te  d e c i d i n g  th e  
i s s u e . )  A. Rae had once h e l d  a h ig h  o f f i c i a l  p o s i t i o n  i n  th e  A.W.U.
In  v iew  o f  w i d e s p r e a d  r a n k  and  f i l e  d i s c o n t e n t  i n  t h e  A.W.U. (see  
above p .  / 47 ) t h e  l e f t  can t h u s  be c o n s i d e r e d  f a i r l y  s t r o n g  i n  t h i s
u n i o n ,  a t  l e a s t  u n t i l  1923»
The Communists had l i t t l e  o f f i c i a l  i n f l u e n c e  i n  t h e  m i n e r s '
u n i o n .  Two o u t s t a n d i n g  l e a d e r s  o f  t h e  N o r t h e r n  C o l l i e r i e s  A s s o c i a t i o n ,
J .M. B adde ley  an d  T. ( ' B o n d y ' )  H o a r e , were l e f t - w i n g ,  t h e  l a t t e r
f a r  more so t h a n  th e  Communist o f f i c i a l s  o f  th e  Trades  and  Labor
C o u n c i l .  B adde ley  was a l m o s t  w h o l ly  u n d e r  t h e  p e r s o n a l  i n f l u e n c e  of  
t h e  m i n e r s '  g e n e r a l  s e c r e t a r y  i n  New S ou th  W ales ,  A.C. W i l l i s .
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Though a l l e g e d  t o  have j o i n e d  th e  Communist P a r t y  i n  1921,  even  
l a t e  i n  t h a t  same y e a r  t h e  Communists cou ld  n o t  coun t  him as  one 
o f  t h e i r  f a c t i o n ,  and  by e a r l y  1923 W i l l i s  and  t h e  Communists were 
open en e m ie s .  P u t  w h i l e  the  Communists c o u l d  n o t  c l a im  m i n e r s ’ 
l e a d e r s  a s  members o f  t h e i r  f a c t i o n ,  t h e y  c o u l d  e x p e c t  and  o f t e n  
r e c e i v e d  a s y m p a t h e t i c  h e a r i n g  f rom th e  r a n k  and  f i l e  o f  t h e  u n i o n ,  
and. a t  t im e s  d i d  n o t  h e s i t a t e  t o  appea l  t o  i t  o v e r  th e  heads  of  
m i n in g  o f f i c i a l s .
Of t h e  r e m a i n i n g  l a r g e s t  u n i o n s ,  t h e  f o u n d a t i o n  Communist 
H. D en fo rd  had some i n f l u e n c e  i n  t h e  F e d e r a t e d  I r o n w o r k e r s '  A s s o c i a t i o n  
by 1 9 2 1 , and was a member of  t h e  e x e c u t i v e  of  th e  Sydney b r a n c h  by 1924> 
i f  n o t  e a r l i e r  ( t h e  u n i o n ' s  r e c o r d s  a r e  f r a g m e n t a r y  f o r  ou r  p e r i o d )
cmot
w h i l e  th e  l e a d e r s  of  the  H o t e l ,  Club, R e s t a u r a n t  Employees were 
members of  th e  S o c i a l - D e m o c r a t i c  League ,  and  by no means u n s y m p a t h e t i c  
t o  t h e  Communists .
I n  a l l ,  t h e n ,  t h e  Communists and t h e i r  s u p p o r t e r s  were 
p r o b a b l y  b e t t e r  e n t r e n c h e d  i n  t r a d e  u n io n  o f f i c i a l  p o s i t i o n s  t h a n  
t h e i r  comrades i n  European  c o u n t r i e s .  At any  r a t e ,  the  Communists 
were c e r t a i n l y  w e l l  enough e n t r e n c h e d  t o  i n f l u e n c e  s t r o n g l y ,  i f  n o t  
t o  d e t e r m i n e ,  t h e  i n d u s t r i a l  s t r a t e g y  a d o p t e d  by t h e  t r a d e  u n io n  
movement i n  New S ou th  Wales i n  th e  wages and  ho u rs  campaigns of
1919-20  and 1922
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CHAPTER I I I  *N0 MORE 1917 DEBACLES!• -  th e  Trade 
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In 1919» there were many who felt that the world-wide mass
unrest, of which the Bolshevik revolution was a part, was vigorously
manifest in Australia. Indeed Senator Newland asserted:
We in Australia have been... more sorely oppressed by that 
fworld-wide] spirit of unrest than any other part of 
the civilised world. 1
In the Legislative Assembly of New South Wales, W.E. Robson alleged that
the great body £of the workersj have refused to recognise 
the arbitration laws of this country. 2
while the liberal Round Table spoke of
a great intensification of class-consciousness and the 
development of an internationalism hitherto almost un­
known amongst the rank and file of Australian Labour. 3
George Beeby, Nationalist Party Minister for Labor and Industry in New
South Wales, wrote:
The strike is rapidly becoming political instead of 
industrial. Syndicalism is eating its way into the 
very vitals of trade unionism. 4
Certainly the figures show that Australian labor was in an
unusual state of industrial unrest. In 1919 over four million working
days were lost in industrial disputes throughout the Commonwealth - a
5remarkably high figure for Australia. Yet 1917 was the year of the
Comm. Pari. Deb., vol. XCI, p.21, 26 Feb.1920.
2 N.S.W. Pari. Deb., vol. 75, P-654, 10 Sept. W 9 -
Round Table.vol.9t 1918-1919, P*6l4; compare with Ernest Scott's later 
reference to 'the atmosphere of suspicion which permeated industrial 
life' (The Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918. 
vo1• XI. Australia During the War, p.683.).
The Sunday Times, 11 May 1919-
Appendix to this chapter, Table 3*
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g e n e ra l  s t r i k e  which, though i t  b ro u g h t d e f e a t ,  o b v io u s ly  d id  no t 
c ru sh  i n d u s t r i a l  s e l f  c o n f id e n ce ;  i n  New South W ales, in d e e d ,  the  
average  d i s p u te  o f  1919  was more p ro lo n g ed  th a n  t h a t  of 1917*^ In  
s h o r t ,  one f i n d s  the  w orking  c l a s s  o f  1919 caugh t up i n  a wave o f 
m i l i t a n c y ,  f o r  whose o r i g i n s  we must go back a few y e a r s .
In  the  e a r l y  war y e a r s ,  l a b o r ’s d i s c o n te n t  had ta k en  shape 
a round  i s s u e s  such  as  th e  ’wage f r e e z e * ,  o r  th e  r e f u s a l  o f  Labor 
p a r l i a m e n ta r i a n s  to  execu te  Labor p o l i c y  ( in  p a r t i c u l a r ,  on h o u rs ,  
p r i c e s ,  and th e  a b o l i t i o n  o f  th e  L e g i s l a t i v e  C o u n c i l ) ,  Trade un ion  
o f f i c i a l s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  th o se  from u n s k i l l e d  and s e m i - s k i l l e d  un ions  
such  as th e  r a i l  and tramways, m iners  and the  A.W.U., p lay ed  the  
le a d in g  p a r t  i n  c r y s t a l l i s i n g  t h i s  e a r l y  la b o r  d i s c o n t e n t ,  and t h e i r  
a c t i v i t i e s  were d i r e c t e d  l a r g e l y  th ro u g h  the  e s t a b l i s h e d  t r a d e  un ion  
p a r t y ,  the  A u s t r a l i a n  Labor P a r ty  (though the  I.W.W. and , to  a l e s s e r  
e x t e n t ,  the  ' i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s o c i a l i s t s '  o f v a r io u s  b rands p lay ed  no 
sm all  p a r t  even in  th e  e a r l y  war y e a r s ) .  In  1914 and 1915» p o l i t i c a l  
i n t e r e s t  and a c t i v i t y  were s t i l l  more o r  l e s s  r e s t r i c t e d  to  l a b o r ' s  
le a d in g  c a d re ;  by 1 9 1 5 » the  r a n k  and f i l e  i t s e l f  was in  fe rm e n t .
Through the  c o n s c r ip t i o n  r e f e r e n d a  and the  s t r i k e  wave 
b e g in n in g  in  1916, the  work o f th e  s c a t t e r e d  s o c i a l i s t  and I.W.W. groups 
began to  b e a r  f r u i t .  Fragm ents o f  th e  id e o lo g y  o f ' c l a s s  s t ru g g le *  
g rip p ed  th o u s a n d s ,  h e lp in g  to  make them more i n t e r e s t e d  i n  p o l i t i c a l  
a f f a i r s  th a n  th ey  were n o rm a lly ,  and i n t e n s i f y i n g  t h e i r  i n d u s t r i a l  
m i l i t a n c y .  But the  un ion  o f f i c i a l s  who, i n  th e  f i r s t  war y e a r s ,  had
6 Appendix to  t h i s  c h a p te r ,  Table 5
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supplied the yeast for this ferment of 1916, now revealed increasing
uneasiness over the impetuous 'direct action' of the ranks; even the
left-wing miners' officiaPb (A.C. Willis, for example), did their best
7to restrain brushfire militancy, while the politically moderate 
officials of the A.W.U. and the rail and tram union frankly opposed
g
the new and heady current.
Noting the contrast between headstrong rank and file militancy 
and official industrial timidity, one might expect a tendency for the 
rank and file to throw up new officials more in accordance with their 
mood. Indeed, the leftists who were late to establish the Communist 
Party gained control of the New South Wales Labor Council in 1918. 
Knowing that the early European and American Communists were industrial 
militants, one might suppose that the New South Wales Communists 
supplied a new and militant leadership to the unions.
But this supposition is wrong. The established leaders of 
the unskilled and semi-skilled unions were not industrial militants; 
years of participating in an arbitration and parliamentary network 
had blunted the edge of any industrial militancy they had possessed, 
and had shaped their inclinations, habits and abilities in the direction 
of 'legal' rather than 'direct' action. Wherever the pressure of the
They did this as early as 1914> incidentally. The strike against 
the afternoon shift of that year furnished a good example. (See 
S.M.H., 4 >5» 6 June, 1914» and Direct Action, 15 June 1914»
For the attitude to militancy of Claude Thompson, secretary of the 
Amalgamated Rail and Tramways Association, see Direct Action,
1 July 1914> quoting from Thompson's speech in the Cooperator, 
official journal of this union.
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rank and file made direct action unavoidable, these officials chose
what was called the 'scientific* method of confining the strike area
1 1 9to "its narrowest possible limits". What of the new, left-wing
leaders, the Trades Hall reds? Many of them were craft union officials,
and explicitly endorsed the 'scientific* idea of confining strikes.
Though they had extensive links with the rank and file militants in
the unions, skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled, they made little use
of these links to encourage industrial militancy and to help unseat
entrenched non-militant officials. The Trades Hall reds were not
themselves industrial militants.
If the climate of the times had been unsympathetic to
industrial militancy, it would be less remarkable to find the leading
industrial Communists were non-militants. The first step then is to
establish that there was in fact widespread industrial militancy in
the early years of left-wing control of the Labor Council.
Quoted in Direct Action, 1 July 1914> reporting Claude Thompson. 
Compare with a similar statement by J. Tudehope, secretary of 
the New South Wales branch of the Marine Cooks' Union, quoted 
below at p. 149.
118
Industrial Militancy 1919-1920 
In 1920, of the 884,104 breadwinners in New South Wales, 
277,519 were trade unionists, organised in some 214 separate unions; 
of the 2 58 ,863 unionists, 234 ,8 9 8 were males and 23,9^5 females. ^
12Of the twelve main industrial groups identified for official purposes, 
using statistics furnished in 1925, we give here those who figure fre­
quently in this study: the ’building group’ comprised 15 unions, had 
some 2 9 ,0 0 0 members, and constituted 11.8$ of the total number of 
unionists in New South Wales; the engineering and metal working group 
comprised 14 unions, some 22,000 members, and constituted 9*1$ of the 
total; the mining and smelting group covered 13 unions, some 18,000 
members, and constituted 7«3$ of the total; the pastoral group, 6 
unions, some 27,000 members, 10.8$ of the total; the shipping and sea 
transport group covered 11 unions with some 5>800 members, and constit­
uted 2.3$ of the total.^ A substantial increase in the number of 
unionists in New South Wales and in the Commonwealth as a whole occurred 
during the war and immediate post-war years, and overseas observers 
such as the American labor historian Carter Goodrich claimed that
Commonwealth Year Book, No. 14, 192«! , p.899*
N.S.W. Year Book, 1928-29, P-772.
See Table 1 in the Appendix to this chapter.
From the Report of the Acting Registrar of Friendly Societies and 
Trade Unions for the Twelve Months ended 30 June, 1925 (N.S.W. Pari. 
Papers, vol. 2 ,p.773, 1926).
In New South Wales, the number of unionists rose from 150,527 in 
1911 to 231,550 in 1916, and 258,863 in 1921. (N.S.W. Year Book, 
1928-9, p.772).
10
11
12
13
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Australian labor was unusual in its degree of unionisation, singling
out as especially noteworthy the extent of unionism among sheep shearers,
and the mere fact that unionism had spread at all amongst domestic
15workers, musicians, journalists, civil servants and teachers.
Australian unionists were caught up in that world-wide wave 
of political radicalism and industrial militancy swelling out of the 
first world- war, though they were not, it is true, as deeply affected 
as their counterparts in countries more directly involved in the war. 
Stimulated by the Russian revolution, the Irish Easter rebellion and 
the anti-conscription struggles, political and social ideas of a left- 
wing nature spread through the Australian labor movement. For the 
purposes of analysis, we distinguish industrial militancy and political 
radicalism as two separate entities but, in the labor movement of the 
time, the distinction was blurred so that both formed a whole, a climate 
of dissatisfaction and of self-confidence. Political and social ideas 
of a left-wing nature nurtured, and were in their turn nourished by, 
a sentiment of industrial militancy; but contributing more directly 
to this militancy were price rises which far outstripped wage increases1*
'The Labour Movement in New Countries; Australia, New Zealand, the 
United States,' chap.2,p.3* See also H. Heaton, Modern Economic 
History with Special Reference to Australia, p.246.
In 1907> wage earners received 56.2$ of the national dividend. 
Between 1907 and 1929» the lowest point was reached during the war, 
when wage earners received 48•4% of the national dividend (30 C.A.R. 
l8). The New South Wales Year Book for 1921 referred to the 
'tendency of wages to lag behind advancing prices in the early years 
of the war' (p.660), while in 1924» the economist D.B. Copland 
declared (The Economic Journal,vol. 34>P»4^) that 'real wages were 
lower during the whole period 1914-19^P than they were in 1913» 
supporting his view with the table set out below.
(continued next page)
120
1 n
(despite increased productivity), 'dilution' of labor to meet the
18
needs of war, and the relatively low level of unemployment.
A cycle of strikes, beginning in 1916, rose to a first peak
in 1917» In that year an extended strike, initiated by the rank and
file and executed with minimum help from officials, met with severe 
l8bdefeat. Perhaps nothing gives more convincing proof of the combat-
ivity of the rank and file than the rapid rise of strikes to a new 
19peak in 1919» for officials were not much more enthusiastic about
leading strikes then than they had been in 1917*
16 (continued)
Table Showing Movements in Wages, Cost of Living, etc.
(Plus sign indicates a rise, and a minus sign, a fall).
1913-1920
August 1920 
to December 
1921
January 1922 
to June 1923
Wholesale prices + 128$ - 38 + 16
Retail prices + 92 - 25 + 12
Rent + 19 + 6 + 7
Cost of Living 
Wages of Adult
+ 62 - 18 + 11
Male Workers + 51 + 11 - 2h
Sources D.B. Copland,'The Economic Situation in Australia) in the 
Economic Journal, vol. XXXIV, 1924,p»46«
Copland, op.cit, p*47 '...in years of rapidly rising prices wages 
lagged behind when the productivity of industry might have justified 
higher rates.•,'
See Table 2, in the Appendix to this chapter.
Heavy unemployment offers employers a ready means of strike-breaking, 
& thus one often finds strike peaks correlated with a low level 
of unemployment.
V.G. Childe, op.cit., p.184 'The net result, in N.S.W. at any rate, 
was that unionism was virtually crippled in almost every industry'.
See Appendix to this chapter, Tables 3 and 5*
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Unionists were indeed in unusually aroused and combative
frame of mind. The Sydney Coal Lumpers Union stopped work in 1919>
and then never again until 1961. The lofty marine engineers stopped
21work in this period, as did their retiring poor relations, the marine
22cooks and butchers. The period saw strikes by civil servants and
p*} n j pc
school teachers (in Western Australia), J musicians, 4 chorus girls,  ^
and even (in Victoria) by policemen. The industrial defeat of 1917 
was an abysmal one; the Wharf Labourers and Coal Lumpers Unions were 
shattered, the once strong Amalgamated Road and Tramway Services
26Association was for some time unable to scrape together a quorum.
Yet by 1919» the still-battered Wharf Labourers had joined two of their 
bitter rivals - the Returned Soldiers* and Sailors* Wharf Labourers*
The domestic history of other conservatively-led unions reveals 
near-strike situations. For example, the executive of the Electrical 
Trades Union had considerable difficulty in restraining its rank 
and file in 1919 and 1920. (Exec. Minutes, 26 May,1919; Minutes, 
l8 Feb.1920; Electrical Trades Journal, 28 May 1919*)
22 Annual Report and Balance Sheet, Marine Cooks *.Bakers *and Butchers* 
Association of Australia, 31 December 1919*
See Round Table, vol.ll, 1920/21, p.l80-l83, for an account; also 
F.K. Crowley, Australia's Western Third, p.227.
^  Int. Socialist,29 Nov. 1919; A.W., 27 Nov. 1919; see also reference 
to the strikes in this industry, N.S.W. Industrial Gazette,
31 Mar. 1920, p.666.
Int. Socialist, 14 Aug. 1920.
See, for example, the minutes of the executive meeting for 29 May 
1918, in Minute Rook, Amalgamated Rail and Tramway Services' 
Association, JUW .
26
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Union and the Permanent and Casual Waterside Workers* Union - in a
purely political strikes a refusal to load the vessel ’Sonora*, to
prevent the deportation of one Paul Freeman, prominent left winger of 
27the day. Seamen, though defeated in 1917» held an interstate strike 
in 1919 and evoked considerable sympathy when they asked others to 
join them.
On the whole, the unions struck work to improve existing 
conditions and not to defend them; in short, they were taking the 
initiative, and this in itself is evidence of labor's combative spirit. 
Striking in 1920 for a forty four hour week to replace the old forty 
eight hour week, unionists also demanded the right to work their forty 
four hours in five days - a goal not to be won until after 1945*
The years embraced by this study also saw the peak of the movement for 
'industrial unionism', and the popularity of this demand indicates a 
climate of optimism and self-confidence in the labor movement. When 
morale is low, the worker has barely enough energy to fight piece-meal 
rearguard actions in defence of bread and butter conditions; given a 
high morale, he may be prepared to do great things. In much of our 
period he was not merely aggressive in pursuit of bread and butter 
demands; he was also enthused about building anew the union movement 
and rudely forced his notions upon the peaceful traditional mass 
political party of labor; in June 1921, the trade unionists forced the 
Australian Labor Party to adopt a socialisation objective. The 
years of this study saw, for the first time, May Lay celebrated through-
27 S.M.H., 3 and 4 , June 1919
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o u t  A u s t r a l i a .  May Day had b e e n  c e l e b r a t e d  i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y  s i n c e  1886
b/by th e  l a b o r  movement,  b u t  was s u p p l a n t e d  i n  A u s t r a l i a  u n t i l  1921 t h a t  
now modest  r e f o r m i s t  s l o g a n  ’The E i g h t  Hour D a y ' .  I t  i s  no a c c i d e n t ,  
g iv e n  t h e  c l i m a t e  of  t h e  t i m e ,  t h a t  t h e  New S ou th  Wales Labor  C o u n c i l  
f e l l  u n d e r  l e f t - w i n g  l e a d e r s h i p  i n  1 9 1 8  f o r  t h e  f i r s t  t ime  i n  i t s  h i s t o r y .  
As a consequence  t h e  Labor  C o u n c i l  began  t o  show keen  i n t e r e s t  i n  
l a b o r  a f f a i r s  o v e r s e a s ,  w hereas  u n d e r  c o n s e r v a t i v e  l e a d e r s  i t s  o u t ­
l o o k  had  been  i n s u l a r .
A s u r e  s i g n  o f  an a r o u s e d  and s e l f - c o n f i d e n t  mood amongst  
t h e  masses  may be fo u n d  i n  "the e x i s t e n c e  o f  ’ g r a s s - r o o t s ’ l e v e l  o r g a n i s ­
a t i o n ;  t r a d i t i o n a l l y  t h i s  may be a ’w o rk s '  c o m m i t t e e ,  a ’ shop* c o m m i t t e e ,  
o r  a combined u n i o n s  c o m m it tee .  I t  i s  t r u e  t h a t  A u s t r a l i a n  i n d u s t r y  
had  n o t h i n g  t o  compare w i t h  t h e  s h o p - s t e w a r d  and  w o rk s -co m m it tee  move­
ment t h a t  swept B r i t a i n ' s  r a i l ,  b u i l d i n g  and  e n g i n e e r i n g  u n io n s  be tw ee n  
281914 and 1920 . Yet A u s t r a l i a n  i n d u s t r y  d i d  p o s s e s s  a  good many s h o p -
c o m m i t t e e s ,  s c a t t e r e d  w i d e l y  i f  t h i n l y :  job  com m it tees  i n  th e  S eam en 's
Union;  amongst  w a t e r s i d e r s  i n  some p o r t s ,  u n i o n - c o n t r o l l e d  r o s t e r
s y s tem s  which  c o n s t i t u t e d  a d e g re e  o f  ’ j o b - c o n t r o l ' ;  ' w o r k s '  c o m m it tee s
i n  t h e  meat  i n d u s t r y ;  s h o p -c o m m i t t e e s  i n  t h e  f u r n i t u r e - m a k i n g  i n d u s t r y
29and i n  a t  l e a s t  some p a r t s  o f  t h e  m e ta l  t r a d e s  i n d u s t r y .
See Branko P r i b i c e v i c ,  The Shop S t e w a r d s '  Movement and W o rk e r s '  
C o n t r o l  1910- 1 922; G.D.H. C o le ,  A H i s t o r y  o f  th e  Labour  P a r t y from igm \ 
H. P e l l i n g ,  The B r i t i s h  Communist P a r t y .  A H i s t o r i c a l  P r o f i l e , p . 4;  
J . H .  S t e w a r t - R e i d ,  The O r i g i n s  o f  t h e  B r i t i s h  Labou r  P a r t y , p . 2 l 6 -
2 2 0 .
29 See n o te  ii<5 c h a p t e r  I
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And t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  shop s t e w a r d s  was even  more w i d e s p r e a d . ^
F i n a l l y ,  t o  u n d e r p i n  th e  c l a im  f o r  a  c l i m a t e  of  u n u s u a l
m i l i t a n c y ,  t h e r e  a r e  some f i g u r e s  a v a i l a b l e  o f  a t t e n d a n c e  a t  u n i o n
m e e t i n g s .  A cc o rd in g  t o  a u n io n  r e s e a r c h  o f f i c e r ,  a t t e n d a n c e  f i g u r e s
i n  t h e  E l e c t r i c a l  T rad e s  Union i n  1919 and  1920 were f a r  h i g h e r  t h a n
31
t o d a y ,  a f t e r  a l lo w a n c e  i s  made f o r  t h e  i n c r e a s e  i n  membership .
There  were shop s t e w a r d s  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  u n i o n s :  
t h e  Amalgamated S o c i e t y  of  E n g i n e e r s  ( l a t e r  t h e  Amalgamated 
E n g i n e e r i n g  U n io n ) ;  see  Month ly  R e p o r t , Commonwealth C o u n c i l ,  J a n . ,  
March ,  A p r . ,  O c t . ,  1919;  th e  Amalgamated S o c i e t y  o f  C a r p e n t e r s  and 
J o i n e r s  (C a r p e n t e r s  M onth ly  J o u r n a l , Dec. 1921,  May 1922,  N o v .1922 ) ;  
E l e c t r i c a l  T r a d e s ’ Union ( E x e c .  Min.  17 Sep .  1918,  30 Aug. 1920 ) ;  
F e d e r a t e d  Boilmakers*  S o c i e t y  (M in u te s ,  G en e ra l  M e e t in g ,  27 J a n .  
1 9 2 0 . ) .
See th e  m in u te s  o f  g e n e r a l  m e e t in g s  o f  th e  E l e c t r i c a l  T rad e s  Un ion ,  
N.S.W. b r a n c h ,  June  1919 -  J u l y  1920.  A t t e n d a n c e s  r a n g e d  f rom  58 
t o  150 ,  i n  com par i son  w i t h  a r a n g e  be tw een  June  and  December 1918,  
o f  f rom 22 t o  67 . I n  1918,  th e  membership  o f  th e  New S ou th  Wales 
b r a n c h  was 2049 ( Exec .  Annual  R e p o r t  f o r  1918,  i n  E l e c t r i c a l  
T ra d e s  J o u r n a l  26 J u l y  1918) and i n  1919? 2088.  A t t e n d a n c e s  i n  
t h e  y e a r  1919-1920  compare f a v o u r a b l y  w i t h  a t t e n d a n c e s  t o d a y ,  
t h o u g h  th e  b r a n c h  i s  v e r y  much l a r g e r  t o d a y .  N o rm a l ly  deco ro u s  
m e e t in g s  d u r i n g  1918 were o f t e n  r e p l a c e d  i n  ihe y e a r s  1919  "to 1921 
by  e x c i t e d  o n e s ;  s a i d  a s t a i d  com menta to r  i n  t h e  E l e c t r i c a l  T rades  
J o u r n a l ,27 Mar. 1920: ' E v e n t s  move r a p i d l y  i n  i n d u s t r i a l  c i r c l e s  
t h e s e  t i m e s .  New S ou th  Wales b r a n c h  has  been  r u n n i n g  a 100$ o v e r ­
l o a d  s i n c e  t h e  b e g i n n i n g  o f  th e  y e a r .  D u r in g  th e  months o f  
F e b r u a r y  and  March,  commit tee  o r  g e n e r a l  m e e t in g s  were the  d a i l y  
and  n i g h t l y  o r d e r ' .
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Even at meetings of the union perhaps most damaged by the 1917 defeat, 
the Wharf Labourers’ Union, attendances were high during 1919 and 1920;^ 
in a membership of 2,099> the New South Wales branch of the Ship 
Painters’ and Lockers' Union enjoyed attendances of up to 150 members 
at monthly meetings, which a present-day organiser of that body has 
described as an unusually high attendance.^  Attendance at quarterly 
meetings of the Amalgamated Society of Carpenters and Joiners was also 
substantial. The Printing Industry Employees' Union, with relatively 
peaceful domestic politics, and with its most vocal sections skilled 
and highly paid, had its half-yearly and special general meetings
Aattended by from eighty to 800 members, while its regular Board
of Management meetings were attended by up to sixty. By contrast, when
the wave of militancy receded, one hears anxious complaints that
35attendances at union meetings were falling away.
3 The membership was given in the Financial Secretary's report for 1919 
as 1900 (though in 1920 the branch paid affiliation fees to the A.L.P. 
for 3*000 members); 1,196 participated in a voluntary ballot on the 
O.B.U.(Minutes, Special Gen.Meeting 31 March 1920). Attendances 
at general meetings during 1920 and 1921 ranged from 130 to 330, 
though it must be remembered that these were daytime stop-work meet­
ings. The branch paid affiliation fees to the Waterside Workers' 
Federation for 3,400 members.
^  Minutes, Gen.Meetings, 1918-1923, at offices of the state branch 
of the union; interview with I. Wyner, 17 Oct. 1962.
Printing Trades Journal. 1918-1920. The latter attendance, and others 
similar, occurred when there was the possibly of a strike.
Minutes, Gen. Meeting Labor Council, 3 July 1924*
35
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One of  t h e  p o l a r  c o n c e p t s  o f  t h i s  s tu d y  i s  t h a t  o f  t h e  r a n k
and f i l e ,  d e f i n e d  a s  members o f  u n i o n s  and l a b o r  p o l i t i c a l  o r g a n i s a t i o n s
35A
who h o l d  none o f  t h e  main o f f i c i a l  p o s i t i o n s .  A p p ly ing  t h i s  t o  t h e
i n d u s t r i a l  s i d e  o f  l a b o r ,  one t h i n k s  o f  a t r a d e  u n io n  rank  and f i l e  a s
p a r t i a l l y  s e p a r a t e  f rom i t s  l e a d e r s h i p ;  p o s s e s s i n g ,  and a t  t im e s  m a n i f e s t i n g
v e r y  c l e a r l y ,  i n t e r e s t s  and an o u t l o o k  which c o n f l i c t e d  w i th  t h o s e  o f  i t s
l e a d e r s  -  a l o n g s i d e  t h o s e  which were h e l d  i n  common.
H i s t o r i a n s  w r i t i n g  a b o u t  t h e  e i g h t y  two day g e n e r a l  s t r i k e
o f  1917 ha v e  employed t h e  c o n c e p t  o f  a r a n k  and f i l e  a s  d i s t i n c t  f rom 
36
t h a t  o f  l e a d e r s .  The a f f a i r  was i n i t i a t e d  by t h e  r ank  and f i l e  i n
t h e  f a c e  o f  o f f i c i a l  a t t i t u d e s  r a n g i n g  from p a s s i v i t y  to  o u t r i g h t
d i s a p p r o v a l .  O f f i c i a l s  e n t e r e d  t h e  s t r i k e  when i t  was i r r e v o c a b l y
u n d e r  way, and c o u ld  n o t  be s to p p e d  o r  i n f l u e n c e d  u n l e s s  by t h o s e  who
p u t  t h e m s e lv e s  a t  i t s  h e a d .  Two weeks a f t e r  t h e  s t r i k e  had  be gun ,  t h e
o r g a n  o f  t h e  C h i c a g o i t e  I.W.W. i n  New South  Wales co u ld  say :
The re  i s  no p u b l i c i t y ,  and t h e  g r e a t  b u l k  o f  s t r i k e r s  know 
v e r y  l i t t l e  abou t  what i s  g o i n g  on .  So f a r  t h e r e  h a s  
been  no o f f i c i a l  mass  m e e t i n g  o f  a l l  u n i o n s  on s t r i k e  and 
no r e s p o n s i b l e  o f f i c i a l  h a s  a p p e a r e d  on t h e  p l a t f o r m  t o  
e x p l a i n  t o  t h e  s t r i k e r s  what  b u s i n e s s  i s  b e i n g  t r a n s a c t e d ,  
and how t h e  p r o s p e c t s  a r e  l o o k i n g .  No s t r i k e  b u l l e t i n s  ha v e  
been  i s s u e d ,  and no l e a f l e t s  o r  p a p e r s  e x p l a i n i n g  t h e  c a u se  
o f  t h e  s t r i k e . . .  '
Yet r ank  and f i l e  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  was a p p a r e n t l y  s t u b b o r n  and m o ra l e
35A
36
See above
See ,  f o r  
o p . c i t . ,
, p p . 6 - 7 .
e xa m ple ,  C h i l d e ,  
p p . 253-257 .
o p . c i t . ,
37
D i r e c t  A c t i o n , 18 Aug. 1917.
p p . 188-189 ;  I . A .  T u r n e r ,
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buoyant. According to a recent historian of the general strike, '... 
remarkably, the unsystematic organisation and the poor publicity had 
little effect on the morale of the strikers... As it was at the begin­
ning of the railway strike, so it was at the end: the men, still more 
determined than their leaders, "declared that they had been sold, and 
... angrily denounced the action of their Executive"'. Thus the 
strike of 1917 was such that any analysis of it which merely used the 
term 'labor movement', and took no cognisance of the fact that two 
entities comprised that whole, would be plainly inadequate. Yet 
the division noted in 1917 between rank and file and leaders did not 
spring up overnight; it certainly existed throughout the war years, and 
indeed Robert Michels argued as long ago as 1906 that there exists a
general tendency for the interests of leaders and the rank and file to 
39clash. Though no one appears to have seriously undermined this aspect 
of Michels's argument, all we will claim in this study is that such a 
clash was manifested in New South Wales between 1916 and 1930.^ Such 
evidence as has been seen of trade union affairs, particularly of
Turner, op.cit., p. 259; p.263, citing Worker, 13 Sept. 1917*
39 Robert Michels, Political Parties, 1959» Republished from an English 
translation first made in 1915«
^  For evidence of this clash from 1928 to 1930, see the writers 'The 
Strike of Waterside Workers in Australian Ports, 1928, and the 
Lockout of Coal Miners on the Northern Coalfield of New South Wales, 
1929-30', M.A. thesis; and 'The Timber Strike of 1929** Historical 
Stud., Aust. and New Zealand, vol. 10, no. 40, May 1963.
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strikes in New South Wales in this period, suggests that, just as the 
1917 division between leaders and rank and file did not appear overnight, 
neither did it disappear overnight.
The argument to he developed on labor's industrial strategy 
must, from the nature of the problem, be offered tentatively; but 
even at this point it does not seem safe to adopt analytical concepts 
which deal with the labor movement only as a whole, and not, addition­
ally, as divided into these two, not necessarily harmonious, parts.
An approach dealing with the labor movement ohly as a whole excludes 
the possibility of studying any disparity between the leadership and 
the rank and file. Where the rank and file are largely inarticulate, 
officials leave generous documentation behind, so that if precision 
were the main consideration for the historian - instead of being merely 
a vitally important consideration - one should give up the effort of 
estimating the rank and file view, and use the approximation that the 
officials spoke for labor as a whole.
However this approximation is too misleading.
In the industrial conflicts of 1920-1922, both old-established 
officials and new leftist officials favoured confinement or no direct 
action at all. Within the Communist Party, there was clear opposition 
both on an official and a rank and file level to the confinement line 
advocated by Garden and the Trades Hall reds. But opposition was not 
pushed to the point where it became effective, for the Trades Hall reds 
had the mass links and the Communist central executive recognized this 
fact. However confinement achieved few of labor's stated aims in the
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industrial campaigns of 1920-22, and the rank and file would have adopted 
extension had they been asked.
136
The Unions  i n  th e  'boom' p e r i o d  1919-1920: Marine 
T r a n s p o r t  and  t h e  F o r t y - F o u r  Hour S t r i k e s .
Of t h e  t r a d e  u n io n  e f f o r t s  t o  improve c o n d i t i o n s  d u r i n g  th e  
y e a r s  o f  r e l a t i v e l y  low unemployment i n  1919  and 1 9 2 0 , we s e l e c t  th e  
campaign f o r  th e  f o r t y  f o u r  h o u r  week,  and t h r e e  o f  s e v e r a l  m ar ine  
t r a n s p o r t  d i s p u t e s :  th e  s e a m e n ' s  s t r i k e ,  f rom May t o  A u g u s t ,  1919;  Ike  
mar ine  e n g i n e e r s '  s t r i k e  f rom 13 December 1919 t o  28 F e b r u a r y  1920,  and 
th e  s t r i k e  by  m ar ine  s t e w a r d s  and p a n t ry m e n ,  f rom 15 December 1920 t o  
25 J a n u a r y  1921 .
As t h e  l a s t  of  t h e s e  mar ine  d i s p u t e s  was w e l l  u n d e r  way,  i n  
g i v i n g  h i s  a n n u a l  l e p o r t  f o r  th e  y e a r  1920,  L abor  C o u n c i l  s e c r e t a r y  
J . S .  Garden a s k e d :
Would i t  n o t  have been  b e t t e r  f o r  t h e  Seamen,  Marine 
E n g i n e e r s  and S tew ard s  t o  have d e c i d e d  to  t a k e  a c t i o n  a t  
th e  same t i m e .  I t  would  have been  more e f f e c t i v e . . .  41
The r e a d e r  w i l l  p r o b a b l y  f e e l  no g r e a t  s u r p r i s e  i n  r e a d i n g  
G a r d e n ' s  w o rd s .  Some may d e c i d e  t h a t  t h e y  were o n l y  common-sense.
O th e r s  w i l l  doub t  the  ' e f f e c t i v e n e s s ' ,  b u t  w i l l  r e c a l l  t h a t  Garden was 
a f t e r  a l l  a Communist.  The i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t e n d e n c y  o f  t h e  e a r l y  Communists ,  
i n  c o n t r a s t  w i t h  t h a t  o f  t h e  1 9 5 0 ’s and  e a r l y  1 9 6 0 ' s ,  i n  w e s t e r n  
c o u n t r i e s  a t  any  r a t e ,  d i d  n o t  l e a n  to w ard s  ' i r r i t a t i o n '  t a c t i c s  of  
r o l l i n g  s t r i k e s ,  o v e r t im e  b a n s ,  r e g u l a t i o n  s t r i k e s ,  o r  tow ards  h a l f  day 
s t o p p a g e s .  Nor d i d  t h e  e a r l y  Communists  u s u a l l y  c o n c e iv e  a s t r i k e  
a c t i o n  on a f a c t o r y - b y - f a c t o r y  b a s i s ,  w i t h  a s i z a b l e  p a r t  o f  the
41 Ann. Rep.  Lab .  C o u n c i l ,  31 Dec. 1920 ,  p . l l
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unionists left at work to finance the strikers. A variation of the
latter form was commonly used in New South Wales during the 1920's,
and the form itself Knowles, the strike historian, has called the
'bumper' strike. The 'bumper' strike was first used by craft unions
in the early nineteenth century, and in the twentieth century '... re-
42discovered by the Syndicalists'. The early Communists, after all, 
were more inclined to 'short big strikes... rather than small protracted 
ones...';^J in the terms used throughout this study, more inclined to 
the 'extended' rather than the 'confined' strike.^
45If, after noting that Garden advised 'action at the same time'.
K.G.J.C. Knowles, Strikes - A Study in Industrial Conflict, p.12.
Turner, op.cit., p.241. Turner is not referring to Communists here; 
he is discussing strike forms which developed in Europe during 
and after the l890's.
Compare these with the terms used by E.T. Hiller (The Strike. A 
Study in Collective Action, pp. 136-137). In discussing ways in 
which a strike may be initiated, Hiller distinguished two main 
types: the strike 'en masse' and the strike 'in detail'. The strike 
'en masse' Hiller described as 'the more usual form of initiation', 
and of the strike 'in detail' (for which term we use 'the confined' 
strike) Hiller wrote.: '...in the simplest form £it was] used by a
few English craft unions during the middle of the nineteenth 
century.' Fred S. Hall (Sympathetic Strikes and Sympathetic Lock­
outs , p.10, and passim) used the term 'general strike' for what 
we call the 'extended' strike, while for the general strike in 
the traditional sense, Hall used the term 'universal strike'.
For discussion and definition of the 'general strike', often used 
as a substitute for the 'extended' strike, see Wilfred H. Crook, 
Communism and the General Strike, and 'The Revolutionary Logic of 
the General Strike', in the American Political Science Review, 1934? 
vol. 28. pp.655-663.
45 Above, p. 130
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the reader supposed that the Trades Hall reds, too, were proponents 
of the extended strike, this would he a natural and logical thing to 
suppose. But the reader would he wrong. Whenever Garden and his 
fellow red union officials were themselves directly responsible for a 
strike, and even when it appeared that they could seriously influence 
it, Garden and his colleagues did not propose or countenance 'action 
at the same time 1.
By 1919? marine transport unions in New South Wales shared 
pressing common grievances, outstanding amongst which were desires for 
wage increases, for decreases in hours, for an increase in the numbers 
of the crew working on a given ship (the 'manning' dispute), and for 
the removal of non-unionists placed on the waterfront following the 
defeat of 1917» Marine transport unionists possessed in the Transport 
Workers' Federation^ a centralised organisation capable of directing 
common action suggested by common grievances, and made feasible by rank 
and file militancy. Yet no common action was taken; unions went out 
one at a time. Though thousands were thrown idle, willy-nilly, by each 
of these, no officials save the seamen's ever invited those they knew
Under the impact of the rising tide of industrial militancy, in July 
1917 marine transport unions came together with the avowed purpose of 
setting up an Industrial Union. Known as the Transport Workers' 
Federation, the resulting organisation embraced the following unions: 
the Marine Stewards with 2,000 members; the Federated Seamen's Union, 
12,000 members; Marine Cooks 1,000 members; Merchant Service Guild of 
Australasia, 2,000 members; Newcastle Coal Trimmers' Federal Union, 
400 members; Federated Ship Painters' and Dockers' Union, 3>000 
members; Federated Carters and Drivers Union, 7,000 members; Water­
side Workers' Federation, 15*000 members (see a pencilled estimate 
on the Minutes of the Conference to Establish the Transport Workers 
Industrial Union, 6 July 1917)»
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would, be thrown idle to participate voluntarily on behalf of their 
own grievances, as well as in 'solidarity' with the initiating group.
For years, seamen had attempted to improve their conditions 
through arbitration.^ Then they had been drawn into the anti- 
conscription campaign and, against the wish of their officials, had 
joined the 1917 extended strike and suffered heavy defeat. Such was 
the morale of the rank and file, however, that in February, 1919» Aust­
ralian seamen joined New Zealanders in a wage strike, sparked off by 
the influenza danger. Officials of the Sydney branch, along with 
federal officials, withdrew Australian seamen save for the Queenslanders. 
Then, however, an internal militant revolt consolidated the formerly 
insecure position of Thomas Walsh in the Sydney branch itself and 
later, when the strike became Australia-wide once more, in the federal
leadership (as the * general*secretary.) By 20 May, 1919» the strike,
49having faltered after February, had once more become Australia-wide.
Round Table described the strike as 'above all a repudiation of
arbitration in favour of direct action' (though, added that journal,
the strike was conducted over demands which were 'nothing very extrava- 
50gant'). In addition to wage increases, seamen now also stressed
^  S »M.H., 1 Dec. 1922; T.J. Smith, N.S.W. Pari. Deb.,vol.76, p.880, 
17 Sept. 1919.
For a fuller account of this complicated story (for which I am 
indebted to Mr. R. Coates, currently carrying on research on the 
Seamen's Union), see the Appendix to this chapter, item 6.
In New South Wales, some 7»700 workers were drawn in, 2,190 in 
Victoria, 2,770 in Queensland, 1,705 in South Australia, 9^5 in 
Western Australia, and 655 in Tasmania (Labour Report, No .15»1924>
p.110.)
(Footnote 50 next page.)
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accommodation on board ship. The seamen wanted an advance of thirty 
five shillings per month for able seamen, with similar increases for 
ordinary seamen, firemen and other grades; a maximum six-hour day in 
port and the carrying into effect of the 1913 Commonwealth Navigation 
Act with regard to accommodation on board ship. The seamen also re­
quired additional provisions for light, bedding, attendance and clean­
ing, and the application of the menu of the Commonwealth Shipping Line 
to all ships. They desired increased payments for overtime, for work­
ing the cargo, and for trimming coal, with an insurance guarantee of 
£500 to be paid to next of kin of seamen dying at sea, and wages during 
sickness. Other unions had made no secret of their grievances, and the 
seamen’s officials asked others to join in extending the strike. This 
was seriously considered by at least three conferences which included 
water-side workers, (who in Melbourne had a dispute of their own in 
progress over non-unionists on the waterfront,) carters and drivers, 
ship painters and dockers and the two engineers' unions, and later,
51coal miners, engine-drivers and firemen. Indeed, for some time, -the 
daily press had anticipated extension. Before 10 July, one conference
Round Table, vol. 10, 1919-1920, p.l66.
The seamen later repeatedly charged certain other unions with 
trying to send them back to arbitration, a charge indignantly 
denied. (Transcript of Proceedings of Interstate Trade Union 
Conference, 21-26 July 1919)*
51y See the leaflet, Seamen’s Strike... a brief history of the negot­
iations between the Melbourne Industrial Disputes Committee and the 
Seamen’s Federal Council, on the one side, and the Federal Govern­
ment on the other. This refers to a conference on 6 June 1919? 
while the Sydney Morning Herald records another conference on 10 
July (S.M.H.,11 July 1919)t see also Argus, 28 July, 1919»
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had actually recommended interstate extension to coal miners, engine- 
drivers and firemen, and non-marine transport workers, around demands 
including removal of non-unionists from the waterfront, abolition of 
the 'bureaux* through which non-unionists on the waterfront were alloc­
ated jobs, and settlement of the current Barrier miners' strike in the 
miners' favour. And on 10 July, the Melbourne Trades Hall Council
voted for steps to bring extension about, in accordance with this
52recommendation. Emissaries then were dispatched interstate to plead
for extension, and an interstate union conference arranged for 21 July.
53At this gathering, alleged to be uniquely broad in representation,
54extension was clearly very popular. But on Hie eve of the conference,
Thomas Walsh, seamen's general secretary and probably the leading advocate
for extension, was imprisoned; and two days later opinion began to move
away from extension when A.C. Willis and J.M. Baddeley, from the New
55South Wales miners, arrived and threw their weight against it, ^
Baddeley and Willis advised an approach to Federal Cabinet, but union 
distrust of Cabinet's word was deep. Indeed, up to this point, Cabinet 
(in charge of the strike because shipping still fell under the Common-
S,M.H., 21 May, 11 July; Argus, 11 July 1919«
53 Transcript of Proceedings of Interstate Trade Union Conference, 
21-26 July 1919.
54 Extension seems to have been peo-red by the daily press. See, for 
example, Argus, 22, 25 July 1919»
55 On 13 July, Willis had said in Sydney that the best course was to 
keep as many men at work as possible, these to supply strikers with 
finance (S.M.H., 14 July 1919)*
136
wealth’s war-time powers) had been flatly unprepared to make con­
cessions ’as the attitude of the union constitute^d^j a challenge to
#56the authority and laws of this Parliament*,. Cabinet at first re­
buffed the approach instigated by Willis and Baddeley, and during the 
’uproar’ which greeted the refusal, 'direct actionists’ cried out:
This is the finish. No more parleying.
Out with the coalminers! 57
Later, a further deputation received assurances that demands would be 
met if the men resumed, and those on the deputation felt that the 
Government would honour its assurances. Other unions had their own 
demands, and to ensure that these were satisfied, and that the Govern­
ment kept its promises on the seamen, the conference ’resolved to 
keep itself intact, and be prepared to take any action that might be
possible to see that the seamen get justice in the event of the Govern-
58ment failing to keep its promises'. However the conference did 
agree to recommend that seamen accept the Government's terms, and the 
seamen’s officials, including the gaoled Walsh, urged the same course. 
And it is probable, though one cannot be certain, that such a resumption
Comm. Pari Deb., vol. 88,p.10040, 25 June 1919? Statement by the 
Acting Prime Minister and Treasurer.
57 Argus, 25 July 1919*
58 Prom the leaflet Seamen’s Strike... a brief history of the negot­
iations between the Melbourne Industrial Disputes Committee and 
the Seamen's Federal Council, on the one side, and the Federal 
Government on the other1.
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would have gained the seamen what they sought, so near were the others
to ’coming out’, and so aggressive were the seamen themselves. But
the seamen themselves did not feel inclined to chance ma.tters - in
particular, they wanted Walsh released, for without him they felt at
a disadvantage; and they rejected the conference recommendation.
Deeply resentful that other unionists refused to help them, they would
not allow the Melbourne Trades Hall Disputes Committee to handle their
strike any longer. This, the Sydney Morning Herald charged, left
the conduct in the hands of certain ’extreme socialists',^
prominent amongst whom were Victorian Socialist Patty members R.S. Ross
and Donald Cameron. In Sydney, marine stewards, against the wishes of
their officials, actually did go to the help of the seamen,^ whose
continued strike achieved the desired increase in the basic rate of
62wages, and substantial imrrovements in their formerly wretched ship­
board eating and sleeping arrangements. Walsh was released, while 
seamen also gained °n increase in overtime rates, and improved leave
S.M.H., 2 Aug. ID!?-
Minutes of Special Meeting, Sydney branch Marine Stewards' Union,
1 Aug, 1919.
On 17 Sent. 1Q1°, T.J. Smith, M.L.A., said accommodation on coal 
boats, for example, was such that he would not nut 'a dog which had 
bitten rhimj* on board (U.S.W. Pari. Deb. ,vol. 7f, p.88l); r,ee also
. , '
1919 a mi of the Federated Seamen’s Union, described conditions
as ’very poor' in an interview with the writer (August I961).
138
of absence rights.
Alone amongst the marine disputes of the time, the seamen’s
strike was substantially successful in achieving union demands, while
concessions were also gained for the Melbourne Wharf Labourers who
struck at the same time, notably abolition of the so-called ’scab’
labor bureau.^ Of all the marine strikes, the seamen's came closest
to being an extended strike, some wharf laborers and stewards actually
joining of their own volition, while union sympathy was such that for
some time wider extension was expected daily. Indeed, Round Table
assessed union sympathy at the time as so intense that a demand by the
Commonwealth government for volunteers 'would have precipitated immed-
65iately a general strike throughout Australia'.
The seamen, with their marked preference for extension, were 
semi-skilled unionists. Tom Walsh, an old 'international socialist', 
became Federal Secretary as a direct result of a militant upsurge with­
in the seamen's union. (See this chair's appendix, item 6). He was 
then, and continued to be for several years, the only prominent leftist
64advocating the tactic of extension.
Given the somewhat finely balanced state of extensionist and 
anti-extensionist forces, had the Sydney Trades Hall reds controlling
From the leaflet Seamen's Strike... a brief history of the negot­
iations between the Melbourne Industrial Disputes Committee and 
the Seamen's Federal Council, on the one side, and the Federal 
Government on the other'.
Walsh and his wife, Adele Pankhurst Walsh, were members of the 
provisional executive of the Communist Party elected from the found­
ation conference of 30 October,1920. (See above,p.85) Walsh's name 
soon disappears from central executive records, however, and he 
appears to have had little association with the Trades Hallieds.
65 Round Table, vol.10, 1919-20, I69.
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the Lahor Council so wanted, they could have thrown no small weight
onto the scales on behalf of the extensionist forces. But on the
Labor Council itself, no word was uttered on this, the central question
66of the strike, though finance and sympathy were bestowed. Though
he was a man given to flamboyant public utterance, Garden's press
67statements on the strike were most guarded, while at the time of the
strike, W.P. Earsman, like Garden also a foundation Communist, condemned
the seamen's strike as being 'for something for which the rest of the
68workers would have to pay'. Giving his secretary's Report at the 
end of 1919 "to the Labor Council, Garden dismissed the seamen's strike 
in two lines because, being directed from Melbourne, it did not come
69'within the purview of the Council', ' though distance did not prevent
him from lengthy comment on events in America, Germany or Prance.
However, in the same report Garden did say something which obviously
bears on the seamen's strike.
Surely in this day we can use a more scientific weapon 
than the obsolete weapon of the strike...let us... lay 
aside the strike weapon until the movement is thoroughly 
organised along scientific lines that will make it an 
efficient weapon. 70
Minutes, Gen. Meeting, Labor Council, 10,17,24,31 July; 7 Aug. 1919»
67 See, for example, a statement on the need to proclaim the Navigation
Act, in S.M.H., 9 July 1919«
68 Int. Socialist, 26 July 1919»
Ann. Rep. Lab. Council, 31 Dec. 1919, P»9»
Ann. Rep. Lab. Council,31 Dec. 1919, p*8.
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But on the burning question of the day ('to extend or not to extend'), 
Garden said nothing until there was no hope of extension - until the 
last of the marine disputes, the steward's strike, was well under way.
And then, after noting that responsibility for direction of the marine 
disputes had been in the hands of his political enemies in the Trans­
port Workers' Federation, Garden asked that question to which attention 
has already been drawn:
Would it not have been better for the Seamen, Marine 
Engineers and Stewards to have decided to take action 
at the same time. It would have been more effective...71
Hot long after the seamen returned, thousands were once more
thrown idle by what was surely an aristocrat among the unions: the
Australasian Institute of Marine and Power Engineers. A small, exclus-
72ive, wealthy union normally averse to striking, it is an undoubted 
testimony to the militant climate of the time that the marine engineers
73struck at all. Dissatisfied with an award handed down in December,1918,
Ann. Rep. Lab. Council, 31 Dec. 1920, p.ll.
72 Attendance at the monthly meetings of the Sydney District branch in 
1919? varied from 7 to 87 out of a total of 212 members. (Minutes, 
Sydney District meetings, A.N.U. Archives). For an example of 
exclusiveness, see the attitude towards seamen expressed by Telfer, 
the engineers Sydney District secretary, Sydney Sun,15 Sep.1921.
Small as it was, the New South Wales branch of the engineers' instit­
ute was listed amongst the state's four wealthiest unions in the mid­
twenties. (Report of the Registrar of Friendly Societies and Trade 
Unions,for the Twelve Months ended 30 June 1927» in N.S.W. Pari. 
Papers, vol.l, 1928, p.624.) On the institute's attitude to strikes, 
see Ann.Rep.Lab.Council, 31 Dec. 1920, p.9»
7 3 In 1912, the Commonwealth Arbitration Court had fixed wages for the 
lowest grade of marine engineers at £12 a month, and £34 for the 
highest. These rates had been increased by 15$ in 1917» and raised 
again in December 1918 to £15 and £42 respectively, under an award 
whose currency was fixed at 13 years. Justifying their dissatis-
(continued next page)
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some 350 marine engineers on state and interstate ships stopped work 
on 13 December, 1919» Though the Commonwealth government incurred 
heavy losses as a result of the strike, it was unable to employ non- 
unionists, largely because of the skill needed, but partly because there 
was widespread sympathy in the labor movement for the engineers. When 
the Commonwealth issued a proclamation under the War Precautions Act 
forbidding help of any kind to the engineers, this sentiment deepened.^ 
But the engineers asked no one to join the dispute, and no one offered. 
Hence the War Precautions Act might have prompted additional sympathy 
towards the engineers, but it also prompted the engineers to return to
7 Rwork, accepting a settlement which elicited 'exceptionally lively* ^
opposition from at least some of the rank and file, which was at first
rejected out of hand by the Sydney branch, and which was declared un-
7 6satisfactory by the officials.
73 (continued)
faction, engineers claimed they had put up with unsatisfactory con­
ditions during the war, referred to increases in Britain, U.S.A. and 
New Zealand, and finally pointed out that the recent increases won 
by seamen had narrowed their margin above the seamen.
^  Exec. Min. Labor Council, 19 Feb. 1920, General Min. Labor Council,
12 and 19 Feb. 1920; Ann. Rep. Labor Council, 31 Dec. 1920, p.9?
F. Tudor, Leader of the(Labor) Opposition in the House of Represent­
atives) in Com. Pari. Deb.,vol. XCI,p.l49> (3 March,1920); for other 
Labor comment on the War Precautions Act, see ibid.,p.!78. (N.Makin).
75 S.M.H., 27 Feb. 1920.
7  ^ A.W., 5 Feb. 1920; Minutes, Sydney District, 30 Mar. 1920. Where 
the old rates had ranged from £15.10s. to £42, the new ranged from 
£18 to £50 ., pev manch -
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In Australia, the marine stewards' union has traditionally-
been a notably unmilitant union. During 1919 and 1920, however, the
conservative N.S.W. officials A. Moate, W. Ebsworth and H. Pennington
77found the rank and file extremely restive. And on 15 December 1920,
Imarine stewards throughout Australia struck when interstate shipping
companies refused to reduce by one and a half hours the fifteen hours
'spread' over which the stewards, during seven days of each week, worked
their eight-hour day. The officials immediately put the dispute into
the hands of the conservatively-controlled Transport Workers' Federation, 
iC ute f-e-itr >whichj aammmmumämi&BseksäA would call out other transport workers if
7ft 1 Qnon-unionists were employed. Non-unionists were employed in Victoria y
but no effort was made to extend the dispute, and at the Transport
Workers' Federation's recommendation, on 25 January 1921, work was
8oresumed 'unconditionally.' The Commonwealth Steamship Owners' Assoc­
iation interpreted the stewards' capitulation as a sign of weakness, 
furnishing an opportunity to move against the growing militancy amongst 
the marine transport rank and file which received particular stimulus 
from the militancy and industrial successes of the seamen. Encouraged 
by their victory in 1919 under the new militant federal leadership, sea­
men had taken the lead in prompting the growth of shipboard 'job-committees
Minutes, Gen. Meetings Sydney branch, 1919-21. 
A.W., 23 Dec. 1920.
The Socialist, 14 Jan. 1921.
Labour Report, No.19., 192^ 3 S.M.H. , 25 Jan. 1921.
77
78
79
80
143
Despite their 'industrial unionist* and syndicalist overtones, to most
seamen job committees were essentially an effective 'grass-roots*
organisation for improving everyday working conditions, especially
8lsuited to what today we would call 'wild-cat' direct action. Thus
the Commonsealth Steamship Owners' Association asked stewards' and
seamen's officials to disavow 'job-control' or they would be locked out.
8 2Officials immediately complied.
The owners, however, had taken stock of the situation. They 
knew that the officials were unwilling to strike, as there was no secret 
about this; they believed that no pledges by officials could put an 
end to 'job-control' while the rank and file retained the buoyant 
spirits recent victories had given them (the owners had usually con-
83ceded seamen's demands over 'manning* during 1920);' they also believed 
that the seamen would continue to act as a centre of disaffection for 
the rank and file of other marine unions. Even the normally quiescent 
marine stewards were still intransigent, despite their defeat. But
To set up a 'job-committee' on a given ship, the seamen, firemen, 
cooks, bakers, butchers, stewards, pantrymen and sometimes, the 
officers, would each elect a representative, who would then meet as a 
'job committee'. This committee then received, from each union rep­
resented, full power to negotiate with shipowners rand to take action 
so long as it did not lower existing standards. In thus exercising 
'job control', the 'job committees' would pick a favourable moment 
when a ship was loaded, passengers aboard, and would then bring 
forward their demands. They were not averse to doing this on the 
high seas, and stopping work if unsatisfied.
A.W., 3 Feb. 1921.
Labour Report, No.11, 1920, p.145«83
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most union officials clearly did not want to fight, and, noting also
the jump in unemployment - from 6.9% in the final quarter of 1 9 2 0, to
13»7$ in the first quarter of 1 9 2 1,^ the owners decided the time had
come for "them to take the offensive. It had been left to the unions
for too long. Consequently the ship-owners locked out the seamen and
stewards, the issue at stake being the union's right to take 'direct*
85'job-control' action on the so-called 'manning' problem. " The lock­
out ended on 26 February 1921, following intervention by the Common­
wealth Arbitration Court and the subsequent establishment of a Manning 
Committee. The owners did not achieve their aim of subduing rank and 
file militancy.
Common grievances among marine transport unionists, the 
militant inclinations of the rank and file, and the existence of 
a formally powerful central organisation - all these suggest common 
industrial action. Yet as we have seen, though the marine unions 
certainly struck, they struck in accordance with no overall plan, their 
actions being piecemeal and haphazard, while there is every reason to 
believe that (seamen's officials excluded) marine union officials pre-
See Appendix to this chapter, Table 4«
The shipowners' seizure of initiative brought anti-official opposit­
ion to a head within the marine stewards' union, and in February 
1921 a new militant 'direct actionist' executive replaced the old. 
The new body was- led by one Elliott. The conservative federal 
executive deposed the new executive, replacing it by men of whom 
it approved. (Minutes, Gen. Meetings, Sydney branch, 21 Feb. to 
6 Aug. 192I5 also Marine Stewards' Journal, 21 May, 15 Oct.1921.)
In the process, a rank and file Melbourne steward alleged that 
Elliott ''had done more in two months for the members than anyone 
else had done in ten years. Mr. Elliott was a militant and revol­
utionary man..! ' (Marine Stewards' Journal, 21 May 1921).
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ferred, not to strike at all. But if, under the direction of the 
Transport Workers' Federation, marine strikes were haphazard, by con­
trast the Trade Union movement's official forty four hours' campaign 
was carefully planned by the Labor Council, which set up special and 
elaborate machinery. The red union officials, whether Communist or
on the point of helping to form the Communist Party, had every chance
86to influence the actions of the marine unionists, though they did 
not control the commanding heights in marine unions. As far as the 
forty four hours' campaign was concerned, they did command these 
heights.
In 1918 and 1919 as union after union demonstrated growing
8 7interest in the demand for the forty four hour week, the New South
See for example, the tug-of-war inside the then conservatively con­
trolled Marine Stewards' Union, over affiliation to the One Big 
Union. This was identified with industrial militancy by the stewards-* 
rank and file (Minutes, Special Meeting, Marine Stewards, 1 Aug.
1919, and Gen. Meeting, 27 Oct. 1919.).
Luring 1918, joint union meetings were held over the forty four hour 
demand in various sections of industry. In the shipbuilding industry, 
for example, the Amalgamated Carpenters' and Joiners' Society app­
roached the executive of the Electrical Trades Union to discuss joint 
effort as early as 1918, but were rebuffed on the grounds that the 
electricians still adhered to the war-time Commonwealth Ship-Building 
Agreement which laid down a forty hour week ( executive minutes,
Electrical Trades Union, 13 Aug.l9l8). The electricians' conservative 
executive encountered sharp rank and file resentment over this, how­
ever, and rejected plans made by a later shipbuilding industry con­
ference only on the grounds that they came from a section of industry, 
whereas the demand required 'universal^Aparticipation (Electrical 
Trades Journal, 20 Dec. 1918$ exec .minutes, l6 Dec.l9l8*.) Shortly 
after this, however, the executive said that it 'uncompromisingly' 
opposed any sort of strike. (Electrical Trades Journal,28 May 1919)» 
This, indeed, expressed the executive's consistent attitude.
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Wales Labor Council sponsored widely representative union conferences.
Two tactics were adopted: the first, a go-slow-on the job, the second,
a Saturday morning stay-home - to be implemented by groups of unions
one after another. Using the latter method, the conservative Printing
Industry Employees’ Union had partially achieved the forty four hours
by October 1919» though union records do not reveal that direct action 
89was used at all. ' The printers had withdrawn from the Labor Council 
when the left gained control, and would not publicly associate them­
selves with direct action. The first application of the Labor Council's 
strategy was thus the Saturday stay-home in the building trades, encour­
aged greatly by the actions of prominent leftist J. Kilburn, and well
90 91under way by 1920, though called off from time to time. Also
used in the building trades was the 'go-slow on the job'.
88
89
90
For example, on 10 April 1920 (for its decision, see Ann. Hep, Labor 
Council,1920,p.12).
Printing Trades Journal, 21 October 1919; the method was described 
to the writer by Mr. Fox (interview, Dec. 1961), at present an 
employee of the union, in 1919 an apprentice. The union records 
consulted were Half-Yearly Reports, 1918-1923, Minutes of the monthly 
meetings of the Board of Management, Minutes of Special General 
Meetings, and the Printing Trades' Journal, 1918-1923* In particular, 
see Printing Trades' Journal, 21 Oct. 1919*
In March 1920, key branches of the Operative Bricklayers' Trades' 
Society held Saturday stop-work meetings, ostensibly to find out 
rank and file desires on the forty four hour week (N.S.W, Ind.Arb. 
Rep., vol.l9, 1920,p.14, and N.S.W. Ind.Gaz., 31 May 1920,pp.979- 
983) but in reality to enforce it.
91 Interview with J. Kilburn, Aug. 1961.
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The strike strategy outlined by the Labor Council was
one of confinement, and in all cases examined from 1919 "to 1929 in
New South Wales, whenever the Labor Council was primarily responsible
92for conduct of a strike, it adopted some form of confinement.
Strictly speaking, of course, even the classic so-called 'general' 
strikes have in fact been limited or confined in some way, as it seems 
safe to say that all workers never cease work in any one strike-action. 
But some strikes are more confined than others. Even on the most casual 
inspection there is a clear difference between, say, the maritime and 
shearing strikes of I89O-I89I, the coal strike of 1909» the threatened 
seamen's extended strike of 19H» or the Brisbane General Strike of 
1912 - and the New South Wales Labor Council's Saturday morning strikes 
for the forty four hour week in 1920 and 1922. Thus disputes character­
ised by relatively little confinement, are defined as 'extended' strikes, 
this term clearly applying to the first four of the disputes listed; 
while those marked by a large degree of confinement, we label 'confined'
Apart from those disputes discussed in this chapter, included also 
were more marine transport disputes in 1924 and 1925 (from Round 
Table, vols, 15,16; 21 C.A.R., p.16-25,724-730; Comm. Pari Deb., 
110,111; Comm. Year Book, N0.I8 , 1925; N.S.W. Pari.Deb.,vol.101, 
Australian Worker, Workers' Weekly,Labor Daily, Sydney Morning 
Herald); the forty four hour disputes in 1926 and 1927 (from 24 
and 25 C.A.R.; Commonwealth Law Reports, 37; Australian Worker, 
Workers' Weekly, Labor Daily, S.M.H., and J.T. Lang's I Remember); 
'The Timber Strike in 1929* (Hist. Stud. A.N.Z., vol.10, May 1963) 
and the writer's M.A. thesis, 'The Strike of Waterside Workers in 
Australian Ports, 1928, and the Lockout of Coal Miners on the 
Northern Coalfield of New South Wales, 1929-30'.
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strikes. Such, for example, were the forty four hour strikes of 1920 
and 1922.
An industrial struggle may be confined according to area, or 
according to method of action, or both. In studying confinement in 
area, we may note, for example, that a particular strike is confined to 
one craft within an industry, to one or to several factories, or even 
to one set of workers within a factory. Confinement used in the second 
sense (that is, according to the method of action employed) is exempli­
fied by confined or partial withdrawal of labor; it may be an overtime 
ban, a reduced 'darg', 'ca-canny' ('work to regulations' of 'go-slow-on- 
the-job'); refusal to carry out shift work, or, to take a case from the 
years 1919 to 1922, a stay-home on Saturday morning.
European right-wing officials resembled the right-wing officials
of Sydney in that they preferred no direct action to direct action,
and confined direct action to extended direct action. But the left-
wing European union officials, particularly the syndicalists and
Communists, were far more sympathetic to extension than their counter- 
93parts in Sydney. Knowles, for example, cites an instance from 1922 
and another from 1935 "to show that English Communists favoured extensior^ 
(in this case, throughout the transport industry); but in neither year
One notes that there were no extended strikes in Sydney from 1918 
to 1928, but several in England (see V.L.Allen, Trade Unions and 
the Government, pp.171-177> (<fcn extended rail strike); R.Miliband, 
Parliamentary Socialism. A Study in the Politics of Labour, pp.75-6.
Knowles, op.cit., p.13»
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95did the Sydney Communists favour extension.
One of the conclusions drawn by New South Wales right-wing 
union officials from the failure of the*general strike' of 1917 was 
expressed in the words of J. Tudehope, secretary of the Marine Cooks 
Union:
Advocates of the policy of the general strike for 
the purpose of bringing the employers to their 
bearings will no doubt admit, after this experience, 
that it is a failure... it was plainly demonstrated 
that the smaller the area you confine your dispute to 
the greater the prospects of victory. 96
It is hard to see where the Trades Hall reds would have disagreed with
these words.
By 1919j formal enunciation of the main approaches to the 
question of strike tactics derived from the old Marxist (often dubbed 
'international socialist') line, and from the more recently enunciated 
syndicalist views. The so-called international socialists favoured 
extended action (though not exclusively). According to circumstance, 
syndicalist tactics included extended and confined strikes and'go-slow-
On Communist preference for confinement in 1935» see a discussion 
of the seamen's strike of that year by Jack Kavanagh, former 
Communist leader in New South Wales, in a letter dated 27 Jan.1936, 
to E.M. Higgins (Kavanagh collection); an interview between Kavanagh 
and the writer, 10 May i960, supplied additional evidence.
Fifth Annual Report of the Marine Cooks' Union, 1917; compare 
this with the statement made in 1914 "by Claude Thompson, secretary 
of the Amalgamated Rail and Tramway's Association (see above, pagell7; 
the 'scientific' method was to confine the strike area to 'its 
narrowest possible limits').
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on-the-job', and the Marxists also learned from them. The N.S.W. 
representatives of the Chicagoite I.W.W. gave greater stress to
97extension in the early war years than in the later, for example,
98after 1917» The Workers' International Industrial Union, N.S.W. 
representatives of the DeLeonite I.W.W. tendency, preferred go-slow-on- 
the-job to any form of action 'off the job'.
Relatively few rank and file unionists were capable of, or 
interested in formal discussion of strike theory, but they nevertheless 
had views about tactics. On the whole, the extended tradition had 
been developed by unskilled and semi-skilled unionists (often country 
unionists rather than city), while the city-based craft unions had 
preferred confinement. At this time of unusual militancy and radicalism, 
however, the rank and file of skilled and unskilled unions alike leaned 
towards extension.
The leftists of 1919 were heirs to these traditions, and 
while all major methods were discussed and given occasional approval,
See, for example, V.G. Childe, op.cit.,p,171. There is no doubt 
that Childe echoes the verdict of the I.W.W., as well as that of 
many of labor's spokesmen, on the 1916 Coal Strike, when he praises 
it as 'the most efficiently organised, daringly defiant, and 
completely successful coal strike... the stoppage was complete, 
every coal miner in Australia downing tools simultaneously; the 
whole thing had been carefully worked out in advance...' (pp.174- 
175). See also Turner, op.cit., pp.241-242.
However, they urged that the general strike of that year - begun 
without their organised intervention or endorsement - needed 
further, rapid, and systematically organised extension, if the 
unions were to get optimum results.
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qualified or outright, in the Communist press, the Trades Hall reds 
very strongly endorsed the confined strike and the go-slow. These 
were ’scientific1; the forms of extended strike were ’starvation strikes' 
and 'unscientific.' Thus it is not clear what fault the Sydney Trades 
Hall reds could have found with Tudehope's remark about the 1917 
strike (above, p.149). During the 1920's, when he repeatedly referred 
to what he called 'the 1917 d e b a c l e j i k e  Tudehope in 1917? Garden 
was referring not to 1917‘s lack of leadership and planning, but seem­
ingly, to its essential strategy. In 1922, Garden specifically con­
demned the 'old idea that all the members had to come out', and praised 
the 'splendid' tactics where the 'whole Union concentrated on the first 
shop' . Perhaps the greatest virtue the Trades Hall reds claimed
for their 'scientific' tactics was the fact that those at work could 
finance their striking comrades; a claim in which they conflicted with 
their early British counterparts who, in advocating extension of a 
transport strike in 1922, commented on this particular virtue in the 
following words:
Another often-repeated sentence of union officials in the 1920's 
(Garden included) was the warning to would-be strikers or strikers: 
'Do not let the boss stampede you into another 1917'• It is possible 
that this was the latter-day form of what V.G. Childe describes as 
labor's 'amazing myth' (op.cit.,p.l88) about the 1917 strike. 
According to this 'myth', the general strike had been 'deliberately 
engineered by the Government, in conjunction with the Employers' 
Federation, with a view to dealing a knock-out blow to unionism.'
100 The Communist, 11 Aug. 1922
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'the road transport workers could only pay a levy to 
help the railways jQL.e. the railwaymen who were on strik0 
'by drawing wages that are the result of work that is 
helping to defeat the railwaymen. 101
While the New South Wales Labor Council was sponsoring 
extremely confined strikes on the wages and hours issues in 1920, two 
strikes based on what Garden condemned as the 'old idea' of extension 
were in progress over the same issues - not in Sydney, but in the Vic­
torian metropolis and in the outback of New South Wales.
In Queensland, printers had a forty five and a half hour week; 
in Western Australia, printers had a forty four hour week; in the U.S.A. 
and Canada, a forty four hour week had been arranged; in some parts of 
some Sydney printing establishments, a forty two and a half hour week 
was in vogue and, as we have said, in others a forty four hour week.
But many (chiefly the unskilled) grades of printers in many Sydney 
establishments still had the forty eight hour week, and so did all 
grades of Victorian printers. On 28 February 1920, skilled and un­
skilled members of the Victorian Typographical Society went on strike for 
increased pay and a forty four hour week. The union was soon offered 
increased wages, but all save the lithographers held out for forty four
hours as well. By March 1920, Master Printers in thirty two shops had
102conceded forty four hours and a week later, this had grown to forty 
s h o p s . B u t ,  believing that the dispute had implications for all
Labor Monthly, Sept. 1922, quoted Knowles, op.cit. , p.13.101
102
103
Minutes, Melbourne Trades Hall Council Meeting, 19 Mar. 1920.
Minutes, General Meeting Printing Industry Employees' Union, 27 Mar 
1920. These were 'small* shops.
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Victorian industry, the Victorian Chamber of Manufacturers took over
the conduct of affairs from the Master Printers’ Association,^^ and
employers then refused to further concede the forty four hour week,
105while the unionists, including some 700 unskilled females, refused
to go hack without it. The Victorian example - added to the successes
of inter-state and overseas printers - proved contagious, particularly
in view of the quick partial success (on wages), and the high morale
which rejected the idea of return. Consequently, those Sydney printers
who still did not have the forty four hour week now began to press for
it more urgently. In March, a special general meeting attended by
’6-700’ passed a motion for ’immediate action’ 'owing to the persistent
agitation amongst employees in the Printing Industry generally'.10^
The Victorians too were by this time urging the Sydney printers to strike,
107arguing - as the Victorian Master Printers did later - that while 
master printers could get work done on a forty eight hour week basis 
in Sydney, they would not give the forty four hour week to the Vic­
torians. If printers in New South Wales did not strike in solidarity, 
said the Victorians:
Victoria must go down, and the movement in N.S.W. 
would follow. 108
Printing Trades Journal, 17 Aug. 1920.
Minutes, Melbourne Trades Hall Annual Meeting, 19 Mar. 1920.
Minutes, Special General Meeting, Printing Industry Employees' 
Union, 17 Mar. 1920.
Printing Trades Journal, 15 June 1920.
104
105
106
107
108 Minutes, General Meeting, Sydney Printing Industry Employees’ 
Union, 27 Mar. 1920.
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But the Sydney branch leaders did not hold with direct action:
As a policy direct action is Cut out...
Into the limbo of the dead past we have relegated
this weapon... 109
Attempts to form a federation with the Victorian Typographical society 
participating had broken down in October 1919» because of that body’s 
adherence to ’direct a c t i o n T h u s  though several hectic, packed 
printers' meetings discussed the matter in Sydney^"Sydney finally 
refused to help the Victorians and after twelve weeks the Victorians 
gave in, accepting the proffered wage increase but with no improvement 
in hours.
In July 1920, the Australian Workers' Union throughout Aust­
ralia had, by negotiation, secured a forty four hour week- save, that 
is, for 30,000 men working for the 6,000 members of the New South 
Wales Graziers' Association. The 30,000 struck work - as with the 
printers, in accordance with the 'old idea' of extension. If one can 
judge from the open hostility displayed at annual A.W.U. conferences 
in 1920 and 1921 (; conferences where most delegates were officials), 
or from the behaviour of A.W.U. officials during the 1922 wages strikes7
109
110
111
112
The following words need to be added since in fact some Sydney 
printers did win forty four hours in 1919 by direct action, though 
as we recall, no word of it appeared in union minutes or the 
journal: 'If we have £their emphasis^ to strike we'll make a good 
job of it and pay while the men are out; but we are not plumping 
for strikes'. The writer found no other instance where this union's 
leaders did discover a suitable occasion for a strike. (Printing 
Trades Journal, 18 March 1919«)
Printing Trades Journal, 21 Oct. 1919«
Minutes, Special Gen. Meeting, 8 April, 11 April 1920.
For the story of this, see the following section of this chapter.
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the A.W.U. leaders were by no means happy about this strike. An 
unofficial ’rank and file' ’disputes committee’ was quickly set up, 
led by long-established figures in the A.W.U. such as Arthur Rae,
George Bellamy and George Berry (these were all men active in the 'un­
official' strikes conducted by the 'solidarity section* as early as 
1915)» To judge by the bitter denunciations in the Australian
Worker^ ^  the 'disputes committee* of 1920 was both popular and effect­
ive. In accordance with the 'old idea* (this was no Saturday morning 
affair) the 30,000 stayed on strike until mid-September, when the New
South Wales Graziers' Association conceded them the forty four hour
115week 'in practically all cases'.
Childe, op.cit., 164/165. Childe puts these strikes down to the 
I.W.W., able to go over the heads of the A.W.U's leaders because 
of rank and file discontent about the small (negotiated) wage 
increases in the face of rapidly rising prices. The I.W.W. un­
doubtedly did play an important part; but rso did others, self-styled 
'international socialists' (interview, Mrs Bettsy Matthias, 4 Mar.
1963).
See, for example, A.JW. , 29 July 1920.
Mrs Victoria. B. Turner,'Labor Unrest in Australia and South Africa' 
in Monthly Labor Review, vol.l3?no. 5> Nov.1921, U.S. Department 
of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
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The Forty Four Hour Week in Sydney, 1920»
In Sydney itself, the forty four hour week was pursued through
forms of confined strikes and go-slow.
The building trades Saturday morning strike was called off
after the middle of 1920 and other unions, conservative and militant
alike, seriously discussed direct action. But although rank and file
feeling was strong, and although the Labor Council called other con-
116ferences and established elaborate machinery, action was left to
the builders in accordance with the tactics prescribed by the Labor
Council. When the builders' participation was almost finished, a second
and last industrial group, the iron trades group, entered the fray.
117At the suggestion of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers, the com­
bined Allied Iron Trades Executive arranged a stop-work on Saturday,
In addition to establishing a Forty Four Hour Week Committee, at a 
conference in May of eighty unions the Labor Council divided all 
unions into groups for the purpose of the forty four hours' cam­
paign (Monthly Report of the Commonwealth Council, of the A.S.E.
May 192077“ .
By July, a coordinating committee for the forty four hour week 
had been set up from these groups. On it sat: J. Kilburn (Organ­
iser for the Bricklayers' Union); W.P. Earsman, Amalgamated Society 
of Engineers and foundation member of the Communist Party; J.S. 
Garden, Secretary of Trades and Labor Council and foundation member 
of the Communist Party; G.C. Bodkin, Railway Industry Branch of 
the A.W.U.; and 0. Schreiber, Furniture Trades Society.
Minutes, Boilermakers' Society, 24 Aug. 1920.
lift Minutes, Quarterly Meeting Boilermakers' Society, 21 Sept. 1920.
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4 September 1920. From four iron trades unions, the Amalgamated Society
of Engineers, the Stove and Piano Frame Moulders, the Boilermakers'
Society, and the Federated Ironworkers' Association, some seven hundred
unionists attended, and announced a further stop-work meeting for the
118following Saturday morning. Supported by the Commonwealth govern­
ment, iron trades employers then threatened to close down a number of 
iron trades establishments unless iron unionists signed individual 
pledges to work forty eight hours until the working week was altered 
by constitutional methods. Tempers rose, and according to the account 
of the conservative Electricians:
6 r... a trifle thrown into the scale by eith^party might 
easily have precipitated a repetition of 1917» 119
However before the stop work proposed for 11 September took place, 
the recently-elected State Labor government arranged a conference through 
the state Department of Labour. From the conference came the announce­
ment that the Labor-appointed President of the state Board of Trade 
(former Nationalist Party Minister for Labor, G.S. Beeby) would appoint 
a Special Tribunal to deal with the forty four hours question. The 
employers were extremely dubious about the tribunal, and perhaps the
unions were at first, for the Saturday morning strikes continued on 11
120and 15 September. However, when the Labor government announced that
a Royal Commission would precede the Tribunal, all direct action soon 
121stopped. Unofficially, the government had done more than promise
118 (on previous page).
Electrical Trades Journal, 29 Sept. 1920. So- .
Minutes, Boilermakers' Society, 21 Sept. 1920.
121 Electrical Trades Journal, 29 Sept. 1920.
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the unions a Royal Commission. According to the boilermakers, the 
government had said it
would guarantee they would place before Parliament 
one of the planks of their platform, viz. the Re­
duction of Hour Bill-, within five weeks.d>icj
While the iron trades* strike was still in progress, the stovemakers'
union secretary claimed that
... prominent members of the Government had given assurances 
that legislation for the forty four hr. week would be treated 
as emergency legislation and be brought before the 
house as early as possible. £sic^ ] 122
In November 1920, commenting upon the shortage of labor and prevalence
123of overtime in the iron trades, and noting that 'for the time being
124organised skilled labour is in a strong position', the Royal Comm­
ission Report recommended a forty four hour week for the iron and build­
ing trades. But the Report-excluded sections of the building workers 
and rejected the union demand that the shorter hours be uniformly worked
Report of the New South Wales Secretary of the Boilermakers' 
Society, for the six months ending 30 June 1920, presented 21 
September 1920; minutes, Quarterly Meeting, Stove and Piano Frame 
Moulders, 15 Sept.1920.
Royal Commission of Inquiry,,,into the Proposed Reduction of the 
Standard Working Week from 48 to 44 Hours, N.S.W. Pari. Pap.
1920, vol. 2, pp. 1246-7.
Ibid., P.1240.
122
123
124
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125in five days, leaving Saturday free. In at least some cases a
126reduction in hours was accompanied by a reduction in wages. " And
while building unionists received an immediate forty four hour week,
127iron trades unionists were not to enjoy theirs for six months.
G. Cann, Minister for Labour and Industry, then introduced the Eight
128Hours (Amendment) Bill in December, which when passed, set up a 
Special Court to enquire into working hours and to provide for a forty 
four hour week if it were felt desirable. Over the next eighteen months, 
this Court applied the forty four hour week to nearly all important
129industries under the jurisdiction of the State arbitration tribunals.
N.S.W. Official Year Book,1920, pp.538-9» In the Royal Commission 
Report "(p »1253) Beeby argued that the five-day aspect of the forty 
four hour demand was stressed by militants who actually regarded 
it as part of the demand for a forty hour week. ’I doubt* 1, he said, 
'if there is any real desire on the part of the majority for the 
abolition of Saturday work*. While it may be true, however, that 
the militants (in particular, the bricklayers, led by J. Kilburn) 
did take a leading role in asking for a five-day week, too many 
other unions (including conservative unions) pressed the demand 
for Beeby's conclusion to be acceptable. See, for example, the 
Ballot on the forty four hour week submitted to members by the 
executive of the Electrical Trades Union (Minutes of executive 
meeting,/ March, 1920); the Minutes of a Special General Meeting of 
the Printing Industry Employees' Union, which called for a five-day 
week (25 Apr. 1920); the Minutes of the State Management Committee 
of the Amalgamated Carpenters' and Joiners' Society, 2 June 1920; 
the Minutes of the Board of Management of the Furniture Trades 
Society, 16 May 1921.
1 N.S.W. Ind.Arb.Rep., vol. 20, 1921,pp.211-220. Appeal by Trolly, 
Draymen and Carters' Union from an Award by Rolin,J.
Report of Royal Commission, p.1259; N.S.W. Ind.Arb.Rep.,vol.20,1921. 
p.77(f>In addition, certain large firms were permitted to retain a 
48-hour week fffibid., p.8l-2).
128 No. 28 of 1920. Assented to 29 Bee. 1920 (N.S.W. Pari.Deb.,vol.79, 
p.xv)
129 N.S.W. Official Year Book, 1925-26, p.708.
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2 Juni Mi st re< d to introduce a forty four hour week in all
government de rt u nt ’e: cept where tip cost would he increjsed or
the efficiei ened*. t tl - s considerable union discontent:
~ 1 )le , the P ustr lien R ' ' i c
employees felt '»intense dissatisfaction’ because end ~ conf of tbe ir
130
•
The matter of Saturday work was left to individual e > rs 
and unionists to arrange, and the battle ove^ this issue kept up 
throughout 1921. It tdLI unsettled when in March 1922, tie
Dooley Labor administration fell, and the Nationalist Party was returned 
to Pro r )tly and efficiently tbe new government enacted a
Forty Fight Hour Week Act, relevant proclamations followed and where 
the unions proved stubborn, employers eventually backed up the govern­
ment by lockouts. Trade union reaction was aptly expressed by tbe 
ppT-npnters' and Joiners’ Society, political moderates:
If the Labor Government had treated its supporters in 
the same way as the tTp,td.onalist Government trer ted theirs, 
the result would have been, by Act of Parliament, that the 
standard working hours per week would be 44, and ^be onus 
of rroving that they should be longer or shorter for any 
reason whatever would be on the party making such a claim. 131
Railways' Union Gazette, 20 Oct, 1921.
131 Cpm^ters' Monthly Journal, Nov. 1922.
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Thus the ‘planned campaign' for the forty four hour week 
emerged as a series of heavily confined piecemeal actions, not much 
less haphazard in appearance than the marine transport strikes - which 
at least laid no claim to being a planned campaign. Minimum mobil­
isation of the r&nk and file meant minimum pressure upon the economy, 
and an unimpressive industrial performance reaped unimpressive con­
cessions from the Labor Party administration. The procedure by which 
the forty four hour week was introduced could not have been much slower, 
and in many cases, barely had unions begun to enjoy the forty four
hour week when Nationalist legislation withdrew it, while the five-
y  f- *
day objective was in any case left entirely to the industrial power of 
individual unions.
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The Union in the ’depression1 period 1921-1922
Unemployment in New South Wales rose suddenly during the first
months of 1 9 2 1: from 6*9$ in ike last quarter of 1 9 2 0, unemployment
jumped to 1 3•7% in the first quarter of 1 9 2 1, and fell no lower than
13211$ throughout 1922. The rank and file showed no immediate sign of
declining morale, however. The Sydney marine stewards elected a 
new 'direct actionist' executive in February 1921 when, had their will 
to fight been crushed by the recent increase in unemployment, the best 
way to guarantee industrial peace was to keep their old leaders.
Table 5 of this chapter's appendix sets out strike figures in New South 
Wales for the years 1917 to 1923. During 1921, since there were few 
lockouts, and since the number of disputes rose from 349 in 1920 to 
535 in 1 9 2 1, one can scarcely postulate that union morale collapsed, 
the postulate appearing even less likely when one sees, in the same 
table, that the ratio of those involved directly to those involved 
indirectly also increased as between 1920 and 1921. The examination 
of several major strikes which follows shortly also suggests that a 
militant mood persisted for a time despite unemployment; in short, 
it seems that, for the years we are examining, a 'time lag' occurred 
between the onset of unemployment and the collapse of union morale.
Thus choice of confinement by the Trades Hall reds and other officials 
in the hours and wages disputes of 1 9 2 2, was not forced upon them by 
rank and file timidity, whatever other considerations entered the choice.
132 Table 4 , Appendix to this chapter
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As early as 1921, leading labor spokesmen warned of an
approaching employer offensive. The chairman of the All-Australian
/ vTrades Union Conference of June 1921 later noted that at the time 'it
was predicted that we were on the eve of an organised attack from the
leaders of the capitalist c l ass...Delegate Birrell, a militant
Labor Party man from South Australia, claimed that the non-Labor Premier
of his state had come out for 'a bold policy for the reduction of wages'.
R.S. Ross, socialist, and Labor Party member from Victoria, said:
'Anyone knowing anything about economics knew that a bad time was coming'.
Labor needed 'more machinery' to 'meet the depression that is going
to o c c u r ( T h i s  was a reference to the Commonwealth Council of
Action, which Conference was then discussing). In early 1922 the A.L.P.
in New South Wales accepted a claim by Porgan Smith and the A.L.P.
central executive in Queensland that they had uncovered a concerted
135employer plan to attackvorking class conditions, both A.W.U. and 
anti-A.W.U. factions in the Labor Party reporting and accepting the 
allegations in their newspapers. Union leaders stressed that the
Common Cause, 21 July 1922.
Official Report, 1921 Conference, p.7,21.
1 3 5 -----------See the pamphlet The Gloves Off. Employers' Ultimatum to Queensland 
Workers. Issued by the authority of the Queensland Central Executive 
of the A.L.P. (Molesworth Coll., Set 71, Item 8). Daily Mail,
16 Peb. 1922 (cutting Molesworth Coll.) For comment by one of the 
Communist parties, which accepted the allegation, see International 
Communist, 4 Mar. 1922.
136
Daily Mail, l8 Peb. 1922; A.W., 1 Mar. 1922.
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general attack might fall on one group of workers at one moment, but
that others could scarcely hope to escape. Thus an official statement
from the Miners' Federation said:
We must support the present struggle in every way, 
and if necessary throw our resources on the side of the 
workers concerned. Victory to them means strength 
to us when our turn comes, or even complete immunity 
from attack. 137
The Communists on the New South Wales Labor Council believed that
the Australian 'employer offensive' was part of a world-wide 'offensive'.
Thus Webster:
The object of the Capitalist Class all over the World 
is to reduce wages and lengthen the Working-Week...138
And this might well see the end of capitalism: 'The capitalist
139system is tottering...', wrote J.S. Garden, in the Communist.
On their part, employers made no secret of their belief that 
reduced wages and increased hours were essential. In many parts of 
Australia, union conferences decided to respond to a 'general offensive' 
with counter-blows along a wide, or 'extended' front, counter-blows 
designed to have a maximum impact upon the economy - but in a minimum
137
138
139
S.M.H., 4 Nov. 1922.
Gen. Minutes, Lab. Council, 10 Aug. 1922. 
The Communist, 3 Feb. 1922.
140 Round Table, vol. 12, p.694? 700; Common Cause, 17 Mar. 1922
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time. It was felt that, with unemployment heavy, even more than in
days of low unemployment, time was very much on the employers’ side.
In Melbourne, support for extension had been particularly
strong during the seamen's strike in 1919; later, during the timber
strike of 1 9 2 9? extensionist sentiment (at the official, as well as the
rank and file, level) was also strong. Thus in Melbourne, in 1921,
the Trades Hall Council summoned a union conference which drew up and
published plans for an extended strike - 'not...a 1917 fiasco, but a
142concerted policy of action',- to meet the employer offensive.
Union conferences in Perth1^  and New Zealand"*^ also announced they 
would adopt an extended strategy. Away from Sydney in New South Wales, 
the strikes of 1922 seem to have tended towards 'extension'; for 
example, a strike amongst A.W.U. members in the same year, led once more 
by an unofficial disputes committee, was an 'extended* strike.
In Sydney itself, by contrast, the tactics officially adopted 
by the trade union movement were those put forward by the Communists
141
142 
143
M. Dixson, 'The Timber Strike in 1929', Historical Studies 
Australia and New Zealand, vol. 10, no.4 0, May 1963.
Ann. Rep., Lab. Council, 1921, pp.11-12. Garden claimed that on 
this particular occasion the unions got what they demanded.
S.M.H., , 29 Jan. 1923; A.W., 31 Jan. 1923.
144 S.M.H., 1 Feb. 1923.
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controlling the Lahor Council, a combination of 'go-slow-on-the-job' 
with extremely confined strikes. The most commonly used device was 
a Saturday stay-home which they then confined to certain shops in 
the iron trades. In this situation, Knowles's comment on the 'bumper' 
strike is relevant:
For such a strike tactic to succeed, however... 
at least there must be no possibility of getting 
the work done elsewhere or elsehow. Otherwise 
the 'correct' tactic for strikes is presumably to 
extend rather than to restrict them. 145
With unemployment rising and demand falling, there were ample possibil­
ities for getting work done 'elsewhere' and 'elsehow'.
The employer 'offensive' was manifest in 1921 in the mining 
industry, and by March 1922 miners anticipated wage reductions of 
approximately one-third, with increases in h o u r s . T h e i r  response 
was through 'irritation' tactics. For example, on the south field in
New South Wales the 'darg' was implemented through a one-day-a-week
147strike, and on the north field through a go-slow on the job.
This drew extremely heavy extensionist opposition, but during 1922 the 
Trades Hall reds gave it no support. Miners' secretary Willis was the 
architect of miners' ’irritation' tactics and the Trades Hall reds had 
great expectations of him as a liaison with the A.L.P.; in any case,
145
146
K.J. Knowles, op.cit., p.13.
Int. Communist, 20 Aug., 10 Sept. 1921; Minutes, Central Council 
of the Australasian Coal and Shale Employees Fedn.,
21-23 Mar. 1922.
147 S.M.H., 28, 25 Sept. 1922
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t h e  T ra d e s  H a l l  zeds were c o n d u c t i n g  t h e  m e t r o p o l i t a n  h o u rs  and wages
campaign a l o n g  th e  same l i n e s .  I n  t h e  m e ta l  t r a d e s ,  t h e  em ployer
’o f f e n s i v e *  was u n d e r  way e a r l y  i n  1 9 2 2 . ^ ^  The c o u r t s  announced r e ­
cord  Ktei'a-ble tYiautyms v'ecb’c ta n >
d u c t i o n s  c u l m i n a t i n g  i n  aHäSaa-tfAj-.«. 1 u >i K  and  an h o u r ’s
149i n c r e a s e  t o  f o r t y  e i g h t  h o u r s .  A t u g - o f - w a r  e n s u e d  i n s i d e  th e
A .E .U .  One r e s p o n s e  c o n s i d e r e d  was w i t h d r a w a l  f rom a r b i t r a t i o n ,  th e
op. /«edoctons.
o t h e r  a c c e p t a n c e  I An A u s t r a l i a - w i d e  c o n f e r e n c e  of  th e  A.E.U. d e c i d e d
150t o ' p u t  th e  44  hour  week i n t o  o p e r a t i o n ’ . Some b r a n c h e s  d i d  t h i s  by
S a t u r d a y  s t r i k e s ,  o t h e r s  by e x t e n d e d .  But by November,  r e s i s t a n c e  was 
v i r t u a l l y  a t  an end .
I n  t h e  l a t t e r  h a l f  of  1920,  i n  1921,  and  u n t i l  t h e  t ime o f  
t h e  award by  Mr. J u s t i c e  Powers f o r  t h e  A u s t r a l i a n  p a s t o r a l  i n d u s t r y
cli n  May 1922 ,  s h e a r e r s  and  shed  hands  had worked f o r t y  f o u r  hour  week.  
As Powers s a i d ,  t h i s  was b r o u g h t  a b o u t  ’by f o r c e  o f  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  
and  by th e  f a c t  t h a t  th e  s h e a r i n g  was p r a c t i c a l l y  t h r e a t e n e d  t o  be 
h e l d  u p . . . 151r s i c " | .  Powers i n c r e a s e d  h o u r s  t o  f o r t y  e i g h t ,  f i x e d  th e  
b a s i c  wage f o r  shed  hands a t  £3 . 1 2 .0  p e r  week,  and  th e  s h e a r i n g  r a t e  
a t  t h i r t y - f i v e  s h i l l i n g s  a h u n d re d .  The A u s t r a l i a n  Worker ,
A .W . , 2 ,1 5  F e b . ;  S.M.H. , 1 Dec. 1922,  shows t h a t  t h e  N ew cas t le  
S t e e l  Works were c l o s e d  down i n  A p r i l  1922.
A.W. , 3 May 1922; 16 C .A.R . , 231-311 ;  649-732 .
hi i
M onth ly  R e p o r t ,  Commonwealth C o u n c i l ,  J u l y ,  S e p t .  1922.
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149
150
151 16 C . A . R . , 392.  H e a r i n g  and judgment on t h e  Award,  p p . 375-514
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organ of the Australian Workers’ Union, protested that the award brought
Uec\yy aCtraxk cm uxvK.nj condihotos,
severe reductions and constituted a 3u.luiLn- to the. iKi&Hfr&Hfr.l nththn sf 
13a7 - Members were incensed and struck work in June 1922, their
strike tactic being one traditional for the union, that of extension.
• i~
However, the men suffered a severe setback when their leaders ceased
to lead after prosecutions were launched against them for alleged
153breaches of the Award. To comply with court directions, the A.W.U.
officials suspended rule 113 of the union, which contravened the new
154Powers Award, and circulated new rules conforming with the Award.
The strike went on, led by militants not in official positions.
While the owners claimed that shed after shed was resuming 
•Ate-on j terms of the Powers Award, they also admitted that the shearers as
a whole had not resumed; late in August, for example, the executive of
the New South Wales Graziers’ Association said that it felt 'the fight
155is likely to be a protracted one'. The existence of a large number
156of sheds working under terms of the old award and of a large number 
of strikers, no doubt helped to prompt the owners to this conclusion; 
a further influence, however, ms the election of a left-wing strike 
committee by a large meeting of A.W.U. members during August, prominent 
upon which were old-time non-Communist militants, George Bellamy and
152 A.W. , I l f . May 1922.
153 S.M.H., 7 July, 15 Aug. 1922.
154 S.M.H., 7, 12 July 1922.
155 S.M.H., 29 July, 2,3 Aug. 1922; 24 Aug. 1922.
For the names of some, see the Communist, 18 Aug.1922.
169
Arthur Rae, associatedw, ith a militant organisation existing within 
the A.W.U., the Bush Workers' Propaganda Group.
Before the end of August, references to the shearers' strike 
in J.S. Garden's 'Industrial Notes', in the Communist had tended to
display some sympathy towards the A.W.U. officials. At the same time,
/ I
the Communist's general comment on the strike adopted a tone of approval 
157towards strikers. But after the end of August, J.S. Garden, the
centre of the network of daily associations linking the Trades Hall 
reds with moderate and right wing union officials, sailed for Moscow. 
True, before Garden's departure, the Communist had sympathetically 
reported the formation of the new strike committee. But it was not 
until after Garden's departure that the Communist made its first explicit 
attack upon the A.W.U. officials. The rank and file, alleged the 
Communist, had been
Abandoned by their leaders and organisers who are 
still drawing their pay, sneaking about the country 
away from the places where they should be (the sheds 
that had started).
And further:
If ever the workers were deserted by their leaders in 
an industrial fight it is on this occasion. Look in 
the official paper 'The Worker' and all you see is a 
few lines of police court evidence. 158
The Communist, 4 Aug. 1922; see also ibid. , 18 Aug. 1922. 
The Communist, 22 Sept. 1922.
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The strikers apparently did relatively well from August 
until October, when George Bellamy of the militant strike committee 
claimed:
...we are just beginning to get the upper hand of 
the pastoralists, after one of the hardest fights of 
our lives.*,l60
That the strike committee was at least partly successful is suggested 
by official A.W.U. attacks upon it.1^  A meeting called by the new 
strike committee appealed to the Labor Council for funds, and the 
Council in turn appealed to its affiliates. Investigating the strike 
committee on behalf of the Sydney Wharf Labourers' Union, in response 
to the appeal, W.H. Seale, not a left winger-, reported that the comm­
ittee comprised 'those who had gained the 44 hour week for the A.W.U.
162and were doing all they could to win the strike for the men...'
However late in October, Bellamy was imprisoned for nine months for 
handing out dodgers to shearers working under the new a w a r d , t h e  
organ of the strike committee was silenced by an injunction, and in 
November, Arthur Rae, the other leading figure, was fined £100 on a 
charge of encouraging strikers. Jteprived of their unofficial leader-
160
161
162
163
164
A.W., 25 Oct. 1922.
A.W,, 11,18 Oct. 1922.
Minutes, Special Meeting, Sydney Wharf Labourers' Union, 30 Aug. 
1922. By contrast, the State Committee of Management of the Amal­
gamated Carpenters' and Joiners' Society sought advice from lead­
ing A.W.U. official John Bailey, who told the carpenters to ignore 
the appeal. (Minutes, State Committee of Management, Amalgamated 
Carpenters' and Joiners' Society, 24 and 31 Aug. 1922.)
The Communist, 27 Oct. 1922; A.W., 25 Oct. 1922.
The Communist, 10 Nov. 1922.
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ship, the strikers collapsed.
In this case the Sussex Street Communist press supported an 
extended strike hut the support was tardy and in no way matched support 
given the metropolitan confined campaign where the Trades Hall reds 
led it. The strike would have collapsed had the A.W.U. leaders had 
their way; hut the rank and file were prepared to hold out, provided 
some generalship was offered.
A further indication of rank and file morale comes from an
analysis of the officially-conducted campaign to defend existing hours
c.
and wages standards. Union resistance continued until January of 1923» 
despite the fact that more than six months of the Lahor Council's 
'campaign' had won hardly a single union victory. Only high initial 
morale can explain such persistence in the absence of success.
The Lahor Council was slow to initiate a union campaign against 
the increase in hours and reduction in wages which were long fore­
shadowed and in many cases actually enforced. Union spokesmen had 
warned since 1921 of an employer offensive. In May 1922 the Board of
Trade in Hew South Wales reduced the state basic wage; current awards
165were thereupon quickly varied - and yet a Labor Council sub-committee 
set up in May to combat the reductions seems to have formulated no
I65 See, for example, the June variations of the Breadcarters' 
Award, in N.S.W. Ind. Arb. Rep., vol. 21, 1922, p.73ff*
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policy. The Trades Hall reds hoped that the Commonwealth Council
of Action, a body first elected at the All-Australian Trades Union
Conference of June 1921, and elected anew from asimilar conference in
June 1922, would assume overall control of the unions’ campaign. But
though Chairman E.J. Holloway claimed that since 1921 'there had been
a (considerable.,,onslaught on the v/orkers ’ standard of living' and the
1 67workers had been 'slowly, but surely, retreating ever since', no
plan for coordinated industrial action came from the 1922 conference.
Indeed, the newly-elected Commonwealth Council of Action did not meet
l68until 27 September 1922. However, Conference also authorised the
setting up of 'State Emergency Councils of Action', and this gave the
I69Trades Hall reds their chance.
In July, the Trades Hall reds moved. Labor Council executive
called a conference of officials from some sixty unions, including
the miners and the A.W.U. While confined 'irritation' strikes were
suggested for gas employees, all other unions were merely asked to
170'go slow' and reduce output. On 20 July, the Labor Council accepted
166
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168 
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On it sat: J.S.Garden, G.Sinclair (Boilmakers), E.R.Voigt (Secret­
ary of the Trades Hall Secretaries' Association), 0.Schreiber and 
J.Upton (Furniture Trades), E.C.Magrath (Printers), F.Landon 
(Pastrycooks) (A.W., 17 May 1922.).
Common Cause, 21 July 1922.
A.W., 4 Oct., Common Cause, 13 Oct. 1922.
On the 'State Emergency Council of Action' were to sit Commonwealth 
Council of Action members in each state, the Disputes Committees 
of each Labor Council, along with the representative of any unions 
involved or likely to be involved in a dispute (Common Cause,
21 July 1922).
170 S.M.H., 19 July 1922
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171i t s  e x e c u t i v e ' s  recommendat ion  o f  ' g o - s l o w ' ,  J . S .  Garden em p h a s i z -
172i n g  soon a f t e r  t h a t  ' g o - s l o w '  was boCf a s t r i k e ,  w h i l e  as  Lahor  
C o u n c i l  s e c r e t a r y  he s i g n e d  a C o u n c i l  m a n i f e s t o  which  p u t  th e  m a t t e r  
s h a r p l y :
The most  e f f e c t i v e  b a t t l e  g round f o r  t h e  w orke r  i s  
i n s i d e  th e  f a c t o r y ,  on t h e  j o b .  173
But t h e  ' g o - s l o w '  does n o t  a p p e a r  t o  have c a u g h t  on -  i n s t e a d ,  u n i o n -
i i
i s t s  began  t o  come ou t  on s t r i k e .  On t h e  i n i t i a t i v e  o f  a workshop 
c o m m i t t e e ,  s to v e m a k e rs  a t  W ard ' s  f a c t o r y  i n  S u r r y  H i l l s  s t r u c k  w o r k . ^ ^  
T h i s  p rom pted  Garden t o  s a y :
The t a c t i c s  of  t h e  Union i n  t h e i r  f i g h t  were s p l e n d i d ,  
t h e  o l d  i d e a  t h a t  a l l  t h e  members had t o  come o u t  was 
p u t  t o  one s i d e  on t h i s  o c c a s i o n ,  and th e  whole Union 
c o n c e n t r a t e d  on t h e  f i r s t  s h o p . . .  175
But o t h e r  m o u ld e r s  q u i c k l y  f o l l o w e d  W ard ' s  example 17 6 and  th e
a p p a r e n t
a g ree m en t
177s p r e a d  o f  th e  s t r i k e  was no doubt  i m p o r t a n t  i n  s e c u r i n g  an
1  H  Q
t o  m a i n t a i n  e x i s t i n g  pay  r a t e s  from some e m p lo y e r s .
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M i n u t e s ,  Gen. M ee t in g ,  B o i l e r m a k e r s '  S o c i e t y ,  25 J u l y  1922;
S .M . H . , 21 J u l y  1922.
A.W., 26 J u l y  1922.
The Communist , 28 J u l y  1922.
The Communist , 4 Aug. 1922.
The Communist , 11 Aug. 1922.
S.M.H. , 7 Aug. 1922.
M i l i b a n d ' s  remark  on t h e  r e a c t i o n  o f  t h e  B r i t i s h  government ( the  
em ployer  i n  t h i s  c a s e )  t o  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  t h e  s p r e a d  o f  th e  
R a i l  S t r i k e  i n  1919 i s  r e l e v a n t  h e r e :  'No s o o n e r  however was th e  
Government f a c e d  w i t h  t h e  r e a l  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  t h e  s t r i k e  would  
I h i s  e m p h a s i ^  s p r e a d  t h a n  i t  a g r e e d  to  a s e t t l e m e n t  which gave 
th e  ra i lw a y m en  much, th o u g h  n o t  a l l ,  t h a t  t h e y  had a s k e d * ( o p . c i t . ,  
p . 7 6 ) .
178 A.W ., 16 Aug. 1922
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Yet such victories were not only rare; they were short-lived.
On 12 August the Hadfield's moulders returned, accepting wage reductions
which taken in conjunction with those received in earlier months, now
came to seventeen shillings a week, and by November, the Ward's stove-
makers had also accepted their employers' terms.
In mid-August, waterfront boilmakers, faced with wage cuts,
179adopted the Labor Council's strategy by introducing a 'go-slow'
l80and refusing overtime. At roughly the same time, member unions of
l8lthe Iron Trades Group moved towards 'combined action', when the
Amalgamated Society of Engineers invited the Boilermakers' executive co
attend a meeting of moulders, blacksmiths, sheet metal workers, iron-
182workers and stovemakers. ^n August, a conference of the iron trades 
group of Labor Council carried recommendations for their executives
I O T
which substantially embodied Labor Council policy. Considerable
emphasis was laid upon the need to keep any strike activity under the 
closest control of the Council of Action; where individual employers 
attempted to introduce longer hours, for example, individual factories 
might hold stopwork meetings - but only at such times and places as were
179 S.M.H., 15 Aug. 1922.
The Communist, 18 Aug. 1922.
18l The A.E.U., the Federated Moulders' Union, Australasian Engineers, 
the Boilermakers, the Enginedrivers, the Electrical Trades' Union, 
the Ironworkers' Assistants (Sydney branch and Balmain branch), the 
Blacksmiths and the Patternmakers.
182
183
Minutes, Gen. Meeting, Boilermakers' Society, 8 Aug. 1922 
A.W., 23 Aug. 1922; S.M.H., 19 Aug. 1922.
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determined "by a committee of the iron trades group, which was to he 
appointed subject to the approval of the Council of Action. Such 
emphasis would scarcely have been given had officials not fea.red that 
rank and file initiatives would otherwise have spilled beyond the off­
icial ’irritation’ approach into extended strikes.
Yet another general trade union conference on 23 August added 
little to the range of tactics so far outlined, with the ’go-slow’ once 
more receiving central emphasis. This conference also elected a State 
Emergency Council of Action on which sat some of the leading Trades 
Hall reds and their allies, among them H. Denford and J.J. Graves.
Once again, great emphasis was nlaced. upon the need to keep control 
of the union campaign in the Emergency Council's hands.
Prom the time the left’s tactics of go-slow a.nd confined 
strikes were put forward in July, there had been right-wing criticism, 
though at first few officials came out in open opposition. In some 
unions, officials and at least a substantial section of the rank and 
file were divided, the former against, the latter sympathetic towards, 
the left's tactics. In the Australasian Society of Engineers,
17 6
a section of the members in Sydney was reported as favouring the
Labor Council's policy, while the Engineers' executive flatly refused
to hold stopwork meetings, though warning that 'Great unrest exists
I85amongst the engineers'. As the passing weeks brought little or no
success for the left's policy, opposition voices, at first muffled,
began to be raised more loudly. The executive of the New South Wales
l86branch of the Australian Labor Party 'repudiated' the left's policy, 
which it regarded as extremist. A meeting of the Trades Unions' 
Secretaries' Association in the first week of September decided that 
union resistance should be limited to appeals through the courts.
Thus opposition to all direct action appears to have been nourished by 
the failure of the particular sort of direct action sponsored by the 
left. This was surely the time for a morale-raising turn in tactics. 
Unions were still determined to refuse lengthened hours; for example, the 
executive of the Labor Council iron trades group called for a Saturday
1 ft 7stop-home and go-slow if the forty eight hours were introduced. But 
so much had been said for so many months, and so little done or woni
Suddenly, the unions were faced with the choice: accept forty 
eight hours without struggle, or struggle for concessions. In mid- 
October the state Arbitration Court announced that a forty eight hour 
week would be introduced for the iron trades on 10 November.
S.M.H., 22 Aug. 1922.
S.M.H., 26 Aug. 1922.
A.W,, 20 Sept. 1922; Minutes, Specially Summoned Meeting of the 
Boilermakers' Society, 26 Sept. 1922.
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Labor Council president Howie warned that as soon as employers tried
to implement the court decisions ’a certain policy which had been
l88decided upon would be put into operation’. ' Prominent state union 
officials - Willis of the miners, Johnson of the Seamen, Howie,
Sinclair of the boilermakers, Macleay of the ironworkers - addressed 
a combined mass meeting of iron tra.des unionists, urging all to refuse 
to work the additional four hours but to take care to work forty 
four hours:
This will throw the onus on the employer of declaring 
a lockout, I89
The firm of Hoskins Limited then introduced the forty eight hour week 
at its factories in Ultimo and Rhodes. Three hundred absented them­
selves on Saturday morning, Labor Council officials advising strikers to 
resume work on Monday. Thus the labor movement’s entire hours’ 
campaign in Sydney was being waged by metal trades unionists at Hoskins, 
who absented themselves from work on Saturday mornings and returned 
on Mondays, and by waterfront boilermakers who took the same action 
with the help of thdr unskilled assistants.
188 S.M.H., 17 Oct. 1922.
189 A.W., 25 Oct. 1922.
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Broadly representative union conferences at this time reveal
a sort of paralysis of will. A day-long conference Between delegates
from the iron trades group and members of the State Emergency Council
of Action rose with no decision as to action, other than to hold
'propaganda* meetings and to 'educate' workers concerning the beneficial
possibilities of the Council of Action. A meeting of three hundred and
twenty shop delegates could decide nothing more than that Labor Leagues
should be asked to seek help from the A.L.P. state executive and from
191state Labor parliamentarians in retaining the forty four hour week.
Up to November 1922, a facade of trade union solidarity was
preserved. There was formal unity, if very little unity of action; a
State Council of Action existed and the executive of the iron trades'
group had announced a policy consistent with the State Council of Action's
policy. Quite suddenly, this facade was shattered»
On 3 November came the announcement that the Australasian
Society of Engineers, the Amalgamated Society of Engineers and the
Electrical Trades Union now refused the Council of Action the right to
involve them in strike activity. Then came a decision by the unionists
192at Hoskins to work forty eight hours. Later, the militant Boiler-
193makers' Society withdrew from the Council of Action. According to
191 A.W., 1 Nov. 1922.
192 S.M.H., 3,4 Nov. 1922.
•^ 93 Explaining their action, the Boilermakers' said: 'We withdrew because
of our disgust at the repudiation by certain unions of their under­
taking and their betrayal of the Council of Action and the other 
unions'. (Common Cause, 10 Nov. 1922.)
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the Sydney Morning Herald, the Australasian Society of Engineers with­
drew from the Council of Action for fear it would lose its arbitration 
court registration as a penalty for following the Council’s policy; it
allegedly believed that, if it were de-registered, it would be 'swallowed
194up' by its rival, the Amalgamated Society of Engineers. Common Cause, 
organ of the miners' union, gave a slightly different version of the 
affair; the Amalgamated Engineer*'^Union 'which had somewhat hesitat­
ingly submitted to the council, made its continued allegiance contingent
upon a written undertaking from the Australasian Society, which it
195was impossible to secure'. In explaining events to a mass meeting of
Newcastle district iron trades unionists, President Howie of the Labor
Council was reported to say: 'The primary breakaway resulted from the
refusal of the Australasian Society of Engineers to give a written agree-
196ment that it would stand by the decisions of the council.’
The Sydney Morning Herald greeted the breakdown of formal 
unity with obvious relief:
... it can now be taken for granted that there will be 
no general strike in the engineering industry. 197
194
195
196
S_.M ., 4 Nov. 1922.
Common Cause , 10 Nov. 1922. 
S.M.H., 6 Nov. 1922.
197 S.M.H., 8 Nov. 1922.
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And in Lithgow and Newcastle the dispute soon petered out, though 
in Sydney a rear-guard action persisted till early in 1923«
Sydney waterfront boilermakers, sheetmetal workers and iron­
workers kept up a Saturday strike until early January, while the
199Coopers’ Union was still on strike in early February. But by December
1923, the normal working week in the state was forty eight hours, while 
the average wage was eighty two shillings a week for men and forty one 
shillings and sixpence for women.2(^  And there was obvious truth in 
the retrospective observation of the conservative Printers' Board 
of Management:
Only the minimum of dislocation in the industries 
of the State was seen to follow £the employers'J 
serious attacks... 201
During the years studied in the preceding pages, the advent of high 
unemployment in 1921 and 1922 did not bring an immediate fall in morale. 
There was a time lag in the workers' response to the changed situation. 
Such a time lag occurs, of course, whenever one phase gives way to 
another, but the lag in 1921 and 1922 was a long and important one,
S .M .H ., 10,28 Nov. 1922, 8 Jan. 1923; Minutes of Combined Mass 
Meetings on 25 Nov., 16 Dec.1922, 6 Jan. 1923? in Minute Book of 
the Boilermakers' Society; Minutes, Gen. Meeting, Labor Council, 
1 Feb. 1923.
200 N.S.W. Statistical Register, 1922-23, p.6 0 4.
201 Report of the Board of Management of the Printing Industry 
Employees' Union, for the Half Year Ended 5 Jan. 1923.
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because morale was unusually buoyant in the immediate post-war years. 
High morale spilled over from the years of low unemployment to the 
years of high unemployment.
To see this fact illustrated, we need only consider two sets
of figures: those for unemployment, and those for strike activity.
Unemployment in the first quarter of 1921 was double that of the first
quarter of 1920, while the figure for the whole year 1921 is similarly
202greater than that for the year 1920. But the number of workers
c-
directly involved in disputes in 1921 was 60% greater than that for 
2031920. These figures simply confirm the evidence, brought together
in this chapter, of the rank and file's will to fight in this time of 
high unemployment - even in Sydney itself, where the go-slow and the 
confinement tactic neither stimulated the broad actions, nor won the 
evident successes which feed rank aid file confidence. The rearguard 
actions which persisted when the main campaign had failed are less 
remarkable if one postulates a still combative rank and file. Though 
few officials might have expected to achieve union aims by rearguard
action, they might have felt it unwise to dissuade members from attempt- 
• + 204m g  it.
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203
204
Appendix to this chapter, p.185.
Comm. Year Book, no.15? 1922. Based on a table on p.890: 'Industrial 
Disputes in each State and Territory'.
A parallel lies in the extreme care officials had to use to 
persuade the rank and file to return to vwork during the strikes of 
1928-30 in New South Wales (see writer's M.A. thesis. Chs„ 2 »6. *7.)
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Within the Sussex Street Communist Party there had been a
conflict over strike tactics between the Trades Hall reds and extension-
ists. According to Norman Jeffery the Communist Party central execut-
20Sive decided in favour of extension. However the Trades Hall reds
controlled the Labor Council. The Sussex Street Central Executive 
elected at the Sussex Street annual conference on 27 December 1921 
contained anti-extensionists Denford, Garden, Howie, Voigt, and possibly 
Earsman, facing theittnost formidable extensionist in Carl Baker.
Jeffery claims now that he and Ross leafletted factories on the C.P. 
extension line. It is also possible, however, that their leaflets 
in reality did not conflict with the published Sussex Street line on 
the question, which was a distinct attempt at a compromise with Garden’s 
view.
Comrades and fellow workers, the Communist Party 
calls you to take up the Go Slow policy NOW... the 
Communist Party states that its policy does not cease with 
the adoption of the Go Slow policy, the Communist Party 
stands for... the complete withdrawal of all labor from 
industry should the necessity arise. The Communist Party 
stands for the partial strike, for a general strike, for 
mass demonstrations, and in fact for any organised attempt 
to prevent the capitalist class... from carrying on their 
wage reduction robbery.
... neither the Communist Party nor the Labor Council 
adopted the Go Slow policy as a final and only policy 
for the workers. The Go Slow policy was adopted as an 
immediate policy, to be followed by whatever policy was 
necessary in order to make victory certain. 206
205 Interview
206 The Communist, 15 Sept. 1922 (wrongly dated 8 Sept. 1922).
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If this was meant not as a public compromise position but as a serious 
project, it is important to note that there is no evidence of a Comm­
unist union official mentioning that 'go-slow* and, later, the confined 
(Saturday) strike were to be seen as possible preludes to future 
extension. In January 1923» when the campaign was over and the unions 
defeated, C.P. central executive member Hector Ross sharply criticised 
the entire conception of the union campaign. Heading his criticism 
'The Futility of a Shortened Front', Ross claimed that certain leaders 
had been 'obsessed with, the idea of confining the struggle to a few 
shops...', with the idea that the other shops, exempted, would finance 
the strikers during a long struggle by which employers would be wearied 
into submission. 'Those responsible for lrhis theory', continued Ross, 
'were actuated by the tactics of certain small industrial unions, who 
have undoubtedly achieved much success by "irritation methods'". 
However, he concluded: 'The tactic of the shortened front, should only
be considered under exceptional circumstances, but at the present time
207such a course is absolutely suicidal.'
207 The Communist, 12 Jan. 1923.
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APPENDIX - CHAPTER III
TABLE 1
DISTRIBUTION OP TRADE UNIONISTS IN NEW SOUTH WALES 
ACCORDING TO TWELVE MAIN GROUPS, 1924
Name of Group
Number of 
Unions in 
Group
Number of 
Members
Membership of Group 
as a Percentage of 
Total No. of Unionists
Building Group 15 29 ,605 11.8
Clothing 9 13,322 5.3
Engineering and Metal 
Working 14 22 ,800 9.1
Food, Drink and 
Narcotics 19 2 6 ,389 10.5
Land Transport 
(Exclusive of Railway 
and Tramway) 6 4,403 1.7
Mining and Smelting 13 18 ,257 7.3
Pastoral 6 27,180 10.8
Printing,Bookbinding etc. 3 5,618 2.2
Railways and Tramways 13 29,276 11.7
Shipping and Sea 
Transport 11 5,883 2.3
Manufacturing 19 14,149 5 .8
Miscellaneous 49 54,033 21.5
Total 177 250,915 100.0
Source: Report of the Acting Registrar of Friendly 
Societies and Trade Unions, for the twelve 
months ending 30 June, 1925* (in N.S.W. Pari. 
Papers, vol» II, 1926, p.773.)
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TABLE 2
A. TABLE SHOWING PERCENTAGE UNEMPLOYMENT AMONGST TRADE UNIONS 
FURNISHING RETURNS, COMMONWEALTH, I 89 I - I 928
Year P e rc e n ta g eUnemployment Year
P e rc e n ta g e
Unemployment
I 89 I  (end o f  y e a r ) 9 .3 1916 (a v e ra g e  f o r  5*0
y e a r )
I 896  " 11 1 0 .8 1917 " " 7 .1
1901 " n 6 .6 1918 " " 5 .8
1906 " 11 6 .7 1919 " " 6 .6
1907 " 11 5 .7 1920 " " 6 . 5
1908 " 11 6 .0 1921 " " 1 1 .2
1909 " ti 5 .8 1922 " » 9 .3
1910  " it 5 .6 1923 7 .1
1911 M 11 4 .7 1924 8 .9
1912 " it 5 .6 1925 8 .8
1913 (a v e ra g e f o r  y e a r ) 6 . 5 1926 7 .1
1914 M 11 8 .3 1927 7 .0
1915 " 11 9 .3 1928 1 0 .8
S o u r c e : Lahour R e p o r t ,  No. 19» 1 9 2 8 . p . 1 2 9 .
N ote 1: The f i g u r e s  i n  b o th  t h e s e  t a b l e s  a re  e x c l u s i v e  o f  s t r i k e s
and l o c k o u t s .
B . TABLE SHOWING PERCENTAGE UNEMPLOYMENT AMONGST TRADE UNIONS
FURNISHING RETURNS, NEW SOUTH WALES, 1912-1928
Y ear P e rc e n ta g e Year P e rc e n ta g e
Unemployment Unemployment
1 9 1 2 4 .9 5 1 9 2 0 6 .9
1913 4 .5 1921 1 1 .9
1914 6 .9 1 9 2 2 1 1 .4
1915 5 .5 1923 9 .2
1916 5 .7 1924 1 2 .6
1917 6 .4 1925 1 1 . 0
1 9 1 8 3 .6 1926 7 .4
1919 5 .0 1927 7 .0
1928 1 1 .3
S o u rces  Commonwealth Year Book, No. C (1913) to  No. OLZ (}929)
TABLE 3
INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES IN AUSTRALIA, ALL GROUPS, 1913-1922
Year
Number of Disputes 
(All Industrial 
Groups)
No. of Workers 
Involved, In­
directly and 
Directly
No. of Workers 
Directly 
Involved
No. of Working 
ing Days 
Lost
1913 208 50,283 33,493 623,528
1914 337 71,049 43,073 1,090,395
1915 358 81,292 57,005 583,225
1916 508 170,683 128,546 1,678,930
1917 444 173,970 154,061 4,599,658
1918 298 56,439 42,553 580,853
1919 460 157,591 100,300 6,308,226
1920 554 155,566 102,519 1,872,065
1921 624 165,101 102,198 956,617
1922 445 116,332 100,263 858,685
Source: Labour Report, No. 7 (1916) - No.13 (1922)
Note: There was an international peak of strike activity
(Labour Report, No.12, p.182, ^Industrial Disputes 
Various Countries*).
1919-20.
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TABLE 4
TABLE SHOWING PERCENTAGE UNEMPLOYMENT AMONGST TRADE UNIONS 
FURNISHING RETURNS, BY QUARTERS: 1919-1928, NEW SOUTH WALES
Year 1st quarter 2nd quarter 3rd quarter 4th quarter
1919 5.6 8.4 5.6 5.0
1920 5.5 5.5 5.2 6.9
1921 13.7 13.5 12.3 11.9
1922 11.1 11.4 11.9 11.4
1923 10.2 8.8 9.3 8.4
1924 10.6 11.9 13.5 14.3
1925 13.2 12.7 7.8 10.1
1926 8.4 7.5 7.4 6.2
1927 7.0 6.8 5.3 9.1
1928 11.8 10.9 11.9 10.6
Source: Labour Reports, 1919-1928, no.10 to no.19.
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TABLE 5
INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES IN NEW SOUTH WALES: 1917-1923
Year
No. of  
D is ­
putes
N o.of Workpeople 
in v o lv e d
R a tio  o f  Workers 
In v o lv e d  D ir e c t ly  
to  th o se  In v o lv ed  
I n d i r e c t l y
Average No. A ver-  
of Days age
L ost N o .o f
Per Head men
■^clispute
D ir e c t ly  I n d i r e c t l y
1917 296 118,515 15 ,508 8:1 2 5 .O 390
1918 138 24,417 8 ,6 2 4 3:1 5 .0 174
1919 267 64,956 35 ,040 2:1 4 3 .0 240
1920 349 68,033 2 2 ,349 3:1 6 .5 194
1921 535 108,573 29,921 4 :1 4 .0 240
1922 342 88,257 1 4 ,042 6:1 5 .8 260
1923 200 54,809 5 ,390 10:1 17 274
Source: Based on t a b le s  in  Comm. Year Book no. 15 , 1 9 2 2 , p .890  and
n o . 1 7 , 1 9 2 4 ,P. 561.
ITEM 6 -  Thomas Walsh and the F ed erated
Seamen 's  Union
Walsh had been  a member of  t h e  Sydney b r a n c h  E x e c u t i v e  i n  1912 ,  
and t h e n  d i s c o u r a g e d  Sydney seamen f rom j o i n i n g  Q u e e n s l a n d e r s  on a 
p r o j e c t e d  ' e x te n d ed *  s t r i k e .  S h o r t l y  a f t e r  t h i s ,  Walsh d i s a p p e a r e d  f rom 
th e  E x e c u t i v e ,  a t  much th e  same t ime b e i n g  a c q u i t t e d  of  c h a r g e s  of  
f i n a n c i a l  m i s d e a l i n g s .  A f t e r  t h i s ,  t h e  Sydney Morning  H e r a l d  ( l  December 
1922) r e f e r r e d  t o  t h e  New South  Wales b r a n c h  as  ' f a i r l y  p e a c e f u l ' ,  
r e f e r r i n g ,  p r o b a b l y  to  the  o f f i c i a l s ,  f o r  t h e  r a n k  and f i l e  had p a r t i c ­
i p a t e d  i n  t h e  a n t i - c o n s c r i p t i o n  campaigns and i n  t h e  1917 s t r i k e .
I n d e e d ,  th e  r a n k  and f i l e  were d e e p l y  a f f e c t e d  by l a b o r ' s  g e n e r a l  war­
t ime and  p o s t - w a r  m i l i t a n c y ,  and r a n k  and f i l e  ' j o b - c o m m i t t e e s '  s p r e a d  
t h r o u g h o u t  t h e  s h i p s .  I n  1918,  when t h e  t h e n  ' G e n e r a l '  ( f e d e r a l )  
s e c r e t a r y  was a p p o i n t e d  to  th e  New S ou th  Wales Board  o f  T r a d e ,  and th e
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then secretary in New South Wales, one Edwards, became Acting General 
Secretary, Walsh was elected branch secretary. In early 1919? Walsh 
became General Secretary in a closely-contested ballot (voting 1294 
to 1213) and was left in an insecure position. In the bitter inner- 
branch conflict over the February strike, Walsh put himself at the 
head of the discontented militants, and in May 1919 had the satisfaction 
of being elected General Secretary in a new ballot, this time with no 
precarious lead. On 20 and 21 May 1919? "the Victorian and New South 
Wales branches again joined Queensland in the strike, and in June, 
five members of the Executive of the New South Wales branch resigned 
allegedly because\i,they didn’t believe in direct action* (S ,M,H.,
12 Ju n e  1 9 1 9 ) .
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CHAPTER IV THE REFORMIST PARTY MINUS THE REVOLUTIONARIES:
The S t o r e y - D o o l e y  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n s  a n d  t h e  
U n i o n s ,  1 9 2 0 - 1 9 2 2 .
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Chapter 4»
The years 1919 to 1921 were years of unsurpassed mass 
industrial militancy in Australia. Yet industrially militant though 
they were, unionists still looked to the A.L.P. as their mass party.
It was at this time, however, that the left had chosen to withdraw 
from the A.L.P., a time when they could have expected their influence 
to have been very great within that party. At no time since the l890's 
had the masses been more susceptible to the left's ideas.
We have seen in chapter 2 that, while their Sussex Street 
Communist Party did not concur until December 1922, it was some time 
before June 1921 that the Trades Hall reds began to operate their 
de facto united front line towards the A.L.P. Its effects were 
manifest within the A.L.P. from about September 1921. One sees a 
remarkable renewal of A.L.P. factional and parliamentary interest in 
trade union demands, while a major, if not the major issue of the 
state elections in March 1922 concerned the basic wage, with the red 
menace a close contestant. The leader of one of the two right-wing 
A.L.P. factions, cabinet member 'Greg' McGirr, was alleged to have 
fallen under communist influence.
By early 1921, affiliated unionists were already discontented 
with A.L.P. performance on their demands, and rising unemployment 
sharpened their discontent. But the unionists clearly lacked political- 
faction 'know-how' and toughness in promoting their viewpoint. The 
Trades Hall reds Thought an appreciable increase of these qualities to 
the affiliated unions. And thus trade union demands moved to the
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centre of A.L.P. factional life, when for a long time they had been 
treated as a sort of football between the two factions.
Red interest in the A.L.P. was still only in the early 
stage of its renewal, by late 1921 and early 1922. Thus, despite the 
industrial militancy of the unions and the special place unions have 
in the A.L.P. structure, for most of the time of their maximum 
potential responsiveness to leftist views the unions lacked effective 
leadership in the specialised ways of war of the A.L.P. faction fight. 
Therefore trade union demands played a less effective part in the 
A.L.P. during the time of the Storey and Dooley administrations 
which sat at the time of militancy and radicalism, than they did at 
the time of Lang’s first administration, 1925-1926, when the unions 
were notably less aggressive and self-confident industrially. For 
by early 1926, if we add the periods of de facto operation of the 
united front line to the years after December 1922, when the line was 
formally operated by the whole Communist Party, the A.L.P. had been 
directly subject to red influences for some four and a half years.
In New South Wales from April 1920 to March 1922, both 
main factions ruling the A.L.P. were right-wing factions. These are 
years notorious in the labor movement for the audacious malpractices 
of the warring factions. They are years also marked by absorption 
of A.L.P. spokesmen of that state in the narrowest personal goals.
In Victoria, the Victorian Socialist Party had long been infiltrating 
the A.L.P., with its own brand of ’united front’ policy. And by 
contrast with New South Wales, in Victoria and at the federal level
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of the A.L.P., one finds a greater concern with long-term aims and 
principles than at any time before or since; while outside Australia, 
labor fiercely debated questions of principles, aims and tactics, 
stimulated by revolution, by mass strikes and the fall of syndicalism 
in the path of triumphant marxism.
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The A.L.P. and the Demands of the 
Affilis.ted Unions 1920-21
In March 1920, the Storey Labor administration was elected 
to office in New South Wales. The year 1920 and much of 1921 was a 
time of exceptional trade union militancy, but the Storey Labor 
administration was remarkably unresponsive to trade union demands.
Its slender majority cannot be considered a completely satisfactory 
explanation for this unresponsiveness 5 McGowen, with a majority of 
only two, did more for the unions than Holman, whose majority was ten,^ ' 
and with a similar majority of two, Lang defied the wrath of Labor's 
business and farmer supporters to put through a whole series of 
long-sought industrialist measures. Other circumstances of the time 
make even more remarkable the Storey administration's unresponsiveness 
to trade union demands. Among the trade unions who for many months 
so impotently challenged the parliamentarians in 1920 and 1921, were 
many who participated in forming the 'Industrial Section' which had 
bodly dealt with unresponsive parliamentarians only a few years 
earlier; and while Labor parliamentarians seemed unresponsive to 
demands of affiliated unions (if we measure responsiveness in terms 
of legislative performance rather than in words), they were extremely 
sensitive to the views of a newly-formed country group, the Progressive 
Party.
An essential condition for the setting up of the 'Industrial
H.V. Evatt, Australian Labour Leader. The Story of W.A. Holman and 
the Labour Movement, p.335»
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Section* in 1Q16 had been Holman's refusal to legislate upon trade
union demands. Outstanding among these were the demand for wage
readjustment to rising prices, an Eight Hours Act, a Workmen's
Compensation Act, amendment of the Arbitration Act to give absolute
preference to unionists, equal pay to women for equal work, fair rents,
2and improved shearers' accommodation. In order to gain these things, 
unions also pressed for fulfilment of Labor's policy abolishing the
the affiliated unions expelled Holman from the A.L.P., changed Party 
rules to favour trade union representation at the all-powerful annual 
conference, and excluded parliamentarians from the executive elected 
by that body. During 1916 and 1917» conscription struggles intensified 
a growing working-class unrest, and by early 1919> left-wing union 
officials had won control of the Industrial Section (now called the 
Industrial l/igilance Council) of the A.L.P. and were believed to 
have a good chance of winning control of the A.L.P. itself at the
A
coming annual conference/' When the left's attempt failed, the left 
abandoned the A.L.P. to the right wing, set up the Industrial Socialist 
Labor Party and were expelled from the A.L.P. This is how it came 
about that, as the Storey and Dooley Labor administrations acted out
See J. Graves to J. Power, 12 Aug.1916, in Molesworth coll.,Set 71» 
Item 25 H.V.Evatt, Australian Labour Leader, p.351.
Ibid, p.383,384.
3Council. Partly because he neglected their demands.
4 See above, Ch. I
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their brief and inglorious parts on the parliamentary stage, control 
of the party machine in hew South Wales was divided between two 
right-wing factions.
Penetrating unions and parliament alike, these factions 
may be equally well examined from the vantage point of either the
executive or caucus. The larger of the two main parliamentary factions 
was led by John Storey, state Premier after March 1920, but on the 
executive of the state branch of the Labor Party, Storey’s followers
were a minority, and in the trade unions, Storey's followers were few
and scattered. The majority faction on the Party executive was controlled
by the Central Branch of the Australian Workers' Union, notably by
5J. Bailey and W.H. Lambert." J. Bailey, ruthless, poker-faced and
A document published by the 'Reorganised Industrial Section' 
(Molesworth, Set 71j Item 6) claimed that although the A.W.U. had 
a mere thirty one delegates in an annual A.L.P. conference composed 
of 239 delegates, about one half the members of the central 
executive of the A.L.P. were members or employees of the Central 
Branch of the A.W.U. Important committees elected by the executive 
consisted mainly of members of this body too. On the organising- 
finance committee ( a nominee committee alleged to be of greater 
importance than the central executive itself), the Central Branch 
of the A.W.U. had 2/3 of the members, while it had 4/5 of the 
members of the disputes committee.
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f> 7allegedly semi-literate, ’ dominated the executive faction,' his main
spokesmen in caucus being Voltaire Molesworth, R.J. Stuart-Robertson,
and in cabinet, J.J.G. McGirr. The Bailey faction was to meet
8mounting charges of corrupt practices.
We take the opportunity here to look more closely at McGirr, 
whom the non-Labor dailies were to dub leader of the red forces within 
the A.L.P. and who did in fact make himself spokesman for the affiliated 
union viewpoint in cabinet. In a sense, McGirr practised Langism 
ahead of Lang, at a time when Lang himself sat rather quietly in 
cabinet as Treasurer-no doubt learning a great deal from what McGirr did.
In 1920 McGirr was taking part in his third Labor caucus.
Like Lang who was a Catholic and an estate agent, McGirr might seem
I. Young, 'Conflict Within the New South Wales Labor Party, 1919- 
19321 M.A. thesis, University of Sydney, i960. p. 396; J.H. Catt's 
reference to 'an uneducated and uncouth dictatorship', in the 
leaflet 'To the Delegates, Members, Branches and Affiliated Unions. 
Reply to Inspired Attack in Sydney Daily Telegraph', March 1921 
(h.S. Ross Coll.). See also Truth, 22 June 1919. Such allegations 
are also borne out by the following fragment in the Molesworth 
Collection (Set 71, Item 4), labelled in handwriting: 'J.Bailey's
writing’: 'As against Cumming's statement I can produce five reliable
persuns including the Ex Mayer of Junee who were in my Cumpany at 
the time Cummings stated I Inspected the Boxes in Sydney,'
Bailey was extremely able at settling disagreements with his fists 
(interview with Jack Moss, an ex-shearer who knew Bailey) and 
allegedly inspired fear throughout much of the labor movement (see 
Young, op.cit., p.396) Bailey was vice-president of the Labor Party 
executive before his return to the Legislative Assembly from Monaro, 
and he remained chairman of the A.L.P. organising committee and 
vice-president of the Central Branch of the A.W.U.
See, for example, M.P. Considine in Comm.Pari.Deb., vol.9^.U p.6604, 
17 Nov.1920; and charges by A.B.Berry against Bailey and Lambert; 
the Berry-Bailey Charges, 19 September 1921, processedj in R.S.Ross
Collection: The Infamous Iron Hand,14 December 1921 ,(k.S.Ross Coll.); 
also J.H.Catts, federal Labor parliamentarian, referring to events 
in 1919 and 1920, in Comm.ParI.Deb.,vol.100,p.2478,20 Sep.1922, 
and to events inl921, in ibid.,vol.99,PP*197-9, 6 July 1922.
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an oddly inappropriate spokesman for the affiliated union view:
’Labor’s wealthiest minister', he once owned chemist shops in four 
towns, and described himself as a ’farmer on a large scale and ... 
a representative of farmers for the last ten years,..' with 'more 
acres under wheat than the whole of the members of this so-called 
farmers' party...  ^^That is, the Progressive PartyJ. Freeman's Journal 
(The Leading Catholic Journal of Australia), was initially well- 
disposed to McGirr, but after he became de facto spokesman in cabinet 
for the affiliated union viewpoint, this paper described him as ’of 
the fiery cross order', a man who wanted 'everything at once, with the 
result that the unattached voters get cold feet about a possible 
revolution.'^C
Working in general harmony with the Baileyites, and partly 
overlapping it in personnel, was a Roman Catholic group established 
in 1919 when the Catholic Church took alarm at the leftist tide with­
in the labor movement. Outstanding in this group were P.J. Cleary, 
of the Catholic Federation, and Patrick Minahan and Peter Loughlin, 
both state Labor parliamentarians. To combat the left-wing effort 
to give the A.L.P. a socialist objective, the Catholic group found 
common ground with both Bailey and Storey factions in the defence of 
the 1918 state Labor objective. But the Catholics resented Storey's 
refusal to grant a state subsidy to church schools, and for this among 
other reasons, found themselves, on most issues in the Bailey camp,
Freeman's Journal, 12 Jan.1922; Fighting Line (issued by the Rational 
Association of N.S.W., and later called the Australian National 
Review), 22 Apr. 1920; ll.S.W. Pari. Beb  ^ voT. 79>P*495>4 8 6,
26 Aug.1920.
Freeman’s Journa1, 19 Jan,1922.10
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at least until the sharp identification of the Bailey faction with 
union demands, when the picture becomes less clear. Cutting across 
these faction lines to some extent came the conservative, small but 
formidable, personal empire of James Howard Catts, M.H.R. for Cook, 
an empire scattered amongst trade unions, leagues, caucus and 
cabinet. Despite John Storey’s personal friendship with Catts,
Catts's empire remained uneasily allied with the Baileyites until 
shortly before annual conference in 1921.
So much for the main factions.
In March 1920, the Storey Labor government took office in
a generally unsettled climate, marked by electoral dissatisfaction
with the established parties. Assuming its most marked forms
amongst the working class, this mood of uneasiness infected many
others, having its sources in war time experiences, in a rapid price
12rise coupled with a lag in wages and salaries, and also, no doubt, 
in an Australian echo of the Russian October. While the apathy of 
both labor and non-labor voters contributed to the unusually low poll 
in March 1920,(only fifty five per cent of those eligible turned out 
on election day) the non-labor turnout was noticeably lower than at 
either the preceding or following elections. Don-labor apathy owed
Through a long association with all aspects of the party machine, 
Catts had a personal following in the unions. See James Howard 
Catts, by Dorothy Catts, passim.
ic^ q- lCiRound Table, vol. 10, 191^ -^919? p.68l.
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a good deal to the split in Nationalist party ranks and to the gross
13scandals attributed to the Holman administration, In the country­
side agrarian dissatisfaction took on radical, anti big-business 
overtones along with its more marked anti-city attributes. Yet the 
community-wide unease expressed itself nowhere more clearly and 
violently than amongst workers, with a strike wave reaching a peak 
between 1918 and 1921. How, then, can one explain the tendency to 
indifference of the working-class in New South Wales to the established 
party of labor and to the political process itself?"^ The answer lies 
in the contrast between the working-class mood and the Labor Party's 
image as shaped, largely, by its parliamentarians. The workers stubborn­
ly persisted in believing that the Labor Party was their party through­
out this time of militancy. But the men who modelled the public image
See B.D. Graham, 'The Political Strategies of the Australian 
Country Parties from their Origins until 192.9' (Ph.D. thesis, 
A.N.U., 1958, Chapter 10, pp.271-2; UlrichpThe Country Party.
A Political & Social History of the Party in New South Wales, p.53; 
Molesworth, Set 243, Item 3, 1920 election folder, 'The Scandals 
of Nationalism'.
Labor men of various viewpoints commented on this indifference: 
for example H.E. Boote, editor of the Australian Worker, 22 Dec. 
1921: 'The workers of Australia... display a staggering indiffer­
ence to...the ballot box. In a roneoed document, Peter Loughlin, 
leading Catholic Labor parliamentarian, offered a radical political 
program for workers to offset the popularity of the socialisation 
objective and to restore 'the workers' waning interest in the 
political battle' (Molesworth coll. Set 71, item 7. n.d. but 
almost certainly late 192l). See also D.W. Rawson, 'The 
Organisation of the Australian Labor Party 1916-1941'> Ph.D.
Thesis, University of Melbourne, 1954* PP»43-44*
199
of the Labor Party were not elected merely by working-class votes,
and as election time drew close in 1920, the Labor Party in New
South Vs/ales found that image being groomed into impeccable moderateness,
its vocabulary pruned of militant dropped h ’s and revolutionary
adjectives. The Professor Higgins of this transformation may have
been parliamentary leader John Storey, but there were few Party figures
who did not lend a hand. In the weeks before March, 1920, Labor
Party .spokesmen pledged it to be all things to all men; to be
both an efficient alternative administration of a capitalist economy
and the tribune of the under-privileged. As for the workers, they
found themselves in a sorry, but perhaps not uncommon, plight; they
would vote for no other party but the Labor Party, because they believed
it was their party, and if the men who controlled the Labor Party
gave it such a genteel and toothless air, why, then, they would not
15vote at all, since voting was not compulsory. "
The system of Proportional Representation was used for the first 
time in March 1920. While the ’unnecessary complications’ (to 
quote R.S. Parker in S.R. Davis (ed) The Government of the Austra­
lian otates, p.66) help to account for the high rate of informal 
voting in that year ( nearly 10 per cent), proportional represen­
tation can offer no convincing explanation for the low turnout 
of voters, (fifty five per cent of the 1,182,409 eligibles turned 
out.) The overriding concern of A.L.P. election workers even 
today is to keep electors in working-class areas in mind, of the 
fact that there is an election on a given day; if_ they vote, on 
the whole they vote Labor. The notion that, in 1920, electors 
were fully aware of approaching elections, had considered, the 
mechanics of voting and had decided to absent themselves from 
the booths because of the complexity of these mechanics implies an 
unlikely level of knowledgeability about the electoral process, 
at least in Labor strongholds; it was here, however, that the 
percentage turnout was lowest.
Continued on next page.
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The parliamentarians fought, with marked success, to keep 
the party image impeccably moderate, well within the 'lib-lab' 
tradition. At a time when unionists were industrially militant and 
socially radical, this does much to explain union indifference to the 
A.L.P. John Storey, the Labor leader, emphatically disassociated his 
party from the 'Direct Actionists', and in doing so came near to 
disavowing strikes altogether. He pledged the A.L.P. to take up the 
'great decentralisation and developmental policy' of the Labor 
government between 1910 and 1916, to extend public transport, provide 
water, ^sewerage and power facilities in the countryside, guarantee 
'living areas of land' to all 'bona fide' settlers; establish a Rural 
Bank and a compulsory wheat pool, and offer a guaranteed minimum price 
for wheat. Labor would nationalise monopolies, coastal shipping and 
banking, and restore the positions of trade unionists demoted and other­
wise suffering as a result of the 1917 strike settlement. Labor alleged
1 g
that in 1919, Premier Holman had tried to 'minimize £thej] effect,
(continued)
The view that Proportional Representation caused poor turnout 
thus has little force when applied to 1920 as voters would not have 
stayed away because of a system they had never yet experienced.
But it is conceivable that, in 1922, voters might have recalled their 
earlier experience and not turned out on that occasion as a result. 
One should not ascribe too much weight to the mechanics of voting, 
nevertheless, for voters, both Labor and non-Labor, in fact turned 
out in much greater numbers in 1922 than in 1920; the Chief Electoral 
Officer described the 1922 poll as a 'particularly heavy' poll 
(S.M.H., 27 Mar. 1922).
Round Table's phrase, (vol.10, 1918-19, p.682.) The Board of Trade's 
decision had been 'received, .with consternation in some quarters’ 
(ibid.).
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of the Board of Trade's decision to increase the basic wage to £3.17s, 
and, in denouncing this attempt, Storey promised an increased minimum 
basic wage with periodic adjustment to (a then rising) cost of living,
17with strict price control and gaoling of profiteers. To the lower 
income groups as a whole, Labor offered 'Motherhood Endowment' for
l8families with more than two children where incomes were below £6.15s.^
During the elections of March 1920, the system of proportional 
voting was used for the first time in the history of Dew South Wales. 
Some 313 candidates nominated, including sixty from the Nationalist 
Party, fifty from the Progressive Party, eighty nine from the Labor 
Party and sixteen Socialists. Of the 1,182,409 citizens eligible to 
vote, only some fifty five per cent turned out on election day.
Labor received 285,792 of these votes, non-Labor (Nationalists and 
Progressives) 299j997j while some ten per cent of votes cast were 
informal. In all there were fTorty five Labor members, but as the
On the role of prices in bringing the downfall of the Nationalists, 
Round Table commented:
'This last is possibly the strongest of the varied sentiments 
agitating the public mind and it gathers additional force 
because the Nationalists, possibly unjustly, are accused of 
over-tenderness to the moneyed interests.' (Loc.cit.,p.672)
Holman's bill to offset the declaration of a basic wage of £3.17s. 
provides the immediate background for this much-repeated promise 
by the Labor Party. Holman had proposed that a man and wife alone 
should constitute the unit for the basic wage, while children were 
provided for from a fund derived from employers and, if necessary, 
from Consolidated Revenue. For fuller details of Labor's proposals 
on endowment, see S.M .H., 18 Feb.1920 and Labor News, 6 Mar. 1920.
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Nationalists and independent Nationalists numbered thirty, and the 
Progressive Party fifteen, the non-Labor muster was also forty five, 
Daniel Levy, Nationalist member from the five-member Labor electorate 
of Sydney, agreed to the Labor Party's request to act as speaker, and 
so gave Labor its (Tenuous majority of one. To stabilise their pre­
carious advantage Labor parliamentarians set about winning the good­
will of the Progressive Party, and it is to this interesting newcomer, 
upon whom Labor parliamentarians pinned such hopes, we must now briefly 
turn.
In 1919> long-repeated efforts to form a country political
party were crowned with success, and the Progressive Party was born.
Support in 1917 by the Farmers' and Settlers’ Association for the new
Holman Nationalist administration had given way to hostility during
1918, as the Farmers' and Settlers' Association charged Holman with
neglecting country interests and the Nationalist Association with
excluding it from policy making. Towards the end of 19193 the Graziers'
Association joined the Farmers’ and Settlers' Association in its anti-
Nationalist stance, while within parliament, a group of dissident
lbNationalists crystallised. ' By March 1920 the three groups had come 
together and stood candidates as the Progressive Party. At the moment 
of formation, the Farmers' and Settlers' Association had greater 
influence than the Graziers' Association in Party councils despite the 
fact that the Graziers provided most of the Party's finance, and possibly 
because of this greater influence, even though the Progressives were
19 B.D. Graham, op.cit,, p.256.
ZC 5
among the ’anti-Labor forces,1' 7 of New South Vv'ales, their parliamen­
tarians flatly refused the overtures of Fuller, the Nationalist 
Leader, to form a coalition cabinet. They agreed, though reluctantly 
and with many reservations, to support Labor. As A.K. Trethowan, 
president of the Farmers1 and Settlers’ Association put it:
The country apparently is prepared to give Labour a 
trial, and we have to recognise the voice of the 
majority. We can keep Labour in order. If they 
start any socialistic legislation, they will either 
have to drop that or drop their bundle. 21
Labor men from left to right wing deplored the government’s delicate
position, but drew different conclusions from it. The left took the
view that Storey must press ahead immediately with promised reforms,
deliberately courting an early election if these were frustrated by
22the Speaker or obstructed by the Legislative Council. But the 
parliamentarians, some of whom now for the first time, enjoyed the 
sweet smell of success, concluded that they must hasten quietly and 
slowly, and as if to underline the point parliament met for eleven
Ibid., p.282.
S.M.H. ,23 Mar. 1920; see also B.I). Graham, op. cit. p. 310/311.
See, for example, the Victorian Socialist Party's paper, the 
Socialist, passim, 1920; A.W. 25 Mar.1920. A writer in the 
Australian Worker begged Labor not to form an alliance with the 
Progressives. ’...if you mix Laborism with Capitalism or Half- 
Way-Betweenism you inevitably getjmongrelised policy...’
The Fighting Line claimed that he had a ’Go-Slow Policy1 (22 Apr. 
1920)',* while Storey himself is alleged to have said he had only 
’half a mandate’. (Lang, op.cit., p.127).
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and a half hours in April and then not at all until late September, 
achieving very few of its electoral pledges when it did sit. Although 
the Government's slender majority helps one understand this strange 
and instantaneous paralysis, the success of the Menzies administration 
from December 1961 to late 1962 (to give a recent example) suggests 
tha.t paralysis is not the best way to set a disadvantage to rights, 
however, the paralysis is the more understandable if one looks at the 
savage eruption of the Labor faction struggle which immediately broke 
out.
Despite careful planning by the Bailey faction, by one vote, 
Caucus failed to elect John Bailey to Cabinet^ and Bailey took 
immediate reprisals. Believing Mutch and Dooley to be the ringleaders 
within the Storey faction, by skilful use of the daily press, Bailey 
forced Storey to appoint a Royal Commission over allegations that Mutch
25and Dooley had taken bribes to stop an enquiry into the wheat industry.
The Righting Line,22 Apr.1920, gives biographical detail on some of 
the successful aspirants. T.D. Mutch was a journalist with the 
Australian Worker, organ of the A.W.U., ex-president of the 
Australian Journalists' Association, three years a member of the 
Legislative Assembly, and formerly keen anti-conscriptionist.
Peter Loughlin, a parliamentarian in 1917, was a forty year old 
school teacher. iV. McKell, a twenty eight year old ex-boilermaker, 
was studying law. Sproule, forty years old had the degrees of 
B.A. and Ll.B. Many prominent in the cabinet were Catholic; e.g.,
MeTiernan, Loughlin, McGirr, Dooley, Lang and Lazzarini, George 
Q-arftn ami-T"»Di— fiat oh (Freeman's Journal, 15 Apr. 1920 ).
The Royal Commission concluded that Mutch and Dooley had no know­
ledge of corrupt payments. (Report of Royal Commission of Inquiry 
(Mr Justice Pring)into the Administration of the State Wheat 
Office. N.S.W. Pari.Pap, vol.l, 1920, pp.219-249).
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This was one of several affairs which absorbed no small part of the 
parliamentarians’ energies but contributed nothing to union or 
lower-income groups’ needs. The Bailey faction knew that if it made 
no show of taking up long-standing union demands, the affiliated 
unions would be unhealthily susceptible to the overtures of the 
Communists in control of the New South Wales Labor Council. If 
skilfully handled however, the unions could be drawn into the faction 
struggle on Bailey’s side, yet manipulated so that their demands 
did not threaten the parliamentary alliance with the Progressives 
without which neither Bailey nor Storey faction could achieve its 
goals. The alliance would be seriously threatened, after all, only 
if the administration actually embodied certain of the most controver­
sial union demands in legislation; however, while affiliated unions 
remained pliant and quiescent, the Baileyites had no need to press 
for this step.
Storey and the Demands of Affiliated Unions.
The hard core of unionist demands presented to the Storey and 
Dooley administrations resembled in many ways those presented so 
bodly to Holman by the Industrial Section in 1916. There were, 
however, two main differences. Settlement of the 1917 strike was 
marked by the imposition of unfavourable conditions upon unionists
who had participated, some finding it impossible to get their old
2 6jobs back. ' Unions concerned with marine and land transport were 
most severely affected, and so the Labor government found itself hard
Footnote 26 next page.
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pressed by unions such as the Waterside Workers’ Federation, the
Coal Lumpers, and the Australian Railways' Union, asking for the
2 6restoration of pre-1917 conditions. Affiliated unions also demanded 
the modification of the Returned Soldiers' and Sailors' Preference 
Act because they alleged it was used to the disadvantage of the 1917 
strikers. Many unions had been de-registered from the state Arbitration
■frO 21Court because of their part in the^" 1917 strike^and in 1920, most
Members of the Amalgamated Rail and Tramway Services Association 
alleged that the aftermath of the 1917 strike had included 'union 
smashing') ‘the issue of free pa.sses to union breakers, victimiza­
tion, and the retaining of afflicated-physically and mentally - 
loyalists...'. £sic^] (A.R.T.S.A. Minutes, 29th Annual General 
Meeting, 17 Feb.1919»)
On the waterfront members of the Waterside Workers' Federation 
were issued with discs ranging from the number 5^00 upwards.
Wharf laborers outside this union had discs ranging one to S000, 
and calls for labor at the two main hiring bureaux were on a 
rotary system, starting daily with the number one. (See The Hungry 
Mile by T. Nelson, pp.67-68). Thus, the call often did not 
reach the W.W.F.
The Coal Lumpers demanded Labor return their 'Model Lodging House’, 
confiscated by Holman to house strike-breakers. On 7 September 1920, 
P. Minahan asked Treasurer Lang on behalf of the Coal Lumpers 
whether the Model Lodging House had not been 'leased to certain 
big shipping companies’ (N.S.W. Par1.Deb., vol.79»P«671*
The Railway and Tramway unionists called for restoration of 
seniority rights to their 1917 strikers (see Nationalist Election 
Leaflet, March 1922 'To the Railway and Tramway Employees of New 
South Wales' in 'N.S.W. Election Leaflets, 1922' ("Mitchell] ).
Some unions were registered before this, under the Trade Unions 
Re-registration Act, 1918. See Report»..of the Department of Labour 
and Industry during the year 1918, in N.S.W. Pari. Pap., 
vol.l, 1919, p.466.
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were still not re-registered. Hence they asked Lahor to help. Unions 
also pressed Labor to repeal the severe penalites against striking 
introduced into the state Industrial Arbitration Act in 1918, and to 
give unionists unqualified preference in employment.
Because of the recent steep rise in prices, union demands 
for government help in increasing the basic wage were more Imperative 
than those made in 1916; also very urgent were their demands for 
legislation establishing a forty four hour v/eek. Other measures unions 
wanted, but gave less emphasis, were demands for extension of the 
Workers' Compensation Act of 1916, and an Equal Pay Act. Union spokes­
men also urged measures favouring lower-income groups in general, 
such as fair rents legislation and motherhood endowment.
The Bailey faction set to work to organise affiliated unions 
to draw up a list of demands so that the faction could use these 
against Storey , and using its control of the central executive of
the Labor Party, summoned a conference of sixty eight affiliated unions
27on 30 April, and another in May. In July,1920, the A.L.P. executive 
presented the unions' demandsto Storey. But the Storey faction could 
hardly have failed to realise that the unions were well under Bailey's 
control and thus were harmless until Bailey moved or until they got 
themselves an alternative or additional voice within the A.L.P.
Thus though parliament was summoned on 23 September 1920, it rose
uvuonin December with only one of the important indufitrlalist demands
27A Labor News, 22 May,1920; r Mm » t  i ng—Lafe^ -Counoil ,
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within sight of fulfilment - and very distant sight, so it turned out.
This was the demand for the forty four hour week.
During February 1920 there had been direct action in the
building industry around the demand for the forty four hour week,
and though by September these Saturday stay-homes in the building
trade were faltering, various iron trades unionists now followed their
28example. Some employers retaliated by lockouts. The unionists
were in an aggressive, self-confident mood and it was felt that wide-
2Qspread rank and file strikes might break out. ' Then the Storey 
administration announced that the newly-appointed President of the 
board of Trade (G.S. Beeby, Minister of Labour and Industry in the 
last anti-Labor administration) would conduct a Royal Commission into
v<upi<A
hours, and additionally, the administration promised unions legislation
A
on the forty-four hour week. This put an immediate end to all direct 
action. Following the recommendation of the Royal Commission came 
’emergency legislation’ establishing a Special Court before which 
unions could apply for a forty-four hour week. The unions had wanted 
legislation enacting a uniform forty-four hour week, spread out over 
five days. But as a result of the government’s procedure, the 
question of a five-day week was left to individual employers and
29
30
Amalgamated Engineers’ Union, Monthly Report of the Commonwealth 
Council, Sept.1920; Electrical Trades Journal, 29 Sept.1920.
See above, chapter 3> V* 157.
See above, chapter 35PP« 157-8.
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employees, and relatively few unionists came to enjoy it. Provoking 
more ill feeling in union circles, however, was the fact that as a 
result of the governmentls method the forty-four hour week itself 
was brought in over some eighteen months, by which time a Nationalist 
Coalition was returned to power. Moving fast, this government re­
introduced a forty-eight hour week, (the Eight Hours Amendment Act, 
no. 8 of 1922). Unions were not slow to bewail the oontrast between 
the Labor and Nationalist approaches to hours.^
32Because of the marked discrepancy between prices and wages,
while unionists were keenly interested in the hours problem, they
might well have felt wages an even more pressing matter. Affiliated
unions declared that Labor did little to help in this regard, and there
seems some justification for their attitude. In October 1919 with a
Nationalist government in office, the N.S.W. Board of Trade increased
the basic wage by seventeen shillings, bringing it to £3.17*0 a week.
In October 1920 with the Labor government in office and Labor-appointee
Beeby as President of the Board of Trade, unionists gained undoubted
benefit from regulations 'for the first time applying the living wage
33generally to all male adults..,"' But in announcing the living wage 
itself during that month, Judge Beeby stated that prices had risen 
by about eighteen per cent., while the purchasing power of money had
31
32
33
Carpenters' Monthly Journal, Nov. 1922. ^
D.B. Copland, 'The Economic Situation in Australia, , in the Economic 
Journal,vo1.34,1924. Round Table,vol.12, 1921-22, p.693. The 
price rise from 1919 until Aug. 1920 was particularly steep,
nr ,j..1,1. I|' 1'
Report oh the Operations of the Department 
During the" Year 1920, in ! . o , W . Par 1 . • r.* ?
of Labour and Industry 
vol.2, 1921, p.789.
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declined by at least fifteen per cent, since October of the previous 
year, The basic wage increase was one of 11.4$, bringing the amount 
to £4. 5» 0, In deciding on this amount, said Beeby, the Board of 
Trade had given ’some consideration, to the fact that families by
rearrangement of their expenditure can economise v/ithout lowering
1
their standard of living.“'1' Official interstate union policy had 
followed the Piddington Royal Commission which found that a ’reasonable 
wage’ for New South Wales was £5.17» l.3"
Performance on other ’hard-core* demands was equally un­
satisfying to the trade unions. Despite an amending Act (no. 19 of 1920), 
the Industrial Arbitration Act still contained a penalty of £1,000 
against unions whose executive officers called upon members to ’refuse 
to offer for, or accept employment’. Provisions concerning preference 
to unionists remained thoroughly unsatisfactory from the unionist 
viewpoint as preference was forbidden where a union had taken part 
in, or aided or abetted, an illegal strike,3  ^and in some awards 
preference was granted only where it did not prejudice employment of
ptfpe.r*K£.non-unionists already at work. In all cases/was subject to the provis­
ions of the Returned Soldiers’ and Sailors' Employment Act of 1919?
N.S.W. Year Book, 1920, p. 549» Eor the Declaration of the Living- 
Wage, see N.S.W. Industrial Gazette, 31 Dec. 1920, p.1148.
35 Com. Pari. Pap. vol.IV, 1920-1921, pp. 529-645.
N.S.W. Year Book, 1920, p.540. Trade union dissatisfaction on 
preference began in 1912 when the Legislative Council removed from 
the Arbitration Act clauses granting effective preference to 
unionists, and excluded clerks and rural workers, (V.G. Childe, 
op.cit., p.58.)
(Railwayo'Union Gazette, 22 Sept. 1921)
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and many unions objected to this. 37
The Storey administration was certainly not inactive over
these matters, yet the unions were most dissatisfied with its
achievements. Following the report of a Select Committee on the Trade
o o
Unions' Re-Registration Bill, the government restored to the arbit­
ration system several unions excluded after the 1917 strikes and not
39re-instated under the general amnesty granted in 19l8.~- However, 
re-registration was still a burning question at the Labor Party annual 
conference in 1921, at the state elections of 1922, and the state 
elections of 1925.4° The Labor Party had promised to restore the 
pre-1917 position to unions'''1' but it was not restored in the railways,
for example, until Lang took office in 1925» Waterside workers be­
came irate as the Storey administration, from whom they had hoped 
much, grew increasingly evasive over the removal of non-unionists
from the waterfront; 42 again, this removal was not actually effected
37
38
39
40
41
42
See, for example, the Railways Union Gazette, 28 July 1921.
For its report, & proceedings, see N.S.W. Pari. Papers ,vol. II, 1920,
PP **27 5-64 6.
For the list of those restored, see Summary of the Principal Legis­
lative and Administrative Acts of the New South Wales Labour Govern­
ment , p.5 (Sydney Government Printer, March 1921.).
For some of the implications of de-registration for the trade unions 
(though especially for locomotive enginemen), see the evidence given 
by W. Ainsworth before the Select Committee of the Legislative 
Council on the Trade Union Re-Registration Bill, N.S.W. Pari .Pap. , 
vol• II, 1920, pp.1285-1291; and L.F. Crisp’s Ben Chifley,pp.24-28.
See, for example, a roneoed letter, above John Storey’s name, dated 
2 March, 1920, in the Minute Book of the Amalgamated Railway and 
Tramway Services’ Association, 1918-1919. 'Railway and Tramway Men. 
Beware of the Nationalists'; Storey here specifically promised to 
restore 'service rights'.
Minutes, Gen. Meeting, Sydney branch of the Wharf Laborers' Union,
23 June 1920; 11 Aug. 1920; 13 July 1921.
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until Lang took office in 1925* Criticising the Fair Rents Amend­
ment Act of 1920, Gardiner, Independent Lahor member for Newcastle, 
claimed that the Fair Rents Court was 'acting against the interests
of the tenants', and it is true that in the work of the Metropolitan
Fair Rents Court between 1917 and 1929 only the years 1919» 1920 and 
1921 show rent increases and not d e c r e a s e s T h e  Profiteering 
Prevention Act, 'robbed of its best features' by the Legislative
Council, elicited little response either in praise or in anger, passing
almost unnoticed.^7’ In surveying workers' compensation, Lang ignores
45the Workmen's Compensation Acts of 1920, partly no doubt because 
Storey’s Acts excluded casual hands, outworkers and others embraced 
by Lang's legislation in 1925? and partly no doubt, because as Baddeley, 
Minister for Labour and Industry in 1925> claimed^it was only in 1925
The Act was no. 46 of 1920. For Gardiner's criticism, see N.S.W. 
Pari. Deb., vol.83,pp. 357-358* For the work of the Fair Rents 
Court, see a Table giving a review of the decisions of the 
Metropolitan Fair Rents Court in each year since its inception in 
March 1916, Official Year Book of New South Wales, 1928-29* P*757*
grr~"r 17 1 ‘r^=m ^The Act was no. 41 of 1920.
Lang op.cit. p.230. The state law on Workmen's Compensation was 
contained in Acts of 1916 and 1920. An Amendment (No.45 of 1920) 
and two new Acts were passed in 1920: the Workmen's Compensation 
(Silicosis) Act of 1920, and the Workmen's Compensation (Broken 
Hill) Act, 1920. The wage limit had. been £312; Storey raised to 
£525, and increased th% rate of weekly payment in case of incapacity 
from 50 per cent to 66‘/3 per cent of the average weekly earnings. 
Unionists objected strongly to the Broken Hill Act where one 
clause stipulated that to qualify under the Act, an employee had 
to offer himself for employment within three months of its being 
passed. The Broken Hill raining strike was then in progress.
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A c
that steps were taken to make the Silicosis Act effective.' Items 
of interest to the unions which the Storey government introduced hut
failed to have passed included an equal pay for equal work hill (the
. 47Female Employees' Wages Bill) and a Motherhood Endowment Bill.
Failure to deal v/ith election promises to reduce unemployment ■ imM i ■»
481 n^pjrt Mil n.i irr; i •*. ■' i . also drew criticisms.
The year was a time of considerable industrial militancy and 
of relatively low unemployment 5 hut despite this, long-standing demands 
of affiliated unions con scarcely he said to have weighed heavily with 
A.L.P. leaders, whether one looks, to the faction fights or to parliament. 
True, the Baileyite executive held union conferences; hut we saw how 
seriously the Storey administration took the demands arising from them - 
about as seriously, possibly, as the Baileyites did. In short, while 
the faction struggle was solely between two right-wing groups the 
demands of the trade unions made little headway. Towards the end of 
1°21, however, despite heavy unemployment, a trade union demand became 
the central issue in the A.L.P. The demand was that the basic wage must 
not he reduced, and it soon became the central issue in state politics 
as a whole. A major reason for this was the renewal of left-wing 
interest in the f'.L.P. i.n Pew South Wales.
' ,S. , 1 Deb. ,vol.103,p.2362, l8 lTov.1 9 2 5 . This was the Work-
n* ' ensation (Silicosis) Act of 1920, hich followed the Report 
of Technical Commission of Enquiry appointed by Storey to investigate 
the Prevalence of Miner’s Pthisis and Pneumoconiosis at the Metal­
liferous Mines at Broken Hill (N.S.W. Pari.Pap.,vol,11,1921,
pu.1289-136/0,
Both bills were stopped by the prorogation of parliament.
Gardiner, Inden .Labor member for Newcastle , -N .S . Pari. Tleb . ,vol,. 83 , 
P.361, 11 ^cnt.lQPl# —t**,it*nV"'L—i~ ■
46
47
48
214
Trade Union Demands move to the Centre of the Stage: the 
A.L.P. 1921 - March 1922
The Trades Hall reds had peculiarly close links with the
A.L.P., even in 1919 and 1920 when they were relatively indifferent
to it, A network of daily trade union associations hound them to
fellow union officials who were A.L.P. members at the Trades Hall
itself (and no doubt at its adjacent hotels, important centres of
social contact to this day). Many if not most of the Trades Hall reds
had been A.L.P. members, some well-placed, before July 1919 when they
helped form the ’breakaway' from the A.L.P., namely, the Industrial
49Socialist Labor Party. Against local Communist Party official
policy, though in keeping with what by late 1920 had become the
executive committee of the Comintern's view on work with Labor parties,
before June 1921 these Trades Hall reds, had begun what might be
50called a de facto united front line of permeating the A.L.P.
The Trades Hall reds enabled unionists to press their demands more 
vigorously and more effectively upon the two right-wing factions in 
control of the New South Wales branch of the A.L.P. It is likely that 
they also played some part in the moves to form a new union faction 
within the A.L.P., moves which made the Bailey faction especially 
sensitive to trade union demands. As 1921 wore on, such demands were 
undoubtedly treated far more seriously by the administration and by 
the factions than they had been in earlier months; but it would be
49
50
See above, chapter 1, pp. 25-29 
See above, chapter 2, pp. 95-99
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foolish to put this down solely to left-wing pressures. Other influences 
were at work to put unionists in a frame of mind such that left-wing 
arguments fell on responsive ears.
a world-wide economic depression had overtaken Australia and, while
strike activity here continued to be widespread, the affiliated unions
also began to expect more of political action, directing a searching
gaze towards the Labor administration’s performance over their demands.
At annual conference union spokesmen attacked both the executive and
the Storey administration; charging both with failure to see that
promises to the unions were honoured, and showing for the first time
a tendency to independence. W.J. Mills, B. Mullins and W.H. Seale,
three officials of the Sydney Wharf Laborers’ Union, were, along with
Wheeler (member of the Ships Painters’ and Dockers’ Union and inspirer
of the anti-One Big Union Transport Workers * Federation) and J.Power,
of the A.W.U., vocal in attacking both factions. Mills, Mullins and
51Seale ran for executive positions on a ticket"^ of their own- 'to 
fight this Go-Slow Government’. They issued a leaflet at conference 
entitled:
Claiming that Broken Hill Labor delegates were now to be found in the
’Tickets at the 1921 Annual Conference of the Hew South Wales branch 
of the Labor Party’ (R.S. Koss Collection).
Molesworth, Set 243 > Item 3. (The word ’Party’ here means 'faction'.)
By the time of the annual A.L.P. conference of Easter 1921
The Third Party In the Conference.
Representing the Workers, as against Corrupt Tacti
52
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I n d u s t r i a l  S o c i a l i s t  Labor P a r t y ,  and  n o t i n g  t h a t  t h e  m ine r s  and  
seamen were a b s e n t  f rom c o n f e r e n c e ,  t h e y  warned  t h a t  n e x t  y e a r  so 
m igh t  t h e  Sydney Wharf L a b o re r s  be a b s e n t : ’You know th e  cause  of
th e  1919 b r e a k ,  and the  f o r m a t i o n  of  t h e  I n d u s t r i a l  Labor P a r t y ' .
K U o Sulci'
And t h e  l e a f l e t  - ■ r j s a h
To s a y  t h a t  one i s  p a i n e d  v / i th  f"sicQ d i s g u s t  and  s i c k n e s s  
a t  t h e  e x h i b i t i o n  o f  l a c k  o f  i n t e r e s t  i n  t h e  w e l f a r e  of  
t h e  w o r k e r s ,  a s  shown a t  t h i s  ' C o n f e r e n c e ' ,  i s  t o  p u t  i t  
i n  a  most m i ld  fo rm .  53
54But c o n f e r e n c e  e l e c t i o n s  r e a f f i r m e d  t h e  B a i l e y  ho ld"  and
McGirr  soon became d e p u t y  l e a d e r  o f  t h e  p a r l i a m e n t a r y  P a r t y .  A f t e r  
55a ' r e c o r d ' " "  r e c e s s  o f  n i n e  m on ths ,  p a r l i a m e n t  met on Augus t  30 1921,  
f o r  t h e  t h i r d  and as  i t  t u r n e d  o u t ,  t h e  f i n a l  t i m e .  John  S t o r e y  d i e d  
i n  O c t o b e r ,  and James Dooley r e p l a c e d  him, McGirr  r e c e i v i n g  th e  
a d d i t i o n a l  p o r t f o l i o  o f  Labour and  I n d u s t r y .
M o les w o r th ,  S e t  243? I t e m  3*
54^ A c o n t r i b u t i n g  cau s e  o f  t h i s  v i c t o r y  i s  s u g g e s t e d  i n  a l e a f l e t  
p u b l i s h e d  i n  1922 ( n . d .  M i t c h e l l  L i b r a r y )  by an  ' e l e c t e d  A.W.U. 
o r g a n i s e r '  A.B.  B e r r y .  The l e a f l e t ,  e n t i t l e d  B a i l e y ,  Lambert  & Co. 
L t d ,  S e c r e t s  E x p o s e d , gave A.W.U. C e n t r a l  Branch  Membership a t  
2 F e b r u a r y  1921 ( c i t i n g  'A.W.U. o f f i c i a l  r e c o r d s ’ ) a s  14 ,000  
members. On 24 March 1921,  f o r  t h e  p u rp o s e s  o f  t h e  A .L .P .  a n n u a l  
c o n f e r e n c e ,  i t  was s t a t e d  as  2 2 ,6 0 0 .  But on 31 May 1921 ( a t  t h e  
c l o s e  of  th e  A.W.U. f i n a n c i a l  y e a r )  i t  was g iv e n  a s  1 5 5660.  The 
i n c r e a s e  had g iv e n  t h e  A.W.U. C e n t r a l  Branch  e x e c u t i v e ,  who 
a p p o i n t e d  t h e  d e l e g a t e s ,  tw e n ty  t h r e e  d e l e g a t e s  t o  th e  c o n f e r e n c e  
i n s t e a d  o f  s i x t e e n  o r  s e v e n t e e n .
55 A.N.R. , 24 S e p t .  1921
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Annual conference had stressed the need to abolish the 
Legislative Council by 'swamping1 it with Labor appointees pledged 
to abolition, and one of the government's first acts was to appoint 
sixteen new members to the Council. The Bailey faction announced 
that its nominees had been unfairly treated, and increased its 
attacks on the Dooley faction.
In keeping with their truculent attitude at annual A.L.P. 
conference in 1921, the unions also continued to display their dis­
content. For example in August, the Sydney branch of the Wharf
56Labourers* Union threatened to disaffiliate from the A.L.P., and
57later re-affi^iated to the Labor Council; in September, the Austra­
lian Railways' Union ruthlessly attacked the administration for in-
58activity on trade union demands, while in the same month Labor
parliamentarians received a deputation claiming to represent 90,000
unionists, which protested about unemployment, and included several
59prominent officials associated with the 'breakaways' of 1919," men
5 6 Minutes, Half Yearly Meeting, Sydney Wharf Laborers' Union, 31 
Aug. 1921.
Ibid, 16 November 1921.
Railways' Union Gazette, 25 Aug. 1921. In September,1921, the 
Gazette published a cartoon headed 'The Biggest Program on Earth'. 
A 'spruiker' ('The Storey-Teller') says 'Here You are Gentlemen, 
the biggest program on earth'; railway and tramway employees reply: 
'The program is all right, Mister: but when does the show start*.
Amongst these v/ere J.J. Graves (Stovemakers), M. Gibb (Clothing 
Trades), G. Burn (Hotel., Club and Restaurant Employees), T. Y/alsh 
(Seamen), A. Rutherford (Saddlers), J. Kilburn (Bricklayers).
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whose presence may reasonably he linked with the efforts of the 
Trades Hall reds to gain influence in the Labor Party.
The Labor Administration Falls
By late September 1921, the Trades Hall reds had begun their
strange and tenuous alliance with the Bailey faction - whom we had
better rename the Bailey-McGirr faction in view of McGirr’s new
prominence in it. This association led the Bailey-dominated A.L.P.
executive to adopt the Brisbane socialisation objective (previously
anathema to them) before annual conference of 1923, and only broke up
when Garden, Denford, J. Beasley and R. Heffron moved over to the Lang
camp which emerged from that conference.
By late September 1921, a threatened reduction in the basic
w'age had become the burning political topic of the day, and the
Bailey-McGirr faction put themselves at the head of the affiliated
unions’ opposition to reduction. At the same time, the Bailey-McGirr
faction identified itself with a last effort to pass the Motherhood
Endowment Bill. Together, the basic wage and endowment demands
became the de facto ’fighting platform’ in the A.L.P. faction contest
and, soon after, the main issues of the day in state politics. Anti-
Labor spokesmen alleged that the Dooley faction had fallen completely
under McGirr’s control and predicted that the unions’ demands would
be achieved if anti-Labor parliamentarians did not unite to bring
down the Dooley administration.
’’Mother” McGirr... has shouldered his chief, Premier Dooley, 
off the stage altogether... £andj has taken complete control 
of the administration...
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Dooley is pledged to carry out the late Premier's policy of 
moderation. McGirr, for his own purposes, is an extremist, 
and will place himself in the hands of the ... Communists, in 
order that he may achieve his ambition to wear the Premieral 
crown. 60
The Catholic Freeman's Journal,once well-disposed towards McGirr, now
came to have substantially the same view. McGirr, it claimed, had said
in so many words that if he had the power there would be beer 
and skittles for the industrialists^no matter if the 
capitalists had to live on carrots. 6l
Though the McGirr faction grew more and more outspoken as
the weeks passed, the Dooley administration's performance in relation
to Labor's key promises, trade union or otherwise, was poor.
Parliament met on August 30 1921, with the tiny McGirr faction
in Caucus composed of M.A. Davidson, R.J. Stuart-Robertson, and McGirr
himself. A message from the Governor recommending provision for a
Government Insurance Bill was received 29 September, but the Bill
was not brought in; a message concerning a Fair Rents Bill, received
19 October, met the same fate. W.F. Dunn (Captain Dunn) introduced a
Wheat Marketing Bill on 25 October; by 9 November, it had passed the
Third Reading stage, and was sent to the Legislative Council, but on
28 December, 1921, parliament was prorogued, and the Bill had not been
62returned from the Legislative Council. A Large Holdings Subdivision 
Bill introduced by Peter Loughlin, had similarly not been returned
A.N.R., 24 Nov., 21 Oct. 1921.
Freeman's Journal, 19 Jan.1922. 'Industrialists' was commonly used 
as a substitute for 'unionists'.
N.S.W. Leg.Ass. Votes and Proceedings, 3rd session, 1921, p.203, 
'Register of Public Bills Originated in the Assembly During the 
Session of 1921'.
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from the Council at prorogation.
For some time, the Progressive Party had been growing 
increasingly ill-disposed towards the Labor parliamentarians. But it 
was the heavy emphasis now being given in the more and more openly 
conducted A.L.P. faction-contest, to motherhood endowment and above 
all, to the idea of maintaining the existing basic wage, that led to 
the final rupture between Labor, on the one hand, and Speaker Daniel 
Levy and the Progressives, on the other.
The Motherhood Endowment Bill aroused a storm among the 
Nationalists, though inside parliament Nationalist parliamentarians 
were fairly circumspect in their opposition. Hill, for example, 
confined himself to describing the Bill as ‘a piece of bluff, with 
the object of buying the votes of ignorant people outside'. Outside 
parliament, disapproval was expressed more clearly. The Australian 
National Review for example, expressed itself very sharply: 'Mother
McGirr* had designed what was essentially ’propaganda which buys the 
votes of enfranchised beggars’. And:
Motherhood Endowment was only a part of an enlightened program for 
women promised in Labor election speeches of 1920 (for example, in 
John Storey's 'keynote' speech, S.M.H., 18 Feb. 1920, and in J.H. 
Catts's summary of Labor promises, Labor News, 6 Mar. 1920). Also 
included were 'Scientific instruction for girls of suitable age'; 
maternity hospitals throughout the state, v/ith. outdoor departments; 
pre-natal and after-care facilities; support and protection for un­
married mothers; adequate living allowances for widows and deserted 
wives with young children.
64 N.S.W. Pari. Deb., vol. 85, p.2459, 6 Dec. 1921
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As the ’Review’ has repeatedly pointed out, nationalisation 
of children is coining in this State, When men and women are 
so lost to their own sense of parenthood that they-,accept 
payment from the State for producing children,,,the time is 
ripe for making State wards of the unfortunate offspring. 65
McGirr repeatedly claimed that cabinet opposed the Motherhood Endowment
66bill. This seems more than likely, while it is almost certain that
cabinet resisted McGirr’s Industrial Arbitration Amendment {’basic wage’)
bill. This was the Bill which led to the final rupture between Labor
on the one hand, and Speaker Levy and the Progressives on the other.
The Board of Trade reduced the basic wage from £4. 5* 0 to
6 V£4. 2. 0 in its declaration of October 1921. Immediately following 
the declaration, a trade union deputation interviev/ed McGirr, the new 
Minister for Labour and Industry: one of the participants, the Austra­
lian Railways’ Union, later said:
Acting upon our representations Mr. McGirr took steps to 
endeavour to stay the hand of the Board of Trade. 68
65
66
67
A.N,R.,24 September 1921. There was also a poem entitled
’Motherhood Endowment':
0 women, In your hours of ease,
Uncertain, coy and hard to please!
If you should get Endowment now,
For what next would you raise a row.
A.W., 14 June 1922. Some support may be found for this in 
Freeman’s Journal, 25 Aug. 1921.
N.S.W. Pari,Pap, vol. II. 1921, p.76%rV.
68 Railways Union Gazette. 17 Nov. 1921; see also A.N.R., 24 Nov.1921.
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McGirr then refused to gazette the new wage. He wrote to the President
of the Board of Trade, in his capacity as Minister for Labour and
69Industry, asking the Board to reconsider the reduction, y and to
exempt from their consideration the months of July and August, on the
grounds that these two months had not ever been introduced into living
wage calculations before, but that they alone of the months used for
70calculation, had been months of falling prices.’ The Board refused 
McGirr’s request, and McGirr then refused to gazette the reduced wage, 
though this did not prevent manufacturers (for example, textile manufact­
urers) successfully applying to the State Arbitration Court for the
71reduction as early as October.
Two proposals had then been made in caucus; one that the Board
of Trade be asked to review its findings, the other that the government
pass legislation maintaining the basic wage at £4. 5» 0. Cabinet appears
to have been strongly in favour of the former course, despite an implied
denial of this by an1investigation’ committee set up by A.L.P* annual
72conference in 1922* When the Board of Trade rejected requests for
69
70
71
72
Corresoondence between the Minister for Labour and the President of- -   . ■    I. » ■ ! ■ ■ ■  I. I .I II  ■  '■ —  ■ ■  .  .1 ■ ■  ■ -  , —    ■ . . . .  ■  — ■  . . .  I . .  —  . .  ■ ■  ■ ■ ■ ■ —   I ■     .1     
the Board of Trade Respecting the Reduction in the Basic Wage, in 
N.S.W. Pari.Pap, vol. II, 1921,p. 765,28 Oct. 1921.
In 1919 & 1920, the living wage had been computed on data compiled 
until 30 June (ibid p. 766),
N.S.W. Ind, Arb. Rep., vol. 20, 1921,pp. 269-71.
The Report of the Conference Investigation Committee, 17 June, 1922. 
Worker Print, Sydney.
223
a r e v i e w ,  caucus  demanded l e g i s l a t i o n  f i x i n g  t h e  b a s i c  wage a t  £4* 5* 0
73f o r  tw e lv e  months.  McGirr  made s t r o n g  c l a im s  on th e  m a t t e r  a t  th e  
A .L .P .  a n n u a l  c o n f e r e n c e  i n  1922.  N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g  caucus  i n s t r u c t i o n s ,
s a i d  McGir r ,
. . . M r .  Dooley s a i d  t h a t  no such  b i l l  w o u ld  be i n t r o d u c e d . . .
When th e  B a s i c  Wage B i l l  was p l a c e d  b e f o r e  P a r l i a m e n t  he 
was c o n f i d e n t  t h a t  e f f o r t s  would be made t o  p r e v e n t  i t  
becoming law. The f i r s t  r e a d i n g  go t  t h r o u g h  a l l  r i g h t ,  b u t  
a t  th e  s e c o n d  r e a d i n g  s t a g e  Mr. Lang v/as p u t  up on t h e  Budget  
s p e e c h  t o  b l o c k  th e  b i l l .  Mr. Dooley had t o l d  p ro m in e n t  men 
i n  th e  c i t y  t h a t  th e  £4 . 5» 0 B a s ic  Wage B i l l  would n e v e r  
s ee  th e  l i g h t  o f  day .  And i t  n e v e r  d i d .  I f  t h e  M i n i s t r y  
was s i n c e r e  a b o u t  t h e  m a t t e r ,  i t  c o u l d  have r u s h e d  t h e  b i l l  
t h r o u g h  th e  House a t  one s i t t i n g ,  j u s t  as  i t  d i d  w i t h  th e  
Wheat M a r k e t i n g  B i l l ,  and  had  i t  t e s t e d  i n  th e  Upper House.
That  would have shown t h e  w orke rs  t h a t  t h e y  were g e n u i n e .  74
Labor C o u n c i l  to o k  s i d e s  w i t h  McGir r .  I n  O c tobe r  1921,  i t s  e x e c u t i v e
r e c o r d e d  a p p r o v a l  f o r  M c G i r r ’s ' a c t i o n  on th e  44 hour  q u e s t i o n ' ,  and
i n  t h e  C o u n c i l ’ s a n n u a l  r e p o r t ,  f row ned  upon h i s  o p p o n e n t s :
Mr. McGirr  showed f rom t h e  moment he to o k  c o n t r o l  o f  t h e  
D epar tm ent o f  L a b o u r . . .  t h a t  he v/as g o in g  t o  a s s i s t ,  i f  p o s s i b l e ,  
t o  p r o t e c t  t h e  w o r k e r s .  But h i s  w i l l  t o  do  so  v/as p ro m p t ly  
s a b o t a g e d  by th e  C a b i n e t .  75
McGirr  v/as p a r l i a m e n t a r y  l e a d e r  o f  t h e  A.V/.U. f a c t i o n ,  so u n d e r s t a n d ­
a b l y ,  t h e  e d i t o r  o f  t h e  A .W .U . ' s  o f f i c i a l  nev/spaper c o n c u r r e d  w i t h
73
74
R e p o r t  of  th e  C o n fe ren c e  I n v e s t i g a t i o n  C om m it t ee , p . 2. . ' n ,
A. W. 14 June  1922.
75 A nn.Rep . , p . 27; Ex.  M i n . ,  25 O c t . 1921.
iikk sc \ i h
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this view.
. . . Greg McGirr has "been singled out for the venomous 
attacks of the capitalist class because of his militant 
advocacy of the wage-workers' cause £and] ... has incurred 
the secret enmity of TREACHEROUS ELEMENTS in Labor’s own 
ranks... 76
A.L.P. annual conference of 1922 set up a conference investi­
gation committee to examine McGirr’s charges but, despite its findings, 
it seems clear that McGirr’s account of the position was substantially 
true. However one can see cabinet’s point of view. The basic wage 
bill would have meant the end of Labor’s arrangement with the Prog­
ressive Party, as Progressives and Nationalists alike felt the great­
est misgivings on the basic wage bill. Prices had fallen and a 
regulation introduced by Storey's cabinet in October 1920 extended 
the basic wage to country as well as city areas. In the words of 
the Australian National Review:
A basic wage is bad enough in all conscience at any time in 
connection with city industries, but in the country it is an 
impossible idea.
And Progressive parliamentary leader W.E. Wearne put the matter equally 
clearly:
To apply a basic wage of £4. 5s* a week to rural industries 
would mean closing up all the farms, for no man can pay £4.5s* 
a week, and successfully work a farm when competing in the 
open market... If any hor/nuyinV, i e member went into a wheat- 
growing or stock-raising district and advocated this bill, that 
would be the end of his career as a country member, and 
rightly so. 77
76 A.W. 9 Peb. 1922« i^ Binnri’t Tur irm. 3 , ii.Q Jar* .
77 A.N.R., 24 Jan. 1922; N.S.W. Pari. Leb., vol.85, p.2446, 6 Dec.1921
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Thus certain leading Progressives took the Bill as a sign that the
time was ripe to formally shatter any shreds still remaining on the
IP)alliance with Labor and openly declare for the Nationalists, and the
subsequent passage of the Industrial Arbitration Amendment Bill by
forty two votes to thirty nine precipitated a crisis within the
Progressive Party when a number of Progressives joined Nationalist
leader George Puller in approaching Speaker Levy. Levy resigned the
Speakership on 8 December, claiming that Labor had introduced the
79sort of ’contentious legislation* which he was pledged to oppose.
gOSimon Hickey, from the Labor Party, became Speaker0 and the govern­
ment was then defeated, first on a censure motion, forty five votes
8lto forty four, then on an adjournment. At this Dooley resigned, 
refusing to ask the Governor for a dissolution of parliament, and after 
a week’s hard bargaining with the Progressives, Fuller announced the 
formation of a coalition Nationalist-Progressive Party cabinet. But 
seven of the fifteen parliamentary Progressives were opposed to coalition, 
while many country and city branches of the Progressive Party also
82 8 ^opposed coalition. Thus after seven hours in office, the coalition
78
79
80 
81 
82 
83
B.D. Graham, op.cit,, p.324.
A J . , 15 Dec. 1921.
N.S.W. Pari. Deb., vol. 85, p.2598, 13 Dec. 1921. 
N.S.W. Pari. Deb., vol. 85, p.2602, 14 Dec. 1921. 
B. Graham, op.cit., p.329; A.W., 22 Dec. 1921. 
A.N.R., 24 Dec. 1921.
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cabinet fell when Daniel Levy once more agreed to a Labor request to 
act as Speaker. Dooley was then commissioned to form a government.
He deprived McGirr of his Labour and Industry portfolio, and announced 
early elections, promising to introduce only essential items of 
legislation in the meantime - though there were no strings attached 
to the commission.
When the downfall of Dooley first occurred on 13 December 
1921, H.E. Boote, editor of the Australian 'Worker, suggested it had 
been ’precipitated’ because both motherhood endowment and basic wage 
bills were in the hands of the Legislative Council. The Nationalist 
and Progressive leaders Fuller and Wearne hoped, Boote thought, to
g/
rescue the Legislative Council from the ’odium’ of obstructing these.
In 1922, unemployment was rising and employers were trying to vary 
working conditions to their advantage. Too prolonged obstruction, 
especially in the teeth of an energetic and well-publicised Labor 
protest, could therefore have cast an uncomfortable searchlight upon 
the Legislative Council, a body which Labor had long been pledged to 
abolish. (Queensland had abolished it not long before.) At annual 
conference in 1922, McGirr claimed that he had asked cabinet to prolong 
the life of the government long enough to bring the motherhood and 
basic wage issues to a head, alleging that Labor could have put 1G0 
Labor supporters into the Legislative Council, who could then have 
forced the Governor to agree or have got another governor in his place.
84 A.W., 15 Dec. 1921.
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All statements to the contrary were so much dope, only fit 
for children. 85
said IIcGirr. But Dooley refused to remain in office:
... I will not try another session of Parliament hy getting a 
sq.uib from the other side to come over .and act for us. What 
is the use of our staying in office unless we can carry out 
the platform and policy of Labor. 86
McGirr had asked Labor to stay in office just long enough to pass
haZiC wu^e
the and endowment legislation. The odds against its success
were known and it was clearly understood that in terms of immediate 
action MeGirr’s plea meant that the government should initiate the 
legislation, in the circumstances, amid an inevitable blaze of 
controversy and publicity. Already, according to the Australian National 
Review,
’Dooleyism versus McGirrism* challenged the attention of the 
newspaper reader morning, noon,and night. 87
and a fight over the motherhood and basic wage bills would have inten­
sified interest. A Labor attempt, whether successful or not, would 
have raised the morale of the affiliated unions and of all Labor’s 
’solid’ supporters. Commenting in December 1921, the conservatively- 
inclined Printing Industry Employees’ Union, for example, felt that 
the odds were against Labor in the coming election, but added that certain
measurers such as the basic wage legislation were urgent, and ’a delay-
88and-do-nothing policy will spell disaster.'
A.W., 14 June 1922.
Railways1 Union Gazette, 9 May 1922. Report of the Annual Conference 
of Hew South Wales branch of the A.R.U. held 20-22 Feb.1921, 
reported in May.
A.N.R., 24 Jan, 1922.87
88 Printing Trades Journal, 20 Dec. 1921.
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Dooley made a vigorous effort impossible. Had the Labor Party 
been defeated in the Assembly over the basic wage or motherhood 
endowment legislation, or had it forced a crisis with the Legislative 
Council over such measures, this would not merely have lifted morale 
throughout the entire labor movement; whether successful or not, the 
effort would also have enabled the parliamentarians to face the 
electors in a much sounder position. As it was, the Labor Party’s 
election promises rang hollow, being almost exact repetitions of those 
made two years earlier.
As March 1922 brought election day closer, the trade unions
he.d lost most of the earlier elan and self-confidence in industrial
affairs which had characterised them when Storey took office. The
government was immobilised, and the Labor Party found itself engulfed
in a new wave of in-fighting as factions jockeyed over pre-selection
89ballots. "■ By contrast, on the non-Labor side conflict seemed to have 
disappeared, and the Progressive-Nationalist candidates presented them­
selves as ’The Coalition', the key note of their appeal being opposition
90to the ’Red Challenge to the Establishment and Empire'." Yet of the 
nine seats that swung to the Coalition, only two were in Labor strong­
holds, and the Labor total vote increased, though the Coalition reaped 
most of the benefit of the vastly increased turn-out of voters at this
For examples, see A.W. 12 Jan., 22 Feb. 1922; Daily Mail, 17 Feb.
1922.
S.M.H. 23 Mar. 1922;.N.S.W. Election Leaflets, 1922, Mitchell.90
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’particularly heavy' poll.
From the moment it took office in March 1920, the Labor Party
had two alternatives: to push ahead with 'contentious' legislation,
and face an early election in defence of this legislation, or to
hang on grimly, while achieving very little, and thus help to bring
demoralisation to die entire labor movement. By March 1922, the faction
fighting was blatant and incessant, while rumours of shady dealing 
92were rampant.'' All these things provided the soil for religious
93sectarianism to flare up within the labor movement.' While the 
Nationalist voters would have turned out more strongly no matter how 
soon the election, an early election in a mood of high working class 
morale might have further increased the Labor turn-out. This must 
remain speculative, but it seems safe to say that the course adopted 
by the parliamentarians could not have been much worse so far as 
labor morale was concerned.
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91 The Chief Electoral Officer (S.M.H., 27 Mar. 1922).
92 /Though the most sensational revelations (for example, the sliding
ballot box scandals) were still to come, there were those who 
blamed corruption for Labor's defeat. See, for example, R. Corish, 
assistant secretary of the Australian Railways’ Union, N.S.W. branch, 
in Railways' Union Gazette, 9 May 1922.
93 The a .L.P. official view was that sectarianism 'decided the balance 
of power’ (S,M.H., 1 Apr. 1922; a view also expressed in the 
International Communist ( 1 Apr. 1922). See also A.L.P., State of 
New South Wales, Report of the Executive For the Year 1921. p.4*
Here, Sectarianism was described as 'a primary cause' of defeat.
This estimate goes too far, but the general mood of apathy and 
disappointment with the Labor Party allowed sectarianism to 
play an important part.
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The Return  o f  the  R e v o l u t i o n a r i e s  to  th e  Reformis t  Mass P a r ty
I n  e a r l y  1920,  t h e  A .L . P .  was e n g r o s s e d  i n  a f a c t i o n  f i g h t  
where th e  l i n e s  of  d i v i s i o n  t u r n e d  upon th e  s c r a m b le  f o r  p e r s o n a l  
advance  r a t h e r  t h a n  upon i s s u e s  of  p u b l i c  i n t e r e s t ;  i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  
t h e r e  a p p e a r e d  l i t t l e  s e r i o u s  c o n c e r n  f o r  t h e  demands of  a f f i l i a t e d  
u n i o n s .  But by March 1922,  when new s t a t e  e l e c t i o n s  to o k  p l a c e ,  th e  
s i t u a t i o n  had a l t e r e d .
As we have s e e n ,  i n  l a t e  March 1921 a t  th e  A .L .P .  a n n u a l
c o n f e r e n c e ,  c e r t a i n  a f f i l i a t e d  u n io n s  had t h r e a t e n e d  t o  form a ' T h i r d
94P a r t y ' ,  ' R e p r e s e n t i n g  t h e  W o r k e r s . . . ' "  ' S u b s e q u e n t l y  t h e  B a i l e y - M c G i r r  
f a c t i o n  came t o  be i d e n t i f i e d  w i t h  t h e  demands o f  t h e  u n io n s  and l o w e r -  
income g ro u p s ;  though  n o t  i n c r e a s i n g  i t s  n u m e r i c a l  s t r e n g t h ,  th e  
f a c t i o n ' s  w e ig h t  i n  t h e  A .L .P .  i n c r e a s e d  g r e a t l y ,  as  i t  came t o  be 
c o n s i d e r e d  th e  spokesman f o r  t h e  i n d u s t r i a l i s t s  b o t h  i n  th e  i n n e r - p a r t y  
c o n f l i c t s  and i n  th e  p u b l i c  e y e .  ho s i n g l e  c au s e  can be fo u n d  f o r  
t h i s  dev e lo p m en t .  The u n i o n s '  t r u c u l e n c e  was u n d o u b t e d l y  i n f l u e n c e d  
by ,  f o r  e x a m p le , t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  unemployment and th e  g r i e v a n c e s  
p e r s i s t i n g  f rom th e  191? s e t t l e m e n t .  The w har f  l a b o r e r s '  o f f i c i a l s  
( S e a l e ,  M u l l i n s  and Ward) p l a y e d  a l e a d i n g  r o l e  i n  c r y s t a l l i s i n g  u n i o n  
d i s c o n t e n t  w i t h  t h e  p a r l i a m e n t a r i a n s '  p e r f o r m a n c e ,  and t h e s e  o f f i c i a l s  
were p a r t i c u l a r l y  s e n s i t i v e  t o  t h e  e f f e c t s  of  unemployment and t h e  
p r e s e n c e  of  n o n - u n i o n i s t s  on t h e  w a t e r f r o n t .  A d d i t i o n a l l y  however ,  
t h e y  f a c e d  c l o s e  c o n t e s t s  f o r  o f f i c e  i n s i d e  t h e i r  own u n i o n ,  whose 
r a n k  and f i l e  was v e r y  r e s p o n s i v e  t o  m i l i t a n t  and r a d i c a l  a p p e a l s .
There was c o n s i d e r a b l e  i n t e r e s t  i n  th e  One B ig  Union movement,  v /h i le
94 Above,  p.215.
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5-pi"be official lukewarmness the union reaffiliated in November 1921 
to the •red* Labor Council and through it to the Re d International of 
or Unions. This was no none than a sign of the times. On all sides 
leftist political and social ideas merged with industrial militancy 
to form a whole, a climate of radicalism. In this climate, it would, 
be hard. to overestimate the effect of another event - the renewed 
interest of the Trades Hall reds in A.L.P. affairs, a renewal influenced 
as much, no doubt by the inclinations and associations of the union 
official reds a.s by the new Comintern line on Social-Democratic and 
Labor Parties.
It thus turns out that the last months of 1921, in which 
industrial grievances found a more effective voice inside the New 
South Wal.es Labor Party, were also the months in which the Trades Hall 
reds re-directed their attention towards the faction struggle of that 
party. While that re-direction was not the sole influence which made 
the industrial view more effective, it was probably the strongest. The 
left’s new orientation allowed it once again, as before its departure 
in June 1919? to have an impact on the A.L.P., an impact all the stronger 
in view of the unsettled climate of the post-war years and the growing 
unemployment of 1021 and 1922. Thus the return of the revolutionaries to 
the mass reformist party was of major importance to both.
We see the left's impact grow more marked in the second part of 
this study, as the policy of re-entry of the mass party is pursued.
And we also see the permeators permeated - though they had always been 
susceptible to permeation, as has been shown. Along with their radical 
politics a.nd their marked inclination to opportunism in political
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affairs , the Trades Hall reds carried with them a bureaucratic 
approach to strikes and trade union affairs.
Despite its considerable influence on Labor Party affairs 
which reached a peak in 1925 and early 1926, the final glimpses of 
the left with mass connections as the thesis closes, will be of a 
group largely impotent and disintegrating as a faction within the 
mass party.
PART II: 1922-1927.
'The radicals of yesterday are the moderates of today.'
Round Table, vol.13, 1922-23, p.857.
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CHAPTER V THE REVOLUTIONARY DILEMMA: The Communist
Party 1922-1927
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During 1921 leftists in Dew South Wales once more turned 
to argument over the old socialist tactic of permeation. Within 
the Sussex Street Communist Party there was contention even after 
the line of the third Comintern congress reached Australia. The 
Communist Party's formal adoption of the united front with the A.L.P. 
meant no change in the well-established practice of the Trades Hall 
reds, but it brought into the A.L.P. other Communists who found the 
environment strange. Communist opposition to permeation was suspended 
rather than extinguished.
How many Communists were there at this time? Maurice 
Duverger has indicated the difficulties in defining a party 'member1.
‘ Supporters, adherents, militants, propagandists, form a series of 
concentric circles of ever-increasing party solidarity*. Addition­
ally, in the case of the Communist Party (a Duvergerian 'mass' party) 
there is the notion of enrolment as a formal procedure involving 
'the signing of a definitive undertaking*1 and payment of regular 
dues. But the few existing estimates of total membership do not 
distinguish clearly between members in this sense, and 'adherents, 
militants, propagandists.'
At the fourth congress of the Comintern in November 1922, 
Garden claimed a 'membership of nearly one thousand*. However the
1 Political Parties. p.6l,71
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credentials committee of the same congress announced 900 'members'
r ~ 2in Australia, 'of whom 750 [_werej full-paying members' • Garden 
repeated his estimate to the writer in an interview where no reference 
had been made to his published estimate of 1922. E.M. Higgins, who 
returned to Australia from England in 1924 and soon became a member 
of the C.P. central executive, told the writer in an interview that 
Garden's estimate was 'outrageously inaccurate*.
But it is likely that a substantial drop in party membership 
occurred just before Higgins' return, after the A.L.P. rejected Commun 
ist affiliation in late 1923. Moreover, there were three other Aust­
ralian delegates listening to Garden at the fourth Comintern congress^ 
and unless one assumes he ignored the risk that they would correct 
his figures, it seems that his estimate could not have been as in­
accurate as Higgins thought. The most likely probability is that 
there was an element of exaggeration in Garden's figure, and that he 
included 'adherents, militants, propagandists* as 'members'. Higgins 
was more familiar with the Australian situation two years later, when 
Communist strength had decreased; moreover, he was a most precise man 
who no doubt interpreted 'members* in the strict sense of the word.
2 Fourth Congress of the Communist International, Abridged Report 
of Meetings held at Petrograd and Moscow. Nov. 7- Dec.3. 1922. 
Published for the Communist International by the Communist Party 
of Great Britain, n.d., p.291*
Ibid., p.291. Two delegates were invited and, when four arrived, 
two were given voting rights, two a 'consultative voice.'
•i
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The majority of Communists lived in New South Wales. There,
between 'unity' (presumably the conference of July 1922) and January
1923, the Communist Party claimed, 102 new members joined its ranks,
seventy nine through local branches, twenty three as 'members at
large'.^ The loss of the entire Sydney branch by expulsion at the
end of 1922 had been largely made good, if we can believe reports
given to the Comintern, by 1924»^
While the Sydney Communists had an unusual degree of trade
union influence when compared with, say, the British and American
Communists, Garden seems to have made exaggerated claims on the matter.
At the Comintern fourth congress, he said that the C.P. was
able to direct just close on 400,000 workers-that is, 
including 237,000 in the State of New South Wales - all 
organized workers and 110,000 organized workers in Brisbane, 
Queensland. The Communist Party is based in Australia on 
the nuclei system. Every union has its nuclei from 20 
down to 2... The Labor Council of New South Wales constit­
utes 120 unions. Yet the Communist Party has full control 
of the Executive. Out of the 12 members of the Executive 
eleven are members of the Communist Party and they direct 
these 120 unions and the policy of each union. 7
Garden implied that the influence of the C.P. had increased consid­
erably during 1922, in marked contrast with the British C.P. of which 
Zinoviev had said earlier:
The Communist, 5 Jan. 1923* (See above p. 94).
S.M.H.. 2 Bee. 1922; quoting an statement issued at-~tfee
Nall1 $ also the Communist, 1 Dec. 1922.
From the Fourth to the Fifth World Congress. Report of the 
Executive Committee of the Communist International, p.84»
Fourth Congress of the Communist International. Abridged Report
... , p. 230.
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If we take into consideration the great amount of unemploy­
ment and the suffering of the English proletariat, the slow 
development of Communism in England is remarkable. It is 
practically stagnant...8
During the wages and hours disputes of 1922, Garden claimed that the
C.P.
... got all the workers together and, instead of allowing 
one section to go down one after another, we said, "The 
working class of Australia must stand solid, speak with one 
voice and act together."... The masses rallied round our 
banner, and Australia is the first country in the world that 
was able to withstand the offensive... It was the only 
country in the world which resisted the capitalist offensive 
... And the whole policy was directed by the Communist Party
... The result of this militant activity has been linking
up of the union forces into one big union which is breaking 
down all craft barriers. 9
His words could hardly have been more misleading. It is true that 
Communist influence was significant, in Sydney if not elsewhere, but 
the policy put forward by the most prominent Communists was exactly 
the opposite of that described by Garden. Garden, the man perhaps 
most responsible for the go-slow and confined strike tactics, was 
fully aware of Communist orthodoxy on the matter, and spoke before this 
international gathering of the orthodox as an orthodox Communist 
industrial leader. In fact he was not. He stated that the outcome
of the disputes was a union victory, where in fact it was a clear
defeat. And he implied an increase in Communist influence as a result 
of the fictitious victory, when it is more than likely that the actual 
defeat diminished it.
Ibid., p.25.8
9 Ibid., pp. 231-232
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The left-wing union officials who had initiated the
'breakaway' of 1919 were mostly still with the Communists in 1924,
either in their ranks or cooperating freely with them; others who had
come close to the Communists (or future Communists) subsequent to the
'breakaway', men such as J. Beasley (Electrical Trades Union) and
R.J. Heffron (Marine Stewards) ^  were also still closely associated
12with the Communists, An exception was A.C. Willis, the powerful
secretary of the miners' federation. The Liverpool Street Communist
Party alleged that Willis had once signed up in the Sussex Street
Communist Party, ^  but already by September 1922 Willis, though still
lecturing at the Communist Hall, was advocating a 'constitutional*
14policy. To judge by their close association with Beasley, a devout 
Catholic, both the Trades Hall reds and the Sussex Street C.P. could 
overlook ideological differences on occasions; something they found 
far harder to take, however, was Willis's alignment with the Dooley 
faction before and during the faction flare-up preceding the state 
elections of March 1922.
10
11
12
13
14
For the story of how Beasley rose to prominence in his union, and 
what he did then, see Exec. Min. Electrical Trades Union, 11 Mar. 
1919» 8,12,24 Sept.1919> Minutes of General Meetings, 3 Sept.,
3 Dec. 1919.
For the circumstances in which Heffron became State Secretary 
of the Marine Stewards' Union, see Minutes, General Meeting,
Marine Stewards' Union, Feb.-Nov.1921, and Marine Stewards' Journal, 
21 May, 15 Oct.UjxL
See the Communist,7 Nov. 1922, 5 Jan. 1923*
International Communist, 15 Jan.1921. See above, p.
The Communist, 29 Sept. 1922.
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Relations between the Communists and Willis steadily deteriorated 
during 1923 as Willis played a key part in making Lang's triumph 
possible at the annual A.L.P. conference, and then did little, in 
Communist eyes, to offset Lang's determination to prevent Communist 
affiliation to the Labor Party.
Luring 1923 and 1924» indeed, most of the Communists' 
energies were devoted to achieving this affiliation. After the 
decision of the 1923 A.L.P. annual conference to allow affiliation 
'in principle', Communists regarded affiliation as certain; but 
their newspaper added*
The Communist Party has not ceased to be a Communist 
Party. On the contrary, the Communist Party will 
now become a real Communist Party.••
Workers' Weekly exhorted readers to
Join the Labor Party and Reorganise it.
Join the Labor Party and be an Active Fighter For 
Communism. 15
In October, the A.L.P. central executive rejected Communist affiliat­
ion by sixteen votes to ten, with seven abstentions, and then 
expelled the Communists Garden and Howie from the state and federal 
A.L.P. executives. Lang claims much of the credit for these moves
though E.W. Campbell, the Communist Party historian, says that deputy-
16leader Peter Loughlin also played a leading role.
^  Workers' Weekly, 22 June, 7*14 Sept. 1923*
^  Lang, op.cit.,p.l87; Campbell, History of the Australian 
Labor Movement. A Marxist Interpretation, p. 115•
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Lang gives his reason succinctly:
As the Communist Party was opposed to the Lahor Party,
no one could he a member of both parties. 17
Loughlin, perhaps the most capable right-wing ideologue, put the 
anti-communist case more fully in a pamphlet written shortly after the 
executive's decisions (Ten Reasons Why Labor should continue to 
Exclude the Communist Party and Members of that Party from the A.L.P.). 
Communists should be excluded because they advocated revolution and 
armed violence, wholesale confiscation of land and mines, and an 
'iron dictatorship', with destruction of parliamentary and local 
governing bodies, all contrary to A.L.P. support for majority rule. 
Communists owed 'allegiance to an executive of foreigners in Moscow', 
preached the united front as a 'matter of tactics to deceive the 
Trade Unions and Labor Leagues', and had an attitude to religion 
offensive to 95% of A.L.P. and trade union members. Finally, the 
admission of the C.P. with 'the right of propaganda would destroy the 
solidarity of the A.L.P.' Loughlin clearly recognised the fact that 
Communist ideas were extremely wide-spread in the Labor movement and 
could scarcely be kept out of the A.L.P., and he stressed that the 
A.L.P. 'welcomed' men who accepted 'Communist methods' 'in principle* 
’without desiring or attempting to compromise the A.L.P. by associating 
their Communist beliefs with it'.
17 Lang, op.cit., p.l87
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But, he continued, 'there are also Communists who desire it to he 
known that they believe in Communism, but who are too craven to take 
the responsibility of membership in the Communist Party. True 
blacklegs by instinct, they have neither the courage to join the 
Communist Party openly nor the decency to play the game in the A.L.P. 
Their activities are chiefly directed to "white anting" for the 
comrades outside.'
Loughlin wrote what many of the anti-Communist Labor men 
thought. Lang himself was genuinely anti-militant and anti-Communist, 
an old-style Labor moderate and a Catholic, who, if less ideologically 
committed to Catholicism than Loughlin, was nevertheless deeply 
influenced by his religion. Additionally, Lang cherished political 
ambition, and in this one finds another reason for his wanting the 
A.L.P. to proclaim itself anti-Communist; he hoped that anti­
communism would increase his electoral popularity and bring him closer 
to being state Premier. Yet Lang also believed that the A.L.P. must 
remain anti-Communist if it were to remain the sort of party in which 
moderate and conservative A.L.P. men could work. The Communists had 
never hidden the fact that they intended to use the A.L.P. as a means 
of furthering their influence over unionists and the public generally. 
The climate of the day was such that it was believed likely to prove 
a most effective means, and if the Communists succeeded the A.L.P. 
could be expected to change, in respect both of institutions and 
climate, in a way uncongenial to the anti-Communists. On the other 
hand, it might reasonably have been hoped that Communists would
243
make little headway outside the A.L.P., still regarded as the mass 
party.
After October 1923» the Communists directed a great deal of
effort towards having A.L.P. expulsion decisions rescinded. Motions
from unions and A.L.P. branches calling for rescission of expulsions
18were secured and publicised; and conferences of ‘industrialists* 
were arranged (e.g., the conference of 6 Sept.1924), the Communists 
once more reviving the essentially syndicalist notion of 'the industrial 
wing* versus 'the political wing'. The Communists were decisively 
rejected by the A.L.P. conference of 1924» tut they claimed that the 
one hundred and fifty nine delegates opposing their affiliation repre­
sented only 31*000 members of the Labor Party, while the one hundred 
and ten delegates who supported their affiliation represented 113*000
members. They listed the unions whose delegates voted for them in
20their newspaper, and gave the membership of each.
See, for example, the impressive lists in Workers' Weekly,
9, 16 Nov. 1923** 7 Mar. 1924* See also the Minutes of the General 
Meeting of the Labor Council, 21 Aug. 1924» for a motion from 
the Boilermakers' Society.
Campbell, History of the Australian Labor Movement p.117;
Workers' Weekly,25 Apr.1924» Support for the Communists was 
certainly impressive; but as in 1922, the Comintern appears to 
have been given an exaggerated account. For example, see p.83 of 
From the Fourth to the Fifth World Congress. Report of the 
Executive Committee of the Communist International»'... a consider­
able number of local trade union groups and local Labour Parties 
have joined the Communist Party and demand the convocation of a 
special conference of the Australian Labour Party. With the object 
of settling the question of the position of Communists in the 
Labour Party and of adherence of the Communist Party to the 
Labour Party'.
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The Communists of course took up other issues in 1923 and
1924. They published their own program for the labor movement - a
’Labor Government for all Australia', a 'united front against all
capitalist organisations', the 'linking up of all trade unions in the
One Big Union'; but they did little about this program. They organised
a body called 'Workers' International Russian Reconstruction', upon
which sat men of widely differing labor viewpoints: J.M. Baddeley,
once an official of the miners and now in parliament; H. Pickard (A.E.U),^^
Stuart-Robertson, M.L.A., H.E. Boote, editor of the Australian Worker,
and H. Ross, member of the Federated Ironworkers' Association and a
Communist. They supported the strike by operative bakers against
night work, and protested when leading union officials were arrested
over union refusal to allow the 'Port Lyttleton', an allegedly unsea-
21worthy vessel, to sail. But these were very minor affairs for the 
Communist Party; in addition to the campaign for Labor Party affiliation, 
the other major interest seems to have lain in a mounting conflict 
with A.C. Willis, secretary of the miners' federation.
This conflict was exacerbated when the Communists criticised the offic­
ials' industrial strategy during a lockout in the northern coalfield 
of Hew South Wales in mid-1923, 22 and still further intensified when
Workers' Weekly,29 June 1923» 18 Jan., 16 May 1924«
" ,7be-IQvO
R. Gollan, The Coalminers of New South Wales A History of the Union, 
pp.173-4; Workers' Weekly, 6,20,27 July,~ 3 Aug*1923; see also 
a leaflet Solving the Coal Mystery. How the Miners Were Double- 
Crossed, Worker Print, Sydney, June 1924 (R.S. Ross Collection)•
The Communists almost certainly had a hand (to judge from the 
signatories to the leaflet) in reviving the old A.W.U. - originated 
charges herein.
245
the Communists alleged that A.C. Willis was sacrificing the miners*
23newspaper Common Cause in order to assist the Lahor Daily»
By the end of 1924» a remarkable withering of membership and 
of morale appears to have set in amongst the Communists. Shortly after 
his return from England in August 1924» Esmond Higgins (who immediately 
took a leading part in the affairs of the Communists in New South 
Wales) could write:
... And then there's the Party. A handful of derelicts 
marooned away from everywhere, with of the Party 
members only 'secret* members as a result of the pro­
hibitions of the Labor Party and therefore absolutely 
unreliable from the point of view of the Party. This 
handful restlessly turning over proposals for a way 
out... Bluff, intrigue, faction, indiscipline, hypocrisy, 
talk, ineptitude - this is all the poor old party is able 
to trade on now. 24
Higgin's gloomy impression on the general atmosphere in the party was 
not shared by Guido Baracchi, who returned from Germany by way of 
England at almost the same time as Higgins, and immediately assumed 
a like leading role in the Communist Party; he has suggested that 
Higgins felt 'let down* at the humble scale of Australian revolution­
ary affairs by comparison with England's. Baracchi also felt 
'let down', he claimed, as he had been in Germany at the time of the 
revolts of 1923» but he was nevertheless 'quite impressed' with 
'certain things' in Sydney, Lithgow and Newcastle; he would not use 
the word 'derelict', because he felt that many of the cadres were
Workers' Weekly, 20 June 1924*
E.M. Higgins Papers.
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'up and coming', Membership figures for Australia at the time are given
as 280, the majority living in New South Wales.
However, while Higgins might have overstated the case, things were
by no means well with the Communists. During 1924 came warnings that
the period of 'united front' with the A.L.P. was drawing to a close, as
increasing tension within the Russian Communist Party^ accompanied the
growth of widespread uneasiness within the international Communist move- 
27ment. Heralding the approaching onslaught upon the 'united front', the
executive committee of the Communist International wrote about the New
South 'Wales Communists:
There has ... been a certain confusion in the 
application of united front tactics. The report 
of the last party conference shows that united 
front tactics and its consequences are not yet 
fully understood. ^
25
Interview, 11 July 1962. Baracchi gave as examples: the enthusiasm 
of Charles Nelson and Joe Rogan in Lithgow, of Hector and Hettie 
Ross and their group in Newcastle; the sale of Communist literature 
in Balmain branch of the A.L.P.; the popularity of the Communist 
Party in Balmain, where Labor aldermen, Barrachi claimed, were 
proud to walk down the street with the leading Communist Tom Payne.
28a" M.H. Ellis, The Carden Path, Sydney, 1949» p.157*
26 Victor Serge, From Lenin to Stalin, pp.69-75*
27 For an account of Russian inner-party conflicts in the British 
Communist press, then closely read by at least some leading 
Australian Communists, see the Labour Monthly, vol.6, March 1924, 
pp. 177-182, 'The Discussion in the Russian Communist Party.'
Ruth Fischer, Ctaltn and German Communism, p./;01, writes of the 
'indecisiveness, the restlessness, the secrecy that hung over the 
Comintern in this period.'
28 From the Fourth to the Fifth World Congress, p.84»
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In June 1924» the fifth congress of the Communist International pro­
claimed a new 'left' turn, away from the 1921 'united front', towards
29an independent stand by Communists in anticipation of world revolution, 
and the Comintern reversal set on foot widespread discussion amongst 
Communists in New South Wales.
Despite excellent initial trade union connections, Communist 
trade union influence had dwindled; by 1924» the central executive 
rarely discussed trade union affairs and, when it did, such discuss­
ions were confined almost entirely to Garden and Denford.^ Among 
the reasons for the dwindling Communist union influence was the party's 
trade union policy as was shown in chapter III of this study^ iohile 
of the Communists' work in the A.L.P. Garden said, not without 
justification;
The main tactic of many Party members was to hide 
every semblance of being a Communist... 31
Reasons are not hard to find. Communists were usually politically
gifted in comparison with Labor Party members. Shining easily in
The Fifth Congress of the Communist International. Abridged report 
of Meetings held at Moscow June 17th to July 8th, 1924;esp. p.22. 
Resolutions and Theses Adopted by the Fifth World. Congress of 
the Comintern. Franz Borkenau, The Communist International,
pp.257-259.
30J E.M. Higgins (at the time a member of the Communist Party central 
executive) told the writer this in an interview, 4 Sept. i960.
Workers' Weekly, 19 Dec. 1924. Garden had adapted himself 
immediately, if briefly, to the new Comintern line.
248
Labor Party life, they could quickly learn the lure of office and 
tend to forget their revolutionary purpose. The difficulties of 
evolving revolutionary tactics in a reformist milieu were great, and 
would have heavily taxed an infant organisation, many of whose 
members had only fleeting acquaintance with the Marxist political 
heritage - where indeed, this had much direct bearing on their circum­
stances. A Communist Party today, more authoritarian in structure, 
and reinforced by the world-wide strength of the Communist states, 
might not lose so many cadres if it involved them in Labor Party 
work, as its early predecessors did; even so, the modern Communist 
Party has to deal carefully with its trade union functionaries who, 
like the Labor Party cadres of the 19203^ hold office in a mass and 
reformist organisation. Writing in 1925> Baracchi suggested the further 
reason that a lack of appropriate organisation for Communists working 
in the Labor Party had contributed to the fading of their political 
colour.
It seems likely that, no matter what course the early 
Communists had taken, their unique organisational principle of 
‘democratic centralism' was too new to have been successfully tried 
under conditions of secrecy in the mass party. Yet it seems just as 
likely that the early Communist demand for open affiliation to the 
A.L.P. had no chance of success. Thus, whichever course the first 
Communists chose, the odds were heavily against them. To such
32 The Communist, Feb. 1925
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difficulties one must add the personal characteristics of J.S. Garden; 
and finally, the fact that the disintegration of the Communist and 
Communist-oriented left wing in the Labor Party, and the first crisis 
of note within the New South Wales Communist Party itself, took place 
as part of a world-wide revolutionary ebb.
Some of these difficulties were no doubt unavoidable difficult­
ies of growth; but, in keeping with the Comintern's abrupt 'left' 
turn, many of the New South Wales Communists ascribed them wholly to 
the 'united front* tactic, and hoped to correct them by following the 
Comintern's new line. The Communists' annual conference in 1924 
accordingly decided to stand Communist candidates against A.L.P. candid­
ates in the next state elections. In 1925> Communist candidates 
stood for the heavily industrialised electorates of Balmain (Tom Payne, 
Clerical Association, and Lionel Leece, Clothing Trades), Botany 
(H.L. Denford, Ironworkers, and Mrs. Nelle Rickie, Theatrical Employ­
ees' Union) and Sydney (J.S. Garden, Labor Council, and Pat Drew, Sheet 
Metal Workers' Union). The Communists said 'Vote Labor and Make Labor 
Fight' and 'Return a Communist Ginger Group'. They called for national­
isation without compensation, with workers' control, of banks, mines 
and large scale industries; workers' control of all state and municipal 
services; a full basic wage to all workers when unemployed or sick;
a minimum wage of £6 a week, irrespective of sex; a six hour working
33day and a five day week.
33 Workers' Weekly, 24 Apr., 22 May 1925
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But in all, the Communists polled under 1,000 first preference votes,^ 
and in their disappointment they immediately re-opened the debate on 
perspectives and methods of work.
An important contribution had already been made by Guido 
Baracchi, editor of the new theoretical organ, the Communist, C.P. 
central executive member, one of Australia's most sophisticated 
Marxists, and later described by an official C.P. historian as 'the 
spokesman for [[an J anti-Party group' J which advocated liquidation 
of the C.P. Baracchi wrote:
Our whole Australian movement, besides being one of the 
most insignificant and self-satisfied in the world, is at 
present also one of the rottenest with opportunism. In such 
an environment, even a Communist Party could scarcely be 
expected to have kept itself entirely free from the prevailing 
tendency... In N.S.W., where the C.P. is strongest, this 
opportunism has particularly revealed itself in the course 
of the Party's strivings for a United Front in relation to 
the A.L.P. At least some Communists in the Leagues, instead 
of winning support for the C.P. from A.L.P. 'ers, have been 
seduced by the A.L.P. from their allegiance to Communism...
The result has been a certain amount of demoralisation of 
individual Communists, as well as a certain passivity of the 
whole Party extending beyond its relations with the A.L.P.
Citing as evidence the words of the British delegation to and the theses
of the fifth Comintern congress (17 June to 8 July 1924), Baracchi
argued that 'opportunism* was no local phenomenon but
the result of the slow development of the social 
revolution.
The final figures in the primary vote were as follows: in Balmain, 
Payne received 194 votes, Leece 40; in Botany, Denford 147 votes 
and Mrs. Rickie, 111; in Sydney, Drew received 16 votes, Garden 317 
(A.N.R. 19 June 1925).
35 E.W. Campbell, op.cit., p.120
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Opportunism had taken the form of a
distortion of the tactic of the United Front. Some of our 
sectarian friends will accordingly assert that this 
tactic... should be abandoned. But this is nonsense... 36
During the discussions of 1924> foundation Communist Lionel 
Leece had suggested that the Communist Party be abolished as an open 
party, that its members join the A.L.P. as individuals, and that the 
Communist Party carry on either as an open propaganda group, or as a 
secret committee of the Third International. In 1925 H.E. i^uaiffe, 
an old-time socialist and building trade unionist, proposed that the 
Communists reconstitute themselves as a secret and tightly-knit 
organisation within the A.L.P. Baracchi proposed abolishing the 
Communist Party and substituting for it, on the model of a group al­
ready formed by Percy Laidler and Bert Payne in Melbourne, a Communist 
Propaganda League, which would coordinate left-wing work in the Labor 
Party and the trade unions.
But Baracchi's ’sectarian friends' carried the day, and the 
C.P. reverted to the line espoused before the united front era. By 
so doing, the C.P. lost a good many of its cadres and sympathisers 
now immersed in A.L.P. work, including in particular Denford and 
Garden.
^  The Communist, Feb.1925*
^  Higgin's Papers, late 1924*,0
 ^ Interview with Baracchi, August 1961. Reporting Baracchi's
later resignation from the Communist Party, the Workers' Weekly , 
(8 Jan.1926) referred to a small "non-proletarian*" Right-Wing* 
element who wanted to 'liquidate' the Communist Party.
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Garden had unhesitatingly denounced the way in which the
'united front' tactic was being applied in New South Wales, though he
himself could well have accepted some of the responsibility for the
things he denounced. But after the Communist failure at the state
elections in 1925» Garden transferred more and more of his attention 
39to the A.L.P., losing, in the process, what he had possessed in the
way of a Communist political approach. There was no formal break
between Garden and the Communists for some time, though some of the
polemic in the Workers1 Weekly was clearly aimed at him. The labor
movement in Australia, now deeply influenced by Arbitration, had
thrown up a type of worker with an exaggerated idea of 
the United Front... many there were who regarded the 
Communist Party as an unnecessary piece of duplication 
and they pictured the A.L.P. being 'white-anted' into 
becoming quite revolutionary. When the A.L.P. adopted 
the famous 'Red' objective in the period of reaction that 
followed the war, the 'mergers' were in great spirit and 
many were finally completely estranged from the revolut­
ionary movements, especially those to whom the plums of 
office appeared alluring. 40
At the end of 1926, the Labor Daily reported a speech made by Garden
i
at Young in New South Wales, where Garden allegedly "denied that he
Garden had stood for the elections as a Communist candidate. Yet 
Higgins, who, as Director of the Labor Research Bureau between 
August 1924 and July 1925» had a room near Garden's at the Trades 
Hall, told the writer that 'all Labor Council business stopped' 
during the elections while Garden organised officials in the 
Trades Hall to work for J.T. Lang and other A.L.P. candidates, 
particularly for the popular J.M. Baddeley. 'In a curious, devious 
way', said Higgins, Garden was a Langite long before he was 
nominally one of Lang's supporters. (Interview, 4 September i960.)
40 Workers' Weekly, 19 Feb. 1926
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was a member of either the Communist Party or the Labor Party
The Communist central executive asked him to explain himself, and
Garden answered that since he was speaking on behalf of the Labor
Council, he was entitled to say what he had said. Garden then refused
the central executive's request that he declare his membership of
the Communist Party and the Communists expelled him, concluding their
explanation for this with an attack on the 'Policy of Permeation's
Under the cloak of 'permeation', Comrade Garden has 
allied himself with the reformist politicians to such 
an extent that he has been instrumental in enabling these 
people to 'permeate' the trade union movement and making 
it become an appendage of the political machine. 42
Along with Garden, men who had long been closely associated
with him either left the Communist Party, or ceased to work with it;
A "Xamong them were Denford, Graves, Beasley, Heffron and Rutherford. 
Others were bemused and politically disoriented by the changes of the 
last two years and dropped out of political activity altogether, though 
there were those who continued to work in the Labor Party, some
41 Ibid., 10 Dec. 1926.
42H Ibid., 10 Dec. 1926. However, Garden remained on friendly terms 
with the Communists until their 'social-fascist' period was well 
under way; in 1929> lor example, through Garden's influence, 
leading Communist J. Kavanagh became chairman of the Labor Council 
disputes committee which conducted the timber strike in New South 
Wales•
43 Denford ceased to be a financial member at the end of the first 
quarter in 1926. His reason for leaving, he told the writer 
(interview), was C.P. refusal to support his A.L.P. work.
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continuing as socialists, others promoting their own careers as best 
they could. As for the Communist Party, newer men - E.M. Higgins,
J. Kavanagh, J. Hyan - stepped into the front rank, along with older 
members such as T. Wright and Norman Jeffery. The main Communist cam­
paigns for 1926 and 1927 were energetically conducted, but had little
impact because most of them were not on the main lines of interest of
45the unions and the Labor Party.
The men and women who set up the New South Wales Communist 
Party assumed that the post-war and world-wide revolutionary wave 
would continue. Had it done so, more Australian workers might have 
abandoned the A.L.P. in favour of the Communist Party, and the 
Communist Party might have become a mass party.^ But that revolution­
ary wave passed and, once it had passed, the revolutionaries were
The main campaigns were: 'Hands Off China' (where, as Higgins 
later said, the Communists gave support with few reservations 
to the 'great democrat' Chiang Kai-Shek (interview, 4 Sept.i960; 
see also the Labor Monthly, 1 Mar.1927); the British seamen's 
strike; the threatened deportation of T. Walsh and J. Johnson 
of the Australian Seamen's Union; and the establishment of the 
Pan-Pacific Trade Union Secretariat.
Authors of a recent history of the American Communist Party, Irving 
Howe and Lewis Coser, have a passage which bears closely on this 
possibility (The American Communist Party. A Critical History. 
(1919-1957)9 p.30): 'In its estimate of the European situation, 
the left wing was more realistic than those who looked forward 
to social stability in the world made by Wilson, Clemenceau and 
Lloyd George; but it failed to appraise with equal realism the 
enormous strength and resilience of American capitalism..*
If, on the other hand, the revolution in Europe had succeeded, 
as Lenin was hoping and the American left assuming, then the talk 
about revolution in which the American radicals so easily indulged 
might not have seemed quite so bizarre as it now does. Could 
American capitalism have withstood the impact of a socialist or 
communist Europe?'
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faced with a dilemma upon whose alternative horns we see them impaled 
during our period. The Communists saw the dilemma in terms of two 
truths: the first, that when revolutionaries entered the A.L.P. there 
was a great deal of evidence to suggest that they soon ceased to he 
revolutionary; the second, that the A.L.P. continued to hold the ear 
of the masses on political issues. In the debate which was carried 
on during and after 1924> the side which felt the first of these 
truths more strongly put forward the solution of carrying on as an 
open party of revolution; the side which felt the second of these 
truths more strongly advocated reconstitution, either as an open 
propaganda body or as a secret committee of the Third International 
within the Labor Party. By 1925» the former solution had been adopted 
and the A.L.P. abandoned.
The early years had been hard for the Communist Party. Born 
as a splinter party, rent with profound controversy over policy, 
afflicted by the repercussions on the Comintern of the remote struggles 
within the Russian C.P., the C.P. suffered a high turnover rate in its 
membership. All this it might have overcome. But with the ebb of 
the world wave of revolution, the decision to carry on as an open 
revolutionary party entailed political isolation. In our story 
of the years following 1925? the radicals organised in the Communist 
Party of Australia will be found to play no significant role on
the main political scene
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CHAPTER VI THE A.L.P., THE LEFT AND THE UNIONS,
1922-1926.
'Mr Lang is more closely allied with Mr Willis than 
with Mr Loughlin. Mr Willis's sympathies and friend­
ships run towards the Beasley group and the Reds;
Mr Loughlin is an aggressive moderate and an intell­
ectual. Thus, within both the Cabinet and the 
A.L.P. are two parties, both sharply antagonistic.'
(The Australian National Review, 20 April 1926.)
The A.L.P. Faction Struggle 1922-1924
In this chapter we must attempt to follow the course of A.L.P. 
factional struggles which have "been termed ’bewildering''1'. In 1920 
and part of 1921 the struggle had suggested that of Tweedledum and 
Tweedledee hut by 1922 a clearer distinction between the main protag­
onists can be made, as the increased effectiveness of industrial dem­
ands meant that they could no longer be treated as lightly as they had
in 1920 and early 1921. The Bailey-McGirr faction voiced these demands
2in a way different from their formal tribute of earlier months.
This increased effectiveness of the industrial voice - a phe­
nomenon associated with the revived interest in the A.L.P. of the Trades 
Hall reds - is a thread that continues into the period we now enter.
There are many shifts and manoeuvres connected with the emergence from 
within the Dooley faction of J.T. Lang, who sees the time as the moment 
to ’make his run* - a run that eventually brings him to the solitary 
heights he occupies in 1930. But Lang’s own manoeuvring gives striking 
testimony to the increased weight of the industrialists; for it is by 
adopting the role of their spokesman that he takes his decisive steps 
from 1923 on.
However, in this period one's attention is first drawn by a 
change in the relations between the component parts of the A.L.P. machine. 
Comparatively timid in 1920 and 1921, Labor caucus in the New South
Overacker, op.cit., p.134. 
Chapter IV, above, pp.214-226.
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Wales parliament became increasingly bold throughout 1922 in its 
attitude towards the A.L.P. state executive.
Annual Conference in 1922 had set up a committee to examine 
McGirr's accusations that the Dooley Cabinet had opposed McGirr over 
the basic wage and motherhood endowment issues, and that prominent 
Dooleyites had collaborated with the discredited federal parliament­
arian J.H. Catts. The committee's findings favoured the Dooley faction. 
Since the latter controlled a caucus majority, it is not surprising 
that caucus refused to accept the now expelled McGirr back in its ranks, 
but instead bitterly denounced him, passing a resolution of confidence 
in the ex-Ministers who were alleged to have 'sabotaged' McGirr. When 
J.H. Catts lent his voice to a caucus counter-attack on the executive, 
caucus moved for a further enquiry into corrupt practices, with the 
emphasis on pre-selection ballots. J.M. Baddeley and the Newcastle 
miners supported this move, thus showing the labor movement that the
miners, and A.C. Willis in particular, had come down firmly on the
3Dooleyite side. Federal executive intervention stayed the hand of 
the factions until after the 1922 federal elections, but war was re­
opened when on 21 December 1922, M. Charlton (Leader in the House of 
Representatives), Gardiner (Leader in the Senate), and J. Dooley, state 
parliamentary leader, issued a circular urging pre-conference constit­
utional changes to give branches (and thus parliamentarians) greater 
weight than unions at the annual conference. The aim of a return to 
the pre-1916 situation was further made clear by a call for removal
3 Lang, I Remember, p.198
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of the prohibition against parliamentarian membership of the state 
4A.L.P. executive.
Hard pressed, the Baileyites cast round for allies and as
in late 1921, they met up with the Communists who, for a time, ex-
5changed their largely unqualified support for a Baileyite promise to 
endorse the Melbourne and Brisbane socialisation objectives and to 
urge the A.L.P. to accept Communist affiliation. The Communists once 
more dusted down the concept of the 'industrial' wing versus the 
'political' wing and militant unionists were urged to join the Labor 
Party. Conference was uppermost in their minds.
The Parliamentary leaders aimed particularly at the power of the 
A.W.U.: newspaper ballots were to be abolished, and League rolls 
signed three months before any ballot by those wishing to vote.
The State Executive would no longer be elected from the floor of 
annual conference, but should instead be constituted of one elected 
member from each federal electorate in the metropolitan and Newcastle 
districts; and one from each state electorate in the country districts. 
But if these proposals were particularly damaging to the A.W.U., 
they would also decrease the weight in the party of the unions as a 
whole, and increase that of the parliamentarians.
In the official Communist press, there was condemnation of the A.L.P. 
as a whole in general terms for being a 'reformist' party; and 
specific condemnation of the 'politicians', the Baileyite faction 
being known throughout the labor movement as the 'industrialists'.
There appears to be no word of criticism against the A.W.U. leaders 
until Garden left for Moscow shortly after the end of August 1922 
(see above p. 169)
At the time of the state elections in March 1922, the Communist- 
controlled Executive of the Labor Council issued a statement condemn­
ing the A.L.P. as a whole as a 'reformist' party, though urging 
workers to vote for it. (Exec. Minutes, Labor Council, 7 Mar. 1922.) 
Though the burning topic of the day was that of the two factions 
within the Labor Party, the Labor Council statement ignored their 
existence. Earlier however (see note 75 of chapter IV), the Labor 
Council had made a point of praising McGirr and criticising 
'Cabinet', meaning, in the context, the Dooley factional iOttl.
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The thinkers and fighters in the unions must 
move to control the party. They must see to it the 
delegates are honest and not the mere tools
of those in control. 6
From this it was a short step to open support for the executive who, 
after all, stood for the 'industrial wing' in this misleading dichotomy.
As the 1923 annual conference drew nearer, the faction war 
centred upon efforts by the Dooleyites to convict the Baileyites of 
corrupt practices in connection with 'sliding ballot boxes' in 1920, 
and by the Baileyites to convict James Dooley over the wealthy J.B. 
Suttor. Whether or not it was for gain, Dooley had unquestionably 
breached Party rules in appointing to the Legislative Council Suttor,
7a wealthy man whose Party credentials for the appointment were invalid.
It is at this time that Lang, hitherto a secondary figure, begins to
0
move - with typical caution - on the path towards a position of unique 
power in the labor movement of the state. The Baileyite attack prompted 
an inner-caucus move to unseat Dooley and although this failed, the 
basis was laid for Lang's later successful move for Dooley to stand 
down in his favor. Subsequent moves over the Suttor affair led to the
The Communist, 1 Dec. 1922.
Bailey elicited from Michael Hynes a statement implicating Dooley 
in corrupt practices,(Molesworth, Set 71 Item 7)5 and the ^Executive, 
amidst a public outcry, appointed a special disputes committee to 
enquire into the matter.
As late as January 1923* the outcome of the pending conference being 
still uncertain, Lang was careful not to declare himself openly 
for either faction.
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executive’s expulsion of Dooley on 1 March. A majority of the 
parliamentarians then re-elected Dooley as caucus leader, while the 
Baileyite executive elected McGirr to this position, expelled the 
Dooleyites and declared the whole question sub judice. Molesworth tells 
us that, as a sequel to this, the parliamentarians T.D. Mutch, R. 
O'Halloran, R. Greig and J.T. Lang met with the deposed Dooley, and 
decided to carry the fight into the Baileyites'camp by raising at 
annual conference the issue of ballot boxes that had been 'faked' in 
1920. During the meeting, writes Molesworth (corroborating a surmise 
by Louise Overacker
...To the surprise of certain members present, 
a document was produced which Dooley was asked 
to sign by Lang to the effect that if the committee 
won the fight against the Executive at the con­
ference, Dooley would resign the leadership and 
make way for Lang. Either Mutch or Greig seized 
the letter saying - 'This is over the fence, to 
kill a man when he's down* and tore it up. 11
Doting that the cautious Lang was now prepared to commit his political
future in the struggle, it could be surmised that the omens were
fairly plain. If further evidence is needed of this, it is supplied
by the hint of desperation in the Baileyite manoeuvres. In March, fr1cGivf
had openly pledged support for the Socialisation object^and the anited
12front of 'all working class organisations'  ^drawing praise from the 
13Communists. Given the climate of opinion amongst the union rank and
9
A.W., 7 Mar.1923; Australian Labor Party, State of New South Wales, 
Report Of The Executive For The Year 1_922_. p.6-8.
^  Overacker, op.cit., p.139*
^  Molesworth collection, Set 71> Item 3«
A,W., 14 Mar. 1923; The Communist, 16 Mar. 1923«
The Communist, 16 Mar. 1923»
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file, and in particular among the miners, the Dooleyites could not be 
allowed, to appear less 'red' than the Baileyites: former miners’ union 
official J.M. Baddeley persuaded the Dooleyites to give a like pledge, 
thus neatly cancelling the enemy's advantage. Calling upon its 
Communist allies, the Baileyite state executive announced a trade union 
conference on 28 April, inviting unaffiliated along with affiliated 
unions in an effort to encourage affiliation and secure votes at con­
ference. The Baileyites went to great lengths to convince the leftists 
of their authentically socialist line even singing the 'Red Flag'
at an executive meeting. J About one hundred delegates attended the
18union conference of April. Conference resolved that the executive 
should control the parliamentarians• and that it should be elected 
directly from unions arranged in 'industrial groups’, not from the 
floor of the annual /.L.P. conference.^ Conference supported both 
Melbourne and Brisbane socialisation objectives, and demanded the change 
of .L.P. rules to permit affiliation of other working class parties
5.M.H., 6, 18 Apr. 1923.
Labor Mews 8 May 1223.
Contrast this with the proposal by the three, leading parliament­
arians on 21 December 1222: under their scheme, the executive was 
to be elected, from federal and st to elector, tes.
1 ^
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'with the right of propaganda and organisation, while at the same
time requiring a loyal acceptance of the decisions of representative 
17Conferences'. Finally, conference elected a committee comprising 
J. Kilhurn, J. Shiels, A.C. Willis, J.S. Garden and H. Denford, to 
draft appropriate clauses to secure alterations in the A.L.P. con­
stitution in accordance with the decisions of the All-Australian
1 ftTrades Union Conference of 1922.
Industrious as were the Baileyite-Communist preparations for 
annual conference, those of its opponents proved better. Strenuous 
efforts were made by Lang himself, for he had seen the weakness of 
Dooley's personal position and the fact that it gave him his oppor­
tunity. He knew of the widespread trade union disgust with the 
IPBaileyites whose reputation for improper practices was far worse
than that of the Dooleyites. Thus, in Lang's words:
Most of the organising had been done before Conference 
met. We realised that we could only defeat the Bailey 
faction if we could obtain sufficient support from the 
Trades Hall. 20
17
18
19
20
Labor Hews, 5 May 1923«
If Willis had any reservations about working with men who had cast 
their lot in the faction-fight with the Baileyites, he could not 
express these by refusing to serve on a committee with aims such 
as this committee had. Even if he had no personal desire to see 
such aims fulfilled (and it is likely that he did have such a 
desire), he could not have defended his abstention against attacks 
from Communists and militants within the miners' union.
Even the City Construction section of the A.W.U. itself had, in 
March of 1923? carried a motion demanding that the executive permit 
free discussion before conference.
I Remember, p.198.
263
p-1Of the 340 delegates to conference, 2/3rds were from the unions.
With the aid of J. T.yrell (Municipal Workers' Union), 0. Schreiber 
(Furniture Trades Scoiet^, E. Magrath (Printing Industry Employees' 
Union), J. Culbert (Timber Workers' Union), D. Clyne (Storemen and 
Packers' Union), W.J. Mills (Sydney Wharf Laborers') and above all,
A.C. Willis and J.M. Baddeley of the miners' union, Lang set to work.
The unions his side persuaded to affiliate, or to resume lapsed affil­
iation, included (according to Lang) the Australian Railways' Union and 
the two engineering unions (the Amalgamated Engineering Union and the
Australian Society of Engineers). The minutes of the Ship Painters'
22and Dockers' Union reveal that this union was another. Lang insisted
that the unions pay affiliation d.ues for all their members, thereby
securing the maximum allowable number of delegates to conference; it
had become a common practice, one reflecting the spread of unionist
dissatisfaction with and passivity towards the A.L.P., to pay fees for
23only a small proportion of members. Amongst the miners, Baddeley
and Willis had been working for 18 months to persuade the three district
branches (North, South and West) of the Australasian Coal and Shale
Employees' Federation to affiliate, and when the southern district
affiliated in June 1923? it was the last to do so, opposition to
24affiliation having been substantial. Through the joint efforts of
21
22
23
24
Ibid., p.198.
Minutes, Gen. Meeting, Ship Painters' and Dockers' Union,
21,28 May 1923.
Interview with Lang, December 1961.
Common Cause,22 June 1923« Affiliation would have been arranged 
earlier but for 'certain obstructive tactics adopted by certain 
individuals' (ibid.).
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the enemy factions, ten unions either affiliated or reaffiliated with
the A.L.P. between 28 April and 30 May 1923.^
Counting votes in advance, Lang claims to have seen that the
miners' vote would be decisive. Two problems therefore arose. First,
how could Lang persuade Willis to coax from his fellow delegates a
vote against the 'industrialist' alliance of 1916, and against the
Communists? Second, supposing Lang did win their help, how were Willis
and the other miners' delegates to secure the approval of the rank and
file miner? Lang explains how the first problem was solved:
We then found out that Willis wanted to be President...
We found that we could deal with Willis and Baddeley^and 
in that way split the Industrialists. 26
Lang persuaded Magrath, of the Printers, to stand down for the presi- 
27dency. The second problem was more formidable, as the climate of 
opinion amongst the miners was leftist, and the Communists were seen 
as integral parts of, often as the leaders of, the left. In reporting 
back to the rank and file, miners' delegates to annual conference in 
1923 showed that they were well aware of this climate and went to great 
lengths to demonstrate that the Communists had been untrue to working 
class tradition; the delegates charged that the Communists at confer­
ence had
entered into an agreement with the Bailey section to 
meet their own purpose. It was admitted that a ticket 
had been agreed upon between the Communists and the 
Bailey section that the Communists were to obtain 10 
of their number on the executive and that the Bailey section
A.W., 30 May 1923.
I Remember, p.198.
Interview with Lang, December 1961.
25
26 
27
2.68
were to get the remaining 20... In consideration of 
our position where the Bailey section had consistently 
opposed our policy and constitution (re the All-Australian 
Congress proposals) previously we arrived at the conclusion 
that we would not support the Communists on some issues 
that did not vitally affect the policy of this union, when 
they in unmistakeable terms embraced the Bailey section.
We could not associate ourselves with the compact because 
a number of us have consistently advanced reasons to our 
members that there should be a general clean up of the 
movement, particularly in the light of statements and 
charges in respect to faked tickets, crook ballot boxes, 
etc... Further, we are convinced that the compact entered 
into with these sections had an effect upon the Communists 
in not fighting for a clean up of the movement...
We regretted to find that members of the working-class 
would adopt these tactics. 28fa\c]
Thus, at annual conference, the dice were loaded against the Baileyite- 
Communist alliance. The first show of strength revealed this, when 
H. Denford moved endorsement of a recommendation from the state execut­
ive excluding parliamentarians from conference - and was defeated on a
29division by 130 votes to 121. Benford's motion was very carefully 
chosen to win the maximum number of any possible ’centre'; the motion 
scored well, but also revealed that the 'hard-core' Dooleyites had 
the numbers, which they retained throughout the conference.
Common Cause, 6 July 1923. At the annual conference of the A.L.P., 
D. Davies, a delegate from the Northern district branch of the 
miners, expressed anger at alleged Communist interference in the 
conduct of a lockout on the north field ( A.W., 13 June 1923).
A.W., 6 June 1923. Before division, the count was 129-127.
For example, a report to conference coming from the Baileyite 
majority of the state executive was rejected in favour of a minority 
report from the dissentient eight on the executive (Round Table, 
vol• 13, 1922-23, p.855).
29
30
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Conference heard a letter from Michael Hynes indubitably implicating
Dooley in forging A.L.P. membership ticket butts so that wealthy
J.B. Suttor would be eligible for a seat on the Legislative Council.
But the Bailey side seems to have come off worse in the cross-fire of
corruption charges, when Dooleyites regaled conference with details of
31the Baileyite sliding ballot boxes of 1920. In the crucial elections, 
the Dooleyites had a 'crushing majority'. Dooley was reinstated as 
caucus leader by l80 votes to 79? and the Baileyite executive nominat­
ions for official positions were rejected out of hand, though these
32had included the most prominent leftists of the time, except for A.C. 
Willis. When the new state executive was announced, it was found that 
only one of the old Baileyites had survived - Kate Dwyer, of the Women 
Workers' Union.
Such a decisive defeat of an Executive has never 
before been known in Labor's ranks...
mourned the rrffSi-qj-arl organ of the A.W.U."^ Seven left-wing nominees
gained positions, however, and they included two declared Communists,
For differing accounts of the notorious sliding ballot box affair, 
see Australian Labor Party, State of New South Wales, Report of 
the Executive for the Year 1923, p.2. 'Report of Committee Appointed 
by the N.S.W. A.L.P. 1923 Conference to investigate the Question 
of the Alleged Fraudulent Ballot Boxes'; Complete Report of the 
Federal A.L.P. Committee Of Inquiry Into The Alleged Faked Ballot 
Boxes. Together With The Findings Of The Committee. Sydney, 1924? 
A.W.U. Convention, Ballot Box Inquiry. Debate & Decision. Sydney, 
1925? Lang^op.cit., pp.198-200.
See the Communist,8 June 1923» For the interstate executive, J. Howie 
was nominated. For delegates to interstate conference, H.L. Denford, 
L. Leece. For the state executive, J. Beasley, J.S. Garden, W.Gibb, 
J.J.Graves, R.Heffron, J.Kilburn, A.McPherson, F.Roels, A.Rutherford.
33 A.W., 13 June 1923
J.S. Garden and J. Howie, along with their supporters, J. Beasley, J.
Kilburn, J.J. Graves, and W.J. Gibb. It is worth noting also that
the socialisation objective was adopted by a massive vote.^
The matter of Communist affiliation gave rise to one of the
most heated and most interesting debates at conference. Pledged to
defend his fellow expellees of 1919> the new president A.C. Willis had
to support the Communists but, allied now to Lang, and angered by
Communist opposition to his coalfield industrial strategy of 1923, Willis
also wanted to qualify this support so as to prevent the Communists from
actually entering the A.L.P. as declared Communists. The subject arose
when J.S. Garden, appearing as an alternate delegate from the Clerks'
35Union, moved adoption of a resolution emanating from the trade union 
conference of April 28.
For the purpose of bringing about a united working-class 
front, this conference recommends to the New South Wales 
State Conference of the A.L.P. the alteration of the rules 
and the constitution, to allow of affiliation of other working- 
class parties, with the right of propaganda and organisation, 
while at the same time requiring a loyal acceptance of the 
decisions of representative conferences. 36
It was, of course, impossible to fulfil both of the last two conditions,
Scarcely surprising, for a leading Baileyite, Arthur Blakely, moved 
the adoption of the socialisation objective, while leading Dooleyite 
J.M. Baddeley, seconded the motion (Daily Telegraph, 11 June 1923).
From 1918, Garden's credentials to A.L.P. official gatherings often 
came from either the Clerk's Union or the Sailmakers’ Union.
36 Daily Telegraph, 11 June 1923
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and this fret prompted the charge of duplicity from at least one
17de lege te .'
The new vice-president of the A.L.P., E.C. Ms •- tl 
Industry Employees1 Union), immediately "brought up the point Willis 
was soon to reiterate: the present conference v/as constitutionally 
allowed merely to affirm the principle of affiliation "by the C .P. 5 the 
issue itself must he submitted to the new executive, thence to leagues 
and affiliated unions, and hack to annual conference in 1924# If the 
A.L.P. allowed Communists inside its ranks as ooen Communists, said. 
Loughlin, a Country Lahor Party would he formed, while Alam, of Dubbo, 
went further and declared: ’The Communists are murdering this party*. 
The question resulted in a vote of 122 for altering the rules to permit 
affiliation of other 'working class rarties *, and 122 against, and was 
Tossed on the casting vote of A.C. Jillis.
r.J. Stein, Railway Industry Branch of the A.W.U., said he was 
'amazed* at such a 1"stunt” ' by the Communists who claimed to stand 
for ’square-dealing*. (A.W. , 13 June 1923#^
38 Lai 1 y Telegraph , 11 June 1923#
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The new executive soon expelled the outstanding Baileyites 
from the A.L.P., including, of course, John Bailey himself, suspended 
P. Minahan for two years, and censured P. Coleman.
On 31 July 1923, James Dooley resigned his leadership of 
caucus and, in a contest with W. Dunn, J.T. Lang was elected as leader 
by twenty two votes to eleven, with Peter Loughlin his deputy-leader.
Lang immediately began his efforts to be rid of the Communists, efforts 
which probably met with no great resistance from A.C. Willis, chair­
man of the A.L.P. On 20 October 1923? Lang and Loughlin attended a 
special executive meeting which expelled the Communists by its decision
that “no Communist who fwasj] a member of the Communist Party ["could |
. '42remain a member of the Labor Party*. Sixteen voted for expulsion and 
ten against, while six abstained. The ten opponents of expulsion were 
J. Flanagan, J. Beasley, D. Clyne, J.S. Garden, W.J. Gibb, J.J. Graves,
J. Kilburn, D. Rees, A. Rutherford, and J.T. Sweeney.^“ For months after 
this (as we saw) the Sydney Communists threw all their energies into a 
campaign for affiliation, but at A.L.P. annual conference in 1924 they 
failed to secure the necessary support.
Garden, giving the Labor Council’s annual report in 1923» 
alleged that the executive was ’mere putty’ in the hands of Lang
I Remember, p.l88.
The executive’s right to expel the Communists found precedents in 
actions of the Baileyite executive, based on the right of the 
executive to carry out party policy between annual conferences, 
a right upheld by A.C. Willis at the 1923 conference.
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and L o u g h l i n .  And i n d e e d ,  d e s p i t e  W i l l i s ’s a s s e r t i o n  o f  e x e c u t i v e
supremacy  a t  t h e  1923 C o n f e r e n c e t h e  e x e c u t i v e  soon r e v e a l e d  i t s
d e s i r e  f o r  u n i t y  w i t h  t h e  p a r l i a m e n t a r i a n s .  As Rawson p o i n t s  o u t ,
t h e r e  was no a t t e m p t  to  c o n t r o l  t h e  p a r l i a m e n t a r i a n s ,  and t h e  e x e c u t i v e ,
u n i o n - d o m i n a t e d  as  i t  w as ,  a l l o w e d  a b i g  s h a r e  i n  p a r t y  government t o
45b r a n c h  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ,  t r a d i t i o n a l l y  more r e s p o n s i v e  t o  t h e  p a r l ­
i a m e n t a r y  w ing  t h a n 'w e r e  u n i o n  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s .  The e x e c u t i v e  a l s o  
q u i e t l y  d ropped  th e  Labor  C o u n c i l  demand t h a t  p a r l i a m e n t a r i a n s  s h o u l d  
d e p o s i t  w i t h  t h e  e x e c u t i v e  s i g n e d  b u t  u n d a t e d  r e s i g n a t i o n s .  T h i s  
g e n e r a l  r e t r e a t  migh t  be t h o u g h t  t o  im p ly  t h a t  Lang  was i n  a b e t t e r  
b a r g a i n i n g  p o s i t i o n  t h a n  th e  e x e c u t i v e  b u t  t h i s  was n o t  s o .  Though 
he had s e c u r e d  caucus  l e a d e r s h i p  i n  J u l y  1923 by a r e s p e c t a b l e  enough 
m a rg i n ,  he was t h e n ,  and  had l o n g  b e e n ,  u n p o p u l a r  w i t h  t h e  u n i o n s .
F o r  exam ple ,  L a n g ' s  r e p u t a t i o n  i n  t h e  Sydney Wharf L a b o u r e r s '  Union 
was a l r e a d y  bad  i n  1921 b e c a u s e  he was h e l d  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  i n c r e a s i n g  
th e  r e n t a l s  o f  s t a t e - o w n e d  h ouses  i n  th e  Sydney 'R o c k s '  a r e a .  At 
A .L .P .  a n n u a l  c o n f e r e n c e  i n  1923,  R o b e r t s  and Clyne of  t h e  S to rem en  and  
P a c k e r s '  Union had  moved t h a t  c o n f e r e n c e  recommend th e  w i t h d r a w a l  o f  
L a n g ' s  e n d o rs em e n t  f o r  h i s  r e f u s a l ,  when T r e a s u r e r  i n  t h e  S t o r e y  admin­
i s t r a t i o n ,  t o  pay  an i n c r e a s e  i n  wages t o  Harbour  T r u s t  E m p lo y e e s . ^  
Some weeks a f t e r  Lang was e l e c t e d  p a r l i a m e n t a r y  l e a d e r ,  t h e  m i n e r s '
'We s t a n d  a b s o l u t e l y  f o r  E x e c u t i v e  c o n t r o l '  ( A.W.,  13 June  1 9 2 3 ) .44
45
46
Rawson,  o p . c i t . , p . 1 0 1 .
Clyne l a t e r  came t o  be one o f  L a n g ' s  most f a i t h f u l  henchmen.
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Alofficial caper Common Cause criticised Lang and Loughlin strongly.
By 1924, while Lang had still not made his hig hid for popularity
among the rank and file unionists (that came with his legislation
between August 1925 and February 1926) his position in caucus itself
had grown shaky, and he retained his leadership by only One. vote in
A Pia contest against T.D. Mutch.
The Trades Hall reds and their allies supported the Baileyite 
faction in its efforts to retain and (later) to regain A.L.P. leader­
ship, but once again gave their support without serious qualifications 
49or reservations. In doing so, they appear to have shown that lack of 
concern or sensitivity towards the outlook of the rank and file union-
Common Cause, 5 Sep. 1923. E. Ward and H. Denford both told Irwin 
Young in interviews (op.cit.,p.123) that Lang was most unpopular 
with unionists in the early years.
Daily Telegraph, 28 June 1924; see also ibid., 30 Sept. 1924«
In giving his Annual Report in 1924 as secretary of the Labor Council 
J.S. Garden condemned the A.L.P. as a whole but managed to pass ex­
tremely lightly over the corrupt practices for which the Baileyites 
were renowned. The parliamentarians, by contrast, were criticised 
repeatedly. After the annual conference of the A.L.P. had rejected 
the idea of Communist affiliation, the Communists had got up a 
petition for a special conference; constitutionally, because the 
required number of unions and leagues had requested it, the special 
conference ought to have been granted. However, the A.L.P. execu­
tive had persuaded a special meeting of presidents and secretaries 
of affiliated unions and leagues to agree to a postponement, on 
the grounds that Lang had said he would force an early election for 
October 1924. Garden then commented: 'To grant the special fcdn- 
ference meant even the loss ... of those who were now supporting 
them, because they believed that they were trying to clean the Move­
ment through their action in the "Crook Ballot Boxes". The "Crook 
Ballot Boxes" only affected five persons, and the main one affected 
(John Bailey) was a thorn in the side of the politicians. But to 
deal with "crook selection ballots" was a horse of another color, 
for nearly every politician had gained his selection by crook meth­
ods and to expose such was more than the Executive had the courage 
to do.' (p.lO)
2?2
ist which characterised, their choice of industrial strategy in 1922. 
Both Dooley and Bailey factions had been involved in corrupt practices 
and both had a reputation amongst the rank and file for being so in­
volved. As Common Cause, the miners' newspaper, put it:
The clash between two factions must not be allowed 
to side-track the workers from the chief business, which 
is to clean up the movement. Allied with both sides are 
corrupt and reactionary elements. 50
In the eyes of the rank and file, Communist support did not confer upon
an ally any mantle of uprightness or working class probity and the
Communists, by giving unqualified support to a notoriously corrupt
faction, merely lowered their own standing with militants generally.
The miners, for example, were especially censorious, and the Communist-
Baileyite alignment made it far easier for the miners' secretary A.C.
Willis to turn increasingly away from the Communists in the years 1923
and 1924 and harder for the Communists to secure affiliation to the
51A.L.P. during those years. The 'harmonious relations' Rawson notes' 
between executive and caucus during 1923 and 1924 rested partly on the 
fact that the Willis-dominated executive which swept the Baileyites 
from power in 1923 did little to urge parliamentarians to press for
Common Cause, 16 March 1923. The Communist paper, the Proletarian 
took a similar stand, in contrast with that of the Sydney trade 
union Communists: 'Both sides are handicapped by their political
reputations; on the surface it is a struggle between two sets of 
intellectually bankrupt political adventurers... Reformists and 
reactionaries all, their open opportunism leads them to rival each 
other in red phrase mongering'. 1 May 1923.
51 D.W. Rawson, op.cit. , p.101.
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industrialist demands. Communist identification -with the Baileyites 
put the Communists in a poor position to he the tribunes of the 
industrialists within the A.L.P.; yet this was a role they had chosen 
for themselves, and it was most important to them that they should 
succeed.
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The AtL.P. and the Trade Union 1924-1923
By August 1924? Lang had already said that he would force
91astate elections in October of that year. Once Premier, Lang promised,
he would make good his 1923 pledges to the unions. But Lang, along with
those of his followers most influential in the union movement (A.C.
Willis and J.M. Baddeley), and along with union officials well to the 
52left of these," believed that industrial disputes put electoral victory
in doubt. Thus when he actually became Premier, Lang's influence was
thrown the more effectively against strikes; said J.M. Baddeley, then
Lang's Minister for Labor and Industry:
... the policy of the Government... in connection with 
industrial matters ... is to engender good feeling in 
industry so that strikes may be obviated. 53
Yet though this was certainly the administration's policy, in 1924 and
1925 Lang was not always successful in preventing, putting a stop to, or
'confining' strikes. By December 1924 desrite staunch efforts by his
union followers, a group of isolated, confined marine transport strikes,
begun in October of that year, had taken on the shape of what one might
call a 'de facto' extended strike, and at times it looked as if no
amount of opposition from anti-extensionist officials would prevent
other marine transport unionists deliberately extending it further.
Ann. Rep., Lab. Council, 1924? p.9»
For example, R.J. Heffron, secretary of the Marine Stewards' Union, 
prominent member of the Transport Workers' Group, and, even while a 
close follower of Garden, apparently anxious to stand well with 
Lang (see p.289 of this chapter).
N.S.W. Pari. Deb., 106, p.119, 11 Feb. 1926.53
2?5
Demanding abolition of the Shipping Labor Bureau set up 
following union defeat in 1917? Sydney waterside workers imposed an 
overtime ban on intrastate, interstate and overseas ships on 20 October 
1924, quickly securing the help of Sydney seamen. Unionists soon re­
alised however that this was 'not injuring the overseas interests,
54which were the main support of the Bureau'. When ordered by the
Commonwealth Arbitration Court to resume work on interstate vessels
before 17 November, the waterside workers did so, only to subsequently
place a total 'black' ban on all vessels handled through the Shipping
Labor Bureau, a ban they later extended to all overseas ships save
certain lines obtaining labor through the Waterside Workers' Federation.
On 26 November the Marine Stewards' Union was announced to be on the
55point of joining the dispute as a result of a grievance of its own,
5 6the decision being hailed by the Sydney Marine Transport Group as 
'helpful' to the ’watersiders.
Round Table, vol. 15? P* 5Ö4»
55 Forty-seven stewards had been dismissed for refusing duty on the 
high seas, the refusal being described as an example of 'job-control' 
The men were given clean discharges but the Marine Stewards' Union 
was determined to force their re-engagement, even at the cost of 
a long dispute (S.M.H., 27? 28 Nov. 1924).
56 This should be carefully distinguished from the Transport Workers' 
Federation #iich appeared in Chapter One. This organisation was 
now apparently defunct. The Marine Transport Group was often 
called the Transport Workers Group, and was set up by the Labor 
Council in accordance with its policy of federating unions in 
industrial groups.
27 6
On 28 November 1924? 'the Seamen* s Union refused to man ships
belonging to the Newcastle and Hunter River Company, on the grounds
that, since 1917? the Company had employed 115 permanent wharf laborers
who had formed a 'company union* of their own. Thus the seamen were
57acting in sympathy with the waterside workers and in accordance with 
the policy of the Marine Transport Group. Jacob Johnson, assistant- 
secretary of the New South Wales branch of the Seamen's Union, urged 
the Newcastle Transport Workers' Group to cut off all coal supplies 
to the Newcastle and Hunter River company as a step towards drawing in 
all Newcastle unions. By early December marine transport was threaten­
ed from yet another direction, for Fremantle seamen had struck in 
pursuit of increased wages, and by 4 December, the port was almost par­
alysed as a result of a seamen's blockade.
Thus, willy-nilly, an 'extended' marine strike appeared to be 
taking shape: waterside' - workers with their black ban; seamen at war 
with an important coastal shipping company, and threatening to extend 
that war throughout Newcastle; Fremantle blockaded; stewards on the 
brink of entering the fray. What had begun as a limited or 'confined' 
strike had grown into an 'extended' strike. But this extension was 
regarded with no enthusiasm by officials (at least in New South Wales, 
save for Johnson and Walsh of the Seamen's Union) and, extension came 
about largely as the result of rank and file feeling.
When the marine stewards, for example, decided on 4 December 
to resume work without the reinstatement of their forty seven members,
57 21 C.A.R. 17
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this resumption was due to pressure from the Federal Committee of
Management of the Waterside Workers' Federation and from the Marine 
Transport Workers' Group in Sidney. Prominent upon the latter body 
were W.H. Seale and A.H. Moate (already loyal followers of J.T. Lang) 
and R.J. Heffron. Resumption was urged on the grounds that it would
give extra work to waterside workers outside New South Wales, who
could then finance the Sydney watersiders in their struggle over the
Shipping Lahor Bureau; fears of a 'drastic legal process' were also
59expressed. The stewards' officials had a hard time persuading their
members to accent what they took to be defeat, for 'jujproar prevailed'
60at the meeting which took the decision. Some days later, with 'wide­
spread extension' likely and '(certain union officials' claiming 'that
the whole industrial movement is looking for an issue upon which to 
fight out the question of the inadequacy of the present arbitration
.... legislation', the Commonwealth Shipping Line agreed to reinstate
the forty seven stewards.^ It is possible that marine steward officials
knew of this^advance but were sworn not to reveal it to their members;
59
60 
61 
62
S.M.H., 5 Dec. 1924.
S.M.H., 5 Dec. 1924.
S.M.H., 10 Dec. 1924*
Lang seems to have been on fairly close terms with members of the 
Commonwealth Shipping Board, while A.H. Moate, an avowed Langite in 
1925, was an executive member of the Marine Stewards' Union. R.J. 
Heffron was secretary of the Marine Stewards' Union and, like Moate, 
an influential member of the Transport Workers' Group; in 1927* Labor 
Daily wrote that Heffron had helped prevent 'many industrial disputes 
notably with the Commonwealth Line' (13 Jan.1927)> and from his 
record in 1925, this was true for 1925» Garden, then secretary of 
the Transport Workers' Group, and politically close to Heffron, also 
appears to have carried out an industrial policy in line with that 
of avowed Langites, certainly in regard to marine transport disputes 
(see, for example, S.M.H., 1 July 1925)*
278
a union victory would have had the effect of encouraging other marine
unions to try their luck, particularly since, with Christmas in the
offing, unionists regarded the circumstances as favourable and their
spirits were high. Possibly, too, the Commonwealth Line felt that the
stewards’ rank and file were likely to re-enter the dispute, for the
marine transport industry did not seem to be settling down. Indeed,
the very day that the Commonwealth Government convened a conference
which was to settle the Sydney watersiders' dispute over the Shipping
Labor Bureau, seamen and ship painters in Melbourne refused to work
alongside wharf laborers employed on a permanent basis by the Melbourne
6 ^Harbour Trust.
At the Commonwealth Government’s conference, the employers
agreed to abolish the Shipping Labor Bureau as from February, 1925» ^
This victory for ’direct action’, upon which Justice Powers commented 
68with disfavour, was brought about in no small part by what was in 
fact an extended strike. The obvious reluctance of some union leaders 
to extend the dispute was offset, on the one hand, by the willingness 
of the rank and file, and of certain union officials, to do so, and on 
the other hand, by the proximity of Christmas.
In Victoria, trade unionists resented these, much as trade unionists 
in New South Wales resented the permanent employees of the Newcastle 
and Hunter River Company.
Some few members of the abolished Bureau, however, formed themselves 
into a Permanent and Casual Y/harf Labourers' Union, and this, des­
pite vicissitudes, formed the nucleus of the Permanent and Casual 
Wharf Labourers’ Union which came to prominence after the national 
waterside strike of 1928. See the writer's M.A. Thesis, p.8, 108.
21 C.A.R. 18.65
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In the marine transport disputes of 1925, Lang and his union 
associates bad more success in confining and settling disputes.
No sooner had 1925 begun than seamen struck work and Justice 
Powers suggested, as did the Pound Tabled that the seamen were encour­
aged to do this by the success of the recent direct motion, The union 
wanted labor to be picked up at a spot of its own choosing, for with 
a pick-un under union control, the union could arrange a roster system 
to ensure sharing out of the good and bad jobs, prevent discrimination
against active unionists and see that old or sick members were given
69the easiest tasks. All interstate shipping being held up, the dispute
came before the Commonwealth Arbitration Court, and the picking-up
70places were fixed as those requested by the shipowners, though the
Court refused the owners' and the Attorney-General’s application for
71deregistra.tion of the union. Finally the seamen agreed to obey the 
Court, and on January 29 the dispute was settled, in New South Wales 
at least. But conflict over the general ’job-control’ issue continued,
21 C.A.R. 18; vol.15, p.585.
This explanation was offered the writer by a present-day official of 
the Federated Ship Painters' and Dockers' Union, Sydney Branch. This 
body, along with Waterside Workers' Federation and Seamen's Union, 
today picks up at union rooms, The explanation given in non-labor 
quarters in 1925 was that the seamen acted in pursuance of 'job- 
control', though Round Table suggested that behind the dispute lay 
the principle of who was to choose crews.
21 C.A.R., 19
21 C.A.R., 25.
66
69
71
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and on 5 June 1925? "the Arbitration Court granted the employers’ request
72 1to deregister the union, Deputy President Webb claiming that "foreign
,1 73ideas'1 were at 'the root of the trouble'. The seamen's union did not
oppose the deregistration, announcing that in future it would rely on
its industrial strength.
The effect of Deputy President Webb's deregistration was to 
put the union outside the rates of pay and conditions embodied in the 
award. Thus the owners were now free to engage labor by individual 
bargaining without referring to the award. Following deregistration, 
shipowners refused a union request to put in writing a verbal promise 
t© pay award rates and observe award conditions in respect to the steamer 
Monaro; other similar refusals quickly followed, and the seamen, promptly 
supported by Melbourne waterside workers, struck work. When the ship­
owners refused to negotiate with the seamen's union, the Marine Trans­
port Group of unions stepped in. The secretary of this group was J.S. 
Garden, a Communist, and the president was W.H. Seale, Labor Party 
secretary of the Waterside Workers' Federation.
The seamen's dispute appeared likely to call forth 'sympathy' 
actions from other unions, especially from the rank and file; officials 
were reported, for example, to 1, : plans
to prevent indiscriminate support being accorded the 
seamen by members of other organisations without 
direct instructions how to act had been issued by 
the executive of the union; concerned (sic]}. 74
72 21 C.A.R., pp.724-730.
^  Round Table, vol. 16, p.l62.
7^ Argus, 15 June 1925»
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Sydney Seamen were reported to de confident that the waterside workers
would help them, while in Melbourne a 'mutual understanding' to this
75effect had been reached. By 25 June a meeting of the Sydney Marine
77Transport Workers' Group decided to 'stand solidly behind' the seamen. 
Soon, twenty three vessels were laid up, with about 1,000 seamen and 
6,000 other workers in related industries off work. But as against in­
dications that extension might spread, there were signs that union off­
icials of the Sydney Transport Workers' Group were anxious to see an 
end to it all, and were willing to pledge that unionists would take 
measures to stop the seamen implementing 'job-control'. At the end of 
June, a union deputation waited on S.M. Bruce, the Prime Minister, its 
members including J.S. Garden, secretary of the Marine Transport Group, 
B. Mullins, vigilance officer in the Sydney branch of the Waterside 
Workers' Federation, and E.J. Holloway and C. Crofts, representing the 
recently formed Commonwealth Industrial Disputes Committee. Delegates 
(J.S. Garden prominent amongst them) told the Prime Minister that they 
wished to see the dispute settled and that the Transport Workers' Group 
had taken control of it. A union conference had drafted a clause for 
inclusion in ships' articles designed to stop a ship being held up at 
sea when a dispute occurred - that is, a clause to extract the teeth of 
the 'job control' tiger. But Bruce expressed his lack of confidence in 
the ability of the unions to control the seamen and refused to assist
Argus, 19 June 1925*
77 Argus, 25 June 1925»
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them. To this Crofts replied:
We are disappointed. 'We went over the heads of the 
seamen. 78
Next day, Sydney waterside workers unloaded a ship involved 
in the dispute although they had agreed to a request from the seamen’s 
union not to do so. In permitting this action, the watersiders appear 
to have forgotten the aid seamen gave in abolishing the Shipping Labor 
Bureau and the seamen’s struggle on their behalf against the Newcastle 
and Hunter River Company. W.H. Seale, secretary of the Sydney Wharf 
Labourers' Union, was also at that time a prominent member of the A.L.P. 
state executive and, as has been said, for some time there had been 
harmonious relations between executive and parliamentarians. Seale 
was particularly close to A.C. Willis, now vice president of the New 
South Wales Executive Council, and to J.M. Baddeley, Minister for 
Labour and Industry in the new Lang ministry. Speaking at a banquet 
at Lubbo, Willis 'made pointed references to the seamen's trouble...
79Trades unionists were set against an upheaval of any kind at present.' 
Thus, in examining the watersiders' refusal to extend the dispute, one 
must keep in mind the fact that the new Labor ministry was anxious to 
maintain industrial harmony.
m e n n b e r t  o p
Yet extension was in the air;j the federal executive of the
Marine Stewards' Union arrived in Sydney to decide their policy in case
31extension should occur; the old union objection to the permanent
78
79
S.M.H., 1 July 1925. 
S.M.H., 2 July 1925.
81 S.M.H., 3 July 1925.
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employees of the Newcastle and Hunter River Company now gave rise to a
further dispute, and unionists at Mort's Dock threatened to strike if the
company's employees at the Dock were not dismissed. But the new
Lahor cabinet was particularly anxious to ensure that the marine
trouble did not again spread, as it had between October and December
1924, and on 3 July it was given out that waterfront union officials
8 2were in 'daily' consultation with members of state cabinet. On 6 
July the management at Mort's Dock paid off the entire staff, announc­
ing its belief that it should retain the men to whom the unions took 
objection. In reply, ' a big meeting of union officials' discussed
83'all outstanding disputes in the shipping industry' - in the presence
of J.M. Baddeley, Lang's Minister for Labour and Industry. Soon after
ft/ithis, with Lang's personal help, the Mort's Dock lockout was settled -
85on the management's terms.
But it was not just the Mort's Dock trouble that was settled 
by Lang's personal effort. Following 'daily' consultation between 
marine union officials and the state cabinet, on 6 July 'as the result
82
83
84
85
Ibid. See also S.M.H.,4 July 1925» ’In consequence of the inter­
vention of the State Government the feeling in Ministerial and indus­
trial circles is that the shipping dispute will be settled at an 
early date. For the past week leading trades unionists have been 
in conference daily with certain prominent members of the Cabinet 
and it is understood that certain influential shipowners have also 
been approached on behalf of the Government.'
S.M.H., 8 July 1925.
Labor Daily, 9 July 1925»
S.M.H., 10 July 1925» ’Mr. R.Day, on behalf of the disputes committee, 
said...that the agreement provided that all employees should return 
to work on the same basis of employment as before the dispute'.
A Royal Commission would enquire into the dispute between the Com­
pany and the Watersiders and seamen. (Argus ,10 July }§25-Onueß ney_t
°° pafe)
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85aof the intervention of the Premier', ' an agreement was signed with
8 6the Commonwealth Shipning Line and the Marine Transport Group.
This whittled the dispute down to one between the private shipowners 
and the seamen. In the arrangement concluded with the Commonwealth 
Line, the transnort unions said that if the seamen flouted the agree­
ment, they would not oppose any measures affecting the manning of the
ft 7ships, in order to permit of their continued running.’ The seamen 
were present during this arrangement which, in union vernacular, 
involved agreement by the other unions to work with ’scabs’. The 
original basis of this dispute had been shipowners' refusal to attach 
to the ships’ articles the wages and conditions prevailing at 4 June 
1925, the day on which the seamen's union was deregistered from the 
Arbitration Court. The seamen won this point from the Commonwealth 
Shipping Line, but lost the support of the other unions in respect to 
their most effective weapon in securing demands: in the words of the 
agreement, the unions would
85 (continued)
The Company kept its union, while the Labor Council agreed that 
unions concerned at Mort’s Dock would work all company vessels.
S.M.H., 7 July 1925» Labor Daily (7 July 1925) described the con­
clusion of the agreement with the words: 'Land Settles the Shipping 
Crisis', but added that A.C. Willis, secretary of the Miners' 
Federation and Vice-President of the Executive Council of New South 
Wales, along with R.J. Heffron, N.S.W. secretary of the Marine 
Stewards' Union, also helped.
For Lang's own account of the matter, see I Remember, p. 245»
S.M.H., 7 July 1925«87
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not countenance any action of the members of the seamen’s 
organisation that will he calculated to delay the 
sailing of any ship during the currency of the shipping 
articles. 88
Seamen’s conditions had improved vastly since 1919» when the Walsh 
leadership gained effective control, and this had been done largely 
by taking direct action in the way now excluded, the way of 'job 
control'.
The agreement served to indicate to the private shipowners
that the other unions had abandoned the seamen. No doubt because of
this, the private shipowners decided to attempt a more thorough going
policy than that essayed by the Commonwealth Shipping Line: they wanted
the seamen to depose the Walsh leadership, a move which they believed
would be of great help in abolishing job control. As a member of a
union deputation which included Tudehope (Marine Cooks) and Moate,
(Marine Stewards) J.S. Garden urged, the Commonwealth Steamship Owners'
Association to accept the arrangement reached between the unions and
the Commonwealth Shipping Line.
’Mr. Garden was ... emphatic that industrial peace in the 
shipping industry could be guaranteed the shipowners, such 
as never had existed before, if they would fall in with 
^this^j arrangement... 88a
However the private shipowners declined to accept the agreement, say­
ing they did not think the other unions could control the seamen.
The private shipowners had seen that the danger of other unionists 
joining the seamen was over, for the time being at least. But the
88
88a
S.M.H., 7 July 1925; 
Argus, 10 July 1925«
Labor 7 July 1925.
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seamen, alone of all unions, had militant officials as well as a
militant rank and files furthermore, behind them were six years of
many victories and few defeats. They were thus the very fountain head
of the spirit of self confidence among the marine unionists. And so,
quite shrewdly, the shipowners chose this moment to move in for 'the
kill', and seized the initiative by turning a strike into a lockout.
By mid-July, it was announced that all Australian shipping would soon 
90come to a stop. The Sydney Morning Herald commented:
Having made job control the issue, the owners are 
prepared to lay up all their vessels to achieve 
their object. 91
At the same time the Bruce-Page government revealed its view of the
seriousness of the situation when on 15 July, it introduced a Bill to
92amend the Navigation Act of 1912-1920. Bruce personally appeared to 
take the private shipowners' view on 'job control'; it had, he said, 
caused
incalculable loss, stoppages of vessels, and suffering 
to the community. 93
The owners, like the Prime Minister, gave an almost exclusive emphasis 
to 'job-control'. However, the shipowners were also demanding that
90 S.M.H., 15 July 1925.
91 S.M.H., 15 July 1925; Argus, 15 July 1925»
This became Act No. 8 of 1925» See Comm. Pari Deb., vol.110,pp.1009- 
1090; assent was received on 19 Aug. 1925 (see ibid., vol. Ill, 
P.1471).
93 S.M.H., 16 July 1925.
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94several of the conditions embodied in the late award he dropped.
While it might have been inaccurate of the shipowners to lay so heavy 
an emphasis on ‘job-control’ in their propaganda, it indicated a sound 
estimate of the strength of the rank and file, for ever since 1919? as 
we have said, 'job-control' had done a great deal to secure improved 
conditions for the seamen and to build up their self-confidence to 
the point where they engaged in union-wide strikes. And it soon be­
came clear that the private shipowners were wise in doubting whether 
officials of other unions could prevent seamen from taking direct action. 
True, the Sydney branch of the Waterside Workers' Federation had 
immediately shown that they adhered to the agreement signed with the
Commonwealth Shipping Line, and had unloaded ships manned by non- 
95unionist seamen; but other unions in Sydney and interstate quickly 
revealed that they would not follow suit. The Melbourne branch of the 
Wharf Labourers' Union refused to touch the ships manned by non-unionists. 
At a 'stormy* meeting of the Transport Workers' Group in Sydney, to 
which gas and electricity union representatives were specially invited,
Payment in lieu of annual holidays was to go, if asamen took 'job- 
action* or struck on a union-wide basis; the clause in the late 
award concerning overtime payment for late sailing was to be deleted 
as it was 'a fruitful cause of job-control' (S,M.H., 22 July 1925)« 
Monthly wage payments were to replace fortnightly payments; a sea­
man discharged for intoxication, disorderly conduct or other mis­
conduct was not to be entitled to be returned to the home port, nor 
to wages until his arrival there. Finally, and of particular import­
ance to the seamen, the roster system of engaging labor was to go.
95 S.M.H., 16, 18 July 1925.
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a 'general strike* was described as 'imminent* and 'certain'. In
Melbourne, 'Trades Hall officials declared,..that organised labour would
. q6stand solidly behind the seamen*, the Port Adelaide Trades and Labour
Council endorsed the seamen's cause and, following approval by a
'record attendance' of the Brisbane Trades and Labour Council, '[general
97strike conditions' were anticipated for the next day. Even W.H.
Seale, Sydney branch secretary of the W.W.F. and a member of the state 
A.L.P. executive where the majority were on good terms with Lang, claim­
ed that the owners were not attacking merely the seamen but 'maritime
98unions generally'; and very soon, the Sydney branch of the Waterside
Workers' Federation refused to go on unloading ships manned by non-
unionist seamen. Once more, then, the threat of extension manifested
itself, and by early August an agreement was reached which seems to
have been at least a partial victory for the seamen. The union won
its demand for the right to hold monthly stop-work meetings and to
ha.ve wages paid fortnightly. The seamen agreed to surrender iob-
control; but both seamen and owners knew that 'job-control' strikes
('wild-cat' strikes in the terms of more recent years) would not stop
while the seamen's union retained its self-confidence and its militant 
99leaders. However the union did surrender the roster system of
96
97
98
99
S_._M._H., 15 July 1925. 
S.M.H., 17 July 1925* 
S.M.H., 21 July 1925.
Not long after this, Thomas Walsh, seamen's secretary, ceased 
to be a militant.
289
supplying labor and the pick-up place was to be that desired by the 
shipowners, which made a union-controlled roster system difficult, if 
not impossible. Rank and file seamen in Sydney were at first surly 
(some charging marine transport union officials with accenting bribes), 
and some, supported by Jacob Johnson, their assistant-secretary, made 
a bid to resume the strike. Considerable bitterness was directed to­
wards marine transport officials, many of whom, including R.J. Heffron, 
an intimate of J.S. Garden and a Trades Hall red, had drawn very close 
to Lang:
an industrial upheaval of the first magnitude was only 
averted by the timely and statesmanlike intervention of 
the Premier, Mr. Lang, and... Sir William Clarkson,,of the 
Commonwealth Shipping Board. Mr. Lang’s threat to 
inaugurate a line of State ships played a considerable 
part in bringing the private shipowners into line. 102
100 S .M .H . , 3 Aug. 1 925? Argus , 1 Aug. 1925»
101 S.M.H., 5, 7 Aug. 1925.
S.M.H.102 5 Aug. 1925
(The Railroad, 10 July 1926)
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Lang in Office August 1925 - February 1926
Industrial peace was Lang's demand and his industrial followers 
did their Lest for him. But the restiveness of much of the rank and 
file could not go unnoticed by Lang or by his union-official supporters. 
W.H. Seale, for example, could be considered as one of Lang’s keenest 
supporters in 1925? yet he had not been able to prevent the Sydney Wharf 
Labourers' Union, of which he was secretary, from rejoining the stoppage 
developing in early August. After Lang had passed the legislation of 
his first parliamentary session (a packed program of reforms with a 
marked trade union bias), the Australian Railways’ Union announced that 
it would- hold a banquet for him, and there present to him that tradit­
ional labor token for services rendered, an 'illuminated address'.
But before Lang had passed this most controversial legislation, the 
Railways' Union Gazette carried comments on Lang's administration (and 
even upon Lang in person) in terms ranging from wary, contemptuous to 
mildly threatening.^7
We have mentioned the Sydney Wharf Labourers and the New South 
Wales branch of the Australian Railways' Union. In both, the rank and 
file were militantly inclined on industrial matters; in both, the rank
Railways' Union Gazette, 10 July 1926.
Railways' Union Gazette, 9 July 1924? 9 April, 10 May, 11 July,
10 Aug., 10 Sept. 1925* For example, on 9 April: 'The history of 
parliamentary practice is too often marked by the shuffles of Labor 
politicians on vital industrial planks of Labor policy'; and on
11 July 1925i 'Rise to the occasion, Mr Lang, and display the nec­
essary degree of "backbone" to safeguard the interests of those 
whom your party presumes to represent.'
103
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and file were responsive to left-wing political viewpoints. While we 
argue that unionist industrial militancy and political radicalism helped 
influence Lang to pass controversial legislation long demanded by the 
affiliated unions, we certainly do not claim that the rank and file 
were the sole influence upon Lang. An important role was played by 
such men as A.E. Chapman, a non-Communist socialist considerably in­
fluenced by early experiences in the Independent Labor Party of Great 
Britain, who in 1924 became acting state secretary of the Railways’ 
U n i o n . P r o m  late 1921, moreover, the returned secret Communists 
and the A.L.P.- oriented open Communists had focussed propaganda upon 
the A.L.P. and the affiliated unions, and this affected officials as 
well as rank and file. Such influences as these need to be kept in 
mind when one seeks explanations for Lang's most controversial and 
pro-unionist administrative and legislative achievments, most of which 
fell between July 1925 and January 1926. As this period drew to a 
close, the conservatively inclined Land commented, under the head 
'Socialism In Our Time':
The things which the Lang Government is doing are so
bad that they could not be any worse if his Cabinet
had been chosen by the Communists... he 'repudiates'. 106
Labor's pre-election speeches seemed to indicate (wrongly, as
it turned out) that any Labor administration elected would closely
resemble the Storey administration. As with Storey's pre-election
Chapman was also one of the pioneers of the Shop Steward Movement 
in Britain. (Railways' Union Gazette, 9 Sept. 1924).
106 The Land, 15 Jan. 1926
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speeches, promises for legislation favouring the industrialists were
107swamped by promises of generally ameliorative measures. Lang
108pointedly ignored the socialisation objective, and A.C. Willis de­
fended him with spirit for this omission. Lang also went out of his
109way to repudiate the Communists. This might have appeared unnecess­
ary, since the Communists stood six candidates of their own against the 
A.L.P. But it was already common repute that Lang had the support of 
union officials known as by no means unfriendly to the Communists, and 
it was possibly no secret that Garden, even while standing as a Commun­
ist candidate, was rallying the Trades Hall in support of Lang.110 
Thus Lang’s reputation moved relentlessly to the left, though he was 
a leftist malgre lui if ever there were one. Said the Australian 
National Review, peculiarly well informed, as has been said, on the 
A.L.P.’s most intimate affairs:
It is difficult to imagine Mr. Lang clumsily carving 
up bank directors and corner shopkeepers with a 
Bolsh j~sic~] sword... He seems an inoffensive suburban sort 
of a person; but you never know! Ill
While the election campaign lacked colour by comparison with
107
108
109
110 
111
Labor Daily, 2 May 1925; A.W., 6 May 1925, for Lang’s policy speech 
at the Auburn Town Hall. Round Table (vol.l6, p.625) commented upon 
the ’moderation' of Lang's pre-election policy statements.
At Newcastle and at Wollongong, centres of industrial militancy, 
Lang did make reference to the Socialisation objective, claiming 
that socialisation was ultimately the goal (A.W., 27 May 1925).
e.g. at Temora, 15 May 1925 (A.W., 20 May 1925)»
See chapter V, note 50»
A.N.R., 13 Mar. 1925*
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that of March 1922, electors were evidently interested, for a slightly
greater percentage of enrolled electors voted in 1925 than in 1 922.
For the ninety seats available, there were 280 candidates and ase in
1920 and 1 9 2 2, voting was conducted under the system of proportional
112representation. The Labor Party formed the new government, with a
majority of two seats and the hope of support from one independent
Labor member. The new government moved fast and in August the Australian
National Review sounded an alarm. By ’ministerial fiat or Executive
Council minute... j_the Lang administration! is upsetting much of the
113work of its predecessors.' In early September, Attorney-General
E.A. McTiernan introduced a Bill for the Abolition of Capital Punishment11^
its
and^subsequent rejection by the Legislative Council prompted caucus to
115give Lang unanimous support in abolishing the Council. Labor met
with more success in a far more controversial piece of legislation, 
the Forty-Four Hours Week Bill, introduced by J.M. Baddeley, Minister 
for Labour and Industry, on 9 September.11^
112
113
114
115
116
For the members of the first Lang Ministry, see N.S.W. Pari.Deb., 
vol.lOl, p.vii.
A.N.R., 18 Aug. 1925«
N.S.W. Pari.Deb., 101, p.4 8 4, p.528-534» 2 Sept. See also pp.553- 
584; 612-639; {9 Sep.) p.719-768 (10 Sept.1 9 2 5). While McTiernan 
said 'The object of this bill is to take out of the law of New 
South Wales the death penalty' (ibid., p.528) T. Bavin, Leader of the 
Opposition argued (p.720) that the death penalty should be retained 
but limited to murder in the first degree.
Labor Daily, 17 Oct. 1925*
N.S.W. Pari. Deb., vol.lOl, pp.651-690 (9 Sept.192 5); vol 102, pp. 
819-901 (16 Sept. 1925); vol.102, pp.1082-1122 (29 Sept.); pp.1153- 
1179 (30 Sept.); pp.1202-1217 (1 Oct. 1925); vol.104, p.2715 (l Dec. 
1 9 2 5); vol.105» p .3629 (l8 Dec. 1925-Royal Assent reported).
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There was to he an eight-hour day, and a forty-four hour
week, though if a five-day week were desired, employees might he asked
117to work more than eight hours in one day. Where wages were paid on
an hourly or daily basis, they were to he increased so that the employee
would receive the same amount for forty four hours as he had for
forty eight. About a third of the state's work force worked under a
ll8federal award, but state parliament over-rode Commonwealth Arbitration 
Court decisions here, in that it asserted that standard hours in federal 
award cases were to be forty four, where in many if not most cases 
they had been forty eight. However, where forty eight hours were al­
ready being worked under a federal award, employers were not specific­
ally required to reduce these to forty four but instead, if wishing 
to persist in asking for a forty eight hour week, they had to pay a 
wage increase for the last four hours by way of recognising the new 
standard and compensating workers. As opposed to the procedure laid 
down by the Storey administration in 1920, unions did not have to app­
roach the Arbitration Court in order to argue for the shorter hours, as
Baddeley announced that forty four hours was to be introduced by proc-
119lamation in all industries.
Act No.l6, 1925? Clause 6.
l-l8 For this calculation, see the claim by the Vice-President of the 
N.S.W. Executive Council, A.C. Willis, in N.S.W.Parl.Deb.,vol.Ill, 
P.2376, 23 Mar. 1927» Willis's figure is supported by opposition 
member, J. Ashton.
119 N.S.W. Pari.Deb., vol. 101, p. 65I; A.W., 16 Sep. 1925
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W.E. Wearne, a leading spokesman for the Progressive Party,
warned in opposing the measure that members on his side of the House
120would 'fight it at every stage', one argument being that the work-
121ing man already had enough leisure. An important argument for the
measure was that the economy would benefit from reduced hours and that
increased productivity would follow:
If Henry Ford can make a success of his works with the 
forty-four hours week, then it can fairly be put forward 
as an argument in favour of its introduction elsewhere. 122
As argued in parliament, Labor's ground was thus that of their parlia-
121mentary opponents, of the employers, and of the Arbitration Courts.
Some days before the Bill was introduced, Labor Party caucus 
decided to include shearers in the Bill, even though shearers were 
covered by a federal saward. Caucus decided to place the onus on employ­
ers to go to Court to prove that industries covered by a federal award 
could not be included in state legislation. This reflected, the wide-
120
121
122
123
N.S.W. Pari. Deb., vol.101, p.652. For opposition reasons, see 
ibid., pp. 658, 662 and 664.
The Nationalist member Scott Fell said: 'Surely it is not suggested 
for one moment that forty-four hours is too long a period to work 
out of a total of 168 hours. It still leaves 120 hours, and allow­
ing eight hours for sleep... there still remain sixty four hours 
for recreation. How much more does a working-man want ... We may 
all be inclined to make things easier, but how can you possibly give 
these men easier conditions than they now enjoy under the basic 
wage.' (N.S.W. Pari. Deb., vol.101, p.669, 9 Sept. 1925).
Ibid., p. 654» c.f. M.A.Davidson, at ibid., p.657«
Cf. also the argument for the forty four hours' week in the pam­
phlet The Case for the Forty Four Hours Working Week, by Matt Hade, 
Issued by the..labor Council, Sydney, July 1926 (j.A. Ferguson Coll.).
29k
soread feeling s.raongst Labor Party followers that rural workers were as 
much entitled to the benefits of the Forty Four Hours Act as were others.
To secure these however, the government needed to make specific pro­
vision for the rural workers, as in 1922 the Fuller administration had 
excluded them from the Industrial Arbitration Act. Thus, when the Lang 
Government was drafting legislation to amend the Industrial Arbitration 
Act in 1925, a deputation from the A.W.U. waited upon J.M. Baddeley, 
Minister for Labour and Industry, and urged him to make provisions to 
bring rural workers under the new Act. Baddeley agreed to this and 
rural workers were provided for in Clause 24b of the amendments to 
the Industrial Arbitration Act drafted concurrently with the Forty Four 
Hours’ Week Act. But on 5 November the Labor Daily reported that the 
Government had accepted an amendment to the Forty Four Hours' Act in 
the Legislative Council which excluded rural workers from the Act.
Since late October, Dr. Kater, former president of the Graziers' 
Association and prominent member of the Legislative Council, had ex­
pressed his concern over Labor's ambiguous statements in the Council on 
the rural workers. On 21 October, Kater said to Willis, Labor's leader 
in the Council:
You say this bill does not apply to rural industries. By 
'rural industries' do you mean all industries connected 
with working the land, including the pastoral industry?
Kater was not put at ease when Willis replied:
I have gone very carefully into the point you put to me
the other day and I think I shall be able to satisfy you. 124
124 N.S.W. Pari. Deb., vol. 102, p.1710
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and so later, Kater said:
Whether all rural workers are excluded under the hill or 
not is somewhat obscure, and it is further obscured by 
reason of another bill which will shortly reach us with 
regard to industrial arbitration, as the two have to be 
read together... 125
Consequently on 4 November, Kater moved an Amendment which had the
effect of definitively excluding from the Act rural workers subject
126to federal awards. This Amendment became clause 5 of the Act itself.
Thus partly at least to steer the bill through the Legislative Council,
Willis had controverted caucus’s decision on the matter and nullified
Baddeley's assurances to the A.W.U. deputation. Exclusion of the rural
workers, no doubt made easier by the antagonism of metropolitan and
mining unions towards the A.W.U., provoked understandable bitterness
in the labor movement, while in parliament, leader of the Opposition
Bavin taunted the Labor Party for excluding the rural workers.
It is perfectly clear ... that if honourable members 
opnosite had the courage - which they have not - to 
apply the provisions of this bill to rural industries, 
the cost of production in our primary industries would 
be increased. 127
But P.P. Loughlin, deputy leader of the Labor Party, strongly supported
exclusion of the rural workers:
Suppose you had a crop ready for the harvest. How could 
you apply a forty-four hours working week? 128
125
126
127
128
Ibid., vol. 103, p. 1955, 29 Oct. 1925.
Ibid., vol. 103, p. 208l, 4 Nov. 1925; A.W., 11 Nov. 1925. 
N.S.W. Par1.Deb., vol. 102, p.895, 17 Sept. 1925- 
Op.cit., p.896.
Assent to the Forty Four Hours' Week Act was reported on 17 December
1925, and the Act was proclaimed on 4 January 1926. Almost immediately
it became clear that many employers were not prepared to accept the
shorter week; in January 1926 the Northern Metal Trades' Employers'
Association declared that its members intended to retain a forty eight
hour week, pending a possible application to the High Court, The
story of the forty four hour week now shifts, however, to the legal and
industrial field; the Lang administration had done its job.
On 23 Sentember 1925> W. McKell, Minister for Justice, intro-
129duced the Fair Rents Amendment Bill, which, in the words of Round
Table, imposed 'drastic restrictions on the management of house 
*130property... ~ Nationalist opposition was strong; A.C. Willis, Labor
Lea.der in the Legislative Council, accused the Nationalists of trying
131to construct a new bill under pretext of amending the Government's.
But irritated over Legislative Council opposition to Labor measures,
Labor caucus instructed Lang as early as October to secure enough new
Labor appointees to Council to abolish it. By December moves to this
end were known to be well under way, and these had some effect in
modifying Council opposition to the Fair Rents Act. Assent to the
132Act was received on 10 December. ~ The report on the work of the
N.S.W. Pari.Deb., vol.102,pp.975-977,pp.1337-1375 (7 Oct.),pp.1435- 
1468 (8" Oct. J7""pp.1492-1518 (13 Oct.); pp.1548-1562 (14 Oct.), 
vol. 103, pp.2126-2129 (4 Nov.).
Round Table, vol. 16, p.625.
131 AJ., 9 Dec. 1925.
132 N.S.W. Pari.Deb., vol.106, p.20
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Metropolitan Fair Rents' Court for the year 1928-29 showed that net
percentage reductions in rent during 1925-1927 were substantially
133greater than at any time since the court was set up in 1916.
On 13 October the Minister for Labour and Industry, J.M. 
Baddeley, introduced the controversial Rural Workers' Accommodation 
Bill.^^ Baddeley claimed that Queensland had made similar legislative 
provision for rural workers for twenty years, and New Zealand for ten 
years. In August the Labor Party had appointed M. Swiney, an A.W.U. 
official, to be Inspector of Hut Accommodation for shearers and, accord­
ing to the new Bill, he would be joined later by one further inspector; 
thus at long last the A.W.U. had succeeded in its efforts to remove 
inspections from the hands of the police, the arrangement under earlier 
versions of this Bill. All premises employing no fewer than five 
rural workers were to be covered by this Bill which, unlike an earlier 
and similar Queensland Bill, covered agricultural and dairying indust­
ries as well as 'buildings, stores and works'. The Progressive and 
Nationalist Parties were greatly disturbed by the Bill. Captain Chaffey, 
for example, said:
N.S.W. Year Book, 1928-29, p.757.
N.S.W. Pari.Deb., vol.l02,pp. 1487-1492; vol. 104, pp.3044-3077 
(8 Dec. 1925)? P.3130-3151 (9Dec.); vol.105,p.4039-4041 (13 Jan. 
1926); vol. 106, p.41 (10 Feb. 1926); p.304, 18 Feb. 1926.
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It is reasonable to ask why this extreme step has been 
taken in this State to embarrass every small farmer or 
person engaged in agriculture, dairying, or fruit or 
vegetable growing, upon whom the Minister will enforce 
peculiar and drastic conditions which will make it im­
possible for such persons to continue in their calling. 135
The Legislative Council opposed the Bill so strongly that it did not
become law until 27 September, 1926.
The Australian Railways' Union had kept up aielentless pressure
on Lang to have certain of its demands implemented,and had secured
the help of the Labor Council on those concerning the consequences of 
137the 1917 defeat. In September 1925? it was revealed in parliament 
that Lang had ordered the Railway Commissioners to restore seniority
1 T O
to the 1917 strikers in the railway service. “ The Chief Judge in 
Equity then declared that the action of the Railway Commissioners in 
downgrading the loyalists of 1917 was illegal and therefore on 29 
October 1925 the government hastily passed a Bill bestowing this power 
upon the Railway Commissioners.'*'^ '[sjummarily rejected' by the
Legislative Council, the measure was passed despite considerable
135
136
137
138
139
N.S.W. Pari.Deb., vol.104, p.3 0 4 8, 8 Dec. 1925.
See, for example, the Railways' Union Gazette, 9 Jan. 1925? 10 May 
1925, 10 Aug. 1925.
Minutes, Exec. Meeting, Labor Council, 25 Aug. 1925»
N.S.W. Pari. Deb., vol.101, p.709? 10 Sept.1925. Question by Poster 
10 Sept. 1 9 2 5? for a facsimile of Lang's minute on the subject 
to the Railway Commissioners, see Labor Daily, 15 July 1925»
N.S.W. Pari.Deb., vol. 103? pp.1997-2016 'a bill to validate 
certain actions of the Railways Commissioners for New South Wales..
Round Table, vol.16, p.628; A.W., 25 Nov. 1925»
140
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opposition,^ ^  and only after the new Lahor appointees took their seats,
142receiving the Royal Assent on 12 January 1926.J Other consequences
of the 1917 defeat were also removed, owing to persistent union press­
ure: for example, five 'bogus' unions were eliminated by the Industrial 
Arbitration (Amendment) Act, which also replaced the state Arbitration 
Court and Board of Trade by an Industrial Commission and Conciliation 
Committees. " The 'bogus' unions had been set up after the 1°17 defeat 
and, in the words of H.V. Evatt, labor regarded them as 'creatures of 
the Commissioners'.
The Workers' Compensation Bill, '... more liberal to workmen
145than that of any other English-speaking country,' one of the most 
acclaimed, andiesented measures of Lang's most controversial session,
"I a kT
was introduced on 4 November 1925» The Principal Act had previously
See, for example, the pamphlet Victimisation of the 1917 Loyalists. 
rnve Tistory of Ore of the most Discreditable oisodes in the Ad­
ministration of th< ! ■ -overnment. Published by the National 
Association of N.S.W., Sydney, 1926 (J.A. Ferguson Collection).
N .S .W . Pari. Deb., vo1.105 , p.3944.
N.S.W. Pari. Deb., vol.102, pp.1423-1428, (8 Oct. 192^pp. 159O-I642 
(15 Oct. 19257; Pp.1657-1694 (20 Oct.); Pp.1719-1762 (21 Oct.); vol. 
103, pp.I802-I826 (22 Oct.); pp.1838-1873 (27 Oct.); p.1911 (28 Oct.). 
On 10 February the Bill was re-introduced at the stage at which it 
had been interrupted by the close of the session; vol.1 0 6,pp.117-129  
(ll Feb.1926), p .6 2 9 (5 March 1 9 2 6). See also a pamphlet by J.M. 
Baddeley, A Brief Review of the Industrial Arbitration (Amendment)
Act,1926. Govt. Printer, Sydney, 1926 (j.A. Ferguson collection).
144 A.W., 21 Oct. 1925.
Round Table, vol.l6, p.625.
For its purpose, see N.S.W. Pari.Deb., vol.103,p.2130, Baddeley,
4 Nov. 1925* For debates on the Act; vol.103,p. 2130/2, 2355-2401 
(18 Nov. 1925),pp.2431-2472 (19 Nov.); vol.104,pp.2603-2638 (30 Nov.): 
2693-2714 (1 Dec.1925); 2855-2860 (3 Dec.1925); vol.106, p .41  
(10 Feb. 1926); pp.58l-600; assent reported, vol.107, p.l6 
(22 Sept. 1926).
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e x c l u d e d  p e r s o n s  e a r n i n g  more t h a n  £525 a y e a r ,  h u t  t h e  l i m i t  u n d e r
t h e  new B i l l  was t o  he £750? though  t h e r e  was t o  he no l i m i t  f o r
147p e r s o n s  engaged  i n  manual  l a b o u r ;  th e  B i l l  i n c r e a s e d  th e  w eek ly  
maximum amount o b t a i n a b l e  f rom £3 t o  £5.  A l l  em p loyers  were t o  con­
t r i b u t e  j o i n t l y  t o  a fu n d  ou t  o f  w hich  c o m p e n sa t io n  payments w e r e  t o  
be made; t h i s  was n e c e s s a r y  b e c a u s e ,  when d i s e a s e  was c o n t r a c t e d  by a 
g r a d u a l  p r o c e s s  and em ployees  had meanwhi le changed  t h e i r  j o b s ,  i t  
was f e l t  i m p o s s i b l e  t o  d e t e r m in e  w h e th e r  any p a r t i c u l a r  employment 
had c a u s e d  t h e  i n c a p a c i t y .  B adde ley  p ro p o s e d  t o  c o v e r  ' a n y  d i s e a s e  
o f  any  k i n d  p r o v i d i n g  i t  ["was | an i n d u s t r i a l  d i s e a s e E m p l o y e r s  
were co m p e l l e d  t o  i n s u r e  em ployees  u n l e s s ,  o v e r  a p e r i o d  o f  t h r e e  y e a r s ,  
t h e  wages b i l l  a v e r a g e d  l e s s  t h a n  £20 ,000  a y e a r .  The w eek ly  maximum 
c o m p e n s a t io n  was a l s o  t o  be g i v e n ,  as  i n  th e  Q u een s lan d  A c t ,  f o r  i n j u r y  
s u s t a i n e d  on t h e  way t o  o r  f rom t h e  p l a c e  of  employment.  A Compensa tion  
Commission was t o  be e s t a b l i s h e d ,  w i t h  t h r e e  members: a ch a i rm a n ,  one 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  f rom th e  em p loyers  and one f rom e m p lo y ees .  M i n i s t e r  
f o r  Labour  and  I n d u s t r y  B ad d e ley  e x p l a i n e d  t h a t  t h e  ' f u n d a m e n ta l
149p r i n c i p l e '  o f  t h e  B i l l  was th e  i d e a  t h a t  i n d u s t r y  s h o u l d  b e a r  t h e  c o s t .  
Members o f  th e  O p p o s i t i o n  t o o k  a s e r i o u s  view o f  th e  l e g i s l a t i o n .
H osk ins  c l a im e d  t h a t  t h e  B i l l  would mean ' t h a t  t h e r e  w i l l  p r a c t i c a l l y
N.S.W. P a r i . Deb. ,  v o l .  103 ,  p . 2365 . 
I b i d . , p .  2362.
147
148
149 N.S.W. P a r i . D e b . , v o l .  103,  p .  2357,  18 Nov. 1925
303
be no employment', and that competition with Victoria, already diff­
icult because of the forty four hour week legislation, would become 
more severe. Hoskins also claimed that workmen's compensation in 
Broken Hill had given rise to 'unrest, unemployment and dissatisfaction'
there, and finally alleged that friendly societies and insurance
. 150 companies would be placed in a 'very bad position' by the Bill.
It was claimed that the Bill would cause concern to farmers, and would
have 'disastrous effects' in the timber industry: one hundred sawmills,
151for example, were alleged to have closed down.
Opposition to the Bill was by no means confined to the 
Nationalists, the Progressives and the sawmillers. What made it much 
more serious for the A.L.P. was that opposition was also strong with­
in the Party, and within caucus. Rawson, indeed, cites the case of
a protest deputation comprising sawmillers and members of the Timber 
152Workers'* Union. The Workers' Compensation Bill did much to con­
solidate caucus opposition to Lang, and to revive the latterly quiescent 
faction struggle within the A.L.P.
The Widows' Pension Bill, introduced on 26 November 1925» was 
to become one of Lang's chief claims to radicalism. Of the measure,
Lang claimed:
Ibid., pp. 2396 - 2397.
151 S.M.H., 5,30 June, 2 July 1926.
’V
152 Rawson, op.cit., p.105/6, quoting S.M .H., 17 Aug. 1925«
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It lifts the widow and her children out of the furrow 
of charity, and it places her on a pedestal where she is in 
the position of having her rights granted to her by the 
people of the State.... 153
While some of the parliamentary Opposition denounced the Bill as 'soul-
destroying' Opposition leader T. Bavin made the possibly more
effective point that, in his election speeches, Lang had promised
pensions to widows, whereas the Bill gave money only to widows with 
155children. A widow with children was to receive £1 a week for
156herself and 10s. for each child, provided that, at the time of his
death, her husband had lived in New South Wales.
The legislation passed between August 1925 and February 1926
. 157was, as a recent writer has said, 'genuine Labor legislation', but 
one major defeat was suffered - the attempt to abolish the Legislative 
Council. The first Labor appointees refused to abolish the Council, 
and the Governor, Sir Dudley de Chair, would not appoint a second batch.
N.S.W. Pari. Deb., vol.104, p.2768, 2 Dec. 1925.
A.W., 2 Dec. 1925: cf. the A.N.R., 17 July 1925, which labelled 
the measure Lang's 'Merry Widows' Endowment Act', and described 
the measure as a 'bribe', a gift with 'no moral or economic 
justification.'
N.S.W. Pari. Deb., vol. 104, p. 2770.
156 Lang admitted that more generous provisions might have been made, 
but said that he could not see how the appropriate taxes could 
be raised (ibid., p. 2766).
R.S. Parker, in Chapter 2, p.93, of The Government of the 
Australian States.
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The Legislative Council had not offered really formidable
opposition to Lang’s earliest measures. Round Table suggests that
the Council held itself 'bound.' to pass bills such as the Forty Four
Hours' Week Bill and the Widows' Pension Bill because these had
158'received popular approval'. And as Evatt points out, the Legis­
lative Council often tended to pass radical measures in the early
cart of a parliament's three-year life, and reject them as time went 
159on. ' Additionally, moreover, the question of the Council's abolition 
had been very much in the spotlight in New South Wales since at least 
1913, while in 1920 the Queensland Legislative Council had in fact 
been 'swamped' with Labor appointees with whose help that body was 
abolished. Further, in late 1925 'the New South Wales A.L.P. had an 
appearance of unusual determination and unity, with the faction war 
temporarily somewhat subdued and the affiliated unions in a position 
of unusual strength within the party organisation.
In October, caucus instructed Lang to make new Labor appoint­
ees to Council, with a view to abolishing that body; Labor feeling 
ran high, and Lang moved swiftly.1^0 On 21 December, Governor Sir 
Dudley de Chair told Lang he would accept the twenty five Labor men
Vol. 16, p. 630.
H.V. Evatt, Australian Labour Leader. The Story of W.A. Holman 
and the Labour Movement, p. 336.
A.W., 21 Oct. 1925; N.S.W. Pari. Deb., vol. 103, p.1898, 28 Oct. 
1925; Labor Daily, 10 Dec. 1925»
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suggested, for the Legislative Council,“" ’ But immediate doubt was
apparent in parliament as to whether the new appointees would in fact
162vote for Council's abolition, and a Bill for abolition, passed by
the Assembly, was rejected a month later by the Legislative Council,
'owing, in part at least, to the defection of several Labour support-
ers' . The government then tried to obtain further appointments to
give it a definite majority in the C o u n c i l , b u t  on 4 March 1926, the
Governor declined to make further appointments, exercising what he
166believed were his discretionary powers in the matter.
The story of Lang's 'heroic' period thus fades out on a 
note of impending trouble. But however modest they look from the 
vantage point of the 1960s, for Australia in the 1920s Lang's first 
months were months of radical and trade-union-oriented administrative 
and legislative acts, taking place in a party climate directly influen­
ced by the Trades Hall reds and the Communist Party, and indirectly 
influenced by the prevailing working class mood of radicalism and 
militancy.
161
162 
163
164
165
H.V. Evatt, The King and his Dominion Governors. A Study of the 
Reserve Powers of the Crown in Great Britain and the Dominions, 
p.121; Labor Daily, 21 Dec. 1925»
N.S.W. Pari. Deb., vol. 105, p.3803, 3832, 22 and 23 Dec. 1925.
Evatt, op.cit., p.121; Labor Daily, 20 Jan. 1926; N.S.W. Pari.Deb., 
vol.105, pp.4174-4201, 20 Jan. 1926, 4253-4294, 21 Jan.,4337-4366, 
22 Jan. 1926; vol. 106, p. 305» Presumably the eighteen preferred 
to absent themselves rather than vote against the Bill.
The Land, 5 Feb. 1926.
Evatt, The King and his Dominion Governors,pp. 122-130.
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The A.L.P. Faction Struggle in the Months of Land's 
Most Controversial Legislation
In turning hack to the A.L.P. faction struggle in 1925? one
notes that Lang's trouble with both executive and caucus antedated
the controversial legislation of the months between August 1925 and
February 1926, but was still comparatively mild in this earlier time,
when compared with the later storms.
criticised
At the end of 1924? "the Labor Council had 1 nved 1111, gs=b.
166the Labor Daily," Willis's 'mouthpiece' and official organ of the
criticismLabor Party in New South Wales. The A.W.U. supported this auav.c, never
having reconciled itself to the Lang-Willis victory of 1923. When, in
1 f)7accords,nee with A.L.P. rules, Willis resigned the party presidency
upon his accession to the Legislative Council (and cabinet), E.C. Magrath,
of the Printing Industry Employees' Union, became the new president
on 9 July, his chief support on the executive coming from James Tyrell,
of the Municipal Workers' Union. Anticipating danger at the 1925
annual conference from that A.W.U.- left-wing coalition which had been
seen in late 1921 and at conference in 1923? the Tyrell-Magrath faction
on the executive first postponed annual conference to a date to be
168decided in June and then, when June arrived, joined with Willis in
Minutes Gen.Meeting, Labor Council, 4 Dec. 1924? A .W ., 21 Jan.1925? 
Railways' Union Gazette, 9 Jan.1925. The move failed from lack of 
support from individual unions (Labor Daily,14?15 Jan.;9 July 1925). 
On 9 July, for instance, the newly elected state council of the 
A.R.U. was reported as rescinding a motion declaring the paper 
'black'. For what led up to the Labor Council's 'black ban', see 
Minutes, Gen.Meeting, Labor Council, 13 Nov., 20 Nov. 1924«
Labor Daily, 10 July 1925*
Ibid., 22 Jan. 1925*
167
168
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169persuading the executive to abandon it altogether.'' Fuel was added 
to smouldering discontent when E.C. Magrath and J. Tyrell were appoin­
ted to the Legislative Council and refused to resign their executive 
170positions. The refusal ran counter to Rules 32 and 34 of the A.L.P.
constitution in New South Wales, hut Magrath claimed support for their 
action in a 1921 ruling by W.H. Lambert, then president of the A.L.P., 
that a member of the Legislative Council was not a member of parliament. 
It was pointed out, however, that A.C. Willis had ruled at the 1923
171conference that Legislative Councillors were members of parliament.
As Lang’s legislative program unfolded in late 1925, to these 
sources of discontent were added A.W.U. resentment over Lang's part­
iality towards city unionists, and growing caucus unrest. Caucus 
had long resented Lang's tendency to ignore the official Parliamentary 
body and take his main counsels from a few intimates such as Willis 
and Seale. Now, in addition, caucus began to reflect country and 
city business dissatisfaction with measures such as the Forty four
169 For the official reasons given, see A.W., 24 June 1925; Australian 
Labor Party>State of New South Wales, Report of the Executive, 
for the Years 1924 and 1925? P*5* For a parliamentary comment, see 
Hill, in N.S.W. Pari. Deb., vol. 101, p.234, 19 Aug.1925: 'Why 
has it not met? They know as I do that if the conference met the 
communists would be in charge of it.'
A.W., 5 Aug. 1925.
Workers' Weekly, 28 Aug. 1925*
170
171
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Fours Week Act, the Workers' Compensation Act , and the Hut Accommoda­
tion Act. A further source of trouble lay in the still current scandals
of the years 1920 to 1923; charge and counter-charge, investigations
172and counter-investigations, had raged throughout 1924«
Responding to right-wing discontent over his too prolonged 
and too wholehearted partisanship for the industrialists, in November 
1925 Lang made his first efforts to cut adrift from the moderate 
industrialists led by Seale and Willis.
In November, Lang along with C.C. Lazzarini and Peter Lough- 
lin, was purportedly identified with a motion before the A.L.P. exec­
utive sponsored by J. Tyrell, a motion refusing affiliation to any
union linked with the Labor Council during such time as the Council
173remained affiliated to the Third International. ~ P.F. Loughlin, 
deputy leader of the Labor Party in the Legislative Assembly, endorsed 
Tyrell's motion, adding his opinion that the ban should also apply to 
unions which, while not affiliated to the Labor Council, admitted 
Communists to their ranks. At this time also, Lang refused to sit upon 
the directorate of the Labor Daüly while J.S. Garden, now a Communist
See A.W.U. Convention. Ballot Box Ennu.rv. Rebate £ Decision, 
Worker Print, 1925? a pamphlet in the Ferguson Collection; see 
also the A.W., 18 Mar.; 15 Apr. 1925« In May 1925 the notorious 
'blue' pamphlet was published, full of scandalous allegations. 
See N.S.W. Pari. JDeb., vol. 102, p.1070 (29 Sept. 1925); p.1245 
(6 Oct.); p .1588 (15 Oct.).
173 A.W., 25 Nov., 2, 9 Lee. 1925; Labor Laily, 21 Nov., 5 Lee. 1925»
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in the process of withdrawing from the Communist Party, represented
174the Lahor Council on that body. A little later, revealing his
(at least momentary) alignment with Loughlin, Lang attacked the Lahor
175Council for its Communist associations.
Tyrell's immediate aim was doubtless as the Australian Worker 
suggested: 'to capture [~the~"| N .S .W. Labor conference', or more precisely,
perhaps, to prevent its capture by a coalition between the A.W.U. and 
the left. But Lang saw in the motion his own opportunity to escape 
the grip of the moderate industrialists. However, the exclusion sought 
would have seriously weakened the A.L.P., since so many affiliated 
unions were members of the Labor Council, and Willis opposed Tyrell's 
move in caucus:
The Australian Labor Party will be well advised to remedy 
the defects of its organisation, and consolidate - not dis­
rupt - its industrial foundations. 176
The A.W.U. had immediately suggested that Tyrell's motion would weaken
the A.L.P., so widespread were pro-Communist and Communistic sympathies
among the unionists. How, asked the Australian Worker, would one have
177identified the Communists; did they have 'green hair'? Soon after 
this, some A.L.P. executive members abandoned their support of Tyrell; 
as opposition grew, the executive shelved the matter, Lang stepped aside 
from the combat, and the affair petered out.
174 Labor Daily, 24 Nov. I*12 S'.
175 Ibid., 25 Nov. M S .
176 A,W., 2 Dec. 1925.
177 Ibid.
But Willis had taken the onslaught seriously, and he set out
to rally the labor movement against Tyrell and Loughlin, thus wooing 
Lang back to the fold of the moderate industrialists. As he had done 
in 1921, when wanting to put pressure on the right wing, Willis instig-
1 rjQ
ated moves for an all-Australian trade union congress; then, on
1 December, at Willis's instigation, the Labor Daily alleged that the
parliamentary opposition were trying to bribe several Labor members;
a little before this, Willis appears to have 'staged' a carefully
179arranged 'raid' on the premises of the Labor Daily. This series of
quickfire moves is understandable: Willis feared for his head and not
merely because of his militancy between 1919 and 1921. In 1925 he was
still identified with the left, not just by his own militant followers
in the miners' federation, but also in the public eye. In November 1925
he had underscored this identification by employing as his private
l80secretary the well-known ex-Communist Emil Voigt. Thus Willis took 
a very serious view of Loughlin's attack and the identification with 
it of Lang, who had once run in factional harness with Loughlin and 
could do it again. Willis had good reason to fear, for when the final 
crisis came for the Lang administration in 1927» caucus did demand, 
above all, Willis's head, essentially because Willis was irrevocably 
identified with and blamed for Lang's industrialist penchant.
Labor Daily, 2 Dec. 1925»
179 Labor Daily, 12 Nov. 1925; N.S.W. Pari. Deb., vol.103, p.2251; 
vol. 104, p. 3218.
-I Or\ For parliamentary comment on the appointment, see N.S.W. Pari.Deb, 
vol. 103, p. 2555, 26 Nov. 1925.
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Between August 1925 and February 1926 the Lang Administration 
had to its credit the achievement, or the serious attempt to achieve, 
long-pursued liberal and trade-union demands: the abolition of capital
L
punishment; a fair rent act giving tenants more substantial protection 
than any earlier form of this legislation; a rural workers' accommoda­
tion act; removal of disabilities unionists still suffered as a result 
of 1917; a workers' compensation act, a widows' pension act, and a 
forty four hours week act.
The passage of such measures put an end to the still-lingering
concord between Lang and Peter Loughlin, deputy-leader of caucus, and
foremost spokesman for the right wing in caucus. Among the most
prominent of those who insisted on the measures were A.L.P. executive
members such as W.H. Seale and W.J. Mills of the Waterside Workers,
J.M. Baddeley and A.C. Willis in cabinet, and officials of affiliated
unions such as R. Corish of the Australian Railways' Union, and W.
Padgen of the Amalgamated Engineers' Union. The first phase of Lang's
legislation was linked with the return of the left to the A.L.P., a
tta-n
process which by 1925 had. been in operation for more ^ three years. By 
1925, men such as Seale, Mills, Baddeley, Willis, Corish and Padgen were, 
in the labor movement, political moderates. But the language they 
used was still, in varying degrees, that peculiar popular syndicalist- 
marxist synthesis noted in 1919» For example, J.M. Baddeley, long­
time leader of the Northern district of the miners' union but now, in 
1925, Lang's Minister for Labour and Industry, said, while speaking in 
the Legislative Assembly:
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I am with my friends outside who prefer direct action 
and believe that compulsory arbitration is no good without 
direct action, and that direct action would more quickly 
bring a change in the industrial system...
He added, it is true:
fButJ ... we are carrying on under a capitalistic system, 
and are compelled to acdept some machinery for the regu­
lation of our industrial affairs. Therefore I adopt this 
machinery ... for the purpose of bringing about some 
alleviation of the trouble in industries that has been 
so prevalent. l8l
By 1925) the tide of militancy had receded and both officials 
and rank and file alike were affected by its recession. But the 
officials felt the ebb-tide for more than the rank and file; left to 
their own devices, the moderates of 1925 would have softened and 
reshaded their language far more than they did. The rank and file 
were less sensitive to the ebb, primarily because the daily clash with 
the employers remained substantially unchanged. This clash tended to 
renew continually the militancy of the rank and file, a process which 
to some extent offset the ebb. Thus the militant language and public 
posture of the moderate union officials owed much to the more militant 
outlook of the rank and file.
The left-wing ideology which hardened and gave added direction 
to industrial militancy had been eroded since 1919) yet it was by no 
means dead, and the union rank and file were still responsive to the 
words of officials whose political positions were to the left of the 
more moderate Seale, Willis and Baddeley. These leftists - J.S.
181 N.S.W. Pari. Deb., vol. 102, p. 1592, 15 Oct. 1925
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Garden, H.L. Denford, J.J. Graves, R.J. Heffron, J. Beasley, A. Ruther­
ford - may he defined as Communists or Communist-sympathisers in the 
act of moving away from the Communist Party. If, between 1919 and 
early 1921, these men and their earlier co-thinkers had felt that the 
Labor Party was unworthy of their serious attention, they had changed 
their mind somewhere near the middle of that year. They did not form an 
ideologically homogeneous group; we saw that, when allegedly orthodox 
Communists, they had differed from traditional and prevailing inter­
national Communist standpoints. But despite this, some of the most 
classic and most simple elements of communist ideology remained in the 
language of the group. Their talk was ’tough' and they used the 
rhetoric of the class struggle; regularly they enunciated Marx's view 
on the relation of the state (and especially such of its component 
institutions as the arbitration courts) to the economic power of the 
capitalists. (it is not at present relevant that the industrial action 
they advocated concerning judgments of arbitration courts was out of 
keeping with the fierceness of their tone of voice.) They preached 
the virtues of industrial unionism vis-a-vis craft unionism; they spoke 
of the coming of a re-constructed and socialist society, though less 
often than they had done in 1921; they portrayed the embattled Soviet 
Union as a workers' paradise of bread and brotherhood. When exposed 
to messages such as these, proclaimed now in the midst not merely of 
the unions but of the Labor Party itself, the followers of the moderate 
industrialist officials were still extremely responsive. One cannot 
over-emphasise the fact that the left-wing union officials were now, by
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contrast with the years 1919-21, omnipresent in Labor Party circles 
and their influence inescapable. There was thus, in this way, a limit 
ple.ced upon the distance to which Seale, Willis, Baddeley and others 
could move away from their earlier left-wing images.
The union demands fulfilled by the Lang government in its 
first a.nd second sessions were long standing ones, yet neither McGowen 
nor Holman, nor later Storey and Dooley, had been able to fulfil them. 
These demands were fulfilled in 1925 and 1926 largely because those 
who led the Labor Party union forces in 1925 - Seale, Willis and Baddeley 
were much more effective than those who led them in 1920 and 1921.
One reason for the additional effectiveness in 1925 was simply that 
Willis was present within the Labor Party in 1925? and absent between 
1919 and 1921. But the other reason was that the moderates of 1925 
were in close juxtaposition to leftists of 1925? whose words were heard 
up and down the Labor Party and trade union world. These leftists, 
decayed and decaying as leftists though they might have been, neverthe­
less expressed sentiments which struck nrofound echoes among the rank 
and file. Thus the left officials had so powerful an influence that 
they rendered the moderate union officials immediately in contact with 
Lang more intransigent than they would otherwise have been.
The situation just described was that of 1925-1926, the period 
of Lang’s most contentious legislation. Decay of the left occurs more 
rapidly in late 1926 and 1927? a phenomenon of direct relevance to an 
understanding of the events of this latter time.
CHAPTER VII. •The Big Fella'
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In the period covered in the last chanter, J.T. Lang appear­
ed in a role markedly out of character. The unspectacular Treasurer 
of 1920 who was far from being a favorite of the unions, emerged as 
the ally of the left-wing and moderate industrialists. Dependent on 
their support and paying the price for it in a remarkable series of 
legislative acts, this essentially conservative professional politic­
ian was now widely denounced for his dangerous radicalism.
Lang was indeed miscast, and felt himself to be so; but we 
have seen the failure of his first cautious attempts to break the fett­
ers of an encumbering alliance. It would be no surprise to find him re­
doubling such attempts at escape in the period we now enter, and per- 
ha.ps even succeeding; but that is not the actual turn of events. Instead, 
the need to escape disappears, for the fetters turn to putty. His 
tough, unwelcome allies turn into subservient tools. And their shrunken 
stature helps to form a background against which Lang can loom as 'the 
Big Fella' in these and later years.
This diminution of the industrialist group, then, must receive 
particular attention in the next pages of this study. Since the 
strength of its members depended largely on their positions of leader­
ship in the trade union movement, we must acquaint ourselves with 
developments in this latter sphere, before returning to the story of
the Labor Party itself.
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The Trade Unions 1926-1927
During 1926 and 1927» Labor's official leaders often informed
the unionists (and others) of New South Wales that they were enjoying
times of unusual prosperity.^ Labor Daily, official organ of the New
South Wales branch of the A.L.P., went so far as to describe 1926 as
a 'boom' year, the 'State's Greatest Year.'^
The Official Year Book of New South Wales judged the year 1925-
1926 to be one in which 'prosperity was reflected almost generally
throughout those statistics which provide an indication of business
conditions and of the economic well-being of the population'; deposits
in savings banks showed 'larger increases than had been apparent for
several years'; there was a 'continued increase in profits of public
companies'; the proportion per cent of total value of output in New
South Wales absorbed by overhead charges, profits, etc. 'rose to a
3point higher than it had been in any of the last fifteen years.' There 
was a steady increase in the prices of stocks and shares, and an ex­
pansion of transactions represented by bank clearings. For the year 
1926-27, the Year Book continued its estimate of prosperity until late 
in the year. The volume of primary production 'far exceeded' that of 
any previous year; 'favourable prices' were realised for primary products; 
bank clearings which had reflected an increase of over 30 per cent in
See, for example, J.T. Lang, in Labor Daily, 5 May 1927*
Labor Daily, 3 Jan. 1927« Even the Australian Worker, organ of the 
A.W.U., insisted that there had been a substantial increase in the 
productivity of industry under the forty four hour week.
(A..W. , 2 Feb. 1927).
N.S.W. Year Book, 1928-29, p.8l8, p.298.3
319
inter-bank cheque transactions from 1921 to 1926, showed a further
growth of 5 Per cent in 1926-27. The value of merchandise exported
rose by nearly £2 million and that of imports by over £5 million, one
fourth of the latter increase being on account of machinery and imple-
4ments.
The unemployment figures of 1926 and 1927 give support to the
view that the times were at least comparatively prosperous. In 1924
and 1925? unemployment varied around ten to fourteen per cent of those
returning data, but fell considerably in 1926 and 1927? at one time
5dropping to 5*3 per cent. The weighted average wage payable to adult
males in New South Wales increased from 93.6 shillings in December 1924
to 101.10 shillings in December 1927.^ However during the 1920's
prices rose steeply, and by 1927» the Commonwealth Labour Report
estimated that the purchasing power of wages had not regained the 1922
7level while the New South Wales Year Book stated that, for the year
8 ^1925-26, 'wages lagged slightly behind the rising cost of living.
9By a curious circumstance, between August 1925 and June 1927» there 
was no variation at all in the state basic wage.^
A Ibid., p.821.
See Table 4, Appendix to Chapter III.
Labour Report,No. 19» 1928, p.80.
Ibid., p.85.
0
N.S.W. Year Book, 1928-9, p.8l8. See also N.S.W. Industrial Gazette, 
31 August 1925, P.155, which noted the 'upward trend' of prices 
since December 1924*
9 See p. 355below.
10 N.S.W. Year Book, 1928-1929, p.821.
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Believing the times to he favourable, and experiencing a sub­
stantial increase in membership,^ the unions might reasonably have 
been expected to carry out a fairly bold industrial policy. However, 
in point of fact, union reliance upon the legal and legislative process 
grew even more pronounced in these years, while when forced to take 
direct action, union tactics were an extreme form of confinement, des­
pite the fact that, in the case of the forty four hour week dispute for 
example, employers very early adopted an extended front lockout policy.
On 4 January 1926, the state Forty-Four HoursWeek Act came
into operation. Employers working under state awards made no objection,
but those under federal awards (who employed about a third of the state’s 
12work force)- ' refused to accent the Act. In early January, the Metal 
Trades Employers' Association announced that its members would insist 
upon a forty eight hour week, and that the Association planned an 
appeal against the Act. The thirty federal unions which then met to 
decide union strategy included some of the state’s strongest unions: 
the Amalgamated Engineering Union, the Australasian Society of Engineers, 
the Blacksmith's Union, the Boilermakers' Union, the Ship Painters & 
Dockers, the Printing Trades' Union, Electrical Trades’ Union, the 
Timberworkers and others. The general feeling seems to have been that 
unionists could work forty eight hours provided that overtime rates
The number of unionists in New South Wales increased, from 284,559 in 
1924 to 319,599 in 1925? reaching 34 5 5 0 69 in 1927* (N.S.W. Year Book, 
1928-29, p.772.).
See note ll^ chapter VI.12
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were paid for the last four hours, and in the meantime ’all legal 
channels’ would he used to compel employers to pay the full wage for 
forty four h o u r s . T h e  wealthy A.E.U. would take the lead in a fight 
which was conceived wholly as a legal affair, with no word that direct 
action would he used in the event of legal failure. The union rank and 
file, however, worked forty four hours, not forty eight hours, and the 
emrloyers docked them four hours pay, believing, it was said, that the 
men would soon ’tire of receiving less wages for the reduced working 
week...’
By 1 February, John William Cowhurn, an A.E.U. member, succeed­
ed in an effort to recover from the powerful Clyde Engineering Company 
his full federal award rate as a fitter, while working forty four hours 
under state law. The Chief Industrial Magistrate's Court of Hew South 
Wales also found in favour of the A.E.U. in another case where Metters' 
Ltd. had raid less than award rates to an A.E.U. member refusing to 
work more than forty four hours. But the employers then appealed to 
the High Court, and on 19 April 1926 the High Court found in their favour^ 
The upshot of the contest to this point was that, legally, employers 
could dock employees of four hours pay where they worked only forty 
four hours, though this conflicted with Lang’s Forty-four Hours Week Act.
S.M.H., 8 Jan. 1926.
Labor Monthly, July 1926.
^  Sj,M.H., 26 Apr. 19265 Labor Monthly, July 1926.
Comm. Law Reports, vol. 37, 1925-1926, pp.466-528. Higgins J. and 
Powers J. gave dissenting judgments.
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To the employers this ms nothing more than a -promising start.
By working forty four hours hut a.ccepting a four hours’ pay reduction
since 4 January, the unions had drifted for some three and a half
months, and the employers felt they had the initiative. In the forty
eight hour struggle of 1922, employers seized the initiative in direct
action only after several months had demonstrated beyond all doubt
that the unions were not going to take effective action. But from
the first day in 1926, the union officials had made it plain that they
would use none but legal methods. When these methods worked to the
benefit of the emnloyers, the employers (having no doubt taken the
measure of the officials leading their opponents) announced they would
13lock out all who refused to work a forty eight hour week."
A meeting of metal trades' union officials then drew up plans,
which the Labor Council subsequently aborted: no overtime was to be
worked and no new shifts were to be started until employers 'recognised*
IQthe forty four hour 'principle'. Unionists would also continue to 
absent themselves on Saturday morning, thus working a forty four hour 
week in five days, as they had since 4 January. Next, the Labor 
Council set up a disnutes' committee, consisting of five delegates 
from Council and one from each of the unions involved. As secretary
18
19
Labor 'ontbly, July 1926. 
Labor_ Monthly, July 1926.
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of the Labor Council, J.S. Garden claimed that the decision to take
direct action marked a change for the unions away from ’legal and
legislative action'. For years, he said
... the unions had been advised that the best results 
could only be obtained by legal and legislative action. 
Nineteen hundred and seventeen had caused the strike 
weapon to be looked upon askance, and ever since then, 
when the workers had suggested taking the bit between 
their teeth and introducing industrial action on the 
job - 1917 was trotted out, and held up as a nightmare 
to frighten them from taking direct action. All eyes 
were therefore concentrated on j~this^ j fight.... 21
J.S. Garden had himself used 'the debacle of 1917* in earlier years to
discourage unionists from extending a disnute. And it is very probable
that he defended the official strategy of 1926 - 'jtjiat the area of the
22 23 fight should be limited' - in almost the same words.
While unionists planned to obey state law by absenting them­
selves on Saturday morning and refusing to work overtime or to inaugur-
ErAp'c.vjers ‘
ate ne , the Metal Trades^Association dismissed 5,000 unionists,
and 20,000 more workers were soon thrown out of work^as a result, the
24figure growing rapidly. To show they had no faith in the strategy
to r N p lo y e r s  ‘
of confinement, the Metal Trades'A Association threatened to have raw 
materials out off from any factory in the iron trades permitting a 
forty four hour week, while the Motor Trades' Association compelled 
its members to lock out all employees unwilling to work forty eight 
hours. The rank and file was evidently inclined to meet this employer
Labor Monthly, July 1926, p.12.
Labor Monthly, July 1926.
See the report of a sneech by Garden in Workers' Weekly, 28 May 1926. 
S.M.H., 4 May 1926.
21
22
23
24
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action in similar vein, and after it was all over, J.S. Garden
condemned the engineers, in particular, for their hot-headedness.
N . S , W.
'Down tools', the Engineers in he w -hifmth , * had 
said, ' and be damned to everyone else.' 28
Other rerorts during the strike showed that the officials were having
difficulty in restraining the ranks, but d.espite difficulty, they
succeeded.
By May, the Disputes Committee began peace overtures, and a
conference in the third week of May offered to forego four hours' pay
if employers accepted a forty four hour week. By the end of the
month, a settlement had been reached, whereby forty four hours was
to be worked for forty four hours' pay, with the week's work to be done
in five or six days as the employers desired, though many unions had
2 6worked a five day week, since January. The unions would remove all
restrictions on overtime and shift-work, and work these as required by
employers; the disputes committee promised also not to demand increased
wa ges until a proposed newly-constituted federal tribunal had. dealt with 
27the matter. The disputes committee explained that it envisaged a 
'second struggle' for the forty four hour week, which was to take the 
form of an appeal to the Commonwealth Arbitration Court for a uniform 
forty four hour week for all federal unions, though in outlining the 
'second struggle' Garden appears to have forgotten his earlier condem­
nation, just cited, of reliance on the 'legal process':
Lajpor Daily, 5 May 1927« 
Monthly, July 1926.
S.M.H., 28 May 1926.
25
26
27
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To give 'breathing space before the second struggle 
for the extra money the Disputes Committee agreed 
to the plan to get all men hack on the 44-hours 
working week, also agreeing to allow the Federal 
Unions to orepare their case for the Federal Court 
for a uniform 44-hour working week for the workers 
of the Commonwealth. 28
Both sides claimed a victory, the unionists believing that the
29Commonwealth Arbitration Court would grant forty eight hours' pay, 
and the A.E.U. then initiated a test case in the Commonwealth Arbit­
ration Court on the hours question. This hearing took sixty seven days, 
during which the A.E.U. agreed to accept a weekly wage reduction of 
approximately ten shillings. In the interval, employers showed no sign 
of resting on their laurels; in June, for example, master printers 
applied to the Industrial Commission for a forty eight hour week for 
printers,^ and in the same month, the B.H.P. Company at Newcastle locked 
out certain engineers for refusing forty eight hours. ^  In December, 
after sixty seven days, the Arbitration Court's investigation came to 
an end but no decision was given and various branches of the Australas­
ian Society of Engineers expressed impa.tience with the continued wage 
32reduction. Finally on 24 February 1927, one year after the Forty-Four 
Hour.? Week Act began operation in New South Wales, the Commonwealth
Labor Monthly, July 1926, p.13; see also S.M.H., 31 May 1926. 
S.M.H., 29 May; A.W., 2 June 1926.
Workers' Weekly, 9 July 1926.
Workers' Weekly, 17 Sept.
28
29
30
31
32 A.W., 22 Dec. 1926; Labor Monthly, Dec. 1926
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Arbitration Court handed down its judgment, giving the Amalgamated
33Engineering Union a forty four hour week. In making this finding,
Chief Judge Dethridge indicated that the Court would 'probably apply 
a similar reduction' to other industries 'similar in their conditions 
as to leisure ... to the engineering industry ... but not in other indus­
tries ...'
This was most unsatisfactory to the unions. When the 
Arbitration Court had begun its investigation into the forty four hour 
question in August 1926, union officials had trouble with a restive 
membership, but had at least been able to point out that the Court's 
findings would settle the matter for all unionists, as it was under­
stood that the findings were to be generally applicable to all industry. 
In fact, however, it turned out that unions in each industry had to 
appear before the Court for a separate hearing, while the Court said 
that the shorter week pointed up the need for increased productivity 
through piece-work. Furthermore, because the wage levels of the awards 
based on forty eight hours were not incorporated into the new awards, 
the unions believed they had bought their shorter hours by shorter pay.
24 C.A.R., 904» For the finding in full, see ibid., p.755-904» 
34 24 C.A.R., 904.
36 A.W., 2 Mar. 1927
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Yet Lang's legislation had specifically declared against any such 
exchange, all the more distasteful because prices had risen steadily 
in 1Q26 and 1927*
The particular combination of legal and extremely confined 
direct action used in 1926 and 1927 brought unimpressive results and 
did little, if anything, to enhance rank and file self-confidence during 
times which were at least comparatively favourable for the unions.
In the last quarter of 1927 unemployment rose sharply in New South Wales, 
and continued to be high throughout 1928. Extremely bitter industrial 
struggles were not far away, for in 1928 and early in 1929 employers 
insisted that hours must be increased and wages must be reduced; the 
courts agreed with them. Unionists then had no alternative but to 
resist: it is scarcely to be doubted that they would have been in a 
better position to do so, had bolder action during the easier climate 
of Lang's regime brought them victories denied them by excessive 
official reliance upon confinement and upon the legal nrocess.
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'■,1v,e .L.P. faction -tr'i e l Q26-1927
By January 1926, the A.W.U. had won hack a good deal of the 
ground lost in 1923, and now controlled a substantial minority of the 
A.L.P. state executive. A.C. Willis having departed to become a member 
of Lang's cabinet, the most important of the 'moderate industrialist' 
majority faction on the state executive were now W.H. Seale, J. Tyrell
38and P.C. Magrath. Their faction was known as the 'Pint-Pot Plotters'.'
The O'Reilly group formed a tiny third faction on the executive, even
more unstable than the two la.rger factions themselves, while the
Communists, no longer represented on the executive, continued to run
in factional harness with the A.W.U.
Manoeuvring for advantage at the 1926 annual conference had
started as early as November 1925 with J. Tyrell's attempt to exclude
19conference delegates from unions affiliated to the Labor Council.
In February 1926, the left wing made its move, holding a trade union 
conference which not only supported Communist affiliation to the A.L.P. 
but also brought forward a set of trade union demands which the 
executive had neglected. As a result of this conference, four 
prominent A.L.P. unionists (J. Beasley, Labor Council President, J. 
Kilburn, Bricklayers' Union, C. Tannock, Ironworkers' Association, and 
A.E. Bennet, Coachmakers' Union) were 'summoned' before the A.L.P. 
executive and threatened with, expulsion on the grounds that the con-
This was a term the A.W.U. bestowed on the majority faction because 
its meeting place was a 'certain well-known city pub'.
Seepp. 309-310 above.39
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C O V N t t r o l  C o v V l V V U J A » 5 , f  V ^  ,
ference had been held under the rt.tr, ni on ?■ of the ui pi ] »atiow* 1 ■ o £■
Lob or Uni ett-a . ~ ( Designed to weaken the A. W.U. -leftist hloc at annual 
conference, the threat was thus similar to Tyrell's earlier effort, 
but met such opposition that, like its early counterpart, it was quietly 
dropped.^
As annual conference approached, manoeuvring on the executive
became more spirited: an A.W.U. man submitted a motion of censure
against the ’secret faction’ meeting at ’a certain hotel', only to hs.ve
President E.C. Magrath rule the motion out of order on the ground that
42it implicated a majority of the executive. On the eve of conference 
the executive split when the majority replaced anti-Magrath delegates 
chosen by the Sydney Electoral Council with others chosen at a later 
meeting of the same body, a meeting carefully managed to secure the 
election of pro-Magrath delegates. This incident also involved dis­
franchising three branches,~ and its discussion was to take un a great
44deal of time at Conference.
When conference opened it soon became clear that the A.W.U. -
A.W., 10 Mar. 1926. It had not, but this was a. way in which the 
executive honed to bring pressure upon the Labor Council for its 
affiliation to that body.
Ibid., 17 Mar. 1926. Among those who protested were the Australian 
Worker itself, A.L.P. Executive member T. Palkingham (also a 
member of the boilermakers’ Union Executive), W. Bright (Bricklayers' 
Union) and Shirley (Amalgamated Printing Trades' Union).
Ibid., 3 Mar. 1926.
43 Ibid., 31 Mar. 1926.
44 Labor Daily, 3 Apr. 1926.
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45left-wing alliance had impressive numbers,' and this made the parlia-
A C
mentarians as uneasy as it did the Seale-Ma.grath supporters,' particu­
larly since the Communist Party’s leaders were in such good standing
47tb?t they could openly direct voting procedure. Almost no normal
business was done. On the third day, a lengthy tussle over Magrath’s
right to occupy the presidency ended with conference deposing him
as a parliamentarian. A.L.P. vice-president Conroy of the A.W.U. took
A Pithe chair, the left-wing leader J. Beasley serving as his deputy."'
It began to look as if the left wing might obtain a dangerous number
of followers on the new A.L.P. executive and other official bodies,
and the A.W.U. and the left discussed, the number of seats each should
49h^ve on the new executive. ' Peter Loughlin then took a leading role
in successful moves to reconcile the A.W.U., the Tyrell-Magrath and 
50O'Reilly factions', and at the eleventh hour, the A.W.U. deserted its
This was apparent, for example, in the brush between the Seale- 
Magrath bloc and the A.W.U.- left bloc on the afternoon and night of 
the first day over the exclusion of '20 or 30' delegates (Labor Badly, 
3 Apr. 1926).
Notice, for example, the tone of alarm in Labor Badly on 5 April 1926. 
Remarking that the factions were temporarily reduced to two, the 
paper commented that the A.W.U.-left-wing alliance would 'foist... 
evils' upon the labor movement. An executive controlled by them 
would 'imperil the life of the Labor Government.'
'Prom an elevated vantage point in the public gallery, Mr. J. Howie 
openly directed the tactics of the groups, and from a near-by point 
at the open windows of the Conference Hall, Mr. Garden actively co­
operated with him.' ( Labor Baily, 5 Apr. 1926).
Labor Baily, 6 Apr. 1926.
Workers ' Weekly, 14 Apr. 1926; A .N .R ., 20 Apr. 1926.
Round Table , vol. 16, pp.853/45 A.N.R.,
14 Apr. 1926.
48
49
50 20 Apr. 1926; A.W.,
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left-wing allies, and formed a 'new combination' with the Seale- 
Magrath-Tyrell faction. As a result, the executive elected was a 
most unhappy assortment comprising seventeen supporters of the out­
going Executive, fifteen supporters of the A.W.U., and Mr. O'Reilly 
of the Hairdressers' Union; the new President was W.H. Seale. Hot one 
leftist was returned.
Although Lang had done much to bring about the 'new combina­
tion', he continued to strike the pose of an impartial leader far above 
the faction struggles:
I stand for the people and for the people only.
I have set my hand to the plough, and I am not
going to turn back. 52
The factions' marriage of convenience barely survived the elections, 
and broke up even before the end of conference. This was apparent 
when E.C. Magrath successfully moved that the new executive be instruc­
ted not to re-admit those associated with, the ballot-box scandals, for
53the voting was 153 to seventy one, a blow to A.17.U. hopes of rein­
stating Bailey. This (and earlier) clashes between the new allies 
threatened to send the A.W.U. back to the arms of the left wing, and so, 
on the tenth day of conference, when only one of the pro-Seale faction 
was elected to the agenda committee, Seale declared carried a motion 
for adjournment of conference till 1927* About 120 of the 200 dele­
gates present dissented and remained, but Seale refused to re-open
51
A.W., 14 Apr. 1926.
, . ; • hou "Daily, 7 Apr. 1926.
Labor P"ilv, 1° vor. 1°26.53
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54c o n f e r e n c e .  There  was im m e d i a t e l y  a demand f o r  a s p e c i a l  c o n f e r e n c e ,
55w hich  t h e  e x e c u t iv e  r e j e c t e d  by  f i f t e e n  v o t e s  to  f o u r t e e n .
Whi le  t h e  s t e a d i l y  m o u n t ing  r e s e n t m e n t  o v e r  L a n g ' s  e a r l y  
l e g i s l a t i v e  c o n c e s s i o n s  t o  th e  u n i o n i s t s  had found some e x p r e s s i o n  a t  
a n n u a l  c o n f e r e n c e ,  i t  a p p e a r e d  more s h a r p l y  i n  t h e  months f o l l o w i n g .
A d e p u t a t i o n  f rom  th e  c o u n t r y  s a w m i l l i n g  i n d u s t r y  a s k e d  B a d d e le y ,  Min­
i s t e r  f o r  L a b o u r ,  f o r  a r e d u c t i o n  of  f i f t y  p e r  c e n t  i n  r a t e s  p a y a b l e
s 6
f*or i n s u r a n c e  u n d e r  the  W orkers '  Compensa tion  l e t .  Lang was w in n in g
th e  e s t e e m  o f  th e  u n i o n i s t s .  With an a i r  of  s t e r n l y  f a c i n g  f a c t s ,  a
w r i t e r  i n  t h e  Communist W orke r s '  Weekly s a i d  i n  A ugust :
. . .  a g r e a t  m a j o r i t y  of  th e  i n d u s t r i a l  w o rk e r s  a r e  becoming 
v e r y  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  t h e  A .L .P .  and  a r e  p l a c i n g  g r e a t  t r u s t  
i n  i t . . . 57
But a s  th e  w o rk e r s  grew more p l e a s e d  w i t h  Lang,  r u r a l  and c i t y  b u s i n e s s
men became more i r a t e ,  and  t h e i r  a n t i p a t h y  was n o t  u n c o n n e c t e d  w i t h  an
i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n  o f  th e  A .L .P .  f a c t i o n  f i g h t  which  o c c u r r e d  a t  t h i s  t ime
On 4 August  1926,  t h e  Labor  D a i l y  made c h a rg e s  of  im pend ing  t r e a c h e r y
58on t h e  p a r t  o f  Labor  p a r l i a m e n t a r i a n s ,  and when Lang a p p o i n t e d  th e
' M a n i f e s to  t o  Leagues  and U n ions .  Demand f o r  S p e c i a l  C o n f e r e n c e . 
E x t r a o r d i n a r y  P o s i t i o n  P l a i n l y  S t a t e d ' .  L e a f l e t  i n  t h e  R .S .  Ross 
c o l l e c t i o n  (F e rguson )  A.1I.L. Dated  i n  h a n d w r i t i n g ,  16 Apr.  1926.
The s i g n a t o r i e s  were A.W.U. and l e f t - w i n g  i n d u s t r i a l i s t s .
A.W. , 9 June  192 6 .
56 A.W., 21 J u l y  1926.  Caucus c r i t i c i s m  on th e  r a t e s  l e d  t o  e s t a b l i s h  
ment o f  a commit tee  w h ich  l a t e r  recommended a c o n s i d e r a b l e  r e ­
d u c t i o n .
Work e r s ' Week l y , 20 Aug. 1926.57
58 See L e a d e r  a r t i c l e ,  p . 2 .
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i n d e p e n d e n t  A.D. Kay as  e m p lo y e e s '  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  on th e  Meat Board  a t
a, s a l a r y  of  £1 ,5 0 0  a y e a r ,  t he Labor  Da i l y  a l l e g e d  t h a t  Lang made th e
59a p p o i n tm e n t  t o  f o r e s t a l l  i n  imminent  B e t r a y a l .  Caucus demanded t h a t  
t h e  La b o r  D a i l y  r e t r a c t  i t s  a l l e g a t i o n s ,  r e p u t e d l y  i n s p i r e d  by th e  
p a p e r ' s  e d i t o r ,  S p e d d in g ,  b u t  t h e  Lab o r  D a i l y  r e f u s e d . ^  Both  t h e  A.W.U. 
and  i t s  opponen t s  began  t o  f e e l  t h a t  a d e f i n i t i v e  s t r u g g l e  f o r  power 
migh t  be u n a v o i d a b l e ,  where e i t h e r  th e  A.W.U. was e f f e c t i v e l y  e x c l u d e d  
f rom g a i n i n g  c o n t r o l  of  t h e  A . L . P . ,  o r  i t s  o p p onen t s  would be g iv e n  no 
q u a r t e r .  There were rumours  of  a s p e c i a l  A .L .P .  c o n f e r e n c e  t o  change 
t h e  r u l e s  t o  t h i s  end .
The b r e a c h  be tw een  th e  i n d u s t r i a l i s t  f a c t i o n  (Lang,
W i l l i s  and Co . )  and t h e  m o d e ra te s  . . .  has  been  s t e a d i l y  
g row ing  w i d e r ,  and  now th e  n o i s e  of  th e  c o n t e n t i o n  i s  so 
g r e a t  t h a t  i t  can  no l o n g e r  be c o n c e a l e d  . . .  62
I n  c a u c u s ,  a n t i - L a n g  s e n t i m e n t  r e a c h e d  t h e  p o i n t  where d e p u ty  l e a d e r
L o u g h l in  c h a l l e n g e d  L a n g ' s  l e a d e r s h i p ,  and s c o r e d  tw e n ty  t h r e e  v o t e s  t o
L a n g ' s  tw en ty  two.  As t h e  b a l l o t  was i n  p r o c e s s ,  T rade s  H a l l  d e p u t a t i o n s
w a i t e d  on caucus  to  u rg e  s u p p o r t  f o r  Lang.  The a b s e n t  A t t o r n e y - G e n e r a l ' s
v o t e  u l t i m a t e l y  went t o  Lang ,  and  w i t h  t h e  s c o r e  e v e n ,  caucus  d e c i d e d
6 ^t h a t  Lang s h o u l d  c o n t i n u e  l e a d e r ,  w i t h  L o u g h l in  once more d e p u t y .
Lang h i m s e l f  r e f e r r e d  t o  th e  b r i b e r y  c h a r g e s  i n  j u s t i f y i n g  
a p p o in tm e n t  o f  A.D. Kay (A.W. , 15 S e p t .  19 2 6 ) .
A.W . , 11 Aug. 1926.
Labor  D a i l y , 25 Aug. 1926.
A .N .R . , 25 Aug.;  S.M.H. , 14 S e p t .  1926.
63 A.W. , 22 S e p t .  1926
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Late in September 1926, J.S. Garden applied (unsuccessfully) 
to join the Labor Party through Matraville branch. He was only one 
of a number of Communists and sympathisers, their distinctive Communist 
viewpoint now eroded, who were drifting away from the Communist Party. 
Men such as Garden, J. Beasley, R. Heffron, E.R. Voigt, men influen­
tial and experienced in labor affairs, were entering into a rapproche­
ment with moderates like W.H. Seale, W.J. Mills and B. Mullins of the 
Waterside Workers' Federation, and their bloc in turn was joined by 
E.C. Magrath, J. Tyrell and J. Culbert - in short, by Lang's oldest 
and earliest moderate supporters. The question thus arises: upon 
whose terms was this bloc constituted - those of the left, or those 
of the moderates? Events soon made the answer clear.
'Mr Jock Garden and his friends'... 'flung themselves on the side of 
6SMr. Lang' and the Australian Worker asked:
Does Mr. Lang realise the dangerous position 
into which he is being so cunningly manoeuvred?
Lang, confronting on one side the rampant country interests, the A.W.U., 
and a squarely divided caucus, and on the other side the new industrial­
ist bloc, was by no means eager in his choice of the latter: his pre-
A .W., 22 Sept. 1926.
65 A.W., 6 Oct. 1926.
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66ference would seem to have been for the former. At Lang's invitation, 
Theodore convened a conciliatory conference which broke down, however, 
when trade union delegates refused to attend without Garden and the 
A.W.U. refused to talk with Garden. Then, according to the Australian 
Worker,
... Mr Theodore was informed it would be better to drop the 
whole thing for the time being, as misunderstandings 
seemed inevitable at the Trades Hall if the negotiations 
continued. 67
Lang's tentative approaches to the right had revealed its in­
transigence and evoked the wrath of the industrialists. His formerly 
left-wing friends brought with them the support of the trade unions, 
but there were enough divergent opinions amongst these friends to make 
Lang think he could split off key men like Garden, Beasley, and 
Heffron, especially with Willis's aid. With this in mind, and his 
leadership of caucus in dire danger, Lang agreed to the holding of 
the special conference, ostensibly to revise A.L.P. rules.
Lang denied that he had issued the invitation (Labor Daily, 15 Oct. 
1926). Theodore, however, claimed that Badd.eley, Minister for La,hour 
and Industry, and one of Lang's most faithful allies, prompted his 
first consultation with Lang (A.W., 20 Oct. 1926). Theodore's claim 
was published in a letter brought up to Labor Daily by J. Higgins, 
M.L.C., and published on 16 October. The Labor Daily, in publishing 
the letter, in no v/ay sought to challenge its authenticity, though 
next day Lang and Baddeley did. However it is more than likely that 
the testimony of Theodore (and H.E. Boote of the Australian Worker 
13 Oct. 1926) is accurate. In denying Theodore, Lang was concerned 
above all not to let his allies of the centre-left hoc know that 
(once again) he had tried to desert them in favour of the right wing.
It was no secret that the balance of power at the conference
wouldjbe in the hands of the left. Along with most, the left them-
A.W., 13 Oct. 1926.67
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selves anticipated that the revised rules would allow Communists to 
appear as delegates to conferences, thus charing election of leading 
party bodies, while minimising the role of the A.W.U. But Lang had 
other ideas.
After attacking the State Governor who had thwarted Lahor 
attempts to abolish the Legislative Council, Lang assured conference 
that the Council would nevertheless soon be abolished, and asked con­
ference to make 'the Parliamentary leader more secure ... [withj ...
69the tenure of office such as would enable him to carry out his plans.' 
Moderate and former leftist alike joined in heaping adulation on Lang. 
Oscar Schreiber (Furniture Trades), supported by the former Communist,
A. Rutherford, spoke of
... the great work done by the Lang Government - 
the best Labor Government New South Wales had ever 
had.
Beasley, an intimate of J.S. Garden, endorsed this approach;
... in the past the Trades Unions had seen fit 
to criticise the Premier ... but when they found there 
were men capable of doing their jobs as the Premier 
was doing his they were prepared to applaud them and 
help them on their way. 70
Conference confirmed Lang as parliamentary leader for the duration of
71the existing parliament, enabling him to ignore the hostility of the 
caucus he thus ruled. But once Lang had achieved this, he then per­
suaded conference to postpone adoption of the new rules until
A.W., 17 Nov. 1926.
70 Ibid., 17 Nov. 1926.
See the motion, moved by Schreiber and seconded by Rutherford, in 
the Labor Daily, 13 Nov. 1926, which, in the words of that newspaper, 
gave 'All Power to John T. Lang', and was passed by 274 votes to 4.
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t h e  r e g u l a r  a n n u a l  c o n f e r e n c e  o f  1927» As d r a f t e d  by th e  r u l e s  r e v i s ­
io n  commit tee  e l e c t e d  a t  a n n u a l  c o n f e r e n c e  i n  1926 , t h e  new r u l e s
72p e r m i t t e d  Communists t o  be d e l e g a t e s  t o  a n n u a l  o r  s p e c i a l  c o n f e r e n c e s .
Had t h e s e  r u l e s  been  p u t  up t o  c o n f e r e n c e  f o r  a d o p t i o n ,  t h e y  would
have b e e n  a c c e p t e d .  At L a n g ' s  s p e c i a l  r e q u e s t ,  however ,  a l l  t h a t
c o n f e r e n c e  d i d  was t o  a d o p t  th e  r e p o r t  o f  th e  r u l e s  co m m it tee ,  h o l d i n g
ovep 'kdoption  o f  t h e  r u l e s  th e m s e lv e s  t i l l  t h e  n e x t  a n n u a l  c o n f e r e n c e .
There i s  l i t t l e  doubt  t h a t  W i l l i s  and t h e  key  men i n  G a rd e n ' s  group
a g r e e d  t o  do as  Lang w is h e d .  I n  th e  words of  V o l .  M olesw or th ,  r i g h t -
wing Labor  j o u r n a l i s t  and f o r m e r  p a r l i a m e n t a r i a n :
The 'sham b a t t l e '  s t a g e d  a g a i n s t  t h e  S t a t e  Governor s e r v e d . . .  
as  an e x c e l l e n t  smoke s c r e e n  d u r i n g  which  th e  ' r e d s '  who 
were m a in ly  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  s a v i n g  Mr. Lang f rom f u t u r e  
caucus  d i s c i p l i n e  were q u i e t l y  ' d r o p p e d '  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  th e  
new i n d u s t r i a l  c o n t r o l  r u l e s . . .  T h e l e d s  manoeuvred  t o  a l l y  
th e m s e lv e s  w i t h  t h e  Lang F o r c e s .  Mr. Lang g r a c i o u s l y  a c c e p t e d  
t h i s  s u p p o r t  t o  s t a b i l i s e  h i s  p o s i t i o n .  But  th e  a l l i a n c e  
th e n  smashed.  Where th e  ' r e d s '  had e x p e c t e d  i n  r e t u r n  to  
s e c u r e  s u p p o r t  f o r  a d o p t i o n  of  th e  new r u l e s  t h a t  would have 
handed  o ve r  c o n t r o l  and i n c i d e n t a l l y  e x e c u t i v e  and n e x t  
s e l e c t i o n  b a l l o t s  t o  them, t h e y  had t o  accept  t h e  s h e l v i n g  of  
new r u l e s  u n t i l  E a s t e r  C o n f e r e n c e .  73
Where th e  l e f t  had hoped t h a t  t h i s  c o n f e r e n c e  would s e e  b o th  th e  a d o p t ­
i o n  o f  t h e  r u l e s  and th e  d i s m i s s a l  of  t h e  e x i s t i n g  exe c u t iv e  w i th  i t s  
f o u r t e e n  A.W.U. s u p p o r t e r s ,  a f t e r  Lang had s e c u r e d  h i s  v o te  of  con­
f i d e n c e ,  t h e  A.W.U. h e l p e d  L a n g ' s  s u p p o r t e r s  to h u r r i e d l y  c l o s e  th e  
c o n f e r e n c e .
The Communists soon saw what had h appened ,  b u t  t h e y  were o u t -g u n n e d .
Rule 59, A X ,  10 Nov. 1926.
M olesworth  C o l l e c t i o n ,  s e t  71,  i t e m  4 . Copy f o r  a newspaper  
a r t i c l e  by  M o le s w o r th , d a t e d  14 Nov. 1926.
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Meny of the industrialists who were awaiting a fight on 
the proposed alterations were astounded and a gathering 
during the lunch adjournment demanded of Willis, why they 
had "been tricked. Albert's reply was that the resolution 
had been handed to him by certain trade union officials and 
he had moved the resolution as requested. The industrialists 
decided that there was nothing else to do except fall into 
the trap and support the motion.,.. The smooth workings of the 
scheme and its successful conclusion give it all the appear­
ance of a frame up . , 74
In the new rules, branches and unions alike were divided into 'groups’
from which, delegates to annual conference would be elected, thus
/
interrosing an extra stage between the rank and file and delegates. 
Unions were grouped somewhat along the lines of the trades hall scheme 
for industrial grouns, and three executive members could be elected 
by conferenc^delegates representing the nine union groups controlled 
by the Labor Council, three from the A.W.U.’s delegates, three from 
the miners. Pour executive members were to come from representatives 
of metropolitan leagues, but A.W.U. spokesmen alleged that the metro­
politan trade unions could, hope to control some, if not most, of these 
78representatives. Because the trade unions could gain a majority of
delegates to annual conference, they could also hope to choose the 
A.L.P. president and vice president, as these were to be elected dir­
ectly from annual conference. Thus it would seem that metropolitan 
and mining unions together might hope to control at least thirty two 
of the forty six members of the state executive, with up to thirty six 
if it is true that they could influence metropolitan league representa­
tion to annual conference. They certainly could secure some delegates
Workers' Weekly, 19 Nov. 1926.74
75 W.P. Ahearn, in A.W_. , 10 Nov. 1926.
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to conference from these leagues. The only doubt is whether they
could secure enough of them to ensure that the whole four executive
elected
members I from metropolitan league delegates were their men, or only 
part of the four. Metropolitan and country annual conference were set 
up under the new rules, but effective control remained in the hands of 
the main annual conference.
The rules were called ’red rules' by their opponents.
eelRawson and Overacker find that the rules favourja faction whose numbers 
were spread over a number of unions and electorates, having the aim 
of breaking A.W.U. power within the A.L.P. Apart from this, these 
writers imply that there was little justification for the title of 'red
rj ^
rules'. However, whatever the immediate motives of Willis and others
drawing up the new rules, given the situation in the labor movement at
the time, these rules would almost certainly have enhanced direct
Communist influence unless Communists were exulicity excluded. This
result flowed from rule fifty nine, which said that
any delegate elected by a plebiscite of his Trade Union 
Group shall be deemed a fit and proper person to represent 
his organisation at the Annual Conference or any Special 
Conference.
In this sense the rules were certainly red rules, and they also denied 
effective power to the A.W.U., a body essential to offset Communist 
influence within the A.L.P. Thus there was more than red-baiting in­
volved in the use of the term 'red rules'. Had the rules been adopted 
at the special conference of November 1G26, where the comrosition was
Rawson, Op.Cit., pp. 115-119? Overacker, op.cit., p.141.7 6
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such that no motion eyrlicity forbidding Communists to appear as 
delegates to A.L.P. policy-making conferences could succeed, the 
Communists would have been in a good position. When the rules were 
actually adopted, however, at the annual conference of April 1927? at
moved a motion excluding Communists from attending A.L.P. conferences 
as union delegates.
On 19 November Peter Loughlin resigned from the Labor Cabinet and, 
along with V.W.E. Goodin and R.T. Gillies, left the A.L.P. to form the 
nucleus of a Country Labor Party. Loughlin gave his reasons:
been placed in an entirely wrong position. I have done 
more than my share in jtighting against the outside influences 
which have crept in... Year by year, he said, people who 
were foreign to Australia and to the Labor Movement ... had 
been seeking to ... establish a dictatorship which he believed 
was abhorrent to the members of Caucus. 77
Goodin and Gillies ( and perhaps, at this early stage, Loughlin as well) 
were willing to bargain with Lang who wished to save his administration, 
and when he promised to go no further with budget proposals and hold 
elections within four months, the three rebels left parliament, thus 
ensuring failure for a Nationalist Party censure motion on 22 Novembe?? 
Supply was then secured for four months and parliament prorogued.
Before he would agree to return to the A.L.P. Loughlin insisted that 
Lang must resign the premiership and repudiate the power conferred on
Labor Daily, 20 Nov. 1926.
N.S.W. Pari. Deb., vol. 108, p. 1364.
Lang's personal request Rutherford, Communist, successfully
At his very moment of triumph, Lang was assailed from caucus.
The party with which I have been associated for many years has
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him by the November special conference. These terms were too onerous.
But representatives of the A.L.P. federal executive secured terms 
from Goodin and Gillies, acceptable to caucus, which quickly became 
notorious as the 'Goodin-Gillies pact' whose existence was denied even 
while its terms were the subject of passionate and open debate in the 
A.L.P.
While it was widely admitted that the Goodin-Gillies pact 
stipulated that red rules must be abandoned, that the State Electoral 
Act be amended to give country areas four new seats, and priority 
given to legislation benefitting country areas, there was considerable 
doubt as to whether the pact also insisted that Willis must be dis­
missed from cabinet and leadership of the Legislative Council. There
79is no doubt that such a provision existed, and Willis knew it. The
provision may be found in the Molesworth collection, 'Pull Terms of
Settlement of the Dispute Last November Between Messrs. Goodin and
80
Gillies and the Labor Party.'
Seale and Voigt, Willis's private secretary and a prominent 
former Communist, were also fearful for their heads. Willis and Seale 
were extremely influential in the Labor Daily, and the paper, which 
had built up Lang as labor's saviour, now began to cautiously threaten 
him by mobilising rank and file support for Seale and Willis as a
31weapon to bring Lang to heel if he strayed too far towards the right wing.
Molesworth coll. Set 71? item 4» Typescript of Report to Broken Hill 
Assembly, dated 13 May 1927* Labor Daily, 18 Apr. 1927; A.W.,
15 Dec. 1926.
o0
Set 71, Item 4.
81 Labor Daily. 14 Dec. and December, passim. 1926.
They do not seem to have anticipated that he would prefer his own 
select group of advisers to either.
And so the battle raged, with the columns of the Lahor Daily 
mobilising support for the Willis-Seale alignment at the 1927 Easter 
annual conference, which the moderate industrialists saw as a care­
fully stage-managed arena where Lang would either be lavishly extolled 
or discreetly threatened, according to whether he did or did not 
appear to understand that his own best interests could be secured by 
casting his lot with the moderate industrialists. They did not after 
all intend to ask much of him - mainly that he save their necks.
In January the moderate industrialists lost their slender 
majority on the A.L.P. state executive which then deposed Seale from 
the presidency (later expelling him from the party) and moved the 
date of the approaching annual conference from Easter to June. Two 
bodies now called themselves the state executive of the A.L.P.:
Seale's followers, and the rump, A.W.U.-controlled executive. The 
deposed Seale announced that he would continue preparations to hold 
annual conference at Easter, alleging that the postponement was a ruse 
concealing an intention to call off conference altogether. The Labor 
Daily then began to publish the names of those who opposed the A.W.U.- 
controlled executive's move. While there were many branches on the 
daily-growing lists published by the Labor Daily, their number was 
vastly exceeded by that of the affiliated unions listed. A few caucus 
members come out for Seale and were duly listed too, and support grew 
steadily. O'Reilly, leader of a tiny faction, announced his support,
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Lang announced his support first ’on general principles' and then, as
evidence of union support mounted, announced that he would attend the
Conference, though as 'peacemaker', and not as 'factionalist'.
At the Easter conference in 1927, a good deal of the time
was taken up with the Goodin-Gillies pact. O'Reilly of the Hairdressers'
Union asked Willis's secretary Voigt
... if he believed that a pact was arrived at between the 
renegades and amongst others, the Premier and his two right 
hand men, to sacrifice Mr. Willis.
Voigt 5a,d earlte./*’,
... Goodin and Gillies have openly given the terms of their 
pact, and these terms include the victimisation of Mr. Willis 
and myself. /-\nci be continued
I do not believe ... f*the Premier and his two right hand menl 
were a party to a pact of any kind, though I know nothing. 82
Seale had ruled Goodin and Gillies were 'outside the movement', had him­
self been expelled by the A.W.U.-dominated state executive, and was most 
anxious to have conference uphold his rulings and put his case beyond 
doubt. While expressing the greatest loyalty to Lang, conference fin­
ally upheld the expulsion of Loughlin, Goodin and Gillies and repudiated 
the Goodin-Gillies pact. In short, conference did as the moderate in­
dustrialist leaders asked.
Lang's attitude to the pact was then, and is still, ambivalent.
Lang was alleged both to have supported and opposed its original accept­
er -2
ance by caucus. ~ Shortly after conference repudiated the pact in
82 Labor Daily, 18 Apr. 1927*
83 A.W. , 15 Dec. 1926. On p.3 & 15
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Easter, caucus reaffirmed support for the pact, and Lang was reported 
to say that he would honour the pact but not repudiate conference,8<^ 
while at a cabinet meeting where members unanimously demanded Willis's
85resignation, Lang maintained 'complete silence'. In recent years Lang
has described conference's repudiation of the pact as a blunder prompted
largely by A.C. Willis's 'anxiety to get even with some of those who had
been trying to force him out of Cabinet because of his action in making
,86Voigt his .secretary... '
Conference also reaffirmed Lang's leadership of caucus, 
gave him power to reconstruct cabinet if he thought it necessary and 
adopted the 'red rules' held over from the special conference of
O n
November 1926.
Inconvenient as it was for Lang to have Goodin and Gillies 
expelled and his administration thus put under death sentence, because 
caucus out for his blood, Lang had to keep conference on side. How 
fortunate for him, that in the spectrum of demands conference held out 
as its price, there were none which interfered with what had become 
Lang's chief concern in late 1926 and 1927? to placate the swinging 
voter in the electorate rather than, as in 1925 and early 1926, to 
placate the trade unions in the A.L.P. structure. The concessions 
demanded by Seale, Willis and other spokesmen at conference involved
84 A.W., 27 Apr. 1927.
85 JUW., 27 Apr. 1927.
86 I Remember, p.320.
S. Encel, Cabinet Government in Australia, pp. 158-9»
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Lang in no further economic or social concessions to unionists, hut
were essentially designed to preserve their own personal influence in
the Lahor Party. At the Easter conference there was no word, for
example, save from J. Kilhurn, on the basic wage, stationary since
December 1925 despite marked price increases.
Mr. Kilhurn referred scathingly to the spectacle of a 
Labor administration collaborating with the Nationalist 
Party on the wage question ... The Premier painted a good 
picture of prosperity - but not of ours. For three years 
the basic rate has remained stationary. The trouble is 
that the Parliament really does not go. The power of 
finance restricts them. 88
Many other leftists spoke, but no-one mentioned Lang's poor record on 
recent union demands. A.E. Bennet, F. Roels, and A. Rutherford fell 
in behind Seale, without reservation and without raising independent 
demands as a price for support. Lang made a special appearance at 
Conference to ask it to exclude Communists from attending A.L.P. 
conferences as delegates from unions. A. Rutherford moved a motion 
embodying Lang's request, the only speakers in opposition being M.P. 
Ryan, (Storemen and Packers' Union), T. Leslie (northern district of 
the miners' union and self-avowed Communist) and H. Sutherland (Feder­
ated Engindrivers'). The Communist Party reproached the leftists 
bitterly:
The militants had the entire Conference in their hands and 
could have wielded it in the interests of a militant fighting 
policy and to secure the domination of the trade unions in 
the Labor movement. 89
Labor Daily, 16 Apr. 1927» See also Kilburn's argument (ibid., 
l8 April) that Labor parliamentarians were responsible to the trade 
union movement and the A.L.P., not the electorate as a whole.
Workers' Weekly, 29 Apr. 1927»89
346
mv,r 'fft "bloc had fused with the moderete "bloc. To Lang the demands of 
the coalition seemed eminently manageable. Though the moderate union 
bloc hod secured its position in the A.L.P., the needs of the trade union 
rank and file did not figure in their demands. This feet did much to 
ensure acceptability of the moderates to Lang, now bent on appee.sing 
the non-industrial elements in the community where once he had been 
more concerned to appease the trade unions in the party. But it also 
weakened the identification of the rank and file unionists with the 
union faction in the A.L.P., and Lang thus felt the faction to be a 
shadow in the process of divesting itself of its substance. Thus, 
with very little to fear from the moderate union bloc, and. with the 
A.W.U. organised in a rival Labor Party, the A.L.P. was without strong 
factions. Conference itself was thus not much more than a shadow.
Prom that time on, Lang, a man who responded to strength, took less and 
less notice of conference or of the executive elected from conference.
In April 1927 it might have seemed as if conference were dictating to 
Lang. So it was - in a few matters of importance only to "a limited 
group of union and party officials. But in limiting itself to these 
matters, and thus passing over the chance to involve the interest of a 
wide circle of rank and file unionists through pressing trade union 
demands even against Lang's wishes, conference in effect signified to 
Lang that he was set free of its control. Already free of caucus be­
cause of conference support, he was thus free of all the traditional
mechanisms of Labor Party control
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Shortly after conference a by-election occurred at Warringah, 
iheand bothjfederal executive and the A.W.U.-controlled state executive
of the Labor Party endorsed one Captain Conway for‘the seat; the Seale
state executive endorsed A.A.L. O'Gorman. The outcome served to show
that the strength in the struggle between Lang and his opponents lay
with the former, for O'Gorman received over 1,000 votes more than
Conway in a white-collar area.
Individual Ministers were now said to have approached the
Governor as to whether he would commission one of them, should Cabinet
GOvote Lang out of power, ' but Lang seized the initiative. When Cabinet 
refused to endorse his appointment of his private secretary, T. Treble, 
to a new and well-paid government post, Lang abruptly sought a ’show­
down1 , and on 26 May 1927 asked the Governor to convene a meeting of the 
Executive Council, at which he tabled a minute to prorogue Parliament, 
and to follow up with a dissolution. All Ministers except Willis 
opposed the move; the Governor adjourned the meeting, and Lang handed 
in his resignation as Premier. The Governor accepted the resignation
and commissioned Lang to form a new cabinet, on the understanding that
91Parliament would be dissolved quickly. The new cabinet had the
I_Rememb er, p .3 24•
Australian Worker, 1 June 1927. The ex-Ministers issued a statement: 
’’Messrs'.’ Lang and Willis have destroyed the Labor Government. For 
this dishonourable and treacherous act they alone are responsible.1 
(Australian Worker, 1 June 1927)« Lazzarini commented: ’Future
generations of Labor people will remember him as the strong leader 
who risked the widows’ pensions, 44 hours and workmen's compensation, 
so that he might».,give a favoured friend and public servant a posit­
ion at £1850 a year.' For a, comment on Lang's tactical shrewdness, 
see Encel, op.oit., p.159-60.
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s u p p o r t  of  t w e n t y  t o  tw e n ty  one members of  t h e  o r i g i n a l  Lahor  f o l l o w i n g  
92of f o r t y  s i x .
A f e d e r a l  A .L .P .  c o n f e r e n c e  i n  May 1927 r e f u s e d  to  a c c e p t  
d e l e g a t e s  f rom t h e  ' E a s t e r '  s t a t e  e x e c u t i v e  of  New Sou th  Wales ( the  
d e l e g a t e s  i n c l u d e d  W.J.  Gibb,  J . F .  O ' R e i l l y ,  A. McPherson,  A.A. R u t h e r f o r d ,  
and  J . J .  G r a v e s ) , ^  and r e p u d i a t e d  th e  ' E a s t e r '  e x e c u t i v e  hy tw e n t y  two 
v o t e s  t o  e i g h t .  But  as  i t  Became c l e a r  t h a t  t h e  E a s t e r  e x e c u t i v e  had 
th e  s t r e n g t h  i n  New Sou th  W ales ,  t h e  f e d e r a l  A .L .P .  t o o k  a more c o n c i l ­
i a t o r y  a t t i t u d e .  The f e d e r a l  A .L .P .  e x e c u t i v e  a r r a n g e d  a ' u n i t y '  con­
f e r e n c e  f o r  J u l y  a n d ,  i n  l a y i n g  down i t s  c o n d i t i o n s ,  s t i p u l a t e d  t h a t  
e x p u l s i o n  s h o u l d  n o t  p r e v e n t  a d u ly  a c c r e d i t e d  d e l e g a t e ' s  a t t e n d a n c e .
The A . W . U . - c o n t r o l l e d  s t a t e  e x e c u t i v e  i s s u e d  a 'ge t  of  c o u n t e r - c o n d i t i o n s ,  
and e x p e l l e d  Lang h i m s e l f  f rom the  A .L .P .  F o r  a l l  t h i s ,  th e  A.W.U. l o s t  
th e  day  a t  t h e  ' u n i t y '  c o n f e r e n c e .
M e e t i n g  on 23 and 24 J u l y  and  a t t e n d e d  by n e a r l y  480 d e l e g a t e s ,
th e  ' u n i t y '  c o n f e r e n c e  r e a f f i r m e d  the  d e c i s i o n s  o f  th e  E a s t e r  c o n f e r e n c e ,
94t o  th e  accompaniment o f  a c o n t i n u o u s  ' c o n s i d e r a b l e  u p r o a r ' .  1 A d e l e g a t e  
f rom t h e  Cessnock  b r a n c h  had moved th e  r e a f f i r m a t i o n  o f  t h e  E a s t e r  
d e c i s i o n s ,  w h ich  i n v o l v e d  e n d o r s i n g  th e  e x p u l s i o n  of  Goodin and G i l l i e s ,  
t h e  s u s p e n s i o n  of  the  A . W . U . - c o n t r o l l e d  s t a t e  e x e c u t i v e ,  con fe rm en t  of  
e x t r a o r d i n a r y  powers upon Lang ,  and t h e  new r u l e s  which s p e c i f i c a l l y  
e x c l u d e d  Communists .  C. Tannock ,  s u p p o r t e d  by J .  K i l b u r n ,  A.E.  Bennet  
and M.P.  Ryan,  amended th e  Cessnock  m o t ion  t o  th e  e f f e c t  t h a t  a l l
Round T a b l e ,  v o l .  17,  1926 -2 7 ,  p . 8 2 8 .  
Lab o r  D a i l y , 12 May 1927*
A.W. , 27 J u l y  1927.
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decisions should be endorsed save for those portions which interfered 
with the right of affiliated unions to be represented by any constitut­
ionally elected delegates, but the amendment was lost by 252 votes to 
eighty.Q
Thus the settlement of April 1927 was confirmed. It had 
been implemented with the support of Willis, Voigt, Seale, and initiated 
the leading left-wing union officials. But the fruits of victory 
went neither to the left nor to the moderates, but simply to Lang, now 
well advanced on the road to personal rule. In the next section we 
resume the story of his Government's legislative activity, taking up 
the story at December 1926 and continuing through the period of intense 
faction struggle just described - a struggle whose course and outcome 
helped significantly to shape the legislative program itself.
., 27 July; Workers' Weekly, 29 July 1927»95 A.W
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Lang in Parliament, December 1Q26-1927
In late 1926 and 1927? Lang's legislation was of far less 
benefit to trade unionists and to the lower income groups than his 
legislation in 1925 and early 1926.
Owing to the faction struggle within the Labor Party, par­
liament was prorogued from 3 December 1926 until 11 January 1927«
However, when the Goodin-Gillies pact gave Lang a slender and patently 
temporary majority, he reopened parliament on 20 December amid 
Oonosition protests, resubmitted the budget and declared that a general 
election was unnecessary. One of his first measures was to fulfil in 
wart the clause of the Goodin-Gillies pact relating to further represent­
ation for country areas; on 23 December the Parliamentary Electorates
96end Elections (further Amendment) Bill was introduced, " receiving 
assent in March 1927. But the Bill provided for only one additional 
rural member where four had been promised, and Opposition members were 
quick to point out that the Goodin-Gillies pact had not in fact been 
fulfilled.
Preceding the two measures of the session which enjoy some
radical resnute (the Family Endowment Bill and the Large Estates
91
(Taxation) Bill) came the Liquor Amendment Bill. There was a good deal
N.S.W. Pari. Deb., vol.109?pp.188-193? (23 Dec.1926); pp.686-696 
(27 Jan. 1927)7 vol.110,pp.897-921 (3 Feb.1927); 935-948 ( 4 Feb. 
1927); 1042 (8 Feb.); 1049 (9 Feb.) vol.Ill,1991 (7 Mar.1927); 
assent renorted vol.Ill,p.2333? 22 Mar.1927.
Introduced. 28 Jan. 1927? N.S.W. Pari.Deb., vol.109?pp.734-742; 
765-808 (1 Feb. 1927); 826-862 (2~ Feb*. 1927)5 vol.Ill, pp.1922-192 6, 
4 Mar. 1927.
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of resentment over this Bill in the labor movement. A conference of 
Labor women on 20 February 1927? for example, condemned the Bill
Q8because it was 'against the principles of the Early Closing Act'.
09The Federated Liquor Trades’ Union and the Federated Caterers’ Employ- 
100ees’ Union opposed the Bill on the grounds that it would lengthen 
their hours of work, expressing their opposition in a deputation to 
caucus. From many quarters came the charge that brewery money had in­
spired both the Bill and the volte-face by certain Labor members on the 
matter, while there was also criticism of the fact that the Liquor 
Bill had been brought down before legislation dealing with the basic
wage, which had not increased for over a year, and before the long-awaited
102Motherhood Endowment Bill.
In March came a Large Estates (Ta.xation) Bill‘d ^  which, placed 
a tax described by Round Table as 'not heavy' upon all estates having 
an unimproved value over £10,000. Very little opposition was displayed 
to the measure 5 J.C.L. Fitzpatrick suggested a reason for this when he
98
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100 
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102
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104
IT .S .W.Parl_. T)eb.,vol. 110, t).1643? W.E.V. Robson in the Legislative 
Council on 25 Feb. 1927®
A.W., 9 Mar. 1927®
See H.V. Evatt on their behalf, in A.W., 9 Feb. 1927®
See especially Simon Hickey, H.S.W. Pari.Deb.,vol.110,p.1645/6 
25 Feb. 1927® Hickey alleged that liquor interests controlled the 
Labor Party 'about 90$'; also Workers' Weekly, 4 Feb. 1927®
The bill's precedence over more important legislation drew comment 
inside Parliament (iT.S.W. Pari.Deb. ,vol. 110, F.S. Boyce, p.1645,
25 Feb. 1927) and outside its Socialist Labor Party leaflet,
October 1927 'Tammany in Excelsis' (R.S. Ross collection): Workers^ '
Weekly, 4 Feb. 1927®
N.S.W. Pari. Deb., vol. Ill, p.2164-2168 (9 Mar. 1927).
Round Table, vol. 17? 1926-27, p.625.
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said:
I do not believe that a large number of land owners 
will have to pay very much under this bill...
and
Very few estates in New South Wales wiiybe paying 
the tax... 105
In many countries during the 1920's, child endowment was dis­
cussed a.s an alternative to the basic wage system. ^  In Australia, 
the idea of child endowment was taken up readily by non-Labor parties, 
who at the same time insisted upon a reduction in the size of the 
unit upon which the basic wage was calculated. For example, the New; 
South Wales Board of Trade in 1919 declared a new adult living wage of
£3.17.6, which represented an increase of 17/6 a week. To ease the
1 07consequent burden on employers, W.A. Holman, then Nationalist Premier 
of New South Wales, passed a Child Maintenance Act. Under the terms 
of this Act, the basis for calculation of the livignmge vwas reduced 
from a unit of four ( a man, his wife and two children) to a unit of 
two ( a men and wife); for each child, child endowment of 5/- a week 
was to be paid. Holmen estimeted that he would thereby decrease from 
£14,000,000 to £6,900,000 the burden cast on employers by the 17/6 per
N.S.W. Pari Deb., vol. Ill,pp.2166-2167.
See notes by Miss Persia Campbell in the Interim Report of the 
Select Committee of the Legislative Council on the Family 
ndormant ill. >T.S. . Perl. Parers ? 1026-27, vol. 1,p. 128-130•
This is the interpretation placed on Holman's bill by H.V. Evatt 
(Australian Labour Leader, p.478-479) in giving a sympathetic 
account of Holman's reasons for introducing the Bill.
165
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week increase. Labor parliamentarians denounced the Act, some of 
1 09them fiercely, while John Storey, caucus leader and no leftist,
'"'-reed that it was vitally necessary to provide for child endowment,
but contended that it should not be carried out by reducing the living
,110wa ge . ..
Discussing Lang’s family endowment legislation in 1Q27, J.M.
Baddeley, Minister for Labour and Industry, said:
I think if the hon. member looks at Mr. Holman's 
scheme he will find it is not a different scheme prom 
Lang's j. Ill
There were, of course, differences 5 but Baddeley, the man responsible
for seeing the legislation through parliament, knew what he was saying.
Lang’s scheme, like Holman's, was based on a reduction in the size of
the family unit on which the state basic wage was calculated.
In 1927j child endowment wa.s part of the platform of the
112Nationalist Party in New South Wales, was, indeed, approved by
108
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H.V. Evatt, or.cit., p.479» Evatt continued: ’Clearly Holman was 
bustled into making a proposal which, though logically impressive, 
was ill-timed and unjust. It looked like a deliberate attempt to 
cheat the employees of increased wages for, on Holman's own figures, 
the employers would be better off by £7 ,500>000 if his scheme went 
through. By precisely the same amount, therefore, the employees as 
a body would be worse off.' (op.cit., p.479;»
For example, F.M. Burke (N.S.W. Pari. Deb.,vol.77>p.2061): 'The
employers are to contribute to a charity fund, out of which provision 
is to be made for the maintenance of the children of poorer workers, 
but they are to be relieved of the fair burdens that would have 
been imposed upon them if the determination of the Board of Trade 
had been allowed to take full effect.' (See also Lazzarini, at ibid., 
p.2082, and references to A.L.P. criticisms of Holman's Act in the 
Socialist Labor Party election leaflet in 1927: 'Startling Disclos­
ures. Workers Defra-uded of £9>000,000. .. - R.S. Ross Coll.).
Evatt, loc. cit.
N.S.W. Pari. Deb., vol.110, p.1068, 9 Feb. 1927»
Item 19 of the platform of the Nationalist Association of N.S.W.
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Nationalist Party Prime Minister S.M. Bruce, and seems to have found
] i3afavour with country interests. The Nationalists believed that in
any worthwhile endowment scheme the size of the basic wage family unit 
had to be reduced. The Nationalists knew that this reduction would be 
unpalatable to Labor, and were not easy about Lang's scheme until an 
Act reducing the unit was actually on the statute books. Lang passed the 
endowment legislation in several Acts, and the Act which met Nationalist 
wishes by reducing the unit of the basic wage he left until last, almost 
certainly to put him in the best position to test labor's reactions.
The delay made the Nationalists most uneasy, and T. Bavin, state parlia­
mentary Leader of the Nationalist Party, argued strongly for legislation tc 
reduce the ba.sic wage unit:
The living wage based on the requirements of a man with a 
wife and two children has the drawback that it imposes 
on the industries of the country an obligation to pay 
the cost of the maintenance of 500,000 children who do 
not exist at all. The radical vice of the present 
system is, first, that it provid.es for children who 
do not exist^and secondly, that it does not provide 
for a large number of children who do exist. 114
Henry Boote's comment on the last part of this criticism echoed
the feelings of many in the labor movement:
That, of course, was all to the advantage of the workers.
It ensured a fairly high standard of living, though still 
a lower one than obtained in ... four other Stetes and
Sere eport of the Proceedings of the Conference between the 
Commonwealth and State Ministers to consider the lustralien 
Exhibition, Child "Endowment, Financial delations Between the States 
and the Commonwealth., etc. , June-July, 1 097, N.S .W. Perl.. Parers,
I927V volV 1,' U.86V
11 la See, for example, the Land, 17 Lee. 1926.
N.S.W. Pari. Leb., vol.lll, pp. 25OS-6, 24 Mar. 1927.
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the Commonwealth, all of which have fixed the basic wage 
for a man, wife and three children. 115
Lang’s Industrial Arbitration (Amendment) Act had substituted
an Industrial Commission for the State Arbitration Court, and the Labor
Government appointed Mr. Justice Piddington as President of the
Commission. Long an ardent advocate of child endowment, Mr. Justice
Piddington shared Bavin’s view on the four person unit as the basis
for the basic wage.^^ No Bill to reduce the unit was introduced until
8 March 1927» But in December 1926, when declaring a living wage for
adult males (and simultaneously calling the legislature’s attention to
the need for family endowment), Mr. Piddington made his calculations
on the basis of a two unit family. Anticipating a child endowment of
5/- per child (though Labor caucus planned a 6/- endowment), 1 Mr.
Piddington declared a basic wage of £4.4*0 which was exactly the same as
it had been in 1925» Had he used the four-unit basis, Mr. Piddington
120later stated, the 1926 wage would have been £4.15*0 a week, while
a five-unit family, as used in arriving at the Commonwealth basic wage,
* 121would have resulted in a wage of £5.6.0 a week.
A.W., 8 June 1927-
Standard of Living - Living wage. Declaration of the Living Wage for 
Adult Male Employees and Judgment of Industrial Commissioner (Mr. 
A.B. Piddington, K.C.) together with Reports of Employers’ and 
Employees* Representatives and Appendices. N .S.W . Pari.Papers,vo1.1, 
1926-1927, p. 143-171", at p. 14879t
Ibid., P.159.
N.S.W. Ind. Arb. Rep., vol.26, 1927, p.172.
A.W., 29 Dec. 1926.
A.W. , 28 Sept. 1927.
N.S.W. Ind. Arb. Rep., vol.26, 1927, p.172.
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Protests from the labor movement were immediate and widespread.
E.C. Magrath and Miss I. Cashman (Printing Industry Employees' Union)
were staunch Langites, and Lang had appointed them as employees'
representatives upon the Industrial Commission; though it was well
known that Lang and Piddington had worked together on the endowment
issue, Miss Cashman and E.C. Magrath protested against Piddington's
action in a Minority Report which accompanied the Annual Declaration
122of the Living Wage, and their protest received, publicity in the
123Labor Daily. The Labor Daily itself attacked the Piddington
124declaration, ' while the Australian Worker claimed that in union
circles attention was being drawn to the fact that Lang had made no
provision for an increased basic wage in the budget, tfotk borne
Lem# had known in advance of Piddington's decision - Lang's
omission of such a provision is indeed remarkable. Prices were rising,
the federal basic wage had risen, and his own Minister for Labour and
Industry asserted, in defending child endowment against opposition
charges that it would cripple industry:
... employers here were actually looking forward to 
the declaration of a basic wage at least equal to 
the Federal declaration of £4.11.6d. 126
122
123
124
125
126
Minority Renort ot Employees' 1 :ntptives on . 
Federation for Adult Male Employees, N.S.W. Pari. 
1926-1Q27', pp7”l65-l 67.' ’
I bor T>'ily, 17 Dec. 1926. 
Ibid., 18 Dec. 1926.
A.W., 22 Dec. 1926.
N.S.W. Pari Deb., vol.110, p,1065, 9 Feb.1927.
.. Living Wage 
Perers,vol,1,
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An increase in the wage was certainly anticipated in l~bor circles. 
Labor Monthly stated that the chairmen of the conciliation committees 
(set up under the Industrial Arbitration Amendment Act of 1925) had
for some time been refusing unions increases in anticipation of a.n
127increase in the state basic wage. ' Labor Council set up a special
committee (which included A. McPherson, already one of Lang’s most
devoted followers) to secure ’united action' to increase the basic
wage, while the Australian Worker claimed that
The substitution of child endowment for an increase in the 
basic wage will put millions into the pockets of the 
employing class. 128
Though some workers might benefit, the Australian Worker continued,
129on the whole it was a 'disastrous setback to the working class'.
While the Labor Daily took it for granted that the child endowment
130scheme was a substitute for an increased basic wage, ~ the Communist 
Workers' Weekly believed that the proposed child endowment scheme hoel 
as one of its immediate results the growth of 'antagonism between 
married and single workers', and warned that workers would probably 
have to wait some six months before they actually received child endow­
ment. (The estimate proved too low.) This time lag, the Workers'
127
128
129
130
Labor Monthly, 1 Jan. 1927»
A.W., 29 Dec. 1926.
A.W., 29 Dec. 19265 for unfavourable trade union commentary, see 
The Railroad, 10 July; 10 Aug. 1927.
Lajbor Daily, 22 Mar. 1927* Protesting against amendments in the 
Family Endowment Bill by the Legislative Council, the paper said: 
'... the Council would do veil to remember that the Endowment scheme 
as it stands is a much lighter impost than the basic wage alterna­
tive ' .
131 Workers' Weekly, 25 Feb. 1927
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Weekly continued, would mean a further saving for the employers, and a
further loss for the employees.
In December 1926, caucus had been divided over the Piddington
wage declaration. H.V. Evatt claimed that Piddington had exceeded
his legal powers in assuming that child endowment would be introduced
in the future and giving a judgment based on that assumption. He abided
couid
the government aj intervene under the Arbitration Act and in-
1 32crease the basic wage, while insid.e caucus, D. Murray also urged
Government intervention to increase the v/age. Caucus was persuaded,
however, that prompt attention to the endowment legislation would remedy
matters, and soon approved an endowment scheme; but this scheme, like
other early plans for endowment differed substantially from the plan
133which finally came into operation. According to caucus, endowment
was to be retrospective to 15 December 1926, and was to be paid at the
rate of 6/- a week for each child under fourteen where family incomes
were less than £758 a year. ' In the three items of legislation intro-
115duced i.n February 1927 to cover family endowment, ' it was stipulated 
that endowment should be financed from a tax on wages sheets of from
132 A.W., 22 Dec, 1926.
For a summary of the final forms, see Labour Report, Ho. 19 (1928), 
p, 92-35 and IT.03.". Official Year Hook, 1 °?6-l°27, r.601. See also 
Family Endowment Act, 1927. The let x ined, Government Printer, 
Sydney, Aug. 1927 (H. Holland Collection, A.N.U.).
Labor Daily, 24 Dec. 1926.
These were: the Family Endowment Bill, the Family Endowment (Tax) 
Bill and the Finance (Family Endowment Tax) Bill.
~L ^ 6six to six and a half per cent.'“ This would bring in £6,598,000, 
while direct taxation on 'those who £couldj afford to nay' would bring 
in. £700,000. 7 By 8 February 1927? the Opposition had. forced the
CTOvernment to reduce the income limit of eligibility from £790 to £.364
P • a.
But so far, the unit on which basic wage calculations were
• de had not been formally reduced. Thus, the Opposition v/as by no means
satisfied. Lang was eager to put through child endowment, as he knew
elections could not be far away, and it soon became known that he
contemplated reducing the basic we,ge unit. ITo doubt to outmanoeuvre
Lang, caucus decided, by an 'overwhelming vote' on 7 March 1927 that
Piddington be asked to declare a, basic wage based upon a four-unit
*1 3 8family.“ Lang countered by suggesting legislation for a basic wage 
of £4.11.6, dtnd, after a discussion with Piddington and Baddeley, 
he 'expressed his orinion on the ' advisableness of proceeding a.t once 
with a bill to raise the basic wage ... to £4.11.6 a week in view of the 
adverse circumstances which had overtaken the Endowment Bill in the
tive Council'. But the Ind rbitration (Livd e)
Bill, introduced by Baddeley on 8 M a r c h , m a d e  no attempt to increase
Baddeley pointed out that this was equivalent to an increase in 
the basic wage of c. 5/5d a week. (N.S.W. Pari. Deb., vol.110, 
p.1065, 9 Feb. 1927.)
Baddeley, ibid., pp.IO68-IO69? 9 Feb. 1927«
A.W., 9 Mar. 1927- 
Ibid.
Labor Daily, 8 Mar. 1927*
LT.S.W. Pari.Deb. , vol.lll, p.2075-2096, 2258-2260, 2283, (15 Mar.)
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the basic wage but instead, at the insistence of the Legislative 
Council, reduced the size of the basic wage family unit from four 
persons to two. Thus Lang and Baddeley evidently acted independently 
of caucus's wishes.
For some time Lang had made caucus restive with his tendency 
142to behave as he pleased, but his actions over child endowment marked 
a new confidence on his part. Caucus's instructions on child endowment 
and on the basic wage had been quite definite; they had. even been 
published in the Labor Daily, and caucus members evidently expected 
the instructions to be followed. In the Legislative Council, for 
example, H.J. Connington expressed surprise that the Government had 
accepted Opoosition member Ashton's amendment reducing the size of 
the basic wage unit: '... I understood, on good authority, that the
Government was not prepared to accept it.' he said.~^3 Lang had. 
obviously not consulted Willis, the Labor Leader in the Legislative 
Council, and Willis said of the Ashton amendment:
... so far as I am concerned this bill would go into
the waste-paper basket before I would accept it.,xy3A
The Ashton amendment led Labor parliamentarian M.J. Connington
to say:
One particular grievance was that, for some time cast, Lang had. 
failed to call Cabinet meetings (Encel, op.cit., p.158).
143 N.S.W. Pari Deb., vol.lll, p.2472, 24 Mar. 1927.
M3A. 1 b id j p. 2.3>3i) 'S2-]’
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per cevst
1 suggest to the House that 90 a of the workers will 
receive no benefit whatever from the Family vndowment 
Bill .,. At the risk of being tiresome I have to 
repeat that the workers of this Stete are working for 
a lower wage than the employees of any other State of 
the Commonwealth. 144
while another Labor parliamentarian, J.M. Concannon, alleged that
.., every possible opportunity was embraced by the 
Government to cut down almost to the bone the benefits 
proposed to be given to the working-classes. 145
Yet the Ashton amendment was far from being Lang's only concession to
the Opposition viewpoint.
Where originally the Labor Party had proposed that all workers 
earning less than £.750 a year should receive endowment, it was later 
agreed to accept £,364 as the maximum. Then, however, the Opposition 
•proposed that skilled workers earning above a certain amount, but less 
than £,364, should receive no endowment. Onposition Leader Bavin de­
scribed Ashton's amendment to this effect as a 'very vital amendment 
indeed', as it would 'reduce very substantially the area over which 
pthe^j system will operate'. To have a limit of £364 would have been 
wrong, Bavin believed, because in his eyes
TM.S.W. Pari Deb., vol.lll, p.2472, 24 Mar.
145 Ibid., P.2473, 24 Mar.
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The whole system of child endowment does not pretend 
to do any more than give an adequate subsistence 
allowance to all those who cannot by their own exer­
tions obtain enough to support their families. 146
Thus Bavin's^coincided with the one condemned in 191Q by Labor
parliamentarians as Holman’s: 'a charity fund*.  ^Another prominent
Opposition member, Buttenshaw, believed that this amendment of Ashton’s
would reduce the cost of endowment to industry ’by about one-half'.
The total sum industry had to provide would now be £3,500,000$ where,
as was set out earlier, the Labor Party had envisaged industry paying
a tax of from six to six and a half per cent of the total amount of
149wages paid, the percentage was now reduced, to three per cent. ' The
Opposition was particularly anxious that special arrangements should
be made for employers working under federal awards, for the federal
basic wage was higher then the stete basic wage: though unsuccessful
in attempting to exclude all workers under federal awards from the 
ISOfamily endowment, the Oppositionvas able to secure a reduction of
151ten per cent in payroll tax for their employers. After all this, in
Ibid., vol.lll, p.2507, 24 Mar. In any case, Bavin felt that '... 
most of the skilled workers of Hew South Wales would rather not 
have this endowment..,' He believed, further '... the bulk of the 
wage earners do not want assistance from the Government to maintain 
their families.' (ibid., p. 2508).
Ibid., vol.77, p.2061, 23 Oct. 1919. Cf.Round Table, vol.17,p.626: 
'an endowment in aid of necessitous cases...'
Ibid., vol.lll, P.2510, 24 Mar. 1927.
See N.S.W. Official Year Book, 1926-27,p.601. The tax was not levied 
on wages paid to domestic servants, or casual hands employed other­
wise than in the employer's trade or business.
N.S.W. Pari. Deb., vol.lll, p.2376.
Footnote 151 on next page.
150
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its final form, the Family Endowment Act paid the full endowment only 
where total family income was £221. p.a. Beyond this, endowment was 
decreased by the amount of the family income above £221. Thus a 
family with three children would receive £39 p.a. endowment if family 
income were £221, £29 p.a. endowment if family income were £231, 
and so on.
In recording this compromise with the Opposition at the 
workers' expense, we end our account of Lang's later legislation on a 
note typical of its trend. So far as its benefit to unionists is 
concerned, there is a contrast between the legislation of Lang's third 
session (in particular, the family endowment legislation) and that of 
his first and second sessions. Legislation of the earlier sessions was 
more beneficial to the unionists and lower-income groups than was that 
of the last session. The change stemmed essentially, we suggest, from 
the fact that, ever more confidently as the weeks passed in 1927,
Lang was able to set aside industrialist pressure and, impending 
elections vividly in his mind, respond to non-unionist and anti-unionist 
pressures. In concluding our study, it is of some interest to review 
the events which led to this outcome.
Lang felt the assault of the farmers and city businessmen 
after the close of the second session in 1926; at that time he met
1-1 Ibid., p.2467, 24 Mar. 1927; p.2530, 24 Mar. N.S.W. Year Book, 
1926-27 ,p. 601. The employers’ contribution (equal to 3$ of the 
total payments to employees in the form of wages, salaries, bonuses, 
commission, etc.) was reduced by 10$ in respect of wages paid to 
an employee working under a federal award.
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with increasingly stubborn opposition from within caucus, and in part­
icular from his deputy leader, Peter Loughlin. By August 1926 the 
Lang complex began to shed all semblance of coherence. The Labor Daily’s 
charges of intended right-wing defection prompted Lang to appoint A.D.
Kay to the Meat Board, and possibly precipitated Peter Loughlin's 
bid for caucus leadership. At this very time, important members of 
the Communist and Labor Party left wing were discarding their five- 
year-old policy of intermittent support for the A.W.U. faction within 
the Labor Party and moving towards the Seale-Willis bloc of moderate 
industrialists. If the new alliance took its shape from the more con­
servative partner, this was at least partly because steady erosion of 
the leftists’ distinctive view had left few points of real divergence.
Nevertheless, this alliance opened up a chasm between the 
industrialists and the right-wing factions. Lang's first response, in 
October 1926, was to dally with the right wing, just as be had done 
in December 1925» A fierce trad.e union reaction prompted Lang to 
retreat temporarily, and he attended the union-controlled special 
conference of the A.L.P. in November 1926, giving his blessing to the 
preparation of a constitution for that body which was designed to de­
crease permanently the power of the A.W.U. officials, to the profit of
urViOnthe metropolitan and mining.officials.
As a reaction to what was construed as a trade union victory, 
came the resignation from parliament of three A.L.P. members with
a consequent threat to Lang's slender parliamentary majority. To 
retrieve it, Lang now deserted his industrialist allies, as we saw,
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signing the Goodin-Gillies pact with its provision for sanctions 
against those allies. The state executive of the New South Wales 
branch of the A.L.P. split over the pact, and the trade union bloc 
(now a coalition of left and moderates), knowing that Lang contem- 
plated deserting them and offering the heads of at least Willis and. 
Seele to the right wing, turned to the rank and file for help. In 
return, the rank and file might have demanded much of the union faction 
in terms of immediate reforms - but the rank and file could have done 
this only if it had a tribune in the political faction struggle.
But because the coalition between left and moderate unionists had 
taken place on the terms of the mod.erates, the coalition bloc faced 
Lang with demands which strengthened its position in the A.L.P. machine 
vis-a-vis that of the A.W.U., but which had no direct relevance to the 
~te problems of the rank and file trede: unionist. Yet the only 
independent source of power for the coalition was the rank and file of 
t^e unions, end. by ceasing to press for ra.nk and file demands, the 
coalition not only made Labor Party internal affairs seem less and 
less relevant to the unionists; it also forfeited any chance of 
strengthening its own position vis-a-vis that of Lang and his inner- 
circle within the party machine. The trade union coalition thus 
rendered itself harmless; thereafter Lang accepted their votes but 
rarely sought their advice. With the A.W.U. out of the way through 
the November rules, with caucus disciplined by conference, with
conference rendered an empty shell through the disappearance of the
366
A.W.U. and of the left wing as an effective force, Lang was -able to 
cut free from all the traditional controlling mechanisms of the Labor 
Party. Thus, by July 1927, Lang was well on the road towards those 
heights from which he would rule the labor movement of New South 
Wales during the Great Lerression.
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Conclusion
The links of the early Communists with the mass movement were 
essentially those of the Trades Hall reds, opportunists in political 
affairs and conservative bureaucrats in industrial affairs. Strong 
influences arising from the Australian environment did much to shape the 
cadre which arose from within the mass movement. If one holds that the 
masses automatically get the sort of leadership they deserve, that a 
leadership is a sort of mirror image or reflex of the mass mood, then one 
might conclude that the manifold conservative influences of the 
Australian environment produced their inevitable outcome. These influences 
are well known: the traditions of prosperity, the lack of involvement in 
war, the special place held by unions in the alternative party of 
government, the arbitration system, the notable weakness of a native 
intellectual tradition and labor*s related poverty of theory. Accordingly 
this study could have been conceived as an exposition and analysis of 
the relation between the reds and the reformists; followed by the 
statement - or rather the suggestion, as is more commonly offered 
with problems so thorny - that the inevitable triumph of conservative 
environmental influences has been revealed.
Microscopically examined, however, the matter appears more 
complicated, with man’s will and capacity to choose playing a part that 
cannot be ignored. The story actually reveals a conflict between two 
counterposed sets of tendencies, one set making for conservatism, the 
other for militancy and radicalism. Given the collapse of the world
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revolutionary wave, then the triumph of native conservative-bureaucratic 
and opportunist tendencies was certainly likely, though this tells one 
nothing about the extent of that triumph. Among the counter-tendencies 
one must first note the high standard of living itself which, when 
joined with class struggle ideology, will help create and intensify 
industrial militancy - as it did in 1917 and 1919. This was further 
intensified by the effects of the Irish rebellion and the red October. 
Additionally, the conscription struggles were won, and here the actions 
of the leading cadre (I.W.W., Victorian Socialist Party, left-Labor) 
as well as the efforts of the mass, played a crucial part. High among 
the counter-tendencies one must also rate the spirit of industrial 
militancy. The 1917 general strike which it precipitated was lost, but 
the rank and file did not renounce interest in direct action as a result. 
The Chicago I.W.W. focussed, as would a prism, the mass mood brought 
about by this complex of influences, while at the same time playing a 
quite decisive part in fashioning this mass mood. The direct influence 
of the I.W.W. upon the Trades Hall reds was thus powerful, and its 
removal had far-reaching effect.
After helping to form, and then abandoning, the Industrial 
Socialist Labor Party, the Trades Hall reds threw themselves into 
establishing the Communist Party. Here, partly through past membership 
in and daily contact with the Labor Party, and partly through ideological 
conviction, the Trades Hall reds initiated a de facto united front line
towards the A.L.P., then governing New South Wales, long before the
369
Communist P a r t y  f o r m a l l y  a d o p te d  t h e  new l i n e ,  and even b e f o r e  t h e  Comin te rn  
f o r m a l l y  p r o c l a i m e d  t h e  u n i t e d  f r o n t  i n  m id -1921 .  Thus in  p o l i t i c a l  a s  
w e l l  a s  i n  t r a d e  un ion  a f f a i r s ,  t h e  T r a d e s  H a l l  r e d s  p r o v i d e d  t h e  i n f a n t  
Communist P a r t y  w i th  mass t i e s  t h a t  were p o s s i b l y  amongst  t h e  s t r o n g e s t  
i n  t h e  w or ld  communist  movement.
The T r a d e s  H a l l  r e d s  were n o t  w i t h o u t  i n f l u e n c e  upon t h e  A .L .P .  
even i n  t h e s e  e a r l y  m o n th s .  But i n  t h e  A .L .P .  f a c t i o n  war t h e  r e d s  
b a c k e d ,  i n  a r em a rka b ly  u n c r i t i c a l  way, t h e  m ach ine  o f  t h e  A u s t r a l i a n  
W o rk e r s1 Un ion ,  i n h e r i t o r  o f  t h e  u n i o n  m a n t l e  f rom t h e  e a r l i e r  i n d u s t r i a l i s t  
v e r s u s  p o l i t i c i a n 1 c o n f l i c t s .  By 1923, d e s p i t e  t h e  h e l p  o f  t h e  
Communists ,  t h e  B a i l e y i t e  (A.W.U.) s t a t e  e x e c u t i v e  was swept  f rom o f f i c e ,  
and i t s  p l a c e  t a k e n  by a new b l o c  formed from t h e  o l d  D o o l e y i t e s ,  who 
were now l e d  by J . T .  Lang and numbered i n  t h e i r  r a n k s  many u n io n  o f f i c i a l s .  
The Communists were r e f u s e d  t h e  r i g h t  to  a f f i l i a t e  w i th  t h e  A . L . P . ,  
and a v i g o r o u s  r e a r g u a r d  a c t i o n  d i d  n o t  suc ce e d  i n  r e v e r s i n g  t h i s  
d e c i s i o n .  Fo r  some t i m e ,  t h e  Communists c o n t i n u e d  to  be  s t r a n g e l y  
r e t i c e n t  a b o u t  c r i t i c i z i n g  t h e  A.W.U. h i e r a r c h s  and ,  up u n t i l  an n u a l  
c o n f e r e n c e  i n  1926, formed a b l o c  w i th  t h e  A.W.U. a t  t h e  annua l  A .L .P .  
c o n f e r e n c e s .
Lang became A . L . P .  c aucus  l e a d e r  t h ro u g h  t h e  s u p p o r t  o f  
m o d e r a t e  u n i o n  o f f i c i a l s  who were much i n f l u e n c e d  by l a b o r * s  g e n e r a l  
mood o f  m i l i t a n c y  and r a d i c a l i s m ,  and e s p e c i a l l y  by t h e  T r a d e s  H a l l  r e d s .
I n  h i s  e a r l y  months as  s t a t e  P r e m i e r  Lang c o n s e q u e n t l y  f u l f i l l e d  many 
c h e r i s h e d  and l o n g - s t a n d i n g  demands o f  t h e  a f f i l i a t e d  u n i o n s .  I n  r e t u r n
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however, Lang required industrial peace amongst other things, and his 
union official followers, now beginning to number leading Trades Hall 
reds in their ranks, did their best to restrain the still combative 
union rank and file.
The mechanics of leadership in the union movement intimately 
concern the relation between the levels of combativity of the rank and 
file and of the leaders. Two limit cases may be discerned. Far­
sighted leaders may formulate an adequate policy which the ranks reject; 
or, at the other extreme, the rank and file may perceive and be prepared 
to implement a policy which is effective, but for some reason distasteful 
to leaders. In the period investigated, the situation approximated 
the latter extreme.
Briefly, the available evidence suggests that the level of 
industrial militancy of the rank and file fluctuated between 1916 and 
1927; that from 1916 to 1922, there was a fairly high level of militancy, 
with a temporary fall after 1922 and a revival of some sort after 1925. 
The noteworthy point is that, throughout these years, whatever the 
changing requirements of the situation or the mood of the rank and file, 
the Trades Hall reds clung to one industrial tactic - that defined as 
»confinement*. If, before, during and after their association with the 
Communist Party the Trades Hall reds acted with notable opportunism in 
political affairs, in industrial activities they tended to be both timid 
and bureaucratic.
In the political sphere, the Trades Hall reds were confronted 
with a dilemma: to *bore from within* the mass party, but risk
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d i s i n t e g r a t i o n  as  r e d s ;  o r  to  m a i n t a i n  d o c t r i n a l  p u r i t y  o u t s i d e  t h e  mass 
p a r t y ,  b u t  r i s k  p o l i t i c a l  i s o l a t i o n .  T h i s  was i n d e e d  a g e n u in e  
di lemma.  However ,  i n  t h e  i n d u s t r i a l  s p h e r e ,  m a t t e r s  were v e r y  d i f f e r e n t .  
The T r a d e s  H a l l  r e d s  were h e i r s  t o  a l i v i n g  t r a d i t i o n  o f  ’ e x t e n s i o n 1 , 
A u s t r a l i a n  l a b o r ’ s a l t e r n a t i v e  s t r i k e  t a c t i c  t o  c o n f i n e m e n t .  From 
1909 t o  1917 many o u t s t a n d i n g  s t r i k e s  were c o n d u c te d  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  
s t r a t e g y  o f  e x t e n s i o n .  I n d e e d ,  T u r n e r  h a s  r e c e n t l y  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  what 
t h i s  s t u d y  d e f i n e s  as  ’ e x t e n s i o n ’ was t h e  t r a d i t i o n  o f  t h e  u n s k i l l e d  
and s e m i - s k i l l e d  ’m a s s ’ u n i o n s ,  and t h a t  t h e  p r e - w a r  m i l i t a n t  s o c i a l i s t s  
p r e f e r r e d  t h i s  t r a d i t i o n  b o t h  f o r  i t s  u t i l i t y  i n  a c h i e v i n g  im m edia te  
r e f o r m  and f o r  i t s  e d u c a t i o n a l  power from a r e v o l u t i o n a r y  v i e w p o i n t .
The t a c t i c  o f  c o n f i n e m e n t ,  by c o n t r a s t  w i t h  t h a t  o f  e x t e n s i o n ,  
had  t h e  q u a l i t y  o f  i n v o l v i n g  t h e  r ank  and f i l e  to  a minimum e x t e n t .
T h i s  minimum in v o lve m e n t  had  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  h o l d i n g  down to  a minimum 
t h e  i n d u s t r i a l  r e f o r m s  won by l a b o r  i n  e c o n o m i c a l ly  f a v o u r a b l e  p e r i o d s ,  
and a l s o  h e l p e d  l i m i t  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  o f  t h e  p o s t - w a r  wave 
o f  i n d u s t r i a l  m i l i t a n c y .  A d d i t i o n a l l y ,  i t  p l a y e d  a p a r t  i n  u n d e r m i n in g  
t h e  p o l i t i c a l  s t r e n g t h  o f  t h e  T r a d e s  H a l l  r e d s .
To many u n i o n i s t s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  o f f i c i a l s ,  Lang’ s i n d u s t r i a l  
r e f o r m s  a p p e a r e d  t o  d e m o n s t r a t e  t h e  f u t i l i t y  o f  d i r e c t  a c t i o n .  To 
many Communists ,  a f t e r  y e a r s  o f  work i n  t h e  A . L . P . ,  o r  work o r i e n t e d  
to w a rd s  t h e  A . L . P . ,  such r e f o r m s  a p p e a r e d  t o  d e m o n s t r a t e  t h e  f u t i l i t y  
o f  b e i n g  r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s ,  o r  a t  b e s t ,  a p p e a r e d  to  d e m o n s t r a t e  t h a t  
t h e r e  was someth ing  s e r i o u s l y  wrong w i t h  t h e  manner  i n  which th e y  were
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pursuing their revolutionary course.
Yet Lang's program of radical legislative reform, so soon to 
set in motion events leading to a crisis for Lang's administration, 
would never have been undertaken had it not been for the Communists.
Since 1921 and 1922, the Trades Hall reds had played the role of tribune 
within the A.L.P. for the militancy and radicalism of the rank and file 
industrialists. Thus they had limited the extent to which the moderate 
union officials (in particular Willis, Baddeley and Seale) could allow 
Lang to go back upon his earlier promises of concessions to the 
industrialists. The irony of it was that, even as Lang carried through 
his legislation, industrial militancy, already seriously eroded, was being 
further weakened by the combined efforts of Lang and his industrial 
followers, efforts in which the Trades Hall reds played a vital part.
But rank and file industrial militancy was not to lose its direct 
political effectiveness until late in 1926, when the old A.L.P.-oriented 
Communist bloc disintegrated as such, moving over to and becoming 
indistinguishable from the moderate union officials.
In losing intimate contact with the Communist Party the Trades 
Hall reds lost much of their clear-cut left-wing outlook and factional 
position within the A.L.P., moving towards (but never reaching) the 
right at the very time that a world-wide ebb of earlier revolutionary 
elan was becoming sharply manifest.
It would be going too far to say that the left's disintegration 
'explains1 Lang's rise to power. Clearly, Lang had attributes and
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ach ievem en ts  which must f i g u r e  in  any such e x p l a n a t i o n .  Though f u l l  
e x p l a n a t i o n  o f  Lang*s r i s e  i s  no t  t h e  concern o f  t h i s  s tu d y ,  one must 
n o te  t h i s  suburban r e a l  e s t a t e  agen t* s  p o l i t i c a l  a s t u t e n e s s ,  above a l l  
in  h i s  cho ice  o f  th e  then  tough-minded union m ode ra te s .  One a l so  
r e c a l l s  h i s  co ld  r u t h l e s s n e s s ,  and the  p a t i e n c e  which makes the  y e a r s  
o f  caucus membership from 1913 to  1923 seem l i k e  a c a r e f u l l y - p l a n n e d  
a p p r e n t i c e s h i p .  A d d i t i o n a l l y ,  Lang was a l i b e r a l  C a t h o l i c  wi th l i n k s  
w ith  t h e  1890 v i n t a g e  l a b o r  and s o c i a l i s t  s t a l w a r t s  - a complex 
p e c u l i a r l y  c ongen ia l  to  A u s t r a l i a n  l a b o r  -  though t h i s  d id  no t  s top  him 
from b e i n g ,  on the  whole,  p o l i t i c a l l y  moderate and o p p o r t u n i s t .
A l l  t h e s e  t h i n g s ,  along  wi th  h i s  r a p id  enactment o f  r a d i c a l  l e g i s l a t i o n ,  
h e lp  e x p l a i n  Lang*s im por tance .  But th e  r o l e  o f  t h e  reds  was c r u c i a l ,  in  
making t h e  modera te  u n i o n i s t s  appea r  worthy o f  Lang*s cho ice  in  the  
f a c t i o n a l  s t r u g g l e .  And i f  one t r i e s  to  e x p l a in  no t  mere ly  why Lang 
became p o w e r fu l ,  bu t  why h i s  power took th e  extreme form o f  red u c in g  
t h e  A .L .P .  machine to  v i r t u a l  impotence ,  t h e  p a r t  o f  th e  Trades  H a l l  
r ed s  i n  th e  A.L .P .  f a c t i o n  war assumes an even s h a r p e r  s i g n i f i c a n c e .
When th e  r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s  e n t e r e d  (o r  r e - e n t e r e d )  t h e  mass 
r e f o r m i s t  p a r t y ,  they  began to be p o l i t i c a l l y  e f f e c t i v e .  They a l s o  
c o n t r i b u t e d  c r i t i c a l l y  to  making th e  r e f o r m i s t s  more e f f e c t i v e  as 
r e f o r m i s t s .  At t h e  same t ime th e  r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s  exposed them se lves  to 
t h e  i n f l u e n c e  o f  th e  r e f o r m i s t  m i l i e u ,  hav ing  s t a r t e d  o u t  in  any ca se  
as ex t rem ely  s e n s i t i v e  to th o s e  i n f l u e n c e s .  I s  i t  then  s u f f i c i e n t  to
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say, as was asked above, that the triumph of the environmental influences 
was inevitable? This would seem far from adequate. It is true that 
the crumbling of the faction structure within the mass party, which 
culminated in Lang's ascendancy, faced the Trades Hall reds with a 
peculiarly corrosive milieu. But it must be remembered that the reds* 
own acts of commission and omission contributed vitally to building 
up that milieu. Similarly, the Trades Hall reds* choice of industrial 
tactics played a most important part in shaping labor's industrial 
morale.
Such questions as these - questions of the responsibility of 
historical figures, of what alternative choices and policies were 
possible - seem to arise with peculiar force when one considers the 
major developments of the period. For this study opened in a time of 
turbulence, with strike waves, high hopes for social reconstruction, 
a powerful left wing well placed within the mass labor party, and a 
widespread conviction that the 'industrial wing' of the A.L.P. was 
that body's very foundation and should control its 'political wing1.
Yet, by 1932, labor had not only agree that 'Lang is Right*, that 
'Lang is Greater than Lenin', but had lost confidence in its own 
institutions to the point where cabinet met rarely and caucus never, 
where the unions were industrially quiescent and their influence on 
the A.L.P. minimal. The Chief Secretary of New South Wales,
Mark Gosling, could say of cabinet:
.
Big Fella
John Thomas Lang.
(From the jacket of
The Great Bust, by J.T. Lang, Sydney 1961.)
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... they had one leader who announced the policy.
!When he announces it we follow, and as soon as he 
announces it we follow, and as soon as he announces 
it we know where we stand. We do not seek to know 
what he is going to do and are prepared to surrender 
our judgment, if necessary, in advance.1 
(S.M.H., 29 April 1932.)
There is especial interest, then, in the roles of the major 
actors, in the process by which a strong and confident labor movement 
fell into the humiliation which these words indicate.
THE END
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NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS
Labor Call, Melbourne, 1919-20.
Labor Daily, Sydney, 1924-27.
Labor Monthly, Sydney, 1926-27.
Labor News, Sydney, 1918-24« Official Organ of the Australian Labor
Party . S .W.
Land, Sydney, passim. The Official Newspaper of the Farmers and
Settlers Association of New South Wales ...
0.33.U. Sydney, 1919-20. Official Organ of the Workers’ Industrial Union
of Australia.
One Rig Union Herald. Melbourne, 1918-1920. Official Organ of the
Workers' International Industrial Union of 
Australia.
Proletarian Review, Melbourne 1920- March 1922; Sydney May 1922-23.
Published first in June 1920, it became the 
Proletarian on 7 October 1920.
Round Table, 1919-27» A Quarterly Review of the Politics of the
British Empire. London.
Social Democrat, Sydney, 1917-1918. Official Organ of the Social Democ­
ratic League of N.S.W. This was incorporated 
with the Socialist in June 1918.
Socialist, Melbourne 1919-23. Organ of the Victorian Socialist Party.
Solidarity, Sydney, 1917-1919» Official Organ of the I.L.P. [ Industrial
Labour Party.
Suh, Sydney, passim, 1919-27»
Sydney Morning Herald, Sydney, 1914? 1918-27.
Truth, Sydney, 1919»
Vanguard, Sydney, 1921. (R.S. Ross coll.)
Workers * Weekly, Sydney, 1923-27. See Communist.
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A.L.P. Complete Reoort of the Federal A.L.P. Committee 
of Inouiry Into tie 11e • -'sked Ballot Boxes.
Tog-ether With The Findings Of The Committee. 
Sydney, 1924.
Anderson, Uorma.n C. , One Big Union for Australia. Melbourne, n.d. 
but c.1910.
A.W.U. Convention, Ballot Box Enauiry. Debate & Decision. Sydney,
1925.....
Baddeley, J.M. A Brief Review of the Industrial Arbitration 
(Amendment) lot, 1.926. Sydney, 1926. (Ferguson 
coll.)
Bolshevism.
Blackburn, Maurice, What the Russian Workers are Doing, by Maurice 
Blackburn,Vice-President A.L.P. (Victorian Division) 
Melbourne, 1918, Ferguson coll.
Boote, H.E., O.B.U. Why It Failed! Sydney, 1924.
Unknown A Brief history of the negotiations Between the 
Melbourne Industrial Disputes Committee and the 
Federal Council, on tie one side, 
the Federal Government on the Other. Labor Call 
Print, Melbourne, 1919 (r .S. Ross Coll.).
Bucharin, N., The Co ' t Programme of World Revolution.
Proletarian Publishing • s^oci- tion, Melbourne , 
1920 (Ferguson Coll.).
Cleary, P.S., The One Big Union. Will It Emancipate the 
- R'-dv'o v , 1910.
Hade, Matt, The C^ep for the Forty Four hours Working Week. 
Issued By the Disputes Committee, Labor Council, 
N.S.W. Sydney, 1926.
Hickey, P.H., Solidarity or Sectionalism, A Plea for Unity. 
Queensland, 1918.
I.W.W. Direct Action. Printed by the Sydney Branch of 
the I.W.W., Box 11, Surry Hills P.0, n.d.
This was a 1Chicagoite’ publication.
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Labor Government.
Loughlin, P.F.
National Association 
of N.S.W. (publisher)
Lenin, N.
New Communist Manifesto
Radek, Karl,
Eoss , R .S.,
Simonoff, Peter,
Family Endowment let , ''.a?7. The Act Explained» 
Issued under the Authority o4' The Hon. J(
T. LANG, M.L.A., Premier of New South Wales. 
Sydney, August 1927* (Holland coll.)
Summary of the Principal Legislative and
Administrative ''etc of tte FS.W. Labour Goyern- 
ley, March 1921.
Ten Reasons Why Labor should continue to 
elude the Communist Party and Members of 
thj t Party from the ,L. . rramatta,n,d.
[192374! ’
Victimisation of the 1917 Loyalists. The 
History of One of the Most Discreditable 
•nisodes in the Administration of the Lang 
Government. Sydney, 1926. (Ferguson coll. )
The State and Revolution. Australian Socialist 
Party, Marxian Printing Works, Sydney. First 
Australian edition, April, 1920. (Ferguson 
Coll. )
'Left' Communism. The Infantile Sickness of 
'Leftism' in Communism. Marxian Printing Press, 
Sydney. First Australian edition, May, 1921. 
(Ferguson Coll. )
of the 'Third Internationale' (Bolshevist and 
Left-Wing Socialists). Victorian Socialist 
Party, Fraser and Jenkinson, Melbourne, 
December, 1919* (Ferguson Coll.)
The Russian Revolution. Socialism in Science 
and Action. Andrade's, Melbourne, 1919. 
(Ferguson Co'l-)
Revolution in Russia and Australia. Melbourne, 
192b. (Ferguson Coll.)
What Next? Building the Industrial State 
(Australian Labor's Next Step) Melbourne,
1921. (Ferguson Coll.7*
What is Russia? Sydney, Worker Print, 1919» 
"(Ferguson Coll.)
The I.W.W. Its History, Structure and Methods. 
Ohio, n.d.
St John, Vincent,
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Trautmann, William E., Industrial Union Methods. 
Chicago, n.d. but c.1908.
Trotsky, Leo[n] A Paradise in This World. International 
Publishing Association, Melbourne, 1920.
Workers* International 
Industrial Union, Literature 
and Education Bureau, Job Control, South Melbourne, 1919
Revolutionary Industrial Unionism. Tactics 
and Plan of the Workers International 
Industrial Union. Melbourne, September 
1918.
Zinoviev, G., To the I.W.W. A Special Message from 
the Communist International (Moscow). 
Foreword by Tom Glynn. Melbourne,1920
GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
Commonwealth Arbitration Reports, vols.12-30.
Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, Labour Reports, no.7 (1916)
- 19 (1928).
Commonwealth Law Reports, vol.37, 1925-26.
Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 1919-1927.
Commonwealth Parliamentary Papers, 1920-1925.
Commonwealth Official Year Book, no.7 (1914); no.13 (1920) - no.22 (1929).
Correspondence between the Minister for Labour and the President of the 
Board of Trade Respecting the Reduction in the Basic Wage. N.S.W. Pari. 
Papers, vol.2, 1921, p.765-766.
New South Wales Department of Labour and Industry, Report ... on the 
Operations of the Department of Labour and Industry during the Year 1918, 
N.S.W. Pari. Papers, vol.l, 1919, and Report on the Operations of the 
Department of Labour and Industry during the Year 1920, - N.S.W. Pari. 
Papers, vol.2, 1921.
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South Wales Industrial Commission. Standard of Living. Living age. 
Declaration of the Living Wage for Adult Male Employees and Judgment of 
I) ' trial Com issioner (V-r. A.B. Piddington, K.C.) Together wij 
Reports of - oyers anc )loyees1 Representatives and Appendices. 
N.S.W. Pari. ers, vol. 1, 1926127. p.143-171.
New South Wales, 
New South Woles,
New South Wales,
Industrial Arbitration Reports, vol.lö (l919)-vol.26
(1927)
Industrial Gazette, 1919-28. (Dent, of Labour and Indus­
try) .
Official Year Book, 1919-1929.
New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, 1919-1927. 
New South Wales, Parliamentary Papers, 1918-1928. 
Npw Youth W^les, Statistical he 'inter, passim.
New South Wales, Votes and Proceedings of the Legislative Assembly, 1918-
1923.
Report of Proceedings of the Conference between the Commonwealth and 
State Ministers to consider the Australian Exhibition, 0>m Id vndowrpnt, 
Financial Relations Between the States and the Commonwealth, International 
labour Conference, Soldier Land Settlement, June-July 1927.N.S.W. Pari. 
Papers, vol. 1, 1927. p*57-114»
Report of Royal Commission of Inquiry (Mr. Justice Pring) into the 
Administration of the State Wheat Office. N.S.W. Pari. Papers,vol. 1,1920.
Rerort of the Royal Commission of Inquiry {His_Honor G.S. Beeby) into the 
■Prorosed Reduction of the Standard Working week from 48 to 44 Hours.
N.S.W. Pari._ Papers, vol. 2, 1920.
Rerort of the Royal Commission on the Basic Wage, Also a Memorandum bjy 
Mr. Commissioner Piddington...Mr. Commissioner Keep And Mr. Commissioner 
Gilfillain...Melbourne, 1920.
Rerort From the Select Committee on the Trade Unions Re-Registration 
Bill. Together with the Proceedings of the Committee and Minutes of 
Evidence. N.S.W. Pari. Papers, vol. 2, 1920.
Report of the Technical Commission of Inquiry Appointed... to Investigate 
the Prevalence of Miners* Phthisis and Pneumoconiosis in the 
Metalliferous Mines at Broken Hill. N.S.W. Pari. Papers, vol. 2, 1921.
Report of the Acting Registrar of Friendly Societies and Trade Unions 
for the Twelve Months ended 30 June 1925. N.S.W. Pari. Papers, vol.2, 
p.773, 1926.
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OFFICIAL LABOR MOVEMENT REPORTS, CONSTITUTIONS, DOCUMENTS.
All-Australian Trades Union Conference, June 20th-25th, 1921. Official
Report. Melbourne, 1921.
Australasian Workers’
Union Constitution and General Rules 1922-23.
Sydney, 1922. (Holland coll.-)
Australian Labor Party, Official Report of Proceedings of the Ninth
Commonwealth Conference. Brisbane, October 1921.
Australian Labor Party, Hew South Wales branch.
Australian Labor Party, N.S.W.P.L.L. Con­
ference, Peace Proposals. (Molesworth, set 243» 
item 1, 1918).
Australian Labor Party, Official Manifesto by 
the New South Wales Central Executive, 23 
June, 1919« (Molesworth).
Letter from the Executive of the New South 
Wales Branch of the Australian Labor Party,
14 August 1919» to Secretaries of A.L.P.
Branches and Affiliated Unions throughout New 
South Wales. (Molesworth).
Circular from the A.L.P. Propaganda Committee,
24 August 1919* Signed by J.H. Catts.(Molesworth
Australian Labor Party, State of New South 
Wales, Report of the Executive for the Year 
1921. Sydney, 1921
Report of the Executive for the Year 1922. 
Sydney, 1922.
Report of the Executive for the Year 1923. 
Sydney, 1923.
Report of the Executive for the Years 1924 and
1925. Sydney, 1925.
A.L.P., N.S.W. Branch,
Report of the Conference Investigation Committee 
I7th June, 1922. Sydney, 1922.
Australian Labor Party. Report on Dispute 
Between N.S.W. Executive and Parliamentary 
Labor Party. Sydney,n.d., but after 9 March 
1923. (Molesworth, set 71» item 7).
Executive Manifesto. Reasons Why Red Rules 
Should Not Be Adopted, by W. Carey, General 
Secretary, For and on behalf of the Executive 
(N.S.W. branch A.L.P.) 7 March 1927*
(Ferguson coll.)
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Industrial Section of the Political Labor League of New South Wales -
Rules and Constitution, 1916.
1. First Annual Report and Balance Sheet, 1917•
2. Annual Report and Balance Sheet of the Industrial Vigilance
Council, 1918»
3. Industrial Vigilance Council, Rules and Constitution.,,
Revised and Adopted 24 Jan. 1919 (Molesworth Coll. Handwritten 
inside the constitution are the words: 'never issued'.)
4. The Industrial Section. Statement of the Position. Processed, 
and handed out on 9 June, 1919? at "the Annual Conference of 
the New South Wales branch of the A.L.P. (Molesworth Coll.)
5. Third and Last Annual Report and Balance Sheet of the 
Industrial Vigilance Council ... with Official Report of 
Disbandment. 1919 (Molesworth Coll.)
Communist International (Comintern).
Theses and Statutes of the Third Communist International, 
Adopted by the Second Congress. July 17 - Aug. 7? 1920.
Moscow, 1920. (Butlin coll.)
Third Congress of the Communist International, Report of 
Meetings held at Moscow, June 22nd - July 12th, 1921. Re­
printed from Moscow, the special organ of the Congress. 
Published by the Communist Party of Great Britain, n.d.
Decisions of the Third Congress of the Communist International. 
Held at Moscow, July, 1921. Communist Party of Great Britain,
n.d.
Theses on Tactics Adopted by the Third Congress of the 
Communist International. Moscow 1921. Published by the 
Communist Party of Australia. Sydney, 1921. (Ferguson).
Fourth Congress of the Communist International. Abridged 
Report of Meetings held at Petrograd and Moscow, Nov. 7- 
December 3, 1922. Published for the Communist International 
by the Communist Party of Great Britain, n.d.
From the Fourth to the Fifth WorId Congress. Report_ of 
Executive Committee of the Communist International. Published 
for the Communist International by the Communist Party of 
Great Britain, 1924»
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Fifth Congress of the Communist International. Abridged 
Report of Meetings held at Moscow, June 17th to July 8th,
1924. Published for the Communist International by the 
Communist Party of Great Britain, n.d.
Resolutions and Theses of the Fifth World Congress of the 
Communist International, in the Communist International. 
Monthly Organ of the Executive Committee of the Communist 
International, English edition no. 7* December 1924 - 
Jan. 1925, p.3-132.
Communist Party, Australia.
Communist Party of Australia. Original Minute Book. October 30, 1920 
to March 22, 1921. Hancock collection, MSS 772, 8-12.
Mitchell L.
Communist Party of Australia. Miscell. documents and correspondence, 1920- 
22. Hancock collection, Mgg. 772, 8-12. Mitchell L.
Industrial Socialist Labor Pa,rty. Objective, Constitution and Rules
"dnoted by the Conference of the Industrial Socialist Labor 
Party, Aug. 1919* (R.S. Ross collection, ANL).
International Workers of the World.
Two minute books of the so-called DeLeonite I.W.W. may be 
found at uncatalogued jMSS_262, Mitchell L. The name of the 
first changes form from one -na me to another, sometimes 
'National Executive of I.W.’ . Clubs'. And sometimes 'National 
Executive Committee of Australasia, 1913-1921’.
The second book contains minutes of genera.l meetings of 
the 'Sydney Socialist I.W.W. Club' [sic] 1916-1918.
These are extremely poorly kept minutes, and reveal a tiny, 
faction-ridden and doctrinaire group.
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(Note: The comment ’(union)1 below indicates that the 
T"RADE UNION ’RECORDS records are available at the present Sydney offices of
the union concerned.)
Amalgamated Society of Carpenters end Joiners, New South Wales branch.
Minutes of the State Committee of Management, May 1920- 
Dec. 1923* (union)
Carpenters' Monthly Journal, 1920-1923. (union)
Amalgamated Societ^ of Engineers (which became the Amalgamated Engineer-
U ' n in !• t of the C
Council, 1919-1922. (union).
Australasian Institute of Marine Engineers,
Minutes of Monthly general meetings of the Sydney District, 
and Monthly District Committee Meetings, 1919-1921. (A.N.U.)
Australian Railways’ Union, New South Wales branch,
v.* * Minutes of executive meetings (incomnlete) 1918-1919.
Before 1921 this union was called the Amalgamated Rail 
and Tramway Services Association).CIX.N'U.)
Railways' Union Gazette, 1921-1922, 1924-27. On 10 Jan.
1927 this became The Railroad. (Mitchell).
Baking Trades Employees' Federation of Australasia, Sydney branch,
Minutes of executive and general meeting, 1920-21. (A.N.U.)
Federated T'lectrical Trades' Union of Australia, Sydney branch, Minutes 
of executive and general meetings, 1918-1920. (union). 
Electrical Trades Journal, 1918-20. Monthly organ of the 
Electrical Trades Union, (union).
Federated Ironworkers' ß ssocia.tion, Minutes of some meetings of the 
federal council, 1918-22, and some annual conferences, 
1919-25. (union).
Federated Marine Stewards and Pantrymen's Association of Australasia, 
Minutes of general meetings, April 1918- March 1922.
(a .N.U.). Marine Stewards' Journal, 1919-22. Official 
organ of the union. (Mitchell).
Federated. Society of Boilermakers and Iron Ship Builders of Australia, 
Sydney branch, Minutes of executive and general meetings, 
1919-23. (union).
Half Yearly Report, presented at quarterly meeting, 21 
September 1920. (amor>)
Furniture Trades' Society of New South Wales, Minutes of Board of 
Management, 1919-1923. (A.N.U.).
Hotel, Club, Restaurant and Caterers' Employees' Union, New South Wales 
branch, Minutes of executive meetings, 1918-22; Minutes 
of general meetings, 1919-20 (A.N.U.)
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Interstate Trades Union Conference, 21-26 July 1919, Transcript of
Proceedings, at the state branch office of the Marine Cooks’, 
Bakers’ and Butchers’ Association of Australasia, Sydney.
Marine Cooks', Bakers' and Butchers’ Association of Australasia,
Fifth Annual Report and Balance Sheet, for Year ending 31
Dec. 1917.
Sevenjth Annual Report and Balance Sheet, for Year ending 31 
Dec. 1919. (state branch office, Sydney.)
Melbourne Trades Hall Council, Minutes of general meetings, March 1920 
(A.N.U.)
Miners. The miners' union was called the 'Workers' Industrial Union 
of Australia (Mining Department)
Minutes, Central Council, 1918-22. (Dr. R.A. Gollan kindly 
lent his notes on these minutes).
Rules and Constitution of the Workers' Industrial Union of 
Australia (Mining Department) Sydney, 1921.
Common Cause, Official organ, (see under Newspapers and 
Periodicals)
New South Wales Labor Council. Minutes of executive and general meetings,
1918-26. Annual Reports and Balance Sheets, 1914-27• (Mitchell\
Printing Industry Emnloyees' Union, New South Wales branch,
Minutes of Board of Management and of Snecia.l general meet­
ings, 1918-23.
1 ‘ - ni-'r wennrts of the Board of Management* the Seventy-
Sixth Half-Yearly Report (6 July 1918^, to the Eighty-Fifth 
Half-Yearly Renort (5 Jan. 1923).
Printing Trades Journal, 1918-22. Official organ of the union. 
(All these records at the A.N.U.)
Sheet Metal Working Industrial Union of Australia, New South Wales branch, 
Minutes of Executive Committee Meetings, la19 (A.N,U.)(Name 
changed in 1919 from N.S.W. Amalgamated Tinsmiths and Sheet 
Metal Workers Society),
Shin Painters' and Dockers' Union, New South Wales branch, Minutes of 
General Meetings, 1918-1923. (Union)
Stove and Piano Frame Moulders' and Stove Makers' Emnloyees' Union,
New South Wales branch, Minutes of General Meetings, 1919-1923.
(A.N.U.}
Transnort Workers' Federation. Miscellaneous Records, 1917-1921, at 
Federal Office of the Marine Cooks' Union.
United Operative Bricklayers' Society of New South Wales, no.7 branch, 
Burwood, Minutes of General Meetings, 1920-1923. (Union) 
Waterside Workers' Federation, Sydney branch (Sydney Wharf Labourers' 
Union'', Minutes of General Meetings, 1918-1923. (Union')
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Minute 'Rook, 1908-20, passim. f\ Ni. L , )
Workers * Industrial Union of tr; Lia -
1. Rules, Sydney, 1918.
2. Preamble, Classification and Rules adopted at the A.11-
trs Li? Tri les Union Conference, Melbourne, January 1°1°,
3. The Workers' Industrial Uni.on of Australia, One Big Union, 
Organising and Propaganda Committee, Renort of Congress,
28 nnd 29 March, 191Q. (Letter and Report,processed,
I' olesworth, set 243? item 1.)
orkers' International Industrial Union.Constitution, n.d. hut 1917 or 
1918» ey.
See "I.W.W.", for Minutes.
UMPUBI ISHRI) MITT RIAL ARD THESES
'The One Big Union 1918-1923. The Last Days of 
Revolutionary Syndicalism in Australia’. Honours 
Thesis, Deuartment of Government, University of 
Sydney, i960.
'The Influence of the Russian Revolution On the 
Victorian Labor Movement 1917-1922.' Honours 
Thesis, History Department, School of General 
Studies, A.IT.U., Canberra, 1962.
'Chronological Motes on the History of the 
Australian Communist Party.' Barnes coll.n.d. 
but c.1942. (A.M.U.).
'The Strike of Waterside Workers in Australian 
Ports, 1928, and the Lockout of Coal Miners 
on the northern Coalfield of Mew South Wales, 
1929-30.' (M.A. Thesis, University of Melbourne, 
1997• Submitted under the name of Miriam Rechter.)
'The Labour Movement in Mew Countries: Australia, 
Mew Zealand, the United States.' Typescript at 
A.M.U., written c. 1928; authorship acknowledged 
in a letter from Professor Goodrich on 21 June, 195
'The Political Strategies of the Australian Country 
Parties from their Origins until 1929.' (Ph.D. 
Thesis, A.M.U., Canberra, 1958).
Bedford, Ian,
Campbell, Keith,
Dixson, Miriam,
Goodrich, Carter
Graham, Bruce,
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UNPUBLISHED MATERIAL AND THESES
H e a l y , J . , ' H i s t o r y  o f  t h e  W a t e r s i d e  W o rk e r s ’ F e d e r a t i o n . ’ 
Sydney,  1956.  (Roneoed)
(Unknown) ' H i s t o r y  o f  t h e  A . C . P . '  ( A u s t r a l i a n  Communist 
P a r t y )  T y p e s c r i p t ,  B a rne s  C o l l .  ( A .N .U . ) .
M o le s w o r th ,  V o l t a i r e ,
( 1 ) . • H i s t o r y  o f  t h e  I n d u s t r i a l  S e c t i o n  o f  t h e  P o l i t i c a l  
Labor  League which i n  1918 was Renamed t h e  
I n d u s t r i a l  V i g i l a n c e  C ounc i l  o f  t h e  A .L .P .  i n  
New South Wales .*  T y p e s c r i p t  i n  M ole swor th  C o l l .
( 2 ) . 'T h e  Labor  P a r t y  C r i s i s  o f  1919.  The e v e n t s  l e a d i n g  
up to  t h e  June  1919 c o n f e r e n c e  o f  l e a g u e s  and u n i o n s  
a f f i l i a t e d  w i t h  t h e  A u s t r a l i a n  Labour  P a r t y ,  
o u t l i n i n g  t h e  f i g h t  be tw een  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  
e lem en t  and t h e  O . B . U . - S o v i e t  s e c t i o n . '  T y p e s c r i p t ,  
Molesworth  C o l l .
( 3 ) . 'How t h e  I n d u s t r i a l  V i g i l a n c e  C o u n c i l  was D i s b a n d ed .*  
T y p e s c r i p t ,  Mole swor th  C o l l .
N o rm ing ton -R a w l ing ,  J . , 'T he  Communist P a r t y  o f  A u s t r a l i a ,  t o  1 9 3 0 . '
P a p e r  r e a d  t o  a Seminar  a t  t h e  A u s t r a l i a n  N a t i o n a l  
U n i v e r s i t y ,  C a n b e r r a ,  4 May, 1962.
O ' F a r r e l l , P . J . , •H.E.  H o l l a n d  and t h e  Labor  Movement i n  A u s t r a l i a  
and New Z e a l a n d . '  (Ph .D.  T h e s i s ,  A .N .U . ,  
C a n b e r r a ,  1960) .
Rawson, D.W. , 'T he  O r g a n i s a t i o n  o f  t h e  A u s t r a l i a n  Labor  P a r t y  
1 9 1 6 - 1 9 4 1 , '  (Ph .D .  T h e s i s ,  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  
M e lb o u rn e ,  1954) .
R e c h t e r ,  M ir iam , See D ixson ,  M ir iam .
T u r n e r ,  I . A . , ' I n d u s t r i a l  Labor  and P o l i t i c s .  The Dynamics o f  
t h e  Labor  Movement i n  E a s t e r n  A u s t r a l i a :  1 9 0 0 - 1 9 2 1 . '  
(Ph .D .  T h e s i s ,  A . N . U . , C a n b e r r a ,  1 9 6 2 ) .
Young, I r w i n , ' C o n f l i c t  W i th in  t h e  New South Wales Labor  P a r t y  
1 9 1 9 - 1 9 3 2 . '  (M.A. T h e s i s ,  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  Sydney ,  
1 9 6 0 . )
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Les Bernes  C o l l e c t i o n ,  A.N.U. A r c h i v e s .
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F .  E.  H o l l a n d  C o l l e c t i o n ,  p a m p h le t s  1 019 -28 ,  A.N.U. A r c h i v e s .
J .  Kavanagh P a p e r s , A.N.U. A r c h i v e s .
V o l t a i r e  M oleswor th  C o l l e c t i o n ,  M i t c h e l l .
P . J .  R i l e y  C o l l e c t i o n ,  A.N.L.
R .S .  Ross C o l l e c t i o n ,  p a r t  o f  t h e  F e rguson  C o l l e c t i o n ,  A.N.L.  
INTERVIEWS.
B a r a c c b i ,  Guido,  August  1 9 6 1 , J u l y  1062,  A p r i l  1963»
Brodney ,  A . T . , i n t e r v i e w e d  by  J .  N orm ing ton -R aw l ing  and t h e  t a p e ­
r e c o r d i n g  made a v a i l a b l e  by the  i n t e r v i e w e r .
D en fo rd ,  H . L . ,  August  1 9 6 4 .
Pox ,  A . ,  December 1961.
Garden ,  J . S . ,  August  1 0 6 l .
G rav es ,  J . J .  December 1 9 6 1 .
H i g g i n s ,  E . M . , S ep tember  i 9 6 0 .
Kavanagh,  J . ,  May I9 6 0 .
K i l b u r n ,  J . ,  August  196 1 .
J e f f e r y ,  Norman,  May 1963.
Lang,  J . T .  December 1961.
Malcolm, P . , August  1961 .  Ross^ H e c t o r ,  O c to b e r  1964.
M a t t h i a s ,  Mrs.  B . , March 1 9 6 3 . Wyner, I . ,  O c to b e r  1262.
